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Abstract 
Filling the historiographical gap created by an overemphasis upon its rival 
Liberal and Labour parties, this study analyses the part played by the war in 
shaping Unionist (later Conservative) fortunes between 1914-18. The first two 
chapters consider the internal party dynamic between leaders, MPs and 
grassroots supporters, and scrutinise the effect of war upon the central tenets of 
the Unionist Party (most especially Ireland). The third and fourth chapters 
concentrate. respectively upon the party's reaction to the threat of socialism and 
Bolshevism, and the response to the onset of a mass electorate and of class 
politics in 1918. The fifth chapter investigates the party's approach to state 
intervention during the war and its immediate aftermath. 
The thesis shows that a primary Unionist response to the rise of the Labour Party 
was the construction of an appeal based on the wartime link between patriotism 
and anti-socialism. Bolstered by state propaganda and the press, this served to 
clarify the party's approach through into the 1920s and to counter the Labour 
Party at a crucial juncture in its evolution. It shows how patriotism preserved the 
unity of Unionism and shaped its ideological development. Patriotism also 
dictated the primacy accorded to economic, social and national efficiency, and 
thus shaped responses generated towards post-war reconstruction, most notably 
in the emphasis upon competition along international rather than internal lines. 
Moreover, because the `total' war was viewed as placing exceptional but 
temporary demands upon the economy and society, the party was able to adapt 
itself to war and post-war challenges in a flexible manner distinct from that of its 
counterparts. This however determined that the coalition with Lloyd George and 
notions of reconstruction were also viewed principally as short-term necessities 
to ensure military victory and social stability in the immediate years of recovery. 
Taken together, these conclusions illustrate the Conservative Party's organic 
ideological development into a group committed to the protection of property, 
2 
and its willingness to utilise the means of the state and propaganda to make its 
anti-socialist message a viable goal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
`You would like [it], I daresay, if I could give you a clear and 
definite policy. Well, I cannot. We are looking into a fog. It is 
absolutely futile to make plans for conditions which you cannot 
foresee. ' 
- Bonar Law at the NUA Conference, 30 November 1917. 
Any history of twentieth century Britain interested in society, culture or politics 
will deal in depth with the cataclysmic events of the years 1914-18. The war that 
embroiled all the great European powers during these years claimed over five 
million lives and shaped the future of European life for more than half a century. 
It was a total war executed in novel ways and even for the lives it did not take, 
the conflict defined a generation. Though placed under vastly dissimilar strains, 
the civilian population - like its military counterpart - was ushered into an era of 
change, state control, and new definitions of citizenship. Meanwhile, the 
government, increasing in scope with every month, procured for itself the labour 
and financial resources of its population -a population that was not, of course, 
consulted over the nation's involvement (there being a party truce and no general 
election). Despite these unique demands upon society and government, the 
impact of the war can be overemphasised. Unlike in Russia and many parts of 
continental Europe there was no revolution, constitutional developments altered 
radically rather than overturned the infrastructure and, notwithstanding the 
frequent pronouncements of hope to the contrary, Britain after 1918 was 
eminently recognisable as the Britain of pre-1914. Nevertheless, the demands of 
war clearly placed new challenges before the political parties. The war years 
included vital political developments ranging from the transformation of the 
relation between the state and the individual, electoral reform unprecedented in 
9 
its scale, industrial unrest unique in its stridency and the deliberate influencing of 
public opinion through state propaganda. Mobilising nearly nine million British 
men for military service, it demanded widespread redeployment of labour, the 
maintenance of civilian and military morale and repeated redefinition of the 
purpose behind fighting. 
Because of the colossal social and cultural changes enforced by the war, a radical 
restructuring of the political status quo also marked the period. Most 
prominently, the Liberal Party - in power in 1914 and a governing party for some 
eighty years - exited the political stage, not to be permitted anything beyond a 
walk-on part for the remainder of the century. Concurrently, the role of the 
Labour Party was broadened so much that it was able to play a major part in the 
political drama of the twentieth century. Largely because the spotlights were 
upon these two dynamic actors, there has been an over-representation in 
historical literature of the Labour and Liberal Parties. However, the years 
1914-18 were full of challenges and opportunities for not two but all three of the 
major British political parties. 
For these reasons and others, any general history of the Conservative/Unionist 
Party will point to the First World War as a dramatic period of change and 
regeneration in its development. In such an historical landscape it is perhaps 
surprising that the Unionist Party has not been better represented. At present it 
has had just one article and one thesis wholly devoted to it, both very good and 
both by John Stubbs. ' The emphasis in these works is firmly upon the first two 
years of war and (dictated largely by the discipline of political history at the 
time) the focus is overwhelmingly upon the internal parliamentary dynamic, the 
1 John Stubbs, `The Conservative Party and the Politics of War, 1914-16', Oxford University, D. Phil. 
thesis (1973); Idem., `The Impact of the First World War on the Conservative Party', in Gillian Peele and 
Chris Cook (eds. ), The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939 (Macmillan, London, 1975), pp. 14-35. 
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Union with Ireland and the party's contribution to the war effort. Accordingly, 
Stubbs offers no consultation of local party sources and little attempt to gauge the 
local parties' role within the party. Moreover, and more importantly, he does not 
deal properly with what are considered here as being crucial party responses to 
the conflict and to the challenges of the period, namely the impact of wartime 
patriotism, the formulation of a response to socialism, approaches to the onset of 
class politics and efforts to shape electoral reform, and the ideological evolution 
in regard to state intervention. 
Throughout this study the label `Unionist' will be employed partly for reasons of 
expediency and consistency, but also because this was the name most often used 
at the time. Moreover, to accord the party its more modem label would be to 
neglect the fact that the party's purpose, certainly at the start of the war, was to 
keep the Union with Ireland. Therefore the classification `Conservative' when 
applied is done so knowingly, either for the purposes of drawing longer-term 
comparisons or in order to mark the distinction between the two groups of which 
the party had been composed until their fusion in 1912, namely Conservatives 
and Liberal Unionists. It is not intended to provide a narrative of Unionist 
activities during the war, nor to describe the contributions made to the war effort, 
otherwise than in relation to the broader dynamics of the argument. 2 While 
efforts will be made to elaborate on the specific contributions that war made to 
the party, there will be no continuous comparison between the effects of war and 
what might have happened had it not occurred. Counterfactual history may be 
experiencing something of a rebirth in recent years and the historian may - 
consciously or subconsciously - ask him/herself countless mini `what ifs'. 
2 These are well served in Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War (Collins, London, 1960); Ideen., 
Men and Power, 1917-1918 (Oldbourne, London, 1959); Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War: a 
prologue to the triumph of Lloyd George (Jonathan Cape, London, 1971); John Turner, British Politics 
and the Great War: coalition and conflict (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992). 
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Nevertheless, it is not anticipated that the following question need, or indeed can, 
be answered fruitfully: what would have happened to the party in the years 1914 
to 1918 without the war? Despite the value of such questions for historians of the 
period before the war, as far as this study is concerned the primary objection is 
that the war did happen. In terms, therefore, of the party's ideological evolution, 
its ability to appeal to a mass electorate and its formulation of a response to 
socialism, there is more point in analysing what actually occurred. 
That said, the impositions of war are central to this thesis. Most fundamental 
among the trials with which the party was confronted during the years 1914 to 
1918 were those formulated directly by war, most noticeably the development of 
patriotism, the modification of the principles of Unionism, the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia and the shop-stewards' movement in Britain, state regulation 
of industry and labour, and the shaping of public opinion. More specifically, the 
study will examine the part that these developments played in the longer-term 
ideological evolution of the party. Did they serve to overturn or enhance pre-war 
party doctrines (such as Ireland or tariff reform)? Did they actually function so as 
to alter party principles or were the events and demands of war so exceptional as 
to impact but little upon fundamental political beliefs? What was their effect 
upon the party's rhetoric and the nature of Unionists' appeals? Did war make 
their appeals more coherent and convincing? How did the war influence their 
response to the socialist threat? 3 
The role of war in the social, cultural and political development of a nation 
represents a controversial area of historiography, upon which no real consensus 
has been reached. In its broadest spheres war has been shown to account for the 
3 It is so as to best answer these questions that the thematic chapter structure has been adopted (rather than 
according the various party components - leadership, MPs, grassroots and the press - attention individually). 
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development of class-consciousness, social reform and the transformation of 
political constitutions 4 This diversity is reflected, naturally enough, in views on 
the political impact of the Great War. The debate concerning Liberal decline has 
centred on a variance in interpretations of the movement's strength in July 1914, 
with historians accordingly divided as to the effect of the war. The starting point 
of the discussion was George Dangerfield's elegiac The Strange Death of Liberal 
England. This posited that the critical years of Liberal decline came shortly 
before the war, a period that witnessed the clash between, on the one hand, a 
contradictory ideological inheritance and, on the other, the challenges of Irish 
disorder, direct industrial action, the suffragette movement and the constitutional 
dilemma. 5 The reaction on its reprint in the 1960s was forceful, most famously in 
Trevor Wilson's `rampant omnibus of war'. This depicted the war as knocking 
down flat a Liberalism that had been healthy and thriving before 1914. 
Encapsulated in this debate is the essence of the historiography not only of the 
decline of Liberalism, but also of the evolution of the twentieth century Labour 
and Conservative movements. The radical alteration in political alignment in the 
period surrounding the war encourages three questions regarding all three major 
parties: were they healthy before the war? Did the war serve to undermine or 
enhance their standing? More specifically, was working-class consciousness in 
4 Most famously Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (Macmillan, 
London, 1973 [1" Ed. 1965]); Richard Titmuss, 'War and Social Policy, in idem, Essays on 'The Welfare 
State' (Unwin, London, 1958), pp. 75-88.; Stanislav Andreski, Military Organisation and Society 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968). 
5 George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (Constable, London, 1935). More modem 
interpretations include George Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England (Allen 
& Unwin, London, 1986). 
6 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-35 (Collins, London, 1966). See also, Peter 
Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971), 
Introduction; Michael Bentley, The Climax of Liberal Politics: British Liberalism in Theory and Practice 
1868-1918 (Edward Arnold, London, 1987), pp. 150-3. The latter provides a good historiographical essay 
on Liberal decline, which is updated in Keith Laybourn, `The Rise of Labour and the Decline of 
Liberalism: The State of the Debate', History, lxxx (1995), pp. 207-226. The few efforts to alter the focus 
of attention have tended to deal largely with mistakes within the Liberal leadership. For instance see 
David Dutton, '1932: A Neglected Date in the History of the Decline of the British Liberal Party', 
Twentieth Century British History, xiv (2003), pp. 43-60. 
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evidence before the war or did the war encourage it? 7 For a long time the 
Unionist Party was excluded from this debate. However, as Dangerfield found 
for the Liberal Party, historians of the Unionist Party have discovered in the 
Edwardian period "the death of Tory England". 8 In part this label was an attempt 
(a successful one) to wrest control of the discussion towards the Unionist Party, 
but it was also an appreciation of the difficulties with which the pre-war party 
was faced. Having suffered an almost unprecedented three consecutive general 
election defeats since 1906, the statistics are there to support such anxious 
conclusions. Further, key Unionist tenets, including the Irish union, the 
established Church and defence of landed property, were all destabilised in a 
manner not previously witnessed. More particularly, the rise of the Labour 
movement, and the coalition between the Liberal and Labour Parties, forced the 
party to attempt to formulate a response to socialism. The result has been that 
historians have been ready to appreciate the problems confronting both 
established political parties of the period. 
This uneasiness and pessimism evident in the Edwardian period contrasts acutely 
with the inter-war situation, in which Conservatives dominated electoral politics 
to the extent of being excluded from government for only three of its twenty-one 
years. By this time it had abandoned its commitment to the Union with Ireland - 
the cement with which the party had initially been reconstructed - and had 
emerged as a party capable of appealing to an extended electorate, rather than 
one incapable of formulating an appeal to a smaller, more privileged one. 
However, just as Peter Clarke discovered a new era of hope for the Liberal Party 
For the Labour Party see Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924 (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1973); Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp. 420-30. Other work on class consciousness tends to question 
McKibbin's theory, including Bernard Waites, A Class Society At War, England 1914-1918 (Berg, 
Leamington Spa, 1987), pp. 11-17,235-9. 
8 Ewen Green (review article), `The Strange Death of Tory England', Twentieth Century British History, 
ii (1991), pp. 67-88. 
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(specifically the `New Liberalism' of Lancashire), the unanimity amongst 
Conservative Party historians regarding the dilemmas of Edwardian 
Conservatism disappears in analysis of the years immediately preceding the war. 
For some historians 1911-14 has provided evidence that the party had survived 
its gravest challenges, that there was light at the end of the dark tunnel. For 
instance, for John Ramsden, the party reorganisation of 1911 is `taken as the 
beginning of the climb back to power'. This was complemented by electoral 
revival and the strong, pragmatic leadership of Andrew Bonar Law, which led to 
a `new style' of politics influenced by die-hard attitudes. Thus, if war had not 
intervened, Ramsden alludes to a `probable Unionist victory' .9 Recent 
historians 
of the party and of its leadership have agreed in finding pragmatic rather than 
excessive qualities in Law's attitude to Ulster and Irish civil war from 1911-14. 
Accordingly, the threat of civil war - seemingly fashioned at the whim of 
Westminster politicians and emboldened by the excesses of pseudo-Ulstermen - 
was a means by which to cut ruptures within the pro-Home Rule coalition and 
compel a general election. 10 Despite the benefits of such a policy however, the 
party emerges as confused, divided, fragile, and often no more cognisant of 
Law's motives than many subsequent historians. " In such circumstances, the 
`vice' that pressed the Liberals inexorably towards an electoral solution must be 
juxtaposed against the considerable party disunity and insecurity it generated. 
Indeed, Ewen Green considers that the differences over Ireland, which left the 
9 John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (Longmans, London, 1978), pp. 55-62, 
passim 
10 RJ. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (John Murray, London, 1999), pp. 122-27; Jeremy Smith, The Tories and 
Ireland : Conservative Party politics and the home rule crisis, 1910-1914 (Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 
2000), pp. 6-8, passim. Smith argues that 'Conservative leaders chose to make the issue of Ulster an acute 
political problem after 1912, for domestic electoral reasons' and, as such, `Ulster as a block to Irish Home 
Rule was constructed and invented by the politicians'. This contrasts strongly with the `demonic spirits' 
discovered in Oliver MacDonagh, Ireland: The Union and its aftermath (George Allen & Unwin, 
London, 1977), pp. 68-7 1. 
11 For divisions see Smith, Tories and Ireland, pp. 101-3,109-110. For inner-party ignorance as to Law's 
motives, see David Dutton, Austen Chamberlain: Gentleman in Politics (Ross Anderson, Bolton, 1985), 
p. 105. 
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party `in a mess', reflected the more general characteristic of pre-war 
Conservatism as evinced in its responses to the Parliament Act of 1911 and tariff 
reform. Meanwhile, the party's electoral prospects are portrayed - somewhat 
unfairly - as being poor. 
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Therefore, the suggestion in the work of Ewen Green and (more explicitly) David 
Dutton is that developments either during the war or in its aftermath played a part 
in the reinvigoration of the party's prospects. For Ramsden, the party's recovery 
in the years preceding the war was consolidated for the post-war era by structural 
developments to the constitution, namely the removal of the Irish Nationalist 
Party from Westminster and the favourable redistribution of seats. Alternative 
explanations of the strength of 1920s Conservatism include the development of 
an appeal based overwhelmingly on an alliance of property-owners and, 
elsewhere, the party's ability (and willingness) to monopolise a middle-class 
electorate through deflationary policies. 13 A complementary rather than opposing 
view is that the years immediately following the war represented a period in 
which the party re-channelled its efforts as an anti-socialist party. 14 It is the 
purpose of this study to incorporate wartime Unionist politics into the debate and 
examine the genesis of such political solutions. 
In the existing party histories, there has in some cases been an oversimplification 
of the impact of war. Lord Blake intentionally discussed it little, because it could 
12 Ewen Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, 1880-1914 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1995), 
pp. 303-4,268-9. The inner party cleavages were most especially prominent in the key swing electoral 
region of Lancashire, see David Dutton, `Lancashire and the New Unionism: 1906-14', Transactions of 
the Historic Society of Lancashire and Cheshire, cxxx (1981), pp. 143-6. 
13 David Jarvis, `British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s, English Historical Review, cx 
(1996), pp. 61-82; Ross McKibbin, `Class and Conventional Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the 
"Public" in Inter-war Britain' in Idem., The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain 1880-1950 
(1990), pp. 259-93. 
14 Neal McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular 
Conservatism, 1918-29 (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1998), pp. 225-6; Maurice Cowling, The 
Impact of Labour (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971). 
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be stated simply that `on almost every issue that came up Conservative tradition 
and ideology was better suited than Liberal to meet the needs of the hour. '15 Such 
inattention is dangerous. It conceives all aspects of wartime government as 
endorsing Unionist principles and suggests, inherently, that pre-war ideologies 
were merely enhanced and further entrenched. The fact that, by 1918, Unionists 
. 
had all but resigned their commitment to the Union with Ireland (which was after 
all the primary purpose for their political existence) indicates otherwise. More 
recent histories have displayed, moreover, the evolution of pre-war collectivist 
thought that placed much wartime state intervention closer to the Liberal than 
Conservative tradition. 16 Consideration, therefore, is needed as to whether, and if 
so why, the party was suited to wartime government, and how the challenges of 
war affected party ideology and rhetoric. 
In regard to Ireland and other chief tenets of the pre-war party (such as the Welsh 
Church and the House of Lords), the war is often viewed as somehow conferring 
a favour upon the party in ensuring that by 1918 these issues had `been conceded 
if not de jure then at least de facto'. Considered as negative policies their 
disappearance heralded the opportunity for the party to enter the modem political 
world. 17 But, of course, this development only benefited the institution of the 
party as long as supplements arrived to hold the diverse elements together. 
Moreover, there has been an overemphasis upon the attitudes of the 
parliamentary party and its leadership rather than the rank and file membership. 
It is chiefly with these themes that the first two chapters here are concerned. The 
redefinition of the Union does not receive independent attention in this study 
15 Robert Blake, The Conservative Partyfrom Peel to Thatcher (Fontana, London, 1985), pp. 195-6. 
16 This is notwithstanding the fact that Matthew Fforde's portrait of a uniformly anti-interventionist 
Unionist Party is too one-dimensional. Contrast the interpretations of the interventionist tariff reform 
policy in Matthew Fforde, Conservatism and Collectivism, 1886-1914 (Edinburgh University, Edinburgh, 
1990) and Green, Crisis of Conservatism. 
17 Stubbs, `Impact', p. 35. 
17 
partly because it has been analysed in considerable depth already, 
18 but also 
because this thesis is as much concerned with what replaced Irish Unionism as 
with the cause itself. 19 Nevertheless, although the Irish Unionist cause will not be 
examined in the same depth as it has been elsewhere, it will frequently be dealt 
with as a constituent of the party's broader evolution. Most especially, did the 
war dictate Unionist conceptions of the Union? If so, how? For what grander 
schemes was Ireland abandoned? In answering such questions, it is necessary 
also to address Unionist responses to the war and patriotism. Did the party 
remain concerned with fighting the old battles for Ireland and the Welsh Church, 
or did the prosecution of the European war and patriotism dictate its actions? 
What characterised their reactions on the outset of European war? To what 
factions within the party did the war offer the most encouragement? Did the 
conflict serve to undermine, maintain or enhance party unity? Was the party 
really as vulnerable to division as the Liberal Party (as Martin Pugh has 
argued)? 20 In which case, what preserved Law's leadership? 
A development very pertinent to matters of party solidarity was the changing 
nature of the internal dynamic. This possessed much resonance for the wartime 
and post-war party. Stubbs has demonstrated the reformation that occurred in the 
relationship between the party leadership and its backbench supporters, which 
represented `an important milestone in the evolution of the modem party'. 21 This 
`new pattern' of backbench groups, most especially the Unionist Business 
18 D. G. Boyce, `British Conservative Opinion, the Ulster Question and the Partition of Ireland, 1912-21', 
Irish Historical Studies, xvii (1970), pp. 89-112; Ideen, `Northern Ireland: The Origins of the State' in 
Peter Caterall & Sean McDougall, The Northern Ireland Question in British Politics (Macmillan, 
London, 1996), pp. 12-26; John Stubbs, 'The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-18', Historical Journal, xxxiii 
(1990), pp. 867-93. 
19 This (along with the fact that the period did much to dictate attitudes experienced during the rest of the 
war) explains the extensive treatment given to the first ten months of war (Chapter I). 
20 For instance Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-1918 (Routledge, London, 1978), 
pp. 53-4; Ideen, `Domestic Politics' in Stephen Constantine, Maurice Kirby & Mary Rose, The First 
World War in British History (Edward Arnold, London, 1995), p. 16. 
21 Stubbs, `Impact', p. 23, passim. 
18 
Committee and the Unionist War Committee, portended the influential 1922 
Committee. It is, however, necessary to add to this dynamic the grassroots 
membership who selected the candidates and maintained the organisations upon 
which they relied. The most important matter - which had implications for the 
party's electoral capacity, its ideology and its unity - is the extent to which the 
war denied, or granted, opportunities to the various strata within the party. Did 
war serve to empower or disenfranchise the constituency rank and file? Were the 
latter willing to abandon traditional principles as effortlessly as their 
parliamentary representatives and leaders? These questions are of particular 
significance because they offer clarification as to the depth and breadth of 
commitment to policies adopted between 1914-18. The organisational 
development of the party is also crucial, most especially the extent to, and means 
by, which it responded to the advent of new voters and maintained its structure 
during the war. Was the atrophy evident in wartime provincial Liberal 
organisations mirrored within the Unionist Party? 
The second chapter, which covers the specific period May 1915 to December 
1918 continues analysis of these questions, whilst concentrating on coalition 
government. Involvement in the wartime coalition government has been depicted 
as being at once negative (in the personal ambitions it thwarted) and positive 
(admitting the party back into power and allowing the party to stand alongside 
Lloyd George on the election platform in November 1918). 2 The most 
prominent themes that require consideration include the impact of coalition upon 
the party's commitment to the Union with Ireland and upon other traditional 
`party' principles. How did coalition shape notions of `party', conceptions of its 
future role (indeed its existence), and the maintenance of unity? When Armistice 
was declared in November 1918, was there a real desire (and practical likelihood) 
22 Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 130-5. 
19 
of the party remaining within the Lloyd George coalition? How did involvement 
in coalition government affect Unionist confidence in its ability to govern and to 
appeal to the electorate? How was the internal party dynamic affected? Was 
Law's leadership emasculated under the coalition? If so, how did he retain 
control and party unity? Were the backbench pressure groups the potent forces 
that their leaders (Carson, Salisbury and Hewins) purported them to be? 
Meanwhile, the value to the party of its role in (coalition) wartime government 
has been demonstrated by John Turner.. This was not only in terms of the 
confidence it created, and of the perception in the electorate's mind that it once 
again was a credible governing party, but also because `it was essential to be in 
office and to use the apparatus of state' to control and profit from the decline of 
issues like nonconformity and the rise of labour. Accordingly, the Unionist Party 
was able to shape its ideology towards the developments wrought by war and 
advantageously direct the state accordingly, whilst the Liberal Party's 
inflexibility exacerbated its inability to adapt its doctrine and, inter alia, an 
electoral appeal. 23 There has been little attempt, however, to understand how the 
war helped the Unionists to shape a coherent appeal, or indeed what impact 
wartime government and policies had upon the content and formulation of this 
appeal. It is upon these matters that Chapter III will concentrate. Most 
particularly, this has relevance to the utilisation and influence of wartime 
patriotism. Generally, historians have been ready to acknowledge beneficial 
features of patriotism and the manner by which patriotism harmonised with 
Unionist tradition and thought. In several areas however, question marks have 24 
23 Turner, British Politics, pp. 444-7. 24 Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire: the Conservative Party and British Defence Policy 1899-1915 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991), p. 228; Hugh Cunningham, `The Conservative Party and 
Patriotism', in Robert Colls and Philip Dodd (eds. ), Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920 
(Croom Helm, Kent, 1986), pp. 283-307; Hugh Cunningham, `The Language of Patriotism' in Raphael 
Samuel (ed. ), Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, Vol. I, history and 
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been raised concerning the commitment of the party to the war, for instance 
regarding the immediate response in August 1914.25 In respect of patriotism's 
role in defining the Unionist response to socialism there has 'been an 
overemphasis upon the formal - and largely disappointing - dealings with 
patriotic Labour (the British Workers' National League, later the National 
Democratic Party). 26 The latter movement collapsed shortly after the war and 
with it the patriotic benefits of the war seemingly disappeared, but the broader 
impact that the war had upon Unionist rhetoric and appeal did not necessarily go 
down with it. 
Here the actual role that these direct connections with Labour played will be 
investigated, as will the extent to which the parliamentary party and grassroots 
members were willing to acquiesce in a collaboration. What did the failure of 
these movements represent more generally? How real were the efforts to 
establish a consensus with patriotic Labour? What constituted the most 
prominent response to the rise of socialism: efforts to work with Labour or the 
formulation of propaganda against it? What were the features of Unionist anti- 
socialist literature? There will be a concerted effort here to distinguish how the 
party utilised patriotism and why wartime patriotism was peculiarly beneficial. 
Also, of what it consisted, and how it may have shaped their electoral success 
and the nature of their appeals to the electorate during and after the war, most 
especially in the `coupon' election of 1918. Indeed, despite appreciation of the 
role of Baldwinite conceptions of Englishness, there has been little effort to 
pursue the patriotic elements of the war through to the post-war period, or 
Politics (Routledge, London, 1989), pp. 57-89; Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People, 1880-1935 
(Blackwell, London, 1985), p. 176; Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 116-8. 25 Hazelhurst, Politicians, p. 41. 
26 John Stubbs, `Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour, 1914-18', English Historical Review, lxxxvii (1972), 
pp. 717-754; Roy Douglas, `The National Democratic Party and the British Workers' League', Historical 
Journal, xv (1972), pp. 533-52. 
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acknowledge their part in the construction of party appeals or ideology. What 
will be shown here is the extent to which such propaganda formed a major 
component in Unionist appeals to the working classes, shaped methods the party 
adopted for countering the socialist threat, and were a response to the broadening 
of the electoral franchise. Despite the seemingly reactionary focus of this chapter 
(`anti-socialism' and the `working-classes') this thesis addresses these particular 
themes because it was these that characterised the priorities and fears of 
contemporary Unionists, namely socialism's capacity to seduce working-class 
voters (or even fighters). 
It is this with fixation and concept of class with which Chapter IV is primarily 
concerned and it is partially in such terms that the party's response will be 
analysed. The Representation of the People Bill of 1918 that enfranchised all 
men and the majority of women offers a constructive means by which to examine 
Unionist attitudes towards class and gender, both in terms of the electorate to 
which the party wished to appeal, and alsö in regard to the party's response to 
electoral reform. There will be no attempt to scrutinise the 1918 election through 
statistical means because other historians have carried this out exhaustively. A 
worthwhile analysis, which would have to take into consideration at least two 
post-war general elections as well, would warrant a thesis (perhaps several) of its 
own. 7 Instead, more general conclusions will be sought about the timing and 
nature of electoral reform, the sentiments by which it was inspired and the 
readiness of the Unionist Party to engage with a mass electorate. Did the war, 
and indeed reform itself, act as catalysts for change? What does the Unionist 
response tell us of the electorate to which they wished to appeal, of their 
perspectives on class and their confidence in democracy? To what extent was the 
27 The most extensive analysis is in Turner, British Politics, Chapters X and XI. 
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party able to shape the character of reform? Once reform was enacted, did the 
party adapt itself to the new electorate with immediacy and efficiency? 
Finally, partly the result of an oversimplification of the impact of the war (as 
mentioned above), and partly because of the traditional historiographical 
tendency to investigate the dramatic transformation in the fortunes of the Liberal 
and Labour Parties, there has been little effort to address the ideological 
development of the party in this period of climactic change. At times historians 
are reluctant to acknowledge that the majority of Unionists considered the 
philosophical, practical or military (the length of the war) rationales of state 
intervention. Some doubt whether they were even capable of considering these 
complexities. 8 Other historians have depicted the party's wartime 
progressiveness as upended almost overnight (certainly over a few months), 
when -electoral and business influences dictated events in the years following the 
war. 9 The chief purpose therefore of Chapter V will be to examine the party's 
ideological development in relation to state intervention. Fundamentally, was the 
party willing to appreciate the wartime and post-war implications of policies such 
as military conscription and state control of industry? Was reconstruction 
perceived as a long-term commitment to social progression or as an immediate 
response to the upheaval wrought by war? Did the party move as one in its 
interpretations, or did the war serve to divide further the libertarian and reformist 
wings of the party? Subsequently, how did these ideological developments affect 
the unity of the party and the nature of the appeals that the party could formulate? 
In answering these questions, much is learnt about the nature of Unionism, the 
unanimity with which the party approached the inter-war period, how their. 
Z8 Pugh, Electoral Reform, Conclusion; Turner, British Politics, pp. 61,64. 29 Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (Batsford, London, 1970), pp. 13-25,306; 
Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain. A Study of Economic Control and Social 
Response, 1914-1919 (Frank Cass & Co., London, 1968), pp. 293-5. 
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developing attitudes to state intervention shaped their responses and their 
electoral appeals after the war. More generally, conclusions are drawn as to the 
development and character of Conservatism in this period, most especially 
whether it possessed the innate qualities of flexibility and resilience as reported 
by in-house party histories. 30 
In approaching the questions set out above, it is appreciated that considerable 
methodological differences overarch the literature, with contrary emphases 
placed upon differing elements within politics, most particularly in respect to the 
prominence accorded the party leadership, parliamentary rank and file and 
grassroots constituency politics. 31 More recent histories have rightly taken the 
view that the broad base upon which political leaders have drawn support 
warrants analysis as a dynamic component within their parties. It did after all 
determine a framework within which the leadership could operate. This is no less 
true for the Unionist Party, than for the Labour Party. Therefore the decision has 
been made to consult papers pertaining both to the chiefs of the party and to the 
grassroots. Here, the papers of a total of ninety-two constituency associations 
have been consulted. 32 Together these form a representative group, including: 
rural (22); mixed rural/urban (12); urban middle-class (16), including suburban 
30 The tendency in recent years has been to challenge the traditional in-house interpretation of 
Conservatism as an innate characteristic in all people, a matter rather of temperament rather than 
conscious politics. The traditional interpretation is most forcefully provided in Lord Hugh Cecil, 
Conservatism (Williams and Norgate, London, 1912); Quintin Hogg, The Case for Conservatism 
(Penguin, London, 1947), pp. 10-14. The new understandings can be seen in Alison Light, Forever 
England: Femininity, Literature, and Conservatism Between the Wars (Routledge, London, 1991); Ewen 
Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2002); W. H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition, Volume One: The Rise 
o( Collectivism (Methuen, London, 1983). 
3 This divergence can be seen in a comparison between the works of Maurice Cowling, John Ramsden 
and Stuart Ball. Cowling's analysis of the post-war coalition lays ultimate import on the workings of 
cabinet politics, with backbenchers and party opinion appearing `off-stage as malignant or beneficent 
forces with unknown natures and unpredictable wills'. Cowling, Impact of Labour, pp. 3-5. Ramsden and 
Ball, meanwhile, incorporate the party organisation and the dynamic between the leaders and party 
members within their scope. Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin;, Stuart Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative 
Party: the crisis of 1929-1931 (Yale University Press, London, 1988). 
32 Forty-two directly and fifty more through the notes of Professor John Ramsden. 
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seats such as Lewisham and Wood Green; urban mixed-class (14); urban 
working-class (13); mining seats (4). 33 While matters of convenience have 
dictated to some small degree the constituencies consulted, other factors were of 
greater significance. First, in 1914 and beyond, local Unionist associations varied 
considerably in the spheres of their activities, in the extent to which these 
operations were recorded and in the degree to which they sought to preserve their 
heritage. 34 The varied and incomplete picture that emerges is compounded by 
wartime politics that encouraged many associations to abandon political activity. 
Of course, this in itself presents a methodological dilemma: while not much can 
be garnered from blank minute books, to concentrate entirely upon associations 
with frequent meetings, and well-recorded and well-preserved records, would be 
to focus upon the extraordinary. 
Some areas of Great Britain are dealt with in greater detail than others: Wales is 
particularly short-changed largely because there are few extant records for the 
period before 1918; some counties of Scotland are less well-served than much of 
England, for the same reason that London and the home counties receive good 
treatment - accessibility; Cheshire, Liverpool and Manchester are under- 
represented through constituency papers, but all benefit from substantial area and 
divisional papers and, moreover, local Unionists (Archibald Salvidge, Percy 
Woodhouse and Charles Petrie) ensured that Lancashire issues did not go 
unheard. For all associations consulted, efforts have been made to establish the 
impact of the war by referring to the records for the years preceding and 
succeeding the war. Meanwhile, divisional, provincial and regional papers offer 
33 The classifications of Neal Blewett are used here for the vast majority of constituencies, John Turner 
for divisions outside England and for those constituencies for which records did not exist before the 
redistribution of seats in 1918. Turner, British Politics, pp. 449-79; Neal Blewett, The Peers, the Parties 
and the People: the General Elections of 1910 (Macmillan, London, 1972), pp. 489-94. 34 See Stuart Ball, `National Politics and Local History. The Regional and Local Archives of the 
Conservative Party' Archives, xxii, (1996), pp. 27-59 and Idem., `The Archives of the Conservative Party' 
(an unpublished commentary to the Conservative Party Archives). 
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an overview, as do the papers of party agents and affiliated bodies, by which 
trends and inconsistencies can be detected. Generally speaking they offer a 
convincing means of understanding not only the organisational impact of the 
war, but also the priorities of the rank and file, their role within the party and the 
party's wider response to developments such as electoral reform and the rise of 
socialism. Constituencies have been referred to throughout with their pre-1918 
titles, except in the cases either where the records only of the post-redistribution 
division (e. g. Lewisham West) survive, or when specific points are being made 
about redistribution. The other major primary resources include private papers 
(of which the Steel-Maitland and Law collections are the most significant), 
Unionist Party papers (including party literature and archives of the National 
Unionist Association), the records of other right-wing bodies, Hansard, 
government publications, the press, contemporary monographs, memoirs and the 
many useful edited versions of diaries and letters. Together with the - vast 
secondary literature dedicated to the war and political developments, these 
present a wide range of sources from which to draw conclusions. 
26 
Andrew Bonar Law 
Leader of the Unionist Party in the House of Commons 
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I 
THE PATRIOTIC TRUCE 
`How's the weather, Jeeves? ' 
`Exceptionally clement, sir. ' 
`Anything in the papers? ' 
`Some slight friction threatening in the Balkans, sir. Otherwise, 
nothing. ' 
- P. G. Wodehouse, `Jeeves in the Springtime' (1921)1 
In the House of Commons on 3 August 1914, the words of the Foreign Secretary, 
Edward Grey, were greeted with frantic enthusiasm and the mere arrival of 
Winston Churchill with cheers, not from Liberal but Unionist benches. 2 The 
European conflict, into which they lead Britain, was to challenge to the full the 
patriotism of the Unionist Party a principle upon which they prided themselves. 
This chapter seeks to understand the impact of this upon the party. It will analyse 
the manner by which the party truce arrived, the Unionist response and 
commitment to it, the opportunities afforded the party by the war, and the manner 
by which the party sought to side-step its less favourable implications. The story 
1 Reprinted as P. G. Wodehouse, `Jeeves Exerts the Old Cerebellum' in Idem., The Inimitable Jeeves 
(Penguin, London, 1953), p. 7. 2 Michael MacDonagh, In London During the Great War: the diary of a journalist (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, London, 1935), p. 4; Gershom Stewart, Letters of a Back Bencher to his Son, 1908-23 
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will be taken from late July 1914 up to May 1915, when the Unionist Party was 
invited into Government, and it will seek to understand the impact of war upon 
the Union with Ireland, upon the party's patriotism, and upon its grassroots 
membership, unity and leadership. What opportunities did war offer and to which 
interest groups? Did the first nine months of war witness an abandonment of 
principle to the war effort? 
Some Slight Friction in the Balkans 
In July 1914 the long-drawn out diplomatic contest with which international 
ambassadors, governments and pressure groups had been occupying themselves 
for a decade drew to a close. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo led to a catalogue of ultimatums from Austro-Hungary and 
Germany to its neighbours, first Servia, then Russia, France and finally Belgium. 
Across Europe, the beacons that embodied the intricate network of international 
alliances - which had been built up to prevent such outbursts - were lit. Between 
28 July and 4 August, from one country to the next, fires blazed upon the horizon 
giving notice of the calls upon diplomatic honour (and national interests): Servia 
to Russia, Russia to France (and Britain), France to Britain, and Belgium to 
Britain. 3 On 3 August, Germany invaded France; later that day Edward Grey 
served notice to Germany that, in the event of the violation of Belgian neutrality, 
Britain would declare war upon the aggressor. On 4 August, in response to the 
movement of German troops across the Belgian border, Britain declared war 
against Germany. The beacons had worked, and now it was to be war. 
(Printed for private circulation, Liverpool, 1923), pp. 33-5; Peter Bull, Bulls in the Meadows (Peter 
Davies, London, 1957), p. 75. 
3 Britain had signed the Entente with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907, which 
had both initiated a habit of co-operation between the three powers. Britain had also signed a treaty 
guaranteeing Belgium against territorial violation. 
29 
It is unnecessary to record in great detail the frequent comings and goings, 
conferences and intrigues that attended the Liberal Government's decision to 
intervene in Europe. 4 However, in order to comprehend the impact of the war 
upon party unity and policies, the motives and sentiments that characterised 
Unionist action at the outset must be understood. Together they establish the 
temper of the party as it entered the war and the character of the patriotic truce 
that ensued. They serve also to illustrate the nature of the party's wartime 
patriotism. 
Fifteen years after the onset of war, the Conservative politician Lord Newton 
wrote of the `pitiable vacillation which characterised the [Liberal] Cabinet of 
August 1914'. Thus, only the Government's receipt of a letter of support from 
the Unionist Party leaders Andrew Bonar Law and Lord Lansdowne, determined 
that Britain honoured its duties to France and Belgium. 5 Such an interpretation 
was a classic case of Unionist propaganda. Even today the influence of the 
Unionist letter remains problematic to evaluate, a fact not helped by the 
numerous apologist accounts. Four years after the government had made the 
decision to engage Britain, the ex-Prime Minister Herbert Asquith wrote to John 
St Loe Strachey. He denied that the Unionist communication had had any 
influence on the Cabinet's decision. This statement, however, must be distrusted, 
for Asquith also recorded that he had not even read out the letter in Cabinet 
(which he had). In any case, he cannot have been keen to add grist to the 
powerful mill of rumours that his patriotism had been wanting, even less so to a 
4 See Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War: a prologue to the triumph of Lloyd George (Jonathan 
Cape, London, 1971), pp. 25-117; Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War (Collins, London, 1960), 
pp. 17-41; Keith Wilson, The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 
1904-14 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 135-47. 5 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (Macmillan, London, 1929), p. 441. 
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newspaper editor. 6 Equally politically motivated was the decision of the Unionist 
leadership in December 1914 to publish their pledge in The Times, an act for the 
most part demonstrative of their insecurities at that time. 
Instead, evidence must be sought elsewhere. Asquith gave the letter of Law and 
Lansdowne mention, albeit fleeting, in his daily letter to Venetia Stanley on 
Saturday 2 August. Meanwhile, Walter Runciman (President of the Board of 
Trade) recorded that it had been brought to the attention of Cabinet on that day. 
Despite this, Cameron Hazlehurst largely accepts Asquith's version of events, 
describing the Unionist claim of influence as `unfounded'. 8 In his exhaustive and 
compelling account, Hazlehurst illustrates the manner in which the Liberal Party 
accepted intervention as unavoidable. First, within the Liberal Cabinet, the `anti- 
war' party did not speak with one voice, nor was it as numerous as is frequently 
held. 9 Second, for the `wäverers', the issue of protecting Belgian neutrality `was 
a central, and not at all unexpected, element within their calculations'. Therefore, 
support for war grew as German bellicosity became more discernible, and as 
moral and legal responsibilities to France and Russia became secondary to the 
necessity of defending Belgium. In such terms, the Cabinet emerges as moving 
irrevocably towards an acceptance of the need for intervention, before the 
Unionist letter was received. Furthermore, the content of the letter, focusing on 
issues of `honour' and `security' in relation to France and Russia, were not of 
principal concern to the majority of the vacillating ministers. Instead, by the time 
Cabinet met on 2 August, news had arrived that Germany had invaded 
6 Asquith to Strachey, 11/08/1918. Strachey Papers, S/11/6/22. Strachey was proprietor and editor of the 
Spectator. 
7 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 02/03/1914. Michael & Eleanor Brock (eds. ), I1.11. Asquith: Letters to 
Venetia Stanley (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985), p. 146; Hazlehurst, Politicians, pp. 92-3 
8 Hazlehurst, Politicians, p. 41. 
9 For example, Beaverbrook, Politicians, pp. 26-8. 
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Luxembourg, and the latter was viewed as a crucial step-stone to the decisive 
violation of Belgian neutrality. 10 
A further factor negates the significance of the letter. Namely that, prior to the 
communication, the Cabinet had already been alerted to the Unionist position. 
F. E. Smith had assured Churchill on July 31, that `on the facts as we understand 
them -& more particularly on the assumption (which we [the Unionist leaders] 
understand to be certain) that Germany contemplates a violation of Belgian 
neutrality - the Government can rely upon the support of the Unionist party. ' The 
next day, Churchill had told `F. E. ' that the Cabinet had been acquainted with the 
communication and that it had produced `a profound impression'. " On 2 August, 
Lord Robert Cecil had also notified Churchill of Unionist support for 
intervention. 12 Doubtless, for many of the Liberal `waverers', Churchill's 
belligerent standpoint made him a less then convincing conduit, but such 
intelligence must have been innately predictable to Government ministers. 
Accordingly, if the pledge fell on deaf ears, it was not because of its inherent 
irrelevance. Rather, the Liberals had heard the Unionist Party speak with a 
patriotic voice both in recent days and through the passage of history. And, 
whilst the letter may have had little impact in swaying the Cabinet's decision, it 
is nonetheless very possible that Asquith placed significance on Unionist 
Parliamentary support. He formulated his policy, while estimating that `a good 3/4 
of our own party in the H. of Commons are for absolute non-interference at any 
price'. It may or may not have been coincidence that the Prime Minister recorded 
this fact straight after alluding to the Unionist pledge. 13 Asquith also surely made 
10 Hazlehurst, Politicians, pp. 54-5,58,92 and passim " It is worth noting that the basis of this pledge was the issue of Belgian neutrality. 12 Martin Gilbert, The Challenge of War. Winston S. Churchill, 1914-1916 (Minerva, London, 1990), 
pp. 22-3. 
13 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 02/08/1914. Brock, Letters, p. 146 
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good use of the letter to signal to the `waverers' that continued hesitancy on their 
part risked the formation of a Conservative coalition. '4 
What becomes clear is that the Liberal Government partly interpreted its position 
in relation to that of the Unionists and vice versa. When Grey made his famous 
speech on 3 August outlining Britain's commitments, Unionist reaction exposed 
the preconceptions held in relation to the Liberal Party. William Bridgeman 
estimated that, had the Unionists forced a division, the Government would have 
received only one hundred votes in support of war from its Liberal-Labour-Irish 
Nationalist coalition. 15 Lord Crawford reported the probable number of Radical 
supporters as low as fifty. 16 Such statements were, of course, not necessarily 
accurate. That two men with recent experience in the Whips' Office should 
refuse to accept that the Liberal Government could adopt an interventionist 
policy, revealed the dominance of fixed ideas. '7 Surely, the converse was also 
true, namely that - pledges or no pledges - the Liberal Party recognised that the 
opposition would assist any move to uphold British interests and honour. 
Ministers could have turned their minds back to any in a long line of 
demonstratively patriotic and interventionist Unionist policies. 
At the turn of the century the Boer War had demarcated the line between 
Unionists and Liberals on matters of imperial conflict. In more recent years, as 
Rhodri Williams has explained, the Agadir crisis had `forced the Unionist 
leadership to confront the prospect of Britain's involvement in a Franco-German 
war'. Additionally, Unionists had emphasised the balance that Britain had to 
strike between land and sea. For, whilst Britain had to be prepared to fight on 
14 Wilson, Entente, p. 138. 
is Bridgeman diary, 10/08/1914. Philip Williamson (ed. ), The Modernisation of Conservative Politics: the 
Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935 (Historian's Press, London, 1988), p. 79. 16 Crawford diary, 03/08/1914. John Vincent (ed. ), The Crawford Papers: the Journals of David Lindsay, 
Twenty-seventh Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, 1871-1940 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1984), p. 340. 
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land to maintain the integrity of France against a rising Germany, Unionists had 
wished to protect their overseas empire as well. 18 Commitment to Britain's 
imperial and European obligations was substantiated in support for Churchill's 
rule at the Admiralty, most especially the 60% standard for dreadnoughts, despite 
his having `ratted' . 
19 The National Service League and the Navy League kept 
these matters at the heart of Edwardian Unionism. 
In fact, it was largely such connections that galvanised the immediate response of 
the Unionist leadership. When the first shadow council was convened on the 
European situation late on Saturday 1 August at Lansdowne House, an unusual 
group was in attendance. Present were not only the leaders Law and Lansdowne, 
and the Chief Whip Lord Edmund Talbot, but also George Lloyd MP and the 
Director of Military Operations, Major-General Henry Wilson. Lloyd reported to 
Leo Amery MP that although there had been general agreement at this 
conference, `none of [the leaders] showed the slightest conception of the fact that 
war was on or that it signified anything'. 20 It was not until the Sunday morning 
that Austen Chamberlain drafted a letter to Asquith at Lansdowne House, an 
amended version of which was later signed by Law and Lansdowne and 
despatched, but not without further delay. Chamberlain documented his attempts 
to persuade the leaders to communicate their feelings to Asquith immediately. 
They preferred, however, to wait on a message they had despatched to Downing 
Street earlier in the day. This merely offered their advice if it were called upon. 
This inaction of the Unionist leaders was countered by a reaction full of 
17 For the Liberal reaction see Hazlehurst, Politicians, pp. 121-6. 
18 Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire: the Conservative Party and British Defence Policy 1899-1915 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991), pp. 196-7 
19 Alan Clark (ed. ), `A Good Innings': The Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham (John Murray, 
London, 1974), p. 127. Williams, Defending, pp. 207-8,211. Also see the routine attention devoted to the 
navy at Oxford Division, Central Council, 18/10/1913,07/03/1914, (S. Oxon. Con. I11/1). 
20 The Duke of Devonshire may or may not have been present (depending on which account is believed). 
John Barnes & David Nicolson (eds. ), The Leo Amery Diaries I: 1896-1929 (Hutchinson, London, 1980), 
p. 104; Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years (Cassell & Co., London, 1935), pp. 94-5. 
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decisiveness, excitement and even desperation on behalf of Amery, Chamberlain 
and such diehard company. Were the leaders ignorant of developments? If not, 
why were they reluctant to act? How and why was it left to a particular branch of 
the party to take up the issue? 
As is usual on such critical occasions, it is those that did much - or at the very 
least considered that they did so - who drafted the most extensive reports of 
events. August 1914 being no exception, the mindset of the Unionist leaders 
towards the European crisis is not easy to discern. The only substantive published 
accounts come from Leo Maxse, Amery and Chamberlain. Not only did each 
narrator emphasise his own part, but they also appear to have shared much 
information. For instance, Amery and Chamberlain leaned heavily on 
information from Lloyd as to what happened at the meeting of Unionist leaders at 
Lansdowne House on 1 August. 21 Much suggests that Law, Lansdowne and 
Arthur Balfour knew a good deal of the events in Europe. Grey recorded that, 
during the last week of July, Law had gone daily to the Foreign Office, `to ask 
what the news of the crisis was' 22 Before the weekend, Balfour had heard from 
Admiral Lord Fisher that Churchill had ordered the Fleet up the Channel23 On 
Friday, `F. E. ' had broached Churchill's idea of coalition government to Law, 
Edward Carson and Max Aitken. The Unionist leader summarily quashed this 
suggestion, probably in the belief that Asquith would have viewed any such 
arrangement as an intrigue (which it was) 24 `F. E. ' also informed them, however, 
that his friend's application was founded on divisions within Cabinet. This can 
have served only to force Unionist leaders to surmount the intense personal 
21 For instance, neither Chamberlain nor Amery was present at the shadow meeting of Saturday evening, 
but acknowledged notification of events from Lloyd. Problems on the rail-lines had delayed their return to 
London. `Memorandum on the Arrival of War' by Chamberlain, ACI 14/2. 
22 Viscount Grey of Falloden, Twenty-Five Years (Frederick A. Stokes, New York, 1925), I, p. 327. 
23 Max Egremont, Balfour (Phoenix, London, 1998), p. 260. 
24 Law turned down an invitation to dine with Grey and Churchill on Sunday for these reasons. 
Chamberlain, Down the Years, p. 97. 
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distrust of Churchill, and appreciate the mounting gravity of the European 
situation. 25 
Such knowledge was insufficient to deter the mass exodus to the countryside 
from London that was the political weekend. Consequently, leading Unionists 
were scattered far and wide: Chamberlain at Westgate on Sea; Law, Carson, and 
`F. E. ' at Wargrave ('Paddy' Goulding's country residence); Lansdowne at 
Bowood; Balfour planning not only to retreat to Hatfield, but also until very late 
in the day contemplating an Austrian break; Crawford only just returning on 
Saturday from Bayreuth - because of the Irish, not the European, crisis. 
26 So 
relaxed appeared they that, even on Saturday, although Lloyd discovered Balfour 
`flabbergasted' at developments, he was apparently not sufficiently so as to 
cancel his withdrawal to Hatfield. Such was Law's imperturbability that, `like 
another Drake', he insisted on finishing a tennis set before listening to an agitated 
Lloyd. Even then, Lloyd was forced to set Lord Charles Beresford - purple with 
rage and shouting - upon his leader in order to persuade him to accompany them 
back to London. 7 This apparent disregard for developments must be put, 
however, in the context of the rapid turn of events, which allowed even the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to plan weekends away as late as 
Friday 31 July. 28 
On Saturday, both Beresford and Lloyd heard from the French Ambassador Paul 
Cambon, and Maxse learnt through a Foreign Office source, that `the 
Conservative Party would not support [Grey] in the policy that might lead to 
25 John Campbell, F. E Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead (Jonathan Cape, London, 1983), pp. 372-73. 
26 John Stubbs, `The Conservative Party and the Politics of War', Oxford University, D. Phil. (1973), 
pp. 17-20; Crawford to Lady Crawford, 22/07/1914; diary, 01/08/1914. Vincent, Crawford, pp 339-40. 
2 George Lloyd to Ian Colvin, 18/05/1934 (copy). Lloyd Papers, 17/36/90. Barnes, Amery Diaries, p. 104. 
'Notes on the European War' n. d. [1915] by Beresford. Although not accredited to any author, it is 
evident that this was the testimony of Beresford. Maxse Papers, 471/487-8. 
28 Hazlehurst, Politicians, p. 63. Admittedly, Asquith continued to enjoy long weekends throughout the 
war. 
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war'. They recorded also that the government had been asserting that this was 
determining their action. 29 That this story got afoot can be explained with ease. 
Chamberlain recorded that Balfour `had very characteristically put the other side 
of the case' when discussing the situation with the Permanent Under-Secretary at 
the Foreign Office Arthur Nicolson. Misunderstanding, Nicolson had reported 
Balfour's opinions to Grey `as if they were his own'. 30 From there, it remained in 
the interests of various parties to perpetuate the rumour: for Cambon, and 
subsequently, Chamberlain, Beresford, Lloyd and Maxse, as a method by which 
to encourage concerted Unionist action in favour of intervention; for some 
Liberals as an excuse for their own hesitancy. Indeed, although Lloyd was ready 
to broadcast this story to Amery and others, he admitted later that he knew it to 
be untrue. 31 Balfour had, in fact, written to Nicolson on 2 August, concluding 
that the entente bound Britain morally and logically to intervention in support of 
France. 32 
The prevailing reluctance to get involved emanated from various motives. On 
Sunday 2 August Law argued to Chamberlain that Churchill had held that there 
was nothing the opposition could do of assistance. 33 Later the same day, he told 
Amery that any attempt to exert pressure on the Government would only rally the 
anti-war coalition. 34 Such excuses were certainly genuine - the risk of 
aggravating an anti-war party was a motive later enrolled to resist the formation 
of a Unionist wartime administration. 35 To force a split in the Government might 
have produced an approach to the Unionists by the Liberals and, as Lansdowne 
29 `Notes on the European War' by Beresford; Lloyd to Colvin, 18/05/1934. 
30 Stubbs, `Conservative Party', p. 26. 
31 Lloyd to Colvin, 18/05/1934. 
32 Francis Xavier McDonough, `The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-14', 
University of Lancaster, Ph. D. Thesis, (2000), p. 239. 33 Chamberlain, Down the Years, p. 98. 
34 Barnes, Amery Diaries, p. 105. 
35 Report of Party Meeting in Gleanings and Memoranda [G&M], September 1916, pp. 193-8. 
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admitted, `a change of Govt. would [have been] deplorable at such a moment'. 
36 
Issues of traditional procedure also determined action: both Lansdowne, who was 
a previous Foreign Secretary, and Law appreciated the narrow scope of the 
opposition in diplomatic affairs. Furthermore, the leadership may have remained 
disinclined to make use of information they had acquired in confidence. They 
acted - Balfour sending telegrams to Law and Lansdowne asking them to come 
to London on Saturday evening - only with caution. The converse, of course, 
applied to Lloyd, Amery and Chamberlain who moved largely on information 
from Henry Wilson, Director of Military Operations, for whom an unscrupulous 
nature and a heartfelt yearning for intervention compromised the official' capacity 
of his position. 7 
Understandable to the historian, such equivocation was less so to the crowd of 
doers who hustled and bustled the leadership towards concerted action. Those 
who undertook to exert the influence of the Unionist Party upon the Government 
were of similar ilk. In the accounts of Lloyd, Amery and Wilson, those of 
significance were themselves, Chamberlain, H. A. Gwynne, Lord Percy (later 
Duke of Northumberland), Beresford and Maxse. Such men made up a 
significant element within the right-wing movements of Edwardian 
Conservatism. Lloyd, Percy, Beresford and Maxse had been sympathisers of the 
diehard movement that emerged in the response to the 1911 Parliament Act, with 
Gwynne's Morning Post and Maxse's National Review providing press backing. 
Many had been strong advocates of the National Service League, most 
especially, Amery, Lloyd, Wilson, Beresford and Maxse. The link to 
Chamberlain was through Amery's friendship, a friendship nurtured not only 
36 Lansdowne to Lady Lansdowne, 02/08/1914 (copy). Lansdowne Papers, `Miscellaneous: Delhi 
Announcement, 1912'. The Lansdowne Papers are currently being catalogued at the British Library and 
are listed here under the headings/subheadings under which they reside presently. 
37 Wilson diary, 31/07/1914,01/08/1914,02/08/1914. Wilson Papers, DS/NUSG80/5. 
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through Birmingham politics but also through the increasingly sectional tariff 
reform movement. Beresford and Lloyd had commanded opposition crusades 
against the Government. The former, harbouring resentment towards the First 
Sea Lord Fisher, and given credibility by having served as an Admiral himself, 
launched broadsides against Churchill in parliament. 38 Lloyd, meanwhile, had 
drafted a resolution of the 1913 party conference expressing `deep anxiety' 
regarding inadequate Government defence measures. 39 
What is apparent is that together they formed a core group of right-wing 
Unionists. It has been argued that the leadership was in no way affected by this 
rank and file movement, 40 but Lloyd would not have been invited into the 
shadow council unless he had earned this status during the crisis. It is perhaps 
symptomatic of the opportunities that war offered certain sections of the Unionist 
Party, that these characters should have come to the fore. Williams has written of 
`the relative impotence of the hard men on the Unionist backbenches, the noisy 
Radical Right' in the pre-war political climate 41 However, in the discussions 
surrounding the events of late July and early August 1914, they demonstrated 
themselves to be a vital force. 
How reflective of Unionist opinion they were is questionable. Grey later asserted 
that `about the middle of the week, as news grew more ominous, [Law] said that 
it was not easy to be sure what the opinion of the whole of his party was. [Law] 
doubted whether it would be unanimous or overwhelmingly in favour of war, 
unless Belgian neutrality were invaded; in that event, he said, it would be 
unanimous. ' The appendage of a defensive footnote - in which he claimed that 
38 Williams, Defending the Empire, pp. 212-3. 39 NUA Conference, November 1913. Arthur Lee, the official Unionist spokesman on naval and military 
issues, moved this resolution in Lloyd's absence. 
ao McDonough, `Conservative Party', p. 252. 41 Williams, Defending the Empire, p. 214 
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his expression of Law's views was `well within the mark' and that he had 
`referred only to the opinion of the rank and file of his party' - indicates that 
Grey appreciated that such a statement was controversial (though not sufficiently 
so as to prevent him enrolling it as part of his defence). 2 Lord Hugh Cecil 
certainly had grave misgivings that Britain might intervene without sufficient 
grounds. Subsequently, Robert Cecil, anxious that his brother might have 
provided a misleading portrait of Unionist opinion, assured Churchill that, 
whatever action was undertaken, the Government `may count on the support of 
the whole Unionist Party ... Whatever [Hugh Cecil's] personal views may 
be I 
am sure that he would take no public action inconsistent with this view. ' 43 
Nevertheless, Hazlehurst asserts that Robert Cecil's contention that his brother 
spoke merely for himself, `like so many other statements made in these tense 
days, was an understandable exaggeration; and many silent Tories doubtless felt 
as impotent and bewildered as the Radicals'. Quite who these `many silent 
Tories' were is uncertain. To support the claim of wider party concern, 
Hazlehurst relies solely on the comments of the Liberal MP Edmund Harvey (a 
Quaker): "`The overwhelming mass of the Tory Party seem to regard war as 
inevitable and some seem to be eager to take the best chance of smashing 
Germany. Bentinck and a few others are for peace, but I am afraid that they 
would be swept away by the rest of their party if they tried to protest. "'44Lord 
Henry Bentinck's stance in 1914 is neither contested nor corroborated elsewhere. 
He had, however, been the sole Unionist signatory of a Radical petition during 
the Agadir Crisis. It had requested that the Government ensure that the Anglo- 
French entente did not obstruct a rapprochement with Germany. 45 This probably 
42 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, I, pp. 327-8,328n. 
43 Gilbert, Challenge of War, p. 22. 
44 Hazlehurst, Politicians, p. 42. 
45 Wilson, Entente, p. 31. 
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formed the entire evidence for Harvey's deduction, but Bentinck was certainly no 
pacifist. He had volunteered for the Derbyshire Yeomanry in the controversial 
Boer War and was to do so again during the European war. 6 As it is, other 
accounts offer greater confidence in party unity. Amery recorded on 2 August 
that `except Hugh Cecil, and in a milder degree Robert Cecil, there was no 
section in the Unionist party in favour of neutrality, though of course the Jewish 
influence generally, in so far as it affected the Daily Telegraph and some other 
circles in the party, looked with great aversion on the idea of war. '47 If the 
uncompromising Amery could find no dissentient conclave of note, it well 
reveals its absence. And this was further born out by Amery's erroneous 
consideration of Robert Cecil as pro-neutrality. The only other report of concern 
emerged from W. A. S. Hewins MP, who remarked two days after Grey's speech: 
`If we had been in Office our experience in Opposition shows that we should 
have had some weak-kneed people amongst us. '48 This must be understood, 
however, both in terms of Hewins' character, which was hard-hearted, and his 
estrangement from the party leadership over Ireland, at whom this slight was 
undoubtedly partially aimed. 
Opinion within local associations and the party press was similarly unequivocal 
in its espousal of war. Percy Woodhouse, a leader of Lancashire Unionism, 
forwarded a resolution passed in Lancashire to prove that not all in the area were 
`followers of the Manchester Guardian [anti-war] attitude' 49 The Unionist MP 
for Cheshire Eddisbury told constituents that the party would offer `unflinching 
46 The Constitutional Year Book for 1919 (NUA, London, 1919), p. 163. 
47 Amery diary, 01/08/1914. Barnes, Amery Diaries, pp. 104-5. The Daily Telegraph had strong Jewish 
connections through its major shareholder Harry Levy-Lawson (later Lord Burnham). Presumably, 
Amery was taking the typical Unionist line in such matters, categorising those with Jewish links as driven 
by international (or German) financial interests. See Harry Defries, Conservative Party Attitudes to Jews, 
1900-1950 (Frank Cass, London, 2001), pp. 68-9. 
as Hewins diary, 05108/1914. W. A. S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of Empire Policy 
(Constable & Co., London, 1929), II, p. 3. 
49 Woodhouse to Derby, 04/08/1914. Derby Papers, 17/1. 
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support' in the government's difficulty. 50 Old-fashioned issues of honour were at 
the heart of the Morning Post's championship of intervention: `there is only one 
thing that can be imagined worse than a war, and it is a European war in which 
England did not play the game. '51 This contrasted strongly with the Manchester 
Courier and Daily Telegraph, which swung behind the war only after the 
contravention of Belgian neutrality was to the fore on 3 August. 52 
Divergences did therefore materialise over the grounds for Britain's involvement. 
Just after hostilities commenced, Robert Cecil categorised British foreign policy 
as generally peaceful. Intervention had been determined not by a desire for a 
change in the European map as Britain's geographical position was `tolerably 
secure'. Nor had the motive been imperial expansion. Instead the root cause had 
been `a real belief in justice & liberty - due to centuries of national training. The 
feeling on behalf of Belgium arose from these sentiments. '53 This fell into place 
with the proliferating tendency of Unionist public pronouncements to toe the line 
as regards Belgium. Yet, for the majority of Unionists, unlike Liberals, the casus 
belli rested on the security of Britain and the obligation of honouring the 
agreement with France. Before the issue of Belgian neutrality rose to the fore, 
Bridgeman and Lloyd considered that it would be ruinous for the government not 
to honour her commitments. 54 Meanwhile, the letter of Law and Lansdowne that 
was despatched to Asquith on 2 August stated that `... any hesitation in now 
supporting France and Russia would be fatal to the honour and to the future 
security of the United Kingdom... ' 55 Indeed, Amery laid particular emphasis on 
the prominence within it of `the real main issue of our honour and security, and 
50 liverpool Courier, 03/08/1914. Editorial. 
sl Morning Post, 01/08/1914. Editorial. 
52 Compare the editorial reports of 03/08/1914 with those of the preceding days in both papers. 53 Robert Cecil to Edward Grigg, 11/08/1914 (copy). Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 164-8. 
Bridgeman to Caroline Bridgeman, 30/7/1914. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 80; Lloyd to 
Chamberlain, 31/07/1914. AC/1412/7. 
55 Chamberlain, Down the Years, p. 99. 
42 
[that it] was in no way dependent on the invasion of Belgium. 56 Two months 
after the start of war, Lord Willoughby de Broke was claiming that the Belgian 
question was built up by `the Pharisees' to `satisfy the abstract principle 
gentlemen', robustly stating that he was `fighting for no abstraction, but for the 
authority and position of England'. 57 Five months later still, Maxse derided the 
Liberal Government's `line that as altruists they were too virtuous to go to war 
on behalf of such vulgar British interests as self-protection, and are only 
concerned to establish their good faith in the eyes of pacifists and neutrals'. 8 
While war was certainly less repellent to the Unionist than either Labour or 
Liberal parties, did they really, as Harvey contended, look upon the opportunity 
to `smash Germany' with relish? It certainly remained within the interests of 
Liberal commentators, especially during the events of early August 1914, to 
portray the Unionists as warmongers. Inaction on the part of the Liberal 
Government only made the verdicts of the opposition appear excessive. In the 
years preceding the war, Unionists had undoubtedly wished to undermine 
German industrial dominance through tariff reform. 59 Nonetheless, although 
Germany was frequently cited as the greatest threat to British military and 
economic security, the 60% standard set specifically in regard to German 
Dreadnought strength was established by the Liberal Government. 60 Moreover, 
the radical right - though frequently loud - was neither representative nor 
influential before 1914.61 On the contrary, some British imperialists discerned 
advantages within the Prussian system of national efficiency, military 
56 Leo Amery, My Political Life: Volume Two, War and Peace 1914-29 (Hutchinson & Co., London, 
1953), p. 18. See also Gwynne to Tyrrell (Grey's PPS), 01/08/1914. Keith Wilson (ed. ), The Rasp of War: 
The Letters of H. A. Gwynne to Lady Bathurst, 1914-1918 (Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1989), p. 19. S' Willoughby de Broke to Boutwood, 25/10/1914 (copy). Willoughby de Broke Papers, WB/11/2. 
58 Maxse to Robert Cecil, 04/03/1915. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, f. 206. 
59 P. J. Cain & A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (Longman, 
London, 1993), p. 461. 
60 For example, NUA Conference, 13/11/1913. 
61 McDonough, `Conservative Party', pp. 259-62. 
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preparedness and bureaucratic structure that had established the German Empire. 
As Lord Milner commented on the press attacks on Haldane in The Times, `if it is 
necessary for good and effective patriotism to hate the nation to which your 
country happens to be opposed, I am afraid I don't possess that virtue. '62 
The Worse Blackguard: Asquith or the Kaiser? 
To assist the war effort, an official truce was agreed between the Government 
and the opposition on 28 August 1914. Almost a month earlier, on 31 July, Law 
had invited Asquith to his house, Pembroke Lodge. He proposed that the Second 
Reading of the Amendment (to the Government of Ireland) Bill should be 
postponed, contending `that to advertise our domestic dissensions at this moment 
wd. weaken our influence in the world for peace'. 3 Despite his aversion to 
venturing south of the river to Battersea, Asquith had lent his concurrence to the 
sentiment if not the specifics of the agreement. Ireland, accordingly, was to 
provide the impetus for the political truce. Precedents for collaboration existed in 
actuality if not in spirit: conferences had been convened at Buckingham Palace 
concerning the constitutional question in 1910 and the Irish problem in 1913-14. 
In neither instance, however, had the Unionists cooperated enthusiastically. In 
1910, the gatherings had presented much less opportunity to the opposition than 
to the Government, for whom they had served to `create some semblance of 
62 Milner to Amery, 04/03/1914. Barnes, Amery Diaries, p. 109. See also Dicey's call for equity in any 
appraisal of the actions of the German people. A. V. Dicey, How We Ought to Feel About the War 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1915), pp. 4-7. 63 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 30/07/1914. Brock, Asquith Letters, p. 136. 
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national consensus'. 64 The private consultations over Ireland, on the other hand, 
had offered scant potential for fruitful resolution and much for embarrassment. 65 
Far from consensus in fact, politics had seldom been such a partisan business as 
in the years preceding the European conflict. Three themes in particular lent 
themselves to this hostile climate: first, and foremost, was the controversy over 
Irish Home Rule; second was the increasingly radical social reform, epitomised 
by the Land Act; third was the Parliament Act of 1911 that denied the Unionists 
their established resistance mechanism and, in their view, undermined the 
constitution. In retaliation, the Unionist Party adopted tactical manoeuvres that 
were progressively more scheming and conspiratorial. In May 1913, a Whips' 
memorandum requested all members to be within call of the House of Commons 
during the summer months and for pairing to be done only through the Whips' 
Office. Members were ordered also to arrive when asked, and not before, in the 
hope of defeating the Government in a `snap division'. 66 They were largely true, 
therefore, to the sentiments recorded in February 1914 by Crawford, who found a 
determination at the Carlton Club for the treatment of `ministerialists as 
revolutionaries'. 67 While partly a consequence of an increased emphasis on 
organisation both within and outside the House, this revealed an appreciation that 
the established asset of the House of Lords' veto had disappeared and that the 
first chamber was bursting with distrust and abuse. 68 
64 John Fair, British Inter-party Conferences: a study of the procedure of conciliation in British politics, 
1867-1921 (Clarendon, London, 1980), p. 6. 
65 See for instance, Lansdowne to St Aldwyn, 23/09/1913. St Aldwyn Papers, D2455/PCC/18. Suspicions 
amongst the party rank and file suggest that Lansdowne was not merely being over-sensitive. Norwood 
UA, EC, 13/10/1913, (1V11661113). 
66 H. Pike Pease, Memorandum, 02/05/1913. BL41/I/6. 
67 Crawford diary, 07/02/1914. Vincent, Crawford, p. 325. 68 Lord Winterton recalled one Home Rule debate during which the Ulster Unionist Ronald McNeill 
hurled a book at Churchill, hitting him on the chest. Earl Winterton, Orders of the Day (Cassell & Co., 
London, 1953), p. 68. For party organisational developments in the pre-war era see: Ramsden, Balfour and 
Baldwin, pp. 45-62; Iden, `The Organisation of the Conservative and Unionist Party in Britain 1910-30', 
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With such a recent history of controversy, it is of little surprise that the Unionist 
Party carried much resentment and resolve into the truce, most evidently over 
Ireland in August/September 1914. Indeed, it is often forgotten that allusion to 
war in late July and early August referred, more often that not, to an inevitable 
war in Ireland not Europe. On 15 September, the Government placed upon the 
statute book the Home Rule Act, along with an attendant Suspensory Act. In his 
routinely arrogant, but evocative, appraisal of the violent Unionist response to 
this, Asquith remarked: `[it was] a lot of prosaic and for the most part middle- 
aged gentlemen trying to look like the early French revolutionaries in the Tennis 
Court. '69 Their reaction consisted only of a mass walkout from the chamber, 
which illustrated the impotence in opposition to which they had been reduced 
during the war. 70 However, it also indicated further points. First, had such a 
controversy emerged with the truce beyond its infancy, and wartime cooperation 
no longer novel, the Unionist response would likely have been appreciably more 
drastic. As a direct outcome of this repressed rebellion, Unionists became even 
more aware of their incapacity. This appreciation was to trigger more bellicose 
retaliations during the ensuing nine months and, indeed, during Irish debates 
throughout the war. What is more, the modesty of their retort was by no means 
representative of party feeling generally. Therefore, if the issue of Ireland was 
largely to be relegated to the shelf, it was placed at an easy height for future 
reference, and the imprint of the controversy of August and September left an 
indelible mark upon the minds of Unionists throughout the patriotic truce and 
beyond. 
Several historians, including Lords Beaverbrook and Blake, Patricia Jalland and 
John Stubbs, have argued that the Unionist leadership lost all sense of proportion 
69 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 15/09/1915. Brock, Letters, p. 239. 70 John Stubbs, 'The Impact of the First World War on the Conservative Party', in Gillian Peele and Chris 
Cook (eds. ), The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939 (Macmillan, London, 1975), p. 20. 
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over Ireland during the war. 7' In doing so they pay more attention to the words 
that preceded the withdrawal from the Commons, than the action itself, which 
was at worst melodramatic. It was, for that matter, ineffective, since not only the 
Unionists filed out but also everyone else, seemingly thinking it was 
dinnertime. 72 Another fundamental criterion in such interpretations is the reliance 
on hindsight. Beaverbrook initially avoided retrospection, remarking that, 
`looking backwards now after the lapse of years, such a violent gust of 
antagonism may seem hard to justify in the eyes of posterity', but that it was 
merely indicative of the pre-war tensions that produced it. 73 However, he also 
noted that Law lost proportion because `Bills on the Statute-book would be only 
sand castles against the sweeping tides of change. '74 The certainty that the `rivers 
of blood' of Europe would fundamentally undermine such settlements was 
founded on post-war knowledge, rather than that of September 1914. The 
vastness and length of the European conflict and its repercussions were not 
apparent to contemporaries in autumn 1914. Nor did August 1914 create an 
abrupt line at which political continuities halted. It is a boundary that has been 
made use of frequently to mark the end of the Irish debate within the Unionist 
Party (if only, at times, perhaps for reasons of convenience). 5 This tends to 
distort the continuity in perspectives that passed through to August and 
September 1914, and it removes from consideration much that enhances the 
picture of pre-war Unionism. 
71 Patricia Jalland and John Stubbs, `The Irish Question after the outbreak of War in 1914: some 
unfinished business', English Historical Review, xcvi (1981), pp. 778-807. Stubbs seems to come to the 
opposite conclusion in `Impact', p. 19. 72 Bridgeman to Caroline Bridgeman, 15/09/1914. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 83. 73 Beaverbrook, Politicians, p. 47. 
74 Ibid., p. 50. 
75 See Richard Murphy, `Faction in the Conservative Party and the Home Rule Crisis, 1912-14', History, 
lxxi (1986), pp. 222-234; Jeremy Smith, The Tories and Ireland: Conservative Party politics and the 
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Notwithstanding the straitjacket of the political truce, other restrictions also 
confined Unionist responses to Ireland after July 1914. Previously the threat of 
civil war had appeared imminent on the political calendar, an engagement that 
Law, Carson and `F. E. ' had displayed an eagerness to fulfil if Ulster were 
coerced. 76 With the continued mobilisation of the diehard Unionists (most 
especially through the Ulster Covenant) and the arming of an Ulster Volunteer 
Force, the shadow of civil war had hung ever nearer and darker. 77 However, the 
convergence of armies of millions in continental battle proved a diversion 
sufficient to deter even the most ardent Unionists from playing with the fire that 
was Ulster disobedience. The precedence accorded British security even over the 
Irish Union had been manifested already in the treatment of the 1913 annual 
army act. On this occasion, the party had decided against amending the act, even 
though this had offered a last-ditch chance to wreck Home Rule. However, a pre- 
war policy that had been deliberately tailored around the pursuit of Ulster 
defiance and exclusion was negated entirely by the war. With it went the weapon 
most likely to have split the Liberal-Irish Nationalist alliance, upon which the 
government relied. Likewise, the election for which the party had long fought, 
and which the Ulster threat had nearly won, was now postponed indefinitely. The 
only consolation - and not one that could have been appreciated openly - was 
that of relief at the abandonment of the unconstitutional campaign. 78 
Understandably, given the proximity in time, Unionist attitudes and notions of 
compromise in August and September 1914 remained largely defined by those 
held previously. Hugh Cecil suggested that the Home Rule Bill and its Amending 
Bill should be put into operation but Ulster excluded for six years before the 
76 For instance, NUA Conference, November 1913. 
7' For the diehard movement see Murphy, `Faction', pp. 227-30; Smith, Tories and Ireland, pp. 79-100, 
135-41, passim 
78 For instance, Robert Cecil's fears in Willoughby de Broke to Cecil, 21/09/1913; Amery to Cecil, 
23/01/1914. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 24-25; 51072, ff. 224-5. 
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issues were again considered. 79 The constitutional expert A. V. Dicey called for `a 
bona fide truce' on Home Rule for at least the existence of that parliament, or, 
alternatively (and less acceptably), the exclusion of Ulster. In proposing these 
resolutions, Unionists presumed that six-county exclusion was the minimum 
expectation on their part. 80 The fact that this had not even been an accepted 
threshold before the war seemed to escape them, 81 whilst the shelving of the issue 
in this way was a solution that most of them would have leapt to accept before 
the war. 
Diversity of opinion on Ireland, though, was still evident. F. S. Oliver, the doyen 
of the federalist movement, talked of an extraordinary `opportunity' to settle 
Ireland in a `grand manner'. 82 But the federalist notion remained too abstract and 
the movement too fragmented to be assured of support even from sympathisers. 83 
Southern Unionists, meanwhile, continued their attempts to undermine the 
progress of any home rule bill, by pointing to the dangerous and uncontrolled 
nature of the Irish Volunteers and Nationalists. " If Walter Long was less 
obstinate after August than before, Lord Selborne remained determined. He 
stated that he `could never follow Bonar Law in accepting the present 
Government of Ireland Bill with the complete exclusion of the six counties as a 
final settlement of the Irish constitutional question'. 85 Ulster had its regular 
standard-bearers in Carson and, on a more pragmatic level, Law. 
79 Hugh Cecil to Law, 16/08/1914. BL/34/3/47. 
8° See also Chamberlain to Lord Stamfordham, 17/08/1914 (copy). AC/11/1/95. 
81 Law memorandum on a meeting with Lord Murray of Elibank, 17/07/1914. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 
49693, ff. 169-75. 
82 Jalland, 'Irish Question', p. 78 1. 83 For example, Steel-Maitland to Oliver, 28/08/1914. Oliver Papers, MS 24851, f. 175. 84 Goulding to Law, 17/08/1914; Long to Law, 21/08/1914. BL/34/4/51,63. 
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Alive and well, these oft-heard voices were amplified by the issue of honour 
regarding the political truce. Interpretations of the arrangement appeared to differ 
radically. Law recorded the deal brokered with Asquith at Pembroke Lodge, that 
`until we again resumed discussion of the Amending Bill no controversial 
legislation should be taken, and ... that by the adjournment no party to the 
controversy would be placed in a worse position'. 86 The agreement bore the 
benchmarks of Asquith's style, namely an ability to satisfy those around him 
with unsatisfactorily vague assurances, pledges more powerful in finding 
concurrence than fulfilment. Unionists felt that the arrangement established an 
environment in which controversial legislation would not be tackled at all . 
87 
When contemplating the plural voting bill in 1915, the Party Chairman Arthur 
Steel-Maitland made clear that the truce established on 31 August 1914 
disallowed the consideration of any controversy that would disadvantage any 
party. 88 In such terms, the events of August and September 1914 prejudiced the 
Unionist position in regard to Home Rule. The Liberals, conversely, held that the- 
truce existed to prevent the emergence of domestic disagreement, but that the 
Government was entitled to execute the legislative programme charted before the 
outbreak of was. This was a view shared - in regard hardly surprisingly to Home 
Rule - by the Nationalists. The Government also argued, and with some 
justification, that if Home Rule were not established, then the truce would 
disadvantage the Nationalist Party. Much of the anger that surfaced was 
provoked by the adulteration of this honourable truce. Having met Grey, Robert 
Cecil told Law, with undisguised disbelief, that the Foreign Secretary had treated 
89 the charge of deceit as `novel'. Selborne spoke of any such Bill as `infamous 
86 Brock, Letters, p135, 
87 See Law to Asquith, 07/08/1914 (copy). BU37/4/7. 
88 Memorandum on Plural Voting by Steel-Maitland, n. d. [1915]. SM GD193/164/3/1/17-19x. e9 Robert Cecil to Law, 14/09/1914. B1J34/6/43. 
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treachery' on the part of the Government, Chamberlain of it as an `infamy'. 
90 As 
machine guns in Europe rattled on, and concern over Home Rule became 
increasingly particular to Ulstermen, it was this issue of dishonour that was to 
linger on, causing Bridgeman to claim in November that the Liberals were 
`incapable of honesty or truth' 91 
The desperate and outraged sentiments of many Unionists were manifested in 
specific parliamentary manoeuvres. The most absurd suggestions emanated from 
Robert Cecil who, with both the Home Rule and Welsh Church Bills teetering on 
the edge of the statute book, felt the challenge personally. Both involved the 
workings of the Parliament Act. This act allowed for a bill to be forced through 
the House of Lords if, previously, it had been rejected thrice by that chamber in 
successive years of the same parliament. Cecil's first scheme - merely to refuse 
to reject the bill until parliament was prorogued - was invalidated by the 
Speaker of the Commons. The ambiguity in the wording of the Parliament Act 
was then manipulated to a ridiculous degree, namely through attempts to impede 
the Home Rule bill by confiscating the paper upon which the new bill's 
certificate was written. 92 Such conniving was justified on several grounds: that, 
technically, the House of Lords could withhold the Bill; that the 1911 Act was 
unconstitutional in any case; that, as Lansdowne alleged, the government was 
being `grossly unfair'. 93 That the gentlemanly Lansdowne could sanction this 
petty trick exemplified the widespread frustration. 
90 Selborne to Lady Selborne, 06/08/1914. Boyce, Crisis, p. 114. Chamberlain to Long, 01/09/1914. Long 
Papers, MS Add. 62405, ff. 72-3. 
91 Bridgeman diary, 29/11/1914. Williamson, Modernisation, pp. 81-2. See also, Cheshire Division, AGM, 
23/01/1915, (Are/3/6/2). 
92 Robert Cecil to the Speaker (James Lowther), 09/08/1914,13/09/1914 (copies) and the Speaker to 
Cecil, 21/08/1914 (telegram), 14/09/1914. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 161-3,183,174-5,185. 
93 Lansdowne to Robert Cecil, 20/08/1914. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 172-3. 
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Lansdowne's endorsement was significant in another respect too. For, by the 
time the shadow cabinet convened to decide the issue, he had reneged on his 
earlier pledge to support the plan. The majority, consisting of Chamberlain, 
Long, Carson, Midleton, Robert Cecil, Selborne and Halsbury, were over-ruled 
by Law, Lansdowne, Balfour, Curzon and George Cave, in favour of rejecting 
the scheme. 94 Loyalty to their superiors may have dictated that Selborne and 
company bowed to the minority, so as not to make `the position of the leaders 
impossible'. 95 But why did Lansdowne change his mind between 20 August and 
16 September? It is possible that he simply had not at first thought out the 
implications, but it is more likely that he was swayed by faithfulness to Law, 
who had become increasingly resigned to the establishment of Home Rule on the 
statute book. 
Law's actions were formed partially by the opinions with which he was 
surrounded and partially by his commitment to the patriotic truce. The chairman 
of Wirral Conservative Association wrote: `Let us not forget entirely, in our 
united patriotism, the things that, only a few weeks ago, were so urgent & vital. 
The present war will not last for ever, & we must then go back to them. '96 Steel- 
Maitland, meanwhile, pointed to the assistance, the Unionist Party had offered the 
Government both within parliament and on committees. 97 This feeble emotional 
blackmail was complemented with higher stakes, especially threats to army 
recruitment. While Carson could not decide `which [was] the worst blackguard 
Asquith or the Kaiser', the Ulster Volunteer Force had no such difficulty in 
making up its mind and threatened to stay and fight home rule rather than Berlin 
94 Memorandum on the meeting at Lansdowne House by Chamberlain, 17/09/1914. AC/12/29. 95 Selborne to Salisbury, 18/09/1914. Salisbury Papers, S(4)75/186. 
96 Egerton MacDona to Law, 15/08/1914. BL/34/3/46. 
97 Memorandum, Anne Page to Miss Tyander, n. d. [September 1914]. BLl34/3/16. This memorandum 
was likely written by Steel-Maitland, to whom Anne Page served as Secretary. 
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rule. 98 Halford Mackinder MP asked Law if he could `add one more shot to [his] 
locker? ' - claiming that `if the Government [forced] through H. R. to the front 
just now they [would] break down this powerful agency which is feeding the 
army with more than 1,000 men a day. '99 Despite the persistence of such 
obstructive efforts, Law also received notice of a widespread alteration in mood: 
Talbot considered that the patriotic truce had brought about peace and harmony 
in Ireland conducive to a settlement; John Hills MP felt that the Unionist pledge 
to Ulster should be subservient to Britain's needs; J. P. Croal (editor of the 
Scotsman) advised his leader to be statesmanlike; George Younger (Chairman of 
the Scottish Unionist Association) recommended a `dignified protest'. 100 Perhaps 
the most persuasive communication, however, advocated quiet acquiescence on 
war-related grounds: Gwynne alluded to the damaging effect that a Home Rule 
controversy would have on American relations and, consequently, on any 
assistance the USA might lend Britain. 101 It was perhaps the first real notification 
of how pre-war Unionist perspectives on Ireland would be distorted by European 
conflict. 
Several factors are notable in the manner of Law's response. First, it was 
characterised by a reluctance to allow open dissent. Hence he continued to pursue 
compromise through a dual policy of equivocation. One part consisted of preying 
on the sense of honour of leading Liberals, but even the gentlemanly Grey was 
ready to ride these out. Another was to threaten Asquith with the menace of 
9' Carson to McNeill, 02/09/1914. McNeill Papers, MIC163/2; UVF to Carson, 08/08/1914. BL/34/3/17. 
The UVF did actually all join the army and were slaughtered on the Somme on 1 July 1916, an event 
which became etched into Ulster Unionist folklore (it even shared the date with the Battle of the Boyne). 99 Mackinder to Law, 25/08/1914. BL/34/4/72. 
ioo Talbot to Law, 18/08/1914; Hills to Law, 06/09/1914; Croal to Law, 01/09/1914; Younger to Law, 
05/09/1914. BL/3414/53,20; BL/34/5/3,16. 
101 Gwynne to Law, 03/09/1914. Wilson, Rasp of Isar, p. 28. 
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irrepressible backbench discontent, but Asquith was confident of Unionist loyalty 
to the truce. 102 
There was another important transformation in the debate on Ireland. Namely 
that, in the first few months of war, support can be found for Richard Murphy's 
assertion that `the war saved Bonar Law from his own supporters' . 
103 For, while 
the war did little to diminish the variety or strength of rhetoric employed against 
Home Rule, it did precipitate the resignation of some to its inevitability. 104 In 
doing so, it offered the Unionist leader the opportunity of promoting a solution 
acceptable to the divergent groups within the party, an opportunity that would not 
have arisen in peacetime. His surrender to the inescapability of Home Rule 
persuaded him to propose Ulster exclusion as a basis for agreement. 
Lansdowne's conversion, as a southern Unionist, to the necessity of an exclusion 
settlement was particularly telling. It revealed that the continued diversity and 
intensity of Unionist opinion concealed a newfound powerlessness in which the 
party was forced to cut its losses as best it could! 05 Accordingly, Ulster 
exclusion emerged as the beneficiary of the truce, the cause consolidated as an 
acceptable compromise. 106 
Together, the crisis revealed several fundamental aspects of wartime Unionism. 
A request by Maryhill Unionists that the party leaders be informed of grassroots 
unease at the prospect of Home Rule was not even mentioned at the Western 
Divisional Council of Scotland to which they had appealed. 107 This exposed the 
102 Law to Grey, 06/08/1914; Law to Asquith, 28/08/1914,11/09/1914 (copies). BL/37/4/5,37/4/15, 
37/4/18. 
103 Murphy, 'Faction, p. 232. 
104 See above and Milner to M. Chose, 17/09/1914 (copy). Milner Papers, 349/294-7. St Aldwyn to 
Eleanor Hicks-Beach, 07/09/1914. Hicks-Beach, Hicks-Beach, II, pp. 315. los Asquith to Law, 11/09/1914; Lansdowne to Law, 03/09/1914. BL/34/5/34,34/5/11. 
106 D. G. Boyce, `British Conservative Opinion, the Ulster Question and the Partition of Ireland, 1912-21', 
Irish historical Studies, xvii (1970), pp. 89-112. 
107 Maryhill UA, EC, 17/08/1914; SUA Western Divisional Council, 02/09/1914, (SUCA/Acc. 84, 
10424/28). 
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authority bestowed upon the party leaders in comparison to their supporters. This 
only fostered the idea that the party had not had the matter out properly in 
autumn 1914: the party had not overreacted in autumn 1914; for, if anything it 
had not reacted sufficiently. The distrust and anger was contained only under the 
very heavy lid of early wartime patriotism, a downward pressure to which Law 
had to add only little of his own. This imposed restraint certainly had the most 
severe consequences for the last Liberal government in May 1915. This 
resentment was to be heard again in summer 1916, when the heat was raised once 
more by the `Easter Rising' in Dublin and by disingenuousness of Liberal 
ministers. 
Immediately after the `infamy' of mid-September arose, so did an intensification 
of the feeling of distrust towards the radical government. Chamberlain, with the 
backing of Law and Lansdowne, refused to join Churchill on the recruiting 
platform in Birmingham. 108 Henry Chaplin MP called for the suspension of all 
joint meetings and the continuation of recruitment by the separate parties. 109 
Whilst one Unionist journal in London could be sanguine - `how petty our 
disputes seem in the face of a foreign foe! ' - there were mutterings in the 
provinces. ll° In September and October, it was claimed that Liberal, Labour and 
Roman Catholic groups in Scotland had not been dedicating themselves to 
recruitment, but were instead continuing their party propaganda. 11' Glasgow 
Unionists, who had been ignored by the leadership in August, referred a few 
months later to the `base cowardly betrayal' of Ulster by the government. 112 Even 
those unready to disregard the truce candidly referred to Asquith's untroubled 
ios Memorandum by Chamberlain, September 1914. AC/12/45. 
109 Chaplin to Law, 14/09/1914. BU34/6/46. 
110 Hammer and Crook, September 1914, p. 1. This was the monthly journal of Hammersmith UA. 111 SUA Western Divisional Council, 02/09/1914,07/10/1914, (Ace. 10424/28). 
112 Maryhill UA, EC, 17/08/1914, AGM, 29/01/1915, (Acc. 10424/85). 
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reneging on his pledge. 113 The Liberal MP Richard Holt reported Unionists 
breaking the truce in Hexham. 114 Unionist readiness to threaten the prospects of 
recruitment does more than anything perhaps to illustrate their resentment at the 
`infamy' of Home Rule. Throughout the remaining eight months of the patriotic 
truce, the Home Rule issue of August 1914 continued to rankle sufficiently to 
upset commitment to non-partisanship. What was more, the Home Rule crisis of 
the first two months of war was merely the first articulation of the party's 
impotence within the truce. 
Fighting the Kaiser 
By August 1914, the Unionist Party had been in opposition since December 
1905, a period exceeding any other since its formation. For a party that perceived 
office as a birthright, any prospect of participation whether formal or informal 
was welcomed. Opportunities to be constructive were reinforced by patriotic 
fervour. Chaplin -a mere seventy years of age - was livid to be turned away at 
the recruiting office. For Stanley Baldwin `young deaths aggravated his middle- 
aged frustration'. The atmosphere of the House, frequently busy with men in 
khaki, can only have exacerbated this desire for action. 115 Such frustrations no, 
doubt partly explain the alacrity with which Unionists immersed themselves in 
any work thrown their way, most especially recruitment. Potentially, this activity 
posed an enormous challenge to the patriotic truce, involving cooperation not 
113 Cheshire Division, AGM, 23/01/1915 (Are/3/6/1); Norwood JIL, AGM, 27/01/1915 (IV/166/1/10). 
114 Holt diary, 01/11/1914. David Dutton (ed. ), Odyssey of an Edwardian Liberal: the Political Diary of 
Richard Dunning Holt (Alan Sutton, Gloucester, 1989), p. 35. 
lls Adams, Law, p. 176; Chaplin to Hewins, 11/10/1914. Hewins Papers, 57/201; Kenneth Young, Stanley 
Baldwin (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1976), pp. 20-1; Sanders Diary, 25/08/1914. John Ramsden 
(ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: the Political Diaries of Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (Historian's 
Press, London, 1984), p. 80. 
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only between parliamentary forces, but also between the wider political parties 
and machinery. 
From the outset of war, the Unionists had displayed a willingness to work 
alongside the Government in recruitment. This went beyond the already strong 
links they harboured to the military and militias. On 9 September, the National 
Union Executive Committee (NUEC) unanimously passed a resolution in support 
of the formation of a joint Parliamentary Recruiting Committee (PRC), and 
agreed to surrender St Stephen's Chambers (home of Unionist Central Office) to 
the Speakers' Sub-Department of the new body. 116 With such new 
responsibilities, it was predictable that reports of the successes and difficulties of 
recruiting should feature large and proud in party meetings. Many constituencies 
adopted such duties with. enthusiasm, the Hastings Conservative Association 
even establishing its own joint Unionist/Liberal system before being so instructed 
by Central Office. ' 17 
Furthermore, though it may have gone unnoticed by contemporaries, recruitment 
offered a non-partisan excuse and means by which to maintain normal party 
activity. However, it remains difficult for the historian to evaluate in quantitative 
terms the effect that the truce, or indeed recruitment, had upon party 
organisation. What can be said, is that it was rare that an association wound up 
activities entirely. 118 More frequent was the maintenance of a skeleton 
organisation, including annual reports, infrequent - and ill attended - committee 
meetings, and some attention to measures of finance. The emphasis upon 
recruitment in such gatherings suggests that this responsibility provided a fresh 
focus. Nevertheless it was, overwhelmingly, a focus upon cooperation between 
116 NUEC, 09/09/1914. 
117 Hastings UA, EC, 03/09/1914, (JAR). 
118 See below, p. 237. 
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Liberals and Unionists. Such was the case in Herefordshire North, where it was 
reported that the Unionist and Liberal Agents `had been doing nothing in the last 
few months other than organising recruiting meetings'. 119 Indeed, recruitment 
perhaps did more than any other activity to unite the parties behind a common 
purpose, the PRC in particular being a major buttress for the political truce. 120 As 
Roy Douglas has suggested, the actions of the PRC were `indicative of the way 
in which party attitudes had been submerged'. When opinions diverged, Liberal 
and Unionist representatives could be seen swapping clothes. For example, in 
November 1914, a proposal by the Liberal MP Jesse Herbert to establish a 
system of householder returns was opposed by Steel-Maitland on the grounds 
121 that the forms might be too inquisitorial. 
Notwithstanding this apparent concord between Unionists and Liberals, party 
men pined for the old partisan conflict. In November Law heard from a supporter 
who commented on having seen his leader's name `sandwiched' between that of 
Arthur Henderson (leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party) and Asquith in a 
PRC circular: 
"Tell me whose company you keep and I will tell you what you are" ... The less the 
Conservatives associate themselves with the present Government in curing a position for 
which the Government is a great deal to blame, the better it will be for them at the next 
General 122 
In part representing the remnants of the `short-war fallacy' -a condescending 
term adopted by historians for mainstream opinion (indeed, the opinion of almost 
everyone except Lord Kitchener) - this also reflected the ongoing influence of 
119 Herefordshire North UA, AGM, 19/03/1915, (K78/2). 
120 For instance, Birmingham Handsworth UA, AGM Report, 18/05/1915, (JAR). 
121 This suggestion was a cruder form of the National Register Act of 1915. Roy Douglas, `Voluntary 
Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee', Journal of 
Modern History, xli (1970), pp. 571,575-6. 122 W. Crossley to Law, 23/11/1914. BL/35/3/49. 
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traditional party politics. By Christmas 1914, despite the realisation by many 
Unionists that the war would not end in the predicted six or nine months, efforts 
were made to preserve electoral prospects. Minds were concentrated by the 
spectre of a plural voting bill, which threatened to relieve the party of one its last 
vestiges of privilege. 123 At the end of January, Law informed Curzon that, should 
the Government attempt to pass such legislation, `I am not at all sure that we 
should not openly declare that the truce is at an end. ' 124 In fact, Steel-Maitland 
had been working for some time to force the government to drop the Bill, hoping 
to flex the opposition's muscles over a by-election arrangement to this end . 
125 In 
the mean time, Talbot identified a chance to undermine the whole procedure of 
payment of members: `there is considerable feeling about this on our side that we 
ought to take this opportunity of the War to call attention in the House & move to 
stop it'. 126 In spite of the level of feeling on this point, it was a minor, even petty, 
controversy to broach in wartime. '27 A third case arose over the method by which 
best to extend the tenure of parliament. At the forefront of Steel-Maitland's mind 
was the maintenance of Unionist electoral prospects. Accordingly, he favoured 
the passing of legislation abrogating Clause VII of the 1911 Parliament Act, so as 
to increase the duration of parliament from five to seven years. Lurking at the 
back of his mind, however, was the opportunity to wither the laurels of the 
`much-vaunted' Parliament Act as allowing for `Single Chamber Government in 
perpetuity'. Therefore, it `might solve a real difficulty, and at the same time be a 
party score when the War is over, without in any way hurting the interests of the 
country' . 
128 
123 For detailed analysis of plural voting, see below p. 209. 124 Law to Curzon, 29/01/1915. Boyce, Crisis, pp. 119-20. 125 Steel-Maitland Memorandum on By-Elections, 14/12/1914. Enclosed in Talbot to Law, 15/12/1914. 
BL/34/4/36. 
126 Talbot to Law, 22/01/1915. BU36/2/37. 
127 See also, pp. 135-138. 
59 
Such manifestations of traditional party politics spilling over into war came to a 
head in spring 1915 over the drink question. First proposed in late February, 
Lloyd George's scheme to state-manage the drink trade was promoted as a means 
to stop alcohol consumption upsetting munitions production. Initial plans for full 
nationalisation were watered down, as were those for a stringent taxation on 
strong liquor. And, when the measure was put before parliament on 29 April, all 
that remained was the control of liquor traffic in areas in which war material was 
produced or transported, along with restraints on the sale of liquor less than three 
years old. 129 Nevertheless, Law was acutely embarrassed by a backbench 
rebellion against Lloyd George's scheme, a proposal to which Law had 
previously agreed. 
Taken at face value the party appeared self-centred, opportunistic and more 
concerned with factional than national interests. Together, therefore, did the 
months October to May demonstrate the party retreating towards its pre-war 
shibboleths and sectionalism? Was the party regressive and merely eager to make 
the most of the opportunities of war? Had the war done nothing to rid them of the 
negative, defensive politics that had characterised the pre-war period? 
Several reservations must be placed on these accusations at the outset. In the first 
place, there is much to imply that in the grander scheme of things the rank and 
file of the party adopted the truce without either delay or dissent. On 6 August, 
the NUEC held an emergency meeting to consider `arrangements for the 
temporary cessation of political activity during the European War'. It resolved to 
agree to follow the lead of Liberal Chief Whip Illingworth in running down the 
political operations of the party organisation and ancillary organs. The NUEC 
128 Steel-Maitland Memorandum on a General Election, 05/01/1915. SM GD193/306/4x-8x. Law later 
quashed this idea. Steel-Maitland Memorandum of Conversation with Law, April 1915. SM GD193/386/31-2x. 
129 Hazlehurst, Politicians, pp. 210-13. 
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advised that within the propaganda department, the services of all casual 
speakers were to be discontinued. Permanent speakers, meanwhile, were to be 
paid in full but to be prepared `to do any kind of work they might think fit either 
for the Party or the Government'. In terms of literature, only the `ordinary 
periodicals', namely Gleanings and Memoranda and Our Flag, were to be 
continued. Our Flag was actually discontinued in September. As one editor of a 
constituency gazette put it: `To-day there is but one party' - shortly before 
pursuing his non-partisanship to its natural conclusion by discontinuing 
production of his journal. 130 
The NUEC also circulated requests that their constituency organisations be kept 
up. Accordingly, Glasgow Unionists demanded that their association `must he 
maintained in undiminished strength'. Bristol West Unionist Association sought 
deliberately to sustain the routine, if not the, political, character of its 
otganisation. 131 As is demonstrated in Chapter IV, Central Office advice was not 
heeded universally. Although the NUEC circular was eagerly read in Clapham 
South in October, the constituency decided not to reconvene for what turned' out 
to be the next four years. 132 Nonetheless, for local associations, perhaps the most 
significant point was that `with regard to Registration the Chairman stated that he 
was of opinion that the agents should be advised to go on'. 133 Indeed, many 
constituency secretaries and agents recorded in 1914 their most successful 
canvasses for years. The secretary of Shrewsbury Unionist Association wrote of 
it being `the best registration I ever remember from our point of view'. Though 
contending that one never knew what the radicals might do, he thought it `best to 
130 Hitchen Divisional Conservative and Unionist Gazette, August, p. i. 131 Glasgow UA Annual Report, 25/01/1915, (Acc. 10424/24); Bristol West UA EC, 06/11/1914, (JAR). 
132 Clapham South UA, Park Branch Committee, 23/10/1914, (CCA/6). 133 NUEC, 06/08/1914. 
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get one in, when there's a chance'. 134 The imminence of a general election due in 
1915 does to some extent explain such unashamed delight in registration 
successes. Indeed, it is within the context of an impending election that Steel- 
Maitland's manipulation of the politics of war for electoral advantage must be 
viewed. 
A second indication that the party was not obsessed by regressive or sectional 
politics was that certain pre-war policies were abandoned. The Welsh Church, for 
instance, was permitted to die in relative peace in March 1915. The six-month 
delaying order placed upon the Disestablishment Bill was little more than a 
perfunctory display of Liberal good will. A third dynamic that has to be 
appreciated in evaluating Unionist reactions was that, as over Ireland in autumn 
1914, they remained hamstrung within the patriotic truce. Often, His Majesty's 
Opposition was reduced to polite enquiries about provisions of men and 
munitions. Despite invitations of attendance to ministerial meetings being 
accepted by party notables (including previous Unionist Chancellors Austen 
Chamberlain. and Lord St Aldwyn), the party remained powerless. Even Balfour, 
who was privy to the most confidential decisions through his seat on the 
Committee of Imperial Defence and the Dardanelles Committee, appeared to 
shape the government's actions very little. 135 The insinuation in January 1915 by 
the Lord Privy Seal, the Marquis of Crewe, that the Tory leaders were implicated 
in government decisions may have been `disingenuous', as Lansdowne 
maintained. 136 Nonetheless, the Unionists had done little to avoid, and perhaps 
even had done much to encourage, the accusation. Redolent of the hesitancy and 
the precedence accorded protocol at the outset of war, it was also symbolic of a 
134 William Price to Lloyd, 14/08/1914,14/09/1914. Lloyd Papers, 18/6. 
135 See, for instance, the equivocation in his letter to `Jack' Sandars, 26/09/1914. Sandars Papers, 
766/166-70. 
136 Lansdowne to Curzon, 10/01/1915. Curzon Papers, f112,96. 
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passive acquiescence in nearly all government actions. A particularly vivid 
exposition of this was Law's refusal to act on Long's request that the 
Government should be informed of the desperate need for reinforcements in 
France. His reasoning was that he was `greatly afraid of taking such a decisive 
step as to send any written opinion to the Government'. 137 When Law could 
muster the courage to draw his pen from its scabbard, he was easily placated by 
Asquith's protestations that his own hands were tied, and thus that a challenge 
along normal parliamentary lines would be inconceivable. 138 
Unsurprisingly given such taciturnity, Bridgeman felt that in the autumn session 
they had `carried [patriotism] to an extreme by refraining ... from criticism'. 
139 
Curzon agreed, complaining in January 1915 that the opposition was expected to 
give a `mute and almost unquestioning support to everything done by the 
Government' 
. 
140 This incapacitation within the truce also concealed a 
considerable reduction in the strength of the opposition. Central Office expressly 
informed Unionist MPs that their obligation lay with military rather than political 
brethren. '4' Charles Bathurst agreed, replying that he `felt most strongly that my 
duty now lies in other directions and that my soldiering [with the Monmouthshire 
Yeomanry] should take precedence of my Parliamentary work' . 
142 Close links 
with the military ensured that Unionists volunteered in large numbers and, as 
Central Office boasted, 139 Unionist MPs - compared to 41 Radicals, 1 Labour 
and 3 Irish Nationalists - served with the colours in 1915.143 Patently, this 
reduced the party's parliamentary potential considerably. Quite whether this 
reduction was relevant however - in a parliamentary climate in which criticism 
137 Long to Law, 16/12/1914; Law to Long, 17/12/1914 (copy). BU35/5/44,37/4/38- 
138 For example over the November budget and Home Rule. 139 Bridgeman diary, 29/11/1914. Williamson, Modernisation, pp. 81-2. 
140 Memorandum by Curzon, January 1915. Long Papers, MS Add. 62419, ff. 29-34. 
141 Whip's Notice, 04/11/1914. Long Papers, MS Add. 62418, f. 56. 
142 Bathurst to Law, 08/11/1914. BL/35/2/14. 
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was prohibited and, if evidenced in any magnitude, could prove potentially 
destructive - was questionable. 
The one real opening lay in extra-parliamentary methods. As that great bastion of 
provincial journalism C. P. Scott recorded: `the truce of parties certainly doesn't 
apply to the party press' - an assertion amply corroborated by the historian 
Stephen 144 Whilst the Unionist Party may not have possessed the deft hand 
of Lloyd George, they enjoyed sufficient contacts and friends within the industry 
to utilise its newfound clout. As the incapacity in parliament was felt, Law 
expressed himself happy for the press to attack the Government over the 
Antwerp disaster in mid-October. 145 Central Office spurred on Maxse - who 
hardly needed encouragement - in his anti-alien attacks on Liberal ministers. 
146 
Maxse, the editor of the National Review, spent the majority of the war writing 
overwhelmingly fictitious account of spies within the British, and most especially 
Liberal, establishment. German agents (effectively anyone who had any links 
whatsoever with the enemy country, along with a majority who had no such links 
at all) were unearthed in every corner - most frequently colluding with the 
Haldanes and befriending associates of Asquith's bridge partners. 
Despite the hysteria of the press, it remained an insufficient means by which to 
express party feeling. As Maxse's case exemplified, newspapers were open to the 
personal priorities of proprietors and editors, and they were manoeuvrable only 
to a degree. What is more, censorship under the Press Bureau confined its 
military and political reportage. The country was, in the words of Milner, being 
14 Scott Diary, 02/11/1914. Trevor Wilson (ed. ). The Political Diaries of C. J Scott (Collins, London, 
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treated `like an infant school' . 
147 Wilson could advise Long all he liked that the 
surest way to assist the military was `by telling people the truth', but Unionists 
were in no position to do so. 148 So thwarted were they, in their efforts to utilise 
the press to encourage private economy and recruitment that Steel-Maitland 
considered that a debate upon the subject of censorship could bring down the 
government. 149 In any case, whatever the capabilities of the press, unsystematic 
newspaper criticism of the government was unlikely to assuage backbench 
frustrations. Constrained within the patriotic truce, the parliamentary party was 
no doubt more likely to resort to the old conflict than had it been able to express 
itself freely. Nonetheless, it is evident that the issues on which the party felt most 
frustrated were increasingly war-related. This was evinced in the crises of 
January and spring 1915 principally over recruitment, drink, and munitions. 
Part of a concerted attempt to coerce Law into action, uncompromising 
memoranda on current events circulated by Long and Curzon in January 1915 
focussed on the party's inability to advance recruitment, most especially through 
national service. 150 A contemporaneous consideration of coalition revealed, on, 
the other hand, both the degree of dissatisfaction and the transformation in 
politics since August 1914. Though both Long and Curzon dismissed coalition 
out of hand, Hugh Cecil was a more convinced advocate. He wrote to his brother 
of the opportunity of building a `golden bridge' over which willing Liberals 
could cross, suggesting that Asquith, Grey and Haldane might be glad to make 
the passage and take the opportunity to work with opposition leaders, and thus 
147 Milner to Gwynne, 21/08/1914,03/09/1914. Wilson, Rasp of War, pp. 22-3,28-9. 148 Note between Wilson and Long, 20/11/1914. Long Papers, MS Add. 62418, f. 64. 149 Pencil-note on Memorandum, January 1915; `Memorandum on the Political Situation', February 1915. 
Both by Steel-Maitland. SM/GD193/306/78-83x; 193/386/10-15x. 
iso Long to Colonel [Charles a Court Repington], 01/01/1915 (copy). Long Papers, MS Add. 62419, 
ff. 1-3; Curzon to Lansdowne, 06/01/1915. Lansdowne Papers, Named Correspondent. 
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construct a post-war coalition. 151 Cecil's willingness to welcome over to his side 
the perpetrators of the `infamy' of Home Rule appears outlandish. It was all the 
more remarkable because the men to whom the invitation was to be extended 
were the architects of military unpreparedness themselves (Asquith and 
Haldane). Did it reflect, therefore, a burying of old party hatchets? It certainly 
exposed the peculiar evolution of wartime party politics, for the author was 
considering the formation of a Whig centre party. Consequently, the proposal 
visualised the subordination of the Irish issue in a manner not conceived for 
thirty years. In Cecil's mind, Ireland was to bow to wartime politics. More 
particularly, it was to become subservient to his desire to undermine not only the 
radicalised left (Lloyd George and Labour), but also more specifically the 
reactionary Tory wing (epitomised by Maxse, Gwynne and Curzon), which 
threatened to leave no stone unturned in its quest for a victorious formula for 
Britain's armies. 
Cecil's scheme never received a wide enough airing to either win over or lose 
Unionist adherents, but it is inconceivable that it would have received much 
support. For, if, like many Liberals, Cecil was traumatised by the demands of 
war, it is manifest that the vast majority of his colleagues were not. As such, it 
did not reveal the genesis of a party rupture or the first cracks in the consensus on 
`total' war. Rather, it betokened the predominance of war-related questions, the 
evolution of a specific and distinctive Unionist approach to the war and, perhaps, 
the yielding of Ireland tb the politics of war. Disgust at Liberal indecision in July 
1914 was rivalled only by continued astonishment at the failure of the 
government to `prosecute the war' sufficiently. `Prosecute the war' became a 
catchphrase repeated ad nauseum in Unionist communications and literature. As 
early as 4 August 1914, Balfour felt it necessary to urge upon Haldane at the War 
151 Private Memorandum by Hugh Cecil to Robert Cecil, 10/01/1915. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51157, 
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Office the necessity of the immediate despatch of the Expeditionary Force to 
North East France, a deployment the Liberal Government appeared to view 
equivocally. 152 Five days later, Long felt that the Government `[didn't] know 
what to do or how to do anything' . 
153 Disaffection thereafter emerged on a broad 
variety of Government policies: the internment of aliens; the necessity of 
economy; the development of British industry independent of Germany; military 
and strategic unpreparedness; the refusal to grant the public information on the 
war; methods of recruitment. 
If anything, the formation of the Unionist Business Committee (UBC) in January 
1915 reflected a convergence of this refined appreciation of `total' war and of the 
stultifying position of the Unionist parliamentary rank and file. The UBC was 
founded by W. A. S. Hewins MP, previously secretary of the Tariff Commission, 
as a means by which to introduce greater organisation amongst the backbenches 
and permit them a proper role in parliamentary debates and decisions. Its central 
core was an executive committee of approximately twenty-five members, but it 
was also to possess committed sub-committees through which much detailed 
work was carried out into government war policies. The considerable energies 
expended by Law to temper this new movement were testament to dangerous 
undertows. 154 Law appointed the confrontational but loyal Long as chairman, 
accorded the group a prominent role in opposition debates, and displayed a 
willingness to receive deputations. The failure of these steps to mollify 
backbench dissent revealed the cumulative challenge to the truce, most especially 
from January 1915 onwards, and the inability of the party leadership to control 
its parliamentary forces. 
ff. 16-32. 
152 Memorandum of a conversation between Lansdowne and Haldane, 04/08/1914. Lansdowne Papers, 
Misc. 
153 Long to Law, 09/08/1914. BL/34/3/28. 
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It was essentially such forces that propelled the controversy over drink into 
parliamentary debate. John Stubbs and John Turner have shown that the distress 
in spring 1915 cannot be seen merely as the outcome of residual unhappiness 
over Ireland. 155 Instead, it must be considered within the context of the drink 
controversy and within the framework of internal party dynamics dictated by the 
war. 156 This latter framework dictated that backbench influence was diminished 
and complicity between the frontbenches rose. These influences converged to 
create mass inner-party friction when Law accepted Lloyd George's 
controversial proposals to nationalise the drink industry. 157 However, as is 
explained below (and in depth in Chapter V), the question of drink in spring 1915 
was principally a war-related matter rather than purely a question of the party's 
links to the `trade'. The brewing industry undeniably enjoyed considerable sway 
within the party, and once mobilised was capable of applying pressure to protect 
its interests. 158 Nonetheless, the idea, put forward by Stubbs, that Unionist 
business elements closed ranks behind this `partisan' question so suddenly, and 
just so as to protect its own interests, fails to consider properly the underlying 
contradiction distinguished by Unionists. 159 For, a more considerable faction was 
persuaded by the wider principle of voluntary regulation and enterprise, and 
many conceived the policy to be a poorly camouflaged temperance move. 160 But 
even more pervasively, Unionists perceived hypocrisy in the Government's war 
policy. How could it, they questioned, pursue `business as usual' (meaning free 
154 Hewins Diary, 28/01/1915,10/02/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 12-13; Ramsden, Balfour and 
Baldwin, pp. 112,114. 
155 John Turner, `State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War', Historical Journal, xxiii 
(1980), pp. 589-615; Stubbs, `Impact', pp. 25-27. 
156 John Turner, `The House of Commons and the Executive in the First World War', Parliamentary 
History, x (1991), pp. 299-302. 
157 Lloyd George to Frances Stevenson, 07/04/1915. A. J. P. Taylor (ed. ), My Darling Pussy: the letters of 
Lloyd George and Frances Stevenson, 1913-1941 (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1975), p. 8. 
158 Albert Banister (Chairman of Hop-Growers Defence League) to Law, 31/03/1915; Lord Iveagh 
(Chairman of Guinness) to Law, 19/04/1915. BL136/6/42,37/1/45. 
159 Stubbs, `Impact', pp. 24-7. 
160 For this particular aspect of the debate see below pp. 276-278. 
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trade) in essential industries (such as munitions and dyes) and state interference 
in non-essential trades (in this case drink)? A government that was unready to 
rationalise the nation's industrial resources in regard to munitions, let alone 
accept the necessity of conscription, could not be trusted to state-manage the 
drink trade. Indeed to attempt to do the latter before the former appeared perverse 
and irresponsible. It seemed as if the government was fiddling with the (beer) 
taps whilst the place was flooding - and Unionists were not even convinced that 
the government was lessening rather than increasing the flow. Accordingly, 
dissent emerged from Chamberlain on the grounds of the impracticability of 
executing such a financially extravagant policy during war. Elsewhere, as well, 
objections pertained to the prosecution of the war. Both Long and Hewins were 
unconvinced by the measure both in terms of its effect on the brewing trade and 
related industries, but also, more specifically, upon the war effort. Long felt that 
the measures `had little relevance to the disease they were proposed to remedy 
and none to munitions of war'. Hewins, having previously drawn attention to 
shortfalls in munitions and men at the front, argued that the `remedies [were] in 
no sense adequate'. 161 It was, as even Law could acknowledge, a `bagatelle' - an 
inconsequential diversion to the real matter of munitions. 162 
As is discussed in Chapter V, the true dimensions of this crisis possess 
significance in evaluating the evolution of Unionist perspectives on wartime state 
intervention. Attitudes to drink are also crucial in appreciating the evolution of a 
Unionist commitment to, and method for approaching, the prosecution of the war 
in 1914-15. They establish that sectional interests did not dominate the party and 
that the ideology of war was not subservient to party matters. At their core was 
the question of the best means by which to make war. Taken in conjunction with 
161 Hewins Diary, 30/04/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 28. Long to Law, 01/05/1915 (Copy). Long 
Papers, MS Add. 62404, ff. 73-5. 
162 Law to Wilson, 09/04/1915 (copy). BU37/5/17. 
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the crisis over munitions - which they must be, for even Lloyd George 
established a causal link between the two - they indicated that, although Law 
might have been susceptible to backbench pressure, the party was not being torn 
apart by the European conflict. 
That said, it is unthinkable that had the issue of drink emerged in September 
1914 rather than spring 1915, Law would have faced such backbench willingness 
to upset the government. In April, collusion between the front benches was 
viewed with repugnance, while such actions over Home Rule and the budget the 
previous autumn had passed largely without criticism. 163 Indeed, Lloyd George's 
November budget, which trebled beer tax, had provoked only the rupture of 
Chamberlain's already fragile association with the Exchequer, along with cursory 
parliamentary criticism. 164 While the proposals of spring 1915 were a far greater 
threat to the brewing community than those of November 1914, the majority 
criticism emanated from war management. What therefore had changed? As 
A. J. P. Taylor and others have argued, the `infamy' over Ireland remained in 
Unionist minds. 165 By placing Home Rule upon the statute book in September, 
the Government undermined Unionist confidence both in Liberal commitment to 
the truce, and in the opposition's position within it, and there was a growing 
refusal to accept the vulnerability that the truce imposed upon the party. 
Insecurities over plural voting and payment of members, consequently, surfaced 
to extents that would otherwise have been implausible, and even the hallowed 
practise of recruitment was threatened. 
Nonetheless, two other developments were also to the fore by late spring 1915: 
first, the party's defencelessness and impotence as exemplified in Home Rule 
163 Hewins Diary, 17/11/1914. Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 6 164 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (Odhams, London, 1938), I, p72. St Aldwyn to Michael Hicks- 
Beach, 23/11/1914. Hicks-Beach, Hicks-Beach, II, pp. 320-21. 
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had become even further entrenched; second, the best means by which to impel a 
Liberal Government to prosecute the war along Unionist lines seemed unclear. 
The events of spring 1915 displayed the discharge of backbench frustration at 
their perceived powerlessness, and represented an effort to wrestle control away 
from the party leadership and back towards the rank and file MPs. Backbench 
discontent, meanwhile, was advanced by the failure of the leadership to discover 
a suitable vehicle by which to induce the Government to prosecute the war 
vigorously. In effect this made an intolerable situation an untenable one, in that 
without strict obedience to the leadership, parliamentary controversy was 
inescapable. Unionist concerns in autumn 1914, which largely centred round 
critiques of Government failure to apply policies regarding alien internment 
properly, or to establish systems for provisioning men at the front, were 
developed into constructive demands such as conscription and the rationalisation 
of munitions supplies. Ironically, therefore, it was patriotism itself that 
determined Unionist 'inability to sit comfortably within the patriotic truce. This 
was evidenced in the overwhelming unanimity displayed towards the diplomatic 
crisis of July, and afterwards in the leitmotif of `prosecution of the war'. The 
question now became, whether the Liberals could be better controlled and 
impelled within a coalition. 
165 A. J. P. Taylor, `Politics in the First World War' in Ideen, Politics in Wartime and other essays 
(Hamish Hamilton, London, 1964), p. 19. 
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II 
THE PARTY AND COALITION 
`Of course as no doubt you would be the first to admit, party in 
some shape or form is bound to return ultimately because there 
will always be two opinions of how things ought to be done and 
the men who ought to do them. [But] having got rid of party as 
we have there is no reason why it should haunt us during 
reconstruction and I look forward with strong hope to a non- 
party regime for the next few years. ' 
- John St Loe Strachey to Lord Derby, 05/10/1916.1 
'It was very difficult to sit down and work with the men we have been fighting 
bitterly for years but we have done it without reservation. ' If the date were not 
known of these remarks of Lord Selborne, the historian could be forgiven for 
placing them after 1918 and in relation to the German foe that Britain had been 
fighting tortuously for four years. They were not, but were rather applied to the 
Liberal party in May 1915 2 On 25 May, a coalition government was formed 
under Asquith, comprising Liberal, Unionist and Labour elements (the Irish 
Nationalist Party had been invited but declined). In December 1916, this 
coalition was succeeded by an administration, with the same parties represented, 
headed by David Lloyd George. This chapter seeks to understand how the 
Unionist Party came to be seated alongside their political enemies and the effect 
1 Strachey Papers, S15/2/5. 
2 Selborne to Sophia Palmer, 29/05/1915. D. G. Boyce (ed. ), The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord 
Selborne's Domestic Political Papers (Historian's Press, London, 1987), p. 127. 
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this had upon the working, and the idea, of their party. While it is not the 
intention to demarcate narrowly the boundaries of war and coalition, nevertheless 
opportunities will arise to demonstrate their relative significance. The first two 
sections of the chapter discuss the party processes and inter-party personalities 
that characterised the coalition until the `Coupon' election of winter 1918. While 
questioning whether coalition government acted against the interests of the party 
in the war years, it is shown to have had a destructive effect on the internal 
connections between different strata of the party. As is explained in the third 
part, this affected how far coalition could, and did, transform Unionist 
commitment towards their established principles and towards the idea of 'party'. 
As such, the longer-term prospects of continued partnership are seen to have 
been less than convincing. 
Sitting with the Enemy: Forming the Coalition 
The catalyst for the first coalition has been much debated by historians, with 
some pointing at the revelation of munitions shortages on 14 May by Colonel 
Charles ä Court Repington, the maverick military correspondent of The Times. 
Others emphasise the resignation of the First Sea Lord, `Jackie' Fisher, which 
followed hard on its heels the next day 4 Both approaches tend however to agree 
on the ultimate trigger, namely the threat to the continuance of the patriotic truce 
posed by Unionist disillusionment. Martin Pugh, meanwhile, has distanced 
himself from these factors, drawing attention to the swelling of the Liberal 
3 Ramsden has emphasised the negative implications of coalition. John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and 
Baldwin, 1902-1940 (Longmans, London, 1978), pp. 130-5. 
° Lord Beaverbrook, Politicians and the War (Collins, London, 1960), pp. 100-111; John Turner, British 
Politics and the Great War: coalition and conflict (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1992), pp. 60-61; 
Geoffrey Searle, Country Before Party: Coalition and the Idea of 'National Government' in Modern 
Britain, 1885-1987 (Longman, London, 1995), pp. 89-90; Roy Jenkins, Churchill (Macmillan, London, 
2001), pp. 269-70; Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar 
Law (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1955), pp. 241-6. 
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parliamentary majority by the absence of Unionist MPs at the front. Instead, he 
views `the inexorably approaching election' as the catalyst, because `it was a 
foregone conclusion that Toryism would triumph' .5 In order to thwart an 
election, and this was unavoidable unless Unionist desires in both Houses were 
sated, coalition became the only alternative. 
The issue of a general election was certainly pertinent in May 1915 as the 
Government was due to go the country by December. The local Unionist 
associations and agents had remained on a war footing in electoral terms since 
the outset of the real war, through continued registration work. 6 In April, the 
Unionist leadership had rejected the Government's proposal to prolong 
parliament by the suspension of the Parliament Act for a year, instead informing 
them that `they had better come back in two or three months'. Law was against 
making a bargain with the Government, because they `would not be able to turn 
the Govt. out before that date, even if it became most advisable to try and do so'. 
To what extent these pronouncements reflected a deliberated eagerness to 
challenge the Government in an election is highly questionable. When convening 
a meeting of Unionist leaders, Law had told Lansdowne that, although it was 
`grossly unfair' that the Government should continue with its plans to abolish 
plural voting, the Unionist Party could not readily oppose an extension of 
parliament. It would, he claimed, `be difficult to make a stand which would 
mean forcing an election in the middle of a war on the ground that [the Liberals 
were] not to get the Plural Voting Bill'. 8 Thus, although Trevor Wilson has 
asserted that Law's `strength ultimately lay' in the threat of a general election, it 
S Martin Pugh, `Asquith, Bonar Law and the First Coalition', Historical Journal, xvii (1974), pp. 815-16. 6 See for instance Oxford Division, EC, 01/05/1915 (S. Oxon. Con. III/1) and Chapters I and IV. 
`Memorandum of a Conversation with Bonar Law' by Steel-Maitland, April 1915. SM GD/193/386/30- 
31x 
8 Law to Lansdowne, 13/04/1915. Lansdowne Papers, `Further Correspondence' (88/42). 
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lay only in exactly that -a threat .9 Again, however, it must be noted that 
if this 
menace was being maintained and increased intentionally (as the postponement 
of any electoral arrangement most assuredly did), it was not as a tool to deliver a 
coalition. The only notable Unionist who desired an electoral agreement in April 
1915 was Steel-Maitland. But, his championship of coalition was exceptional, to 
him. The move was actually reflective rather of Unionist resentment at the 
government's domestic and war policies. 
Whether constructed as such or not, in May 1915 an election was undoubtedly a 
potent threat. While a general election fought over the management of war, rather 
than the party-orientated issue of plural voting, would have been politically 
acceptable, Law was still uneasy, realising the divisive effect of a Unionist 
administration upon the country. Accordingly, as John Turner has suggested, the 
avoidance of a confrontation that might lead to a General Election, was the 
priority for both leaders. 10 The question, therefore, was why such a confrontation 
was inescapable. 
As Peter Fraser has argued, there were limits to the political advantage that could 
be accrued from the munitions and Admiralty crises. Through the Committee of 
Imperial Defence and the War Council, Balfour was complicit in the Balkans 
strategy, which had formed the predominant excuse in Fisher's weak logic for 
resignation. It was a policy shrouded in confidentiality in any case. " What is 
more, the nature of Fisher's departure severely undermined any pious respect 
reserved for military commanders. His eighth resignation threat since the outset 
of war displayed scant regard for procedure and hence the war effort, and a 
skulking self-indulgence that endeared him to few: certainly not Selbome, who 
9 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-35 (Collins, London, 1966), p. 62. 10 Turner, British Politics, p. 61 
11 Peter Fraser, `British War Policy and the Crisis of Liberalism in May 1915', Journal of Modern 
History, liv, (1982), p. 17. 
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claimed that Fisher had made `an ass of himself'; or Bridgeman who felt it `a 
discreditable performance'. Balfour even thought him (probably correctly) `a 
little mad'. 12 Finally, although Fisher counted several leading Unionists as 
friends, certain right-wing newspaper editors would not have fallen into a pro- 
Fisher, anti-Churchill line. 13 
As for the munitions shortages, Fraser underemphasises its role in arguing that 
what `could [have been] expected in any parliamentary sequel to the Repington 
telegram was not a party attack but renewed pressure for a policy of national 
organisation'. 14 On the contrary, much suggests that the deficiency of shells, 
together with the Churchill-Fisher dispute, lent themselves to an air of 
inefficiency considered insufferable upon the Unionist benches. Neither was 
Law's readiness to avoid a general election by acquiescence matched within his 
party. And (as was demonstrated in the previous chapter) Unionist submission to 
Home Rule in September 1914 was unlikely to have happened in spring 1915. It 
is in the context of this, of the emergence of the sectional issues of plural voting 
and, most significantly, of war management policies such as drink, that the 
problems at the Admiralty and over munitions must be viewed. Two clear facts 
emerge about the party by May 1915: criticism of the Government was widely 
endorsed and Law's ability to prevent any such criticism was becoming 
increasingly frail. 
12 Selborne to Balfour, 19/05/1915 and reply 20/05/1915 (copy). Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49708, ff. 248, 
249-50. Bridgeman Diary, May 1915. Philip Williamson (ed. ), The Modernisation of Conservative 
Politics: the Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935 (Historian's Press, London, 1988), 
p. 87. 
13 Fisher was friendly with men such as Goulding (Wargrave Papers, 2/47,48). However, both Gwynne 
and Maxse detested the First Sea Lord. Gwynne to Maxse, 30/10/1914. Keith Wilson (ed. ), The Rasp of 
War: The Letters of If. A. Gwynne to Lady Bathurst, 1914-1918 (Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1989), 
pp. 46-7; Maxse to Sandars, 30/10/1914. Sandars Papers, MS 767/46. 
14 Fraser, `War Policy', pp. 18-19. This, he argues, was due to the success of Field Marshal French's night 
attack, which put the munitions shortage in context. 
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After the storm had settled and the patriotic truce been replaced by the coalition, 
Hewins remarked: 
The Government became aware on Friday that they would have to face the music and 
they could not. A debate on munitions would have upset the Government, as Liberals 
more or less agree. Whether the strong letter I wrote to Asquith intimating the attitude of 
the organised Unionists with whom I act influenced his action I do not know at present. 
... No doubt the Fisher-Winston complication made temporising more difficult. 
'5 
Was this evidence merely of Hewins' customary self-aggrandisement or of actual 
events? It certainly tied in with claims in similar circles that the Unionist 
Business Committee (UBC) had precipitated the shells crisis. 16 Fraser, however, 
has dismissed the influence of Hewins' `strong letter' to Asquith of 15 May, 
which informed the Prime Minister that he was to raise the question of munitions 
in the House of Commons, finding the polite language of Hewins' parliamentary 
motion demonstrative of compliance rather than merely of Edwardian civility. 17 
But it surely was just the latter, and Hewins' proclaimed desire to avert 
embarrassment to the Ministry represented a barely-concealed warning, rather 
than any honest wish to see the Government perpetuate its maladministration. By 
May 1915, Hewins was constantly demanding the reconstruction of a 
government with which he had no sympathy. On 6 May Unionists joined Irish 
Nationalists in wrecking the liquor tax. 18 And this served notice of backbench 
dissatisfaction to the leader of the opposition, who had offered it tacit support in 
the House and had tried to organise its safe and quiet passage. 19 When 
specifically asked by Law to remain silent over the munitions question, Hewins 
is Hewins diary, 20/05/1915,26/05/1915. W. A. S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of 
Empire Policy (Constable & Co., London, 1929), II, pp. 31-4. 
16 UBC Annual Report 1915-16. Bull Papers CAC, 4/13; Long to Hewins, 18/04/1916. Hewins Papers, 
59/164. 
17 Fraser, `War Policy', p. 18. '$ William Bull pen-note on Morning Post cutting, 07/05/1915. Bull Papers Hammersmith. 19 See above pp. 68-70. 
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and company retorted that they were perfectly capable of deciding their own 
minds. Although Colonel L. Sanderson subsequently bowed to his leader's 
demand that he should not raise the matter, he did second the motion of Richard 
Cooper calling for the matter to be debated 2° Such insubordination can only have 
emasculated Law's leadership further. 
It was amidst these violent dynamics that the revelation of munitions shortages 
and Fisher's resignation were unleashed. Munitions had occupied opposition 
minds since as early as October 1914. Charles Hunter MP, when serving with the 
army in France in November, had described the dearth of rifles as the `root of all 
evil'. 21 By spring 1915, it had become a fixation within Unionist circles. In 
March, Hewins was backing Lloyd George to make a move on munitions, 
anticipating broad Tory backing. The UBC, in the meantime, `eagerly' took up 
the question of munitions, resulting in a Commons resolution, maintaining that 
the `resources of all firms capable of producing or of co-operating in producing 
munitions of war should be enlisted under a unified administration in direct touch 
with the producing firms'. 22 Neville Chamberlain considered the government's 
actions with regard to munitions `inadequate'. 23 From the end of March, Law 
received from the front a volley of uncompromising communications about 
ammunition shortages. 4 Munitions and recruitment, meanwhile, were the main 
motive lying behind Selborne's demand in The Times for `national organisation', 
a purpose appreciated by Lord Sydenham who agreed that the shells situation 
was `appalling'. 25 On 10 May, Steel-Maitland sought Balfour's advice as to 
20 Hewins Diary, 07/05/1915,18/05/1915 21/05/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, pp. 30-3; House of Commons 
debates, 17/05/1915. Ilansard, 5`h Series, lxxi, 2102-05. 
21 Hunter to Milner, 20/11/1914. Milner Papers, 349/406-7. 
22 Hewins Diary, 12/10/1914,19/03/1915,31/03/1915,08/04/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, pp. 4,21,24-5. 
23 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 14/03/1915. Robert Self (ed. ), The Neville Chamberlain Diary 
Letters, vol. 1: 1915-1920 The Making of a Politician (Ashgate Press, Aldershot, 2000), pp. 92-3. 24 See letters to Law from Wilson (BU36/6), Hunter (BL/37/2), Baird (BL/37/2). 
25 Selborne to Editor of The Times, 11/05/1915; Sydenham to Selbome, 12/05/1915. Selborne Papers, 
93/84-6. 
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whether he might not be able to temporarily entrust his duties as Party Chairman 
to its previous holder Viscount Chilston, so as to assist Percy Girouard in 
munitions production, with which he claimed he had an 'obsession'. 
26 It is not 
without significance that such sentiments and letters from both Steel-Maitland 
(13 May), and Long (12 May) should narrowly pre-date the publication of 
Repington's article in The Times. This suggested that the crisis was incremental 
rather than sudden. The revelation merely confirmed deep-rooted Unionist 
suspicions of the nature of the Liberal Government's war administration, namely 
incapacity to conduct the war effort and a shroud of secrecy that seemed to attend 
every action. 27 
Aside of coalition, what options now lay open to Law? A proposal by Robert 
Cecil to hold a parliamentary secret session had been dismissed as insufficient. 
Law's patriotism made the deteriorating situation an untenable one. When he was 
informed of the resignation of his friend Fisher, Law went at once to visit Lloyd 
George, who `burst out passionately' in favour of coalition 28 A letter from Steel- 
Maitland drafted to Law the day before Repington's `shells' article made the 
direction of Law's appeal quite understandable. In it he spoke of the advantages 
of coalition: action could be compelled on munitions and recruiting; news could 
be published. He also advised that Lloyd George rather than Asquith should be 
approached . 
29 Law probably listened to this latter advice readily: the Chancellor 
had been behind the coalition proposals of 1910, and had spoken of the idea to 
26 Girouard was Director-General of Munitions Supply. Steel-Maitland to Balfour, 10/05/1915 (copy). 
SM GD/193/165/1/429. Balfour was serving as a non-expert on the `Shells Committee' at this time. 
Balfour to Lady Elcho, Easter Saturday 1915. Jane Ridley & Clare Percy (eds. ), The Letters of Arthur 
Balfour and Lady Elcho, 1885-1917 (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1992), pp. 319-20. 
27 Bridgeman claimed that `everyone [knew] it [was] a lie' when Asquith continued the Government's 
pretence of munitions sufficiency in a speech in Newcastle. Bridgeman diary, May 1915. Williamson, 
Modernisation, p. 84. Baird to Law, 30/04/1915. BL/37/U72. 
28 Chamberlain diary, 14/05/1915,17/05/1915. AC/12/27. 
29 Steel-Maitland to Law, 13/05/1915 (copy). SM GD/193/386/52-53x. There is no copy of this in the 
Law Papers, probably because Steel-Maitland, being based at St Stephen's Chambers, apprised Law of 
his thoughts in person. 
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Chamberlain and Law, three months earlier. 30 Lloyd George had also sought 
assistance from the opposition both over financial matters and - with Law 
specifically - over his drink proposals. 
The advent of coalition can have done little to bolster the position of the Unionist 
leader. In February Steel-Maitland had been `like a voice in the wilderness' in his 
espousal of coalition. Nothing had changed by May. 31 As late as 17 May, 
Chamberlain disliked any direct allusion to the need for a partnership. 32 Others 
were even more indisposed: Curzon `much dreaded coalition'; Long `[loathed] 
the idea of our good fellows sitting with these double-dyed traitors'; Lansdowne 
found the idea `intensely disagreeable', to the point of determining to refuse 
office. 33 Outside the leadership, attitudes were more difficult to gauge. On 11 
May, Godfrey Locker-Lampson MP, told Steel-Maitland: `I do hope that Bonar 
Law will set his face against [coalition]. Let him come into his own with his 
party when the time comes. '34 While the Party Chairman probably kept such 
correspondence deadly quiet, he could not silence opinions expressed directly to 
Law, such as those of Beresford. Forging an individual interpretation as ever, he 
alluded to the `fatal effects' of any Liberal-Unionist coalition, whose failure 
would at best be greeted by silence within the party, and could even stimulate a 
3s revolutionary mob. 
3' Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-18 (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1986), p. 203; Alan Beattie, `British Coalition Government Revisited', Government and 
Opposition, (1966-67), pp. 12-13. 
31 Steel-Maitland 'Memorandum on the Political Situation', February 1915. SM GD193/306/78-83x; 
Steel-Maitland to Arthur Glazebrook, 04/05/1915 (copy). SM GD/193/165/1/609. 
32 Fraser, `War Policy', p. 19. 
33 Cameron Hazlehurst, Politicians at War: a prologue to the triumph of Lloyd George (Jonathan Cape, 
London, 1971), p. 286; Fitzroy Diary, 20/05/1915. Almeric Fitzroy, Memoirs, (Hutchinson & Co., 
London, 1925), II, p. 594. 
34 Locker-Lampson to Steel-Maitland, 11/04/1915. SM GD/193/161/5/507 
35 Beresford to Law, 17/05/1915. BL/37/2/36. 
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Law himself seems to have viewed the idea of coalition equivocally. Crawford 
had recorded that his leader was `favouring the idea' in February, though his 
source, Balfour's secretary Jack Sandars, had probably been ill informed or 
intriguing. 36 Equally dubious were Law's protestations of reluctant submission 
after May 1915. On the other hand, it is unlikely that his motive was to pre-empt 
a move upon the leadership by Balfour. 37 Balfour undoubtedly boasted a rather 
cosy position within the Liberal administration. He was also embroiled in 
intrigue alongside Field Marshal French, Northcliffe, and (seemingly as always) 
`F. E. ' and Churchill. 38 However, although Balfour's suavity and philosophical 
inclinations have certainly hidden - more for the historian than his 
contemporaries -a strong ambition and political craft, there is little to indicate 
that his sights were set once again on the party leadership. It is hard to surmise 
that coalition offered more to Balfour than Law: Balfour already held influence 
within Government and any large-scale influx of Unionist ministers could but 
dilute his role and give Law responsibility. 
Instead, it was rather Law's patriotism and concept of the role of `party' that 
determined that he consider the task seriously. 39 He held the notion of `party' in 
high esteem, believing it to be an essential constitutional instrument, and viewing 
it as providing the requirements of electoral choice and effective government. 
When these latter criteria were denied it by the war, his philosophical raison 
d'etre was lessened greatly. 40 Along with Steel-Maitland, he was alive to the 
36 Crawford Diary, 02/02/1915. John Vincent (ed. ), The Crawford Papers: the Journals of David Lindsay, 
Twenty-seventh Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, 1871-1940 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1984), p347. Sandars had served as Private Secretary to Balfour, 1892-1911. His disgust at the idea of 
coalition extended to an irredeemable rupture with his former master. Sandars was certainly against 
coalition: `Patriotism apart what folly! '. Sandars to Maxse, 31/01/1915. Maxse Papers, 470/51 
37 Stephen Koss, `The Destruction of Britain's Last Liberal Government', Journal of Modern History, xl 
(1968), p. 267. 
38 Ibid., pp. 267-76. See also, Stephen Koss, Haldane, Scapegoat for Liberalism (Columbia University 
Press, London, 1969), Chapter VII, `The May Crisis'. 
39 R. J. Q. Adams, Bonar Law (John Murray, London, 1999), p. 186. 
40 Beattie, 'Coalition Government', pp. 21-2. 
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opposition with which any purely Unionist administration would be faced. 1 The 
most significant pointer to Law's position was his acceptance of the idea of 
coalition despite his party's hostility towards it. Not only did almost every 
Unionist speak out against the idea but, after the event, Law always attempted to 
make it clear that the initiative had sprung from Asquith and not himself. 42 But, 
shortly after meeting Lloyd George on 17 May, it had been Law who had 
despatched a letter to the Prime Minister calling for a `change in the constitution 
of the Government' 43 No doubt bolstered by the fact that formally, at least, 
Asquith had to invite Law into partnership not vice versa, his protestations of 
acquiescence rather than initiation were accepted widely within the party 44 
Neither was his success in telling this story insignificant - Unionist suspicions of 
coalition were moderated under the assumption that their party had joined from 
patriotic motives, to preserve the war effort. It was noteworthy in another degree 
also, namely that by saving Asquith the humiliation of appealing to the 
opposition for assistance (and considering Asquith's condescending opinion of 
its leader this would have been humiliation indeed), Law weakened the Unionist 
position within the coalition. 
41 See Steel-Maitland to Reginald Blair, 31/05/1915 (copy). SM GD/193/16511/422,547; Blake, 
Unknown, pp. 280-1. 
42 Report of Unionist conference at Queen's Hall on 09/08/1916. G&M, September 1916, pp. 193-8. Law 
to Buxton, 17/06/1915. Robert Rhodes James (ed. ), Memoirs of a Conservative: J. C C. Davidson's 
Letters and Papers, 1910-37 (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969), pp. 24-5; Speech at NUA 
Conference, 30/11/1917. 
43 Chamberlain diary, May 1915. AC/12/27. 
44 Bridgeman diary, June 1915. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 87; Hewins diary, 20/05/1915. Hewins, 
Apologia, II, pp. 31-3. Hammer and Crook, June 1915, p. 2. 
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Who Sits Where? 
On 20 May, with negotiations just under way, Long told Law: 
As regards posts: If the Liberals are to retain the Premiership, Foreign Secretary of State, 
and War Office, there are very few high Offices left, if you exclude, as you must, the 
Lord Chancellorship, and, as I think you ought, the Boards of Agriculture, and Education; 
the G. P. O. [Postmaster General]; 1st Commissioner of Works & [Chancellor of the] 
Duchy of Lancaster. And it is evident that you may easily find yourself with more horses 
than you have vacant stalls 45 
This articulated two key points about the first coalition: first, the simple fact that 
in coalition government demand for positions exceeded supply; second, the 
apprehension - later proved correct - that Law would prove inadequate to the 
task of gaining the deserved spoils. Adjudging the seven key wartime 
departments to include the premiership, Exchequer, Admiralty, War Office, 
Home Office, Foreign Office and Board of Trade, the Unionists were left 
demonstrably under-represented. Of these posts, the Liberals ceded only the 
Admiralty, and this to Balfour, a man with whom they already worked closely, 
and who in fact had even occupied a room within the department prior to the 
arrangement. The other offices surrendered were: Colonial Office (Law), Privy 
Seal (Curzon), Board of Agriculture (Selborne), Attorney-General (Carson), 
Local Government Board (Walter Long), India Office (Chamberlain); while the 
aged Lansdowne entered as minister without portfolio. Such an allocation was 
unsatisfactory on more than one ground. Now in government, the Unionists still 
remained far from controlling the war effort. Law's position in the 
administration, meanwhile, was inferior to that of six Liberals and also to several 
party colleagues, including Balfour the former leader. Finally, backbench opinion 
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was unlikely to view kindly the continuance in office of a high percentage of 
Liberal 'incompetents'. 
Several historical interpretations have accounted for the modest returns on 
Unionist investment. Law's biographers have emphasised their subject's 
patriotism, and his insistence on the subjugation of corrosive party controversy. 46 
Pugh, conversely, has interpreted `the meagre spoils' obtained as reflecting `the 
rather modest role played by the Unionists in bringing about the coalition'. 7 
More fundamental factors also actually had affect. By the time Law met Asquith 
to discuss appointments on Saturday 22 May, he had certainly been apprised of 
the necessity of receiving a fair share of posts, and of the continued significance 
of party. 48 On Thursday, Londonderry had informed Law - for party not personal 
motives - `I presume we shall have half the Government places - so as to have 
some power -& stop this meddling'. 
49 Meanwhile Long, defying illness to write 
incessant letters, had warned Law of similar dangers, informing him that there 
should be `no appearance of haste in a question of such transcendental 
importance as the formation of a National Government' (merely a prelude to his 
expressed desire `that you will decide nothing about the Opposition after the 
Govt. is formed without allowing me to have a say in the matter'). Further he had 
rolled out fairly traditional party arguments, with the perfunctory disclaimer `I 
don't want to think of Party', namely that `the allocation of Offices is of even 
more importance than the selection of men'. Two days, and two letters later, 
Long had warned his chief that there `was a very strong impression that the 
Radical wire pullers are at work and are deliberately trying to sow dissension in 
45 Long to Law, 20/05/1915 (copy). Long Papers MS Add. 62404, ff. 87-9 
46 Blake, Unknown, pp. 254-7; Adams, Bonar Law, p. 190. 
47 Pugh, 'First Coalition', p. 830. as Asquith to Law, 21/05/1915. BL/50/3/15. 
49 Londonderry to Law, 20/05/1915. BLJ50/3/7. 
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our ranks, and with no small measure of success. 50 Though such a thorough 
working over was conventional for Long, nevertheless, the language and 
arguments employed betrayed less than total confidence in the bargaining 
capacity of his leader. 
The battle at the negotiating table was crucial. Asquith, a barrister by training and 
an unrivalled parliamentarian by trade, was well suited to serve as advocate for 
his cause, Law less so. Initiator of the partisan and uncompromising `new style' 
of politics in the Ulster Crisis, the Unionist leader came rather unstuck when 
placed within alliance diplomacy. As recently as 1913, he had relied on Max 
Aitken to save the situation when he found himself unable to offer the slightest 
courtesy towards the Prime Minister at a private meeting over Ireland, and 
although he was less reliant on his cunning errand boy than Aitken frequently 
made out, Asquith and not Law was the master of the art of persuasion. The dour 
stubbornness that made convincing Law's threats - were they Ulster 
disobedience or backbench rebellion - collapsed without such weapons at its 
disposal. This was never better demonstrated than in his handling of the office of 
Irish Lord Chancellor. Initially, he had informed Carson and James Campbell 
that it had been earmarked for the latter, but finding Asquith dilatory he was 
forced to enrol the services of Lloyd George. Not before long he capitulated to 
the Prime Minister's contention that the Liberals could only allow Campbell an 
inferior post. 5' 
Law's almost immediate acceptance of Asquith's reasoning that the Liberals 
could not stomach a Unionist Irish Chancellor exposed his feebleness. Also 
employed to undermine Unionist entitlement to the Exchequer (rather more 
reasonably given the tariff issue), and the Lord Chancellorship, within a coalition 
so Long to Law, 19/05/1915,21/05/1915 (copies). Long Papers, MS Add. 62404, ff. 84-6,90-1. 51 Law to Lloyd George, 27/05/1915, Law to Asquith, 28/05/1915 (copies). BIJ53/6/8,12. 
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it was a partisan Liberal argument that should have been bluntly rebuffed. 
Moreover, his application to Lloyd George to act as medium reflected 
submissiveness towards Asquith, rather than any great intimacy with the 
Chancellor. It was symptomatic of the overall approach of the Unionist leaders, 
their pliancy extending beyond compromise. While doubting Lord Finlay would 
be Lord Chancellor, Campbell or any Unionist Irish Secretary, Lansdowne 
advised Law listlessly: `Provided Curzon is in the Cabinet I don't think we ought 
to complain - it is quite clear that there are not offices enough to go round, and 
for that reason I am specially anxious not to take a post which would out a good 
man. '52 It smacked of self-doubt and submission. 
Inherent influences beyond such character failings limited Law's ability to call 
the shots. First, readiness to stand aside for the purposes of national unity was 
genuine in Chamberlain and Lansdowne, if not in Long, and in most quarters 
patriotism dictated a moderation of the usual scramble for offices. 53 Unionist 
prospects were hampered also by the long period in opposition, which 
determined that it was lightweight in ministerial experience. Of those who had 
previously taken Cabinet office and were still alive (and a considerable number 
were not), Chaplin, and Lords George Hamilton, Halsbury, Londonderry, 
St Audries, St Aldwyn, Midleton, and Lansdowne were past their best - very 
well past in most cases; Long had briefly been Chief Secretary for Ireland, but 
otherwise had held only the relative backwaters of the Board of Agriculture and 
the Local Government Board. This left only Chamberlain, Balfour, Selborne and 
Salisbury as previous holders of first-rate offices. 4 The fact that Law's own 
52 Lansdowne to Law, 23/05/1915. BU50/3/41. 
53 Long to Law, 12/05/1915, BU37/2/19 and reply 19/05/1915. Long Papers, MS Add. 62404, ff. 84-6; 
Lansdowne to Law, 23/05/1915. BU50/3/41; Chamberlain to Law, 21/05/1915. BLJ50/3/26. Long had 
financial as well as political motives in pursuing office. Bull diary (retrospect), July 1915. Bull CAC 
Papers, 4/11. 
sa Though not actually having taken cabinet positions, Curzon (Viceroy of India) and Milner (High 
Commissioner in South Africa) were certainly of this rank. 
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experience extended only to a three-year tenure as Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Board of Trade revealed the rawness of talent. It was not a good hand with which 
to play. Further, this must be compared to one of the largest and most capable 
pools of Liberal ministers ever in Government. The big guns of Asquith, Lloyd 
George and Grey were institutions; the middle calibre ones, including Reginald 
McKenna, Lord Crewe and Churchill, were movable but indispensable; the small 
arms (either party politically or administratively), including Charles Hobhouse 
and `Jack' Pease, and Lords Beauchamp, Lucas, Emmot and, seemingly, 
Haldane, were expendable. But, any Unionist aspirations had to take into account 
the young guns of Walter Runciman, John Simon, Herbert Samuel and Edwin 
Montagu. Kitchener's entrenchment as a non-party Secretary for War restricted 
available posts yet further. 
Asquith held the trump card as well, for as Prime Minister he retained official 
hold on the reins of patronage, and what leverage Law possessed he enjoyed 
before the coalition had been formed. Once established, withdrawal was 
unthinkable. It could only have resulted in an enfeebled opposition or a general 
election, both reasons for joining a coalition in the first place. Moreover, the 
party would have been presented - not unreasonably - as self-seeking by virtue 
of its retreat into isolation, and this could only have hampered Unionist electoral 
prospects. Without an election, Law would have remained in the same position as 
in mid-May, namely needing to support patriotic silence, whilst being forced 
onto the offensive by his backbenches. Therefore if, as Lloyd George told 
C. P. Scott, Law had put a pistol to the head of the Government a few days 
earlier, it is manifest that now, with no bullets in the chamber, he could ill afford 
to do so again 55 This is well illustrated by the successes attained. The most 
ss Scott Diary, 23/05/1915. Trevor Wilson (ed. ). The Political Diaries o/' C . P. Scott (Collins, London, 1970), p. 124. 
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notable concession to the Unionists was Churchill's transfer from the Admiralty, 
which, for all the absence of wider Liberal disapproval of this, was nonetheless a 
notable achievement. But, this was realised before the coalition had been 
56 formally set up. 
The final and most significant reason was that, when baying for blood, the 
Unionists appeared preoccupied less that the new administration became a true 
hybrid, more that certain Liberal components were expelled. Understandable 
after the length of time in opposition in which animosities were nurtured, it 
nevertheless undermined their own demands. The target of the attacks proved 
that wartime politics was the stimulus, with the Marconi men Rufus Isaacs (now 
ennobled as Lord Reading) and Lloyd George escaping criticism. Conversely, the 
three main targets, namely Churchill, the Home Secretary McKenna, and Lord 
Chancellor Haldane, had been discredited by wartime politics. Churchill's 
unpopularity arose from his increasing independence from military opinion that 
delivered the Antwerp failure and urged a Dardanelles policy, together with his 
lack of respect for naval officials. He was deposited in the back of the carriage in 
the Duchy of Lancaster, where he sat reassuringly far from the reins of war 
strategy and administration. As to McKenna and Haldane, the main motivation 
was the alien question. The Northcliffe press, flanked by the National Review 
and Morning Post, had relentlessly assailed the Lord Chancellor for his 
Germanic links, and the Home Secretary for his ineffective management of 
enemy aliens. 57 Unionist politicians had shown no inclination to refute such 
accusations, and revealed their concurrence by their actions in May 1915. Long 
asserted that `if McKenna remains in the Govt. the great majority of our men will 
bitterly resent it and will be scandalised if any of our Leaders consent to serve 
56 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (Odhams, London, 1938), I, p. 136. 
57 See Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, Volume II: The Twentieth 
Century (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1984), elaborated beautifully in Idem., Haldane, passim 
88 
with him. '58 William Bull (Long's PPS) wrote to the editor of the Morning Post, 
`it seems clear that those departments that are mainly responsible [for mistakes] 
should be under new control. This consideration applies with special force to the 
Home Office and the Board of Trade. '59 As it was, the efficient McKenna was 
removed from the Home Office, so as no longer to be a hindrance to the firm 
management of domestic disquiet, and placed at the Exchequer, where he was 
later to prove an even more awkward impediment, this time to conscription. 
60 In 
the meantime, Haldane was sacrificed by his Liberal friends, whilst Unionists 
were only too happy to stoke the pyre of a man who, in Lord Newton's opinion, 
`would probably have been lynched in any other country'. 61 By achieving the 
transfers of Churchill and McKenna, and, at the least receiving Haldane's 
removal with enthusiasm, the Unionists expended much of the little political 
capital they possessed. 
The one exception to the negativism of May 1915 was the endorsement of Lord 
Milner. A Unionist by principle but not by trade, several party men nonetheless 
acknowledged his administrative capacity. Both Chamberlain and Steel-Maitland 
pushed for his inclusion, the latter- reasoning that `the whole raison d' etre of the 
reconstruction' was `the need for efficient men' . 
62 Chamberlain went so far as to 
offer to take a lesser post to allow for Milner's inclusion: `I know that the more 
58 Long to Law, 21/05/1915 (copy). See also Long to Asquith, 22/05/1915 (copy). Long Papers, MS Add. 
62404, ff. 90-1,140-1 
59 Cutting from Morning Post, 24/05/1915. Bull Papers Hammersmith. Such views were especially ironic 
considering the courting of McKenna by the Unionist leadership in October 1922. By then serving as 
Chairman of Midland Bank, he was considered a steady hand at the Treasury and thus capable of 
inspiring confidence in the City. 
60 Lloyd George reported that the Tories `only agreed' to this appointment on the basis of it being 
temporary. But it was not to be, which merely underlined Unionist impotence once in the fold. Lloyd 
George to Margaret Lloyd George, 25/05/1915. Kenneth Morgan (ed. ), Lloyd George's Family Letters, 
1885-1936 (University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1973), p. 178. 
61 Chamberlain claimed that it was Asquith, rather than a Unionist, who had suggested Haldane's 
removal. (Chamberlain diary, 17/05/1915. AC/12/27). Indeed, leading Unionists hardly mentioned 
Haldane in their communications of this period. Asquith did not rate Haldane's talents particularly highly. 
Stephan Koss, Asquith (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1985), p. 191, passim Newton to Curzon, 11/10/1914. 
Curzon Papers, f112,105, ff. 244-5. 
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extreme section of the Liberal Party dislike Milner, but I am confident that the 
inclusion of his name would give confidence both in the country and the army 
that this was a national Govt. and not merely a two party or three party Govt., 
and that it meant business. ' 63 Despite these petitions, Law was unable and 
perhaps unwilling to surmount the profound dislike felt for Milner by Liberal 
politicians, itself a purely pre-war prejudice. 
Generally, the impact of the appointments was profound in denying the Unionist 
leadership the ability to shape war strategy, and in establishing the sentiments 
elsewhere in the party that they had been severely short-changed and, therefore, 
that Unionists in Cabinet were incapable of exerting the necessary influence. 
Developed into a powerful department by Joseph Chamberlain, in a free trade 
government the Colonial Office retained little control beyond its role as the 
manager of imperial government. Consequently, Law was in no position to use 
departmental authority or expertise in Cabinet, except in the more peripheral 
aspects of war management. Nor was Asquith entirely unjustified in omitting him 
without consultation from the War Policy Committee, formed in August 1915, a 
decision revoked only after several rather beseeching letters. 4 Any such 
constitutional impotence was certainly supplemented with continued personal 
submissiveness on the part of Law. 
Equally vital was the party's perception of the new coalition. Those that 
welcomed it, like Arthur Lee MP, frequently did so on the grounds that `a 
Business Government' had been formed. 65 But it was not such in any sense, and 
the change raised damaging expectations. F. S. Oliver, using a scriptural allegory, 
62 Steel-Maitland to Chamberlain, n. d. [May 1915] (copy). SM GD1193/386/65. 
63 Chamberlain to Law, 21/05/1915. BL/50/3/26. Reprinted in Charles Petrie, Life of Austen Chamberlain 
(London, 1940), II, pp. 27-8. 
64 Law to Asquith, 12/08/1915 (copy). BIJ53/6/38. The War Policy Committee was formed to settle the 
principal theme of manpower and, as such, was a body of the greatest import. 
65 Lee to Law, 21/05/1915. BIJ50/3/29. 
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described the new coalition merely as `the old vat ... half-emptied of its former 
contents and filled up with new wine; but it was the same vat, and the 
predominating flavour remained the same. ' 66 The omission of Milner was 
correctly taken to denote a continued confidence in the unwieldy structure of pre- 
war Government, with a Cabinet of twenty plus meeting irregularly and the 
direction of war determined through departmental channels rather than a 
coordinating body. Meanwhile, the presence of the Liberal old guard - chiefly 
Grey, Asquith and Crewe - and their Unionist counterparts - Balfour and 
Lansdowne - allowed for Milner to speak of it as being `essentially a 
Government of United Mandarins'. 67 Partly the result of an insatiable thirst for 
change felt by right-wing Unionists, this disappointment was due also to the aura 
of front-bench collusion that had attended the formation of the coalition. It 
represented poor payment to the forces that had enforced coalition, namely the 
parliamentary party. 
Party men, some no doubt upset at missing out on promotion, were distressed 
that they had not been consulted 68 Indeed, anxiety about coalition - was 
widespread. Hewins recorded that a Carlton Club meeting, convened to apprise 
Unionist MPs of developments, was, although not against the new ministry, 
`certainly not in favour of it, doubtful and uneasy'. 9 Central Office was forced to 
reply to MPs at the front, anxious at the shape of the new coalition. Reginald 
Blair expressed himself `very uneasy' about political developments and worried 
as to how best explain them in his next communication to his constituents. 70 
Accordingly, Steel-Maitland reeled off reassuring responses to party followers 
66 F. S Oliver, Ordeal by Battle (1915), i. Quoted in Turner, British Politics, p. 62. 67 Milner to Amery, 23/06/1915. Barnes, Amery Diaries, p. 118. 
68 Bridgeman Diary, June 1915. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 87. 69 Hewins Diary, 26/05/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 34. 70 Blair to Steel-Maitland, 26/05/1915. SM GD/193/165/1/424. 
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defending the new coalition. 1 The only recompense was the confidence 
expressed in the `national government' by local associations on the basis that it 
would prosecute the war more effectively. 72 
The most considerable danger for Unionist Ministers was, as Long warned Law 
at the outset, responsibility without power. Indeed this was to be the prerogative 
of Unionist ministers throughout the Asquith coalition. 73 Consequently, coalition 
government undermined the traditional relationships between different party 
strata. Throughout the period, whether the controversy was conscription or 
Ireland, Law remained reluctant to present himself to his rank and file unless 
assured that he could put forward a considered policy approved by the 
Government. It was largely - though not entirely - coalition government that 
permitted him to do so, empowering the party leadership in relation to the 
grassroots. Even within the earlier party truce, the leaders and party management 
had blankly ignored any attempts by the rank and file to assert any authority. A 
resolution passed by the Western Divisional Council in Scotland in March 1915, 
requesting party leaders to turn their minds to economic post-war reconstruction, 
was a case in point. It had been quashed almost single-handedly by George 
Younger, who inserted the ruinous rider that it should be proceeded with only 
`when [the leaders] consider it most expedient to do so. The leadership had 
been forced, nevertheless, to bow to pressure to meet constituency chairmen and 
agents, and to publicise in December 1914 its communication to Asquith of 
2 August 75 
71 SM GD/193/165/1/422-3x, 495-6x, 547-8x, 607-8x. 
72 For instance, Clitheroe UA, AGM, 12/06/1915, (DDX/800/1/1). 
73 Long to Law, 19/05/1915 (copy). Long Papers, MS Add. 62404, ff. 84-6. 
7' Younger to Law, 26/03/1915. BIJ36/6/30; SUA Western Divisional Council, 03/03/1915; Central 
Council, 16/03/1915, (Acc. 10424/28,63). 
75 Steel-Maitland to Law, 29/10/1914. BIJ35/1/40. 
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Within coalition, the further increased power of the leadership was manifested in 
Law's delicate, but authoritative, handling of the National Union Association 
(NUA) Council and Conference. In September 1915, he informed Steel-Maitland 
that the Council meeting should be `put off until the question of National Service 
had been settled by the Cabinet' 76 Again, in October, he postponed it and, 
although he acquiesced the next month, the Council was told in January 1916 
that `matters were in such a state' that it would be inadvisable for Law to address 
it 77 In summer, with rank and file Unionists appalled at the prospect of Irish 
Home Rule, the NUEC was placated only when Chamberlain offered to attend in 
Law's stead. 78 When Law finally made an appearance before the NUA 
Conference in November 1917, itself ostensibly held only because of the need for 
imminent party reorganisation, his performance was characterised by self- 
assurance. 9 
The submission of the NUA and local constituencies was attributable to several 
influences. Noticeable was the absence from this forum of serious consideration, 
or criticism, of military strategy. In the light of post-war criticism of Haig's 
western strategy, this may seem surprising, but the silence was dictated by 
complete confidence in the military commanders. It also probably stemmed from 
a realisation that local associations were poorly placed to make informed 
judgements, many being denied the expertise of their parliamentary 
representative and relying heavily therefore on the bluster of the press. While 
attention was directed to the issue of manpower, this tended to concentrate on 
regional recruitment rather than national conscription. 
76 NUEC, 16/09/1915. 
77 NUEC, 14/10/1915; 11/11/1915; 13/01/1916. 
78 NUEC, 13/07/1916. 
79 The party conference in August 1916 was not attended by the grassroots membership. 
93 
Such restraint was complemented by the support that Law received from 
traditional party elements. In 1916 a movement was afoot seeking to further 
democratise the party. This took the shape of repeated requests by Charles 
Marston, Chairman of Wolverhampton West Unionist Association, that the 
Council should meet more regularly and abide properly by its rules, which had 
been somewhat flouted due to wartime logistical difficulties. 80 By September, 
Marston had produced a circular entitled `The Future of the Unionist Party'. It 
called for the need of `a more democratic spirit', `an AWAKENING', whilst 
lamenting the fact that `we appear to be largely under the Control of the 
Exclusive Men of the Party - the Business Men who constitute such an important 
Section have been pushed on one side. ' 81 It culminated in a meeting organised by 
Marston to gather supporters. While Steel-Maitland thought `it better to let him 
have his run' (even expressing sympathy with his objective of the greater 
integration of the business interest), traditional party figures sought to bolster the 
established powers. Alexander Leith, the Northern Area Chairman, forwarded 
Marston's circular to the Party Chairman, and expressed concern that he `seems 
to be organising some sort of opposition to the Leaders of the Party'. 82 The 
NUEC, meanwhile, studiously ignored Marston's requests. 
The authority bestowed upon the leadership in its interaction with the party 
grassroots was not mirrored in its relationship with the parliamentary rank and 
file. After a Carlton Club meeting to discuss the coalition, Henry Craik (a 
backbencher and long-serving member of the National Service League), wrote to 
his leader: 
80 NUEC, 12/10/1916. 
81 Marston to Leith, 30/09/1916. SM GD1193/558/37. 
82 Steel-Maitland to Leith, 12110/1916,14/01/1917 (copies); Leith to Steel-Maitland, 13/01/1917. SM 
GD/193/558/35,274/405,406. 
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I know how inexpedient it wd. be for a Unionist member to begin to urge compulsion. 
But as this imposes silence in the House, I wish to say how overwhelming is my 
conviction that this is [the] only thing that can save us from national disaster & how vital 
it seems to me ... that [the] Govt. should pronounce their purpose, & promptly take 
action to carry it out. 
In his reply, Law wrote: 
Our effort however must be not to seem to make any movement in this direction the result 
of pressure from us, as it can only be carried if we have - as I believe we shall - the 
support of the Liberal members of the Cabinet also. 83 
This correspondence highlighted the foremost difficulty for Unionist ministers 
during the Asquith coalition, namely the necessity of advancing efficient war 
administration through negotiation and persuasion, whilst ever having to look 
over their shoulders at backbench militancy that would not accept such 
complexities. It exemplified in many ways how little had changed since the 
patriotic truce - `silence' still `imposed' upon the backbenches. The only 
tangible progress was that they now had a voice - through their leaders - in the 
decision-making body, but it was a voice that only rarely made itself heard in 
public. The Unionist leaders were hampered by several considerations. As seen 
above, they did not possess the departmental presence to insist on policies. Nor, 
at times, did they possess the inclination. Many recognised the need to carry 
Liberals in Cabinet and parliament, and Labour in the country, with Robert Cecil 
citing this as his objection to a possible supercession of Asquith and Grey by 
Lloyd George, Churchill and Curzon. 84 This was compounded by the lack of a 
credible alternative (at least in the eyes of the ministers themselves), which 
promoted an obligation toward preserving the coalition. 85 What is more, Cabinet 
83 Craik to Law, 05/06/1915 (copy) and reply 07/06/1915. Craik Papers, MS, ff. 14,15. 
84 Robert Cecil to Selborne, 10/12/1915. Boyce, Crisis, p. 151. 
85 Long to Law, 17/10/1915. BL/51/4/18. 
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was not a decision-making body in any real sense, frequently acting merely as a 
forum for protracted discussion, and an opportunity for the Prime Minister to 
catch up on his letter writing. Finally, once involved in the machinery of 
government, the intricacy of policies such as conscription became manifest. 
86 
Largely due to this disparity between backbench expectation and front-bench 
non-delivery, coalition government exacerbated the uncomfortable dynamic 
between the two. Inherently it tended to concentrate power in the centre and 
enfeeble the periphery, with frontbench collusion becoming the norm and 
consultation with the backbenches a luxury. It may also have made parliamentary 
dissidence less reprehensible, its anti-frontbench stance less specifically and 
explicitly disloyal as within a one-party administration. Such implications were 
substantiated in the cooperation between Liberal and Unionist ginger groups. 87 
Surprisingly, given the limits imposed by coalition government, patronage 
proved only a minor basis for discontent. Although the number of posts that 
could be offered to Unionists was dramatically reduced compared to a purely 
party government, war generated a new batch of administrative offices. This 
allowed the tentacles of patronage to extend more widely, if not deeper, than 
before in all directions - Unionist, Liberal, Labour and business. More 
pertinently, patriotism did much to dam-up Unionist ambitions until the end of 
the war, when, perhaps close to overflowing anyway, discontented claimants to 
office flooded through. Consequently, Steel-Maitland's indignation in December 
1916 at his continued exclusion from Cabinet, and subsequent resignation, was 
but an exception and in more ways than one: few can have received such certain 
assurance of immediate Cabinet rank, only to fall at both the first and the second 
86 For conscription see below, pp. 262-268. 
87 For the Liberal War Committee, see Peter J. Yearwood & Cameron Hazlehurst, "`The Affairs of a 
Distant Dependency': The Nigeria Debate and the Premiership, 1916', Twentieth Century British History, 
xii (2001), p. 400; Stubbs, `Impact', pp. 27-8. 
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hurdle; 88 fewer still can have got on so appallingly with their departmental chief 
as did Steel-Maitland with Long at the Colonial Office. 89 Significantly for the 
war and post-war coalitions (for opposite reasons), Steel-Maitland's resentment, 
manifested not in backbench militancy but in sullen silence, was poured into the 
reservoir, to emerge like spring torrents only after European peace had been 
secured. 90 Where grumbles could be heard, they were frequently not the product 
of coalition, but merely inner-party rivalries. Steel-Maitland, for instance, felt it 
`very awkward' that the Unionist MP Leverton-Harris should join the Privy 
Council to the exclusion of Harry Samuel, a tireless servant of the NUEC. 91 Long 
echoed his sentiments, while giving particular prominence to the division of 
spoils between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives, going so far as to point the 
finger (customarily and erroneously) at Steel-Maitland as the villain 92 It is worth 
noting, too, that those who proved the greatest and most overt threats to coalition 
government were not provoked by such considerations. Dissidents like Frederick 
Banbury and Henry Page Croft were beyond the pale of the most extensive and 
generous patronage. Conversely, both Chamberlain and Carson resigned from 
office, the-latter, even, made a habit of it. 93 
The traditional lines of party communication, meanwhile, were kept up through 
separate whips' offices for Unionists and Liberals, but this was seemingly to little 
effect. The party whip Bridgeman complained, four months in, that he was `more 
out of it' than as a newcomer to parliament, and it seems likely that both MPs 
88 Steel-Maitland to Law, 19/07/1917. BL182/2/10. 
89 Steel-Maitland to Law, 10/12/1916; Younger to Law, 09/06/1917. BL'81/1/33,82/1/10. 
90 For Steel-Maitland's grievances see `Memorandum of Conversation with Arthur Balfour', 09/06/1916. 
SM GD/193/390/3x-4x; Steel-Maitland to Talbot, 12/12/1916,13/1211916. BL/81/1/54,55. Steel- 
Maitland had asked to be Under-Secretary at the Treasury, then sole Under-Secretary at the Ministry of 
Labour, both denied him 
91 Steel-Maitland to Law, 10/01/1916. BL/52/2/18. 
92 Long to Law, 24/01/1916 (also see Memorandum enclosed). BU52/2/26. 93 Such was the case also with Salisbury, who was offered (but refused) a post in December 1916. 
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and leaders dissociated themselves from official channels. 94 Unionist ministers 
were not only understandably busy, but were probably reluctant to reveal 
contentious Cabinet developments - or more particularly non-developments. The 
rank and file, on the other hand, seemed suspicious that the whip's office had 
evolved largely into coalition machinery. This had a damaging effect, such as 
that in summer 1916, when Richard Cooper MP told his leader that differences of 
opinion over Ireland had surfaced because they were `permitted to grow up 
through lack of proper guidance or information from such people as the 
95 Whips'. 
These disruptions of the normal links and bindings between the party leadership 
and its parliamentary followers undoubtedly played some part in the emergence 
of an inordinate number of backbench factions. The formation of the Unionist 
Business Committee (UBC) was accompanied by that of the Beach Committee, 
the Empire Resources Development Committee, the Unionist War Committee 
(UWC), the Imperial Unionist Association (IUA), and any number of smaller 
groups. The two most prominent groups, the UBC and UWC, contrasted 
noticeably with their forerunners: unlike the famous ginger groups of the 
Conservative past, like Disraeli's `Young England' movement or Randolph 
Churchill's `Fourth Party', they were realistic and specific, not romantic and 
vague, and they were associations of the many, not the few. They shared 
personnel and style with the pre-war `Reveille' movement but were less 
sectional. 96 Contrary to other immediate predecessors, such as the Halsbury Club, 
which mobilised backwoodsmen in the clash over the Parliament Act, their basis 
was the House of Commons not the Lords. This in itself fashioned their impact, 
94 Sanders Diary, 13/09/1915. John Ramsden (ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: the Political Diaries of Robert 
Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (Historian's Press, London, 1984), pp. 81-2. 95 Cooper to Law, 10/07/1916. BL/53/4/4. 
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for neither the Liberal Party nor Unionist leaders could characterise them as 
dilettantes dismissive of parliament, crushing government legislation under a 
stiletto shoe in Berkeley Square (as Lord Loreburn had memorably portrayed the 
diehard movement). 97 They were exceptional also in that they were not mirrored 
in their intensity on the Liberal benches. 
They were unquestionably partly reflective of personal ambition. It was little 
coincidence that on the two occasions on which the backbenchers were whipped 
into a position of real prominence, namely December 1916 and May 1918, they 
counted Carson in their midst. A Dubliner by residence, a diehard Irish Unionist 
by inclination, Carson had played the key role in the formation of the Ulster 
Volunteer Force, and indeed perhaps in the whole notion of Ulster exclusion 98 In 
mid-October 1915 he resigned from the Government, citing the impossibility of 
continuing the Gallipoli expedition without disaster, and the abandonment of 
Servia. 99 In the light of a conversation with his friend Ronald McNeill, these 
motives appear to have been sincere, although they extended to frustration over 
compulsion, the handling of the generals, and government vacillation. 100 The 
simultaneous consideration of . resignation 
by Steel-Maitland revealed the 
unsettled nature of the administration, but, significantly, it was a deliberation 
made in collusion with Carson. 101 In 1915, Carson had been breaking free from 
the Government for some time. Though not officially involved with the UBC, as 
Attorney-General he had been willing to offer the group advice that shot across 
96 Henry Page Croft's Edwardian movement was specifically a tariff reform lobby. See Larry Witherell, 
Rebel on the Right: Henry Page Croft and the Crisis of British Imperialism, 1903-1914 (Newark, 
University of Delaware, 1997), pp. 211-13. 
97 Willoughby de Broke, The Passing Years (Constable & Co., London, 1924), p. 260. 98 See Alvin Jackson, `Irish Unionism' in D. G. Boyce & Alan O'Day (eds. ), The Making of Modern Irish 
History: Revisionism and the Revisionist Controversy (Routledge, London, 1996), pp. 120-30. 
99 Law to Asquith, 15/10/1915 (copy). B1J53/6/44. 
ioo Memorandum by Ronald McNeill on a conversation with Carson, October 1915. McNeill Papers, 
MIC/63/2. Carson to Long, undated, [18/10/1915]. Long Papers, MS Add. 62420, ff. 73-4. 
101 Steel-Maitland to Milner, 15/10/1915. Milner Papers, 351/56. 
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the bows of Law's expressed opinions from the Colonial Office. 
102 While 
Carson's influence affected only the intensity and not the continuity of UWC 
operations, his successor, Salisbury, possessed neither the equivalent proclivity 
for political battle, nor the charisma. Additionally, as a peer, Salisbury was 
denied a voice in the Commons, and was all too easily sidetracked into Lords- 
centred controversy, as in 1917 with the cross-party movement to regulate the 
distribution of patronage. 103 
Taken together, however, the political crises of 1916 indicate that backing for 
Carson was qualified. In turn, they also question whether Law's position was 
actually particularly vulnerable. Did he survive only by bowing to backbench 
pressure? Was it his very susceptibility to such forces, as Martin Pugh has 
argued, that ensured he retained the party crown? 104 Many who supported 
Carson's motion for universal military service in April were also those who 
divided with him against the Government in the `Nigeria Debate' of November. 
Nevertheless, these MPs were precisely those who opposed him in June and July. 
Because of this, a considerable overlap arose between Carson's UWC and the 
(anti-Carson) IUA. Salisbury. although later to head the UWC, even hosted the 
IUA's first meeting. This was symptomatic of a climate within which there was 
much intersection between the many ginger groups, most notably the UWC and 
UBC. For instance, of the twenty-five who sat on the UBC Executive Committee 
in early 1915, at least half also later became UWC members. No doubt this was 
due in part to their multifarious programmes and the broad remit of policies 
fostered under the banner of the `prosecution of the war'. Equally crucial was the 
'°2 Hewins Diary, 23/07/1915. Carson informed Hewins that there was no legal barrier to the utilisation of 
Australian ore, a line of reasoning that ran counter to that employed by Law to a UBC deputation. 
Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 45. 
103 Geoffrey Searle, Corruption in British Politics, 1895-1930 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 308-20. 
1°4 Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-1918 (Routledge, London, 1978), pp. 53-4; 
idem., `Domestic Politics' in Stephen Constantine, Maurice Kirby & Mary Rose, The First World War in 
British History (Edward Arnold, London, 1995), p. 16. 
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fact that, as the ever-astute Crawford remarked, `too many of [the Government's] 
critics [were] themselves open to rebuke - Carson for instance or Milner being 
"unsound" on the Home Rule question, Hugh Cecil being rotten on tariffs and so 
on. ' 105 
In fact, the individual influence of, and challenge posed by, these groups is 
highly debatable. The UBC (not a direct product of coalition) continued its work 
after May 1915, initiating parliamentary consideration of national economy, 
contraband and enemy trading, and passing motions urging that the whole 
economic strength of the Empire be brought into cooperation with that of the 
Allies against the enemy. 106 When Parliament was adjourned without division in 
July 1915, Hewins acknowledged that of the `100 or 150 members who attend 
[Parliament] regularly there is no doubt that the majority are against the 
Government but they would not have voted so in face of the united appeal of 
Liberal and Unionist leaders'. Five months later, he admitted: `I am really very 
much alone. Some of my oldest friends and colleagues get frightened and 
lukewarm at the idea of definite action to destroy the German economic 
octopus. '107 Hewins' recurrent protestations of rampant discontent must be 
placed alongside these admissions of fragility within the UBC. Indeed the 
frequency - and inaccuracy - of his prophesies of ruin, does much to undermine 
his account. As John Stubbs has shown, Hewins exaggerated the membership of 
the UBC, claiming it included most Unionist MPs not at the front, when actually 
attendance at general meetings never exceeding forty. 108 Average attendance, 
moroever, was well below this: twenty-nine at general meetings; twelve at the 
105 Crawford Diary, 18/08/1916. Vincent, Crawford, p. 360. 
106 `Report of the Work of the Business Committee', 30/06/1915. Bull Papers Hammersmith. Daily 
Telegraph, 04/11/1915. UBC, EC, 30/11/1915,11/01/1916. Hewins Papers, 26. 
107 Hewins Diary, 29/07/1915,11/12/1915. Hewins, Apologia, II, pp. 46,59. 
108 Stubbs, `Impact', pp. 23-4. 
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executive committee; fourteen at sub-committees. 109 It therefore represented a 
committed hardcore of activists rather than any profound shifting in loyalties or 
priorities amongst the backbenchers. The arrival of a second major ginger group, 
the Unionist War Committee, suggests that the UBC had failed to offer Unionist 
backbenchers a sufficiently organised, powerful, or ideologically reflective 
movement. 
On several occasions, the UWC certainly proved itself a more serious challenge 
to the Government and the Unionist leadership. Though manifested in the 
`Nigeria Debate' of November 1916, events until then cast doubt on the strength 
and unity of this movement as well. The UWC was born out of a rejuvenation of 
the National Service League (NSL), and the mobilisation of a powerful group of 
mainly extra-parliamentary personnel (including Geoffrey Robinson, Gwynne 
and Wilson, alongside MPs Amery, Carson and Waldorf Astor) in a failed move 
to promote Milner as an alternative war leader. 110 Milner, probably feeling 
himself rather too big a man to enter by the backdoor, was nevertheless ready to 
push it ajar for Carson. 11' In late 1915, with a parliamentary extension bill 
required to preserve Asquith's government, a number of backbench MPs and 
peers threatened to compel a general election. To placate these dissidents, the 
government introduced a compromise compulsion bill that threatened to compel 
the bachelor into military service. Unsatisfied, the UWC was launched in January 
1916, its particular emphasis being the implementation of full military 
conscription. A climax was reached in spring 1916 with Asquith vacillating as to 
the number of troops required, and the method by which to find them. A 
movement was thus afoot to replace the Prime Minister, with Lloyd George, 
109 Figures developed from `Report of the Work of the Business Committee', 30/06/1915. Bull Papers 
Hammersmith. 
llo Amery to Milner, 02/08/1915. Milner Papers, 350/243-6. 
111 Milner 'Memorandum on National Service', 29/08/1915. Milner Papers, 350/325-30. 
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Northcliffe and Carson featuring large. 112 In this instance, the UWC was 
restrained by its more moderate (UBC) elements - including Bull, Stanley 
Baldwin, Evelyn Cecil, Craik, Henry Duke, Basil Peto, and Ernest Pollock. That 
Cecil, Craik and Peto were amongst its `weak-kneed' element - as Amery 
labelled it - says much of the UWC's radicalism. 
113 This group distributed an 
urgent telegram convening a meeting at Baldwin's Eaton Square residence the 
day before a UWC meeting planned for Tuesday 21 March. '14 An attendance of 
seventy decided that to support the tabling of a resolution in parliament would 
wreck the Government, and that instead the case should be put privately to Law. 
The following day, the UWC accepted the proposal to abandon the resolution, 
and a deputation to their leader was arranged instead. 115 While the Daily News 
was correct in its diagnosis that a whip-up of moderates had been organised, the 
movement seems to have sprung from conservative forces outside the leadership 
and unsolicited by it. Why the UBC members should have wished to moderate 
the UWC is debatable. Thrown in, certainly, was an ingredient of resentment 
between the two groups. Hewins' resignation from the UWC in mid-February 
exposed the unavoidable rivalry. 116 More significantly, Bull felt that the UWC 
`were being made fools of. It certainly reflected a very qualified endorsement of 
Carson or Lloyd George as potential Prime Minister, and continued confidence in 
Law as party leader. 
In June 1916 the UWC was again unable to impose itself, although disaffection 
was equally widespread, this time over Ireland. A home rule settlement - 
proposed by Lloyd George as an answer to the `Easter Rising' in Dublin - 
112 Alan Clark (ed. ), 'A Good Innings': The Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham (John Murray, 
London, 1974), pp. 147-52. 
113 Amery to Lady Carson, 26/03/1916. Carson Papers, MIC/6651A/15/21. 
114 Circular Telegram, from William Bull et al., n. d., [19/03/1916]. Bull Papers Hammersmith. 115 Pen-note by Bull on a Daily News article, 22/03/1916. Bull Papers Hammersmith. Keith Middlemas 
and John Barnes, Baldwin: A Biography (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969), p. 57. 
116 Hewins Diary, 19/02/1916. Hewins, Apologia, II, p. 64. 
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secured the endorsement of Carson, Law, `F. E. ', Balfour, and Curzon on the 
basis of six-county Ulster exclusion. However, the southern Unionists Long, 
Lansdowne, Selborne, Robert Cecil and Chamberlain considered such a 
compromise insufficient. "? On 22 June 1916, seventy-eighty Unionists met, 
dispatching a deputation to Law. Such was the discontent that Law was 
compelled to summon a party meeting on 8 July at which two hundred MPs 
attended. Majority opinion at both gatherings was against the leadership's 
adoption of the settlement, with the fault-line lying between southern and Ulster 
Unionists. 118 Both Bridgeman and Hewins recorded that although the rank and 
file was unhappy, it was unlikely that a majority would have voted against the 
leadership, though neither MP was averse to stark warnings of Unionist schisms 
in this period. 119 To underline the limited backing for Carson, yet another 
Unionist sub-group - the Imperial Unionist Association (IUA) - emerged, its 
brief specifically to watch over the Government's policy towards Ireland . 
120 
More specifically, it was an anti-Ulster, pro-southern Irish Unionist group, 
founded to ensure that Carson and the Unionist leaders did not sell Ireland short. 
So angry was Walter Guinness at Carson's attempt to employ the UWC as a pro- 
Ulster pressure group that he manoeuvred it against its leader. 121 
The cataclysmic `Nigeria Debate' of November 1916 cannot be understood in 
relation to Law's leadership except in conjunction with these prior failures. In 
any case, Stubbs has described the debate as `something of a minor triumph' for 
117 John Stubbs, The Unionists and Ireland, 1914-18', Historical Journal, xxxiii (1990), pp. 876-80. 
11$ See report of meeting of 22/06/1916 in McNeill to Carson, 22/06/1916. Carson Papers, 
MIC/665/A/17/25/4. For the Carlton Club meeting see `The Irish Settlement: Meeting of the Unionist 
Party, 7th July 1916'. Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/G/2/20. 
119 Bridgeman Diary 07/07/1916. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 108; Hewins Diary, 08/07/1916. Hewins, 
Apologia, I, p. 83. 
120 Daily Telegraph, 12/07/1916,13/07/1916. 
121 Walter Guinness diary, 08/05/1916 (and later recordings). Brian Bond & Simon Robbin (eds. ), Staff 
Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guinness, 1914-1918 (Leo Cooper, London, 1987), pp. 98-9. 
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Law, in that he at least now had the backing of a majority of Unionist MPs. 
122 
Indeed, the UWC was split: thirty in favour of the Government; twenty-six 
abstentions; notable defectors including Ernest Pollock (chairman of the UWC 
`Contraband' Committee) and Peto. 123 Notwithstanding this, as R. J. Q. Adams has 
pointed out, while the division gave Law a Unionist majority of seven, only a 
minority of backbenchers actually voted with him, and `this alone made Carson a 
rival for Bonar Law's place'. 124 `F. E. 's retort, that the Government would `cross 
off the votes of the members who are paid, if [the rebels would cross] off those 
who want to be paid', was witty but disingenuous, implying that all entered 
politics with the unfettered ambition with which he had. 
125 Significantly, Law 
had made clear previously that he would not remain in office if his party 
expressed a want of confidence in him, though judiciously he had remained 
. unspecific about how this might be expressed. 
126 Whether it represented defeat or 
success, the debate was pivotal, presenting to Law a threat that could not be 
readily ignored, or merely providing a reason by which he could act (and act with 
the knowledge that he had support), or indeed both. 
The issue of Nigerian palm kernels definitely fell directly under Law's 
departmental remit as Colonial Secretary. It also fell under that of the Party 
Chairman Steel-Maitland, his Under-Secretary. But, as Steel-Maitland realised, 
the protest actually emanated from a `lack of go-aheadedness in Government and 
not so much on this particular question [of Nigerian contracts] as generally'. 127 
122 Stubbs, `Impact', p. 29. 
123 Yearwood, `Nigeria Debate', pp. 426-7. 
124 Adams, Bonar Law, p. 223; Blake, Unknown Prime Minister, pp. 297-9. 
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More especially, in most quarters, the protest was rather against the 
Government's sluggish prosecution of the war in toto, than a specific move to 
oust Law. Lord Winterton, although voting against the Government's weak case, 
considered his leader 'level' . 
128 It also reflected, above all, a political situation in 
which Unionist attitudes were shaped less by mere party concerns than by 
governmental ones, a fact verified by the reception given the new administration. 
This is not to deny that by December 1916, there existed a long, cumulative 
procession of dissatisfaction at Law's leadership. His malleability, apparent to 
his followers in the excessively protracted adoption of conscription and in the 
crisis over the Irish settlement, had resulted in general cynicism. Selborne could 
justifiably claim that his leader had `emasculated' Unionist influence in the 
Cabinet, by adhering trenchantly to the notion of Asquith's indispensability. 129 
Throughout the country, similar sentiments were present. In July 1916, the 
Chairman of North Leeds Conservative Association told Law that he had 
obviously been foolish in hoping that `when the Coalition Government was 
formed, our Leaders would compel Asquith to change his methods and conduct 
the War as if we were really fighting for our very existence'. 130 Basil Peto aired 
his grievances to his constituents, attacking the government on the broadest of 
grounds - Ireland, drink, conscription, the prosecution of the war and tariff 
reform. 131 A resolution sent to the NUEC from Newcastle-upon-Tyne abhorred 
`the dilatory indecision, and unsatisfactory methods by which the War has been 
hitherto carried on'. The NUEC approved of such views, and communicated its 
127 Steel-Maitland quoted in Yearwood, `Nigeria Debate', p. 398. A core of Liverpool Unionists were also 
pursuing their own mercantile interests in attempting to maintain the monopoly that their port enjoyed in 
Nigerian trade. See John Stubbs, The Conservative Party and the Politics of War, 1914-16', Oxford 
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128 Winterton diary, 08/11/1916. Winterton Papers, 16. 
129 Selborne Memorandum, Summer 1916. Boyce, Crisis, p. 188. 
130 Tennant to Butler, (enclosed in Butler to Law), 08/07/1916. BU53/4/2. 
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feelings to Law. 132 With inaction on their doorstep, such sentiments among the 
grassroots were accentuated within the parliamentary Unionist party. 
More compelling pointers to Unionist backbench demands in winter 1916, 
however, were the changes in procedure and personnel implemented, and the 
reaction that they effected. The Cabinet system was overhauled and an executive 
War Cabinet of five established, with a secondary Cabinet, composed of 
departmental chiefs, providing information and executing decisions. Although by 
December 1916, Milner and his minnows were supporting a small War Cabinet 
composed of five or six, 133 only the more thinking, and involved, Unionists 
expressed this as a substantive explanation for the Government's failure. Indeed, 
much points to the fact that, as regards the constitution of the war policy making 
body even those who had experienced the Cabinet system at its worst were far 
from decided. Successive Presidents of the Board of Agriculture (Selborne and 
Crawford) complained bitterly of the inefficiency of the Cabinet system, but. then 
the Cabinet had repeatedly scotched their schemes for increasing arable 
production. Others were less zealous for change or, at the very least, were 
uncertain of what the reform should constitute. Curzon wanted a committee 
larger than five (as proposed on 21 September 1915), but smaller than twelve 
(the Dardanelles Committee) and did not even ask for daily sittings. By 
December 1916, he appeared to view indifferently the Cabinet's constitution, 
emphasising rather the issue of personnel. 134 Balfour preferred informal 
consultations with Asquith to the official forum of the Cabinet (perhaps as a 
method of bypassing Law). 135 
132 NUEC, 08/06/1916. Almost identical concerns were raised by J. C. Williams at Truro UA, AGM, 
22/03/1916, (JAR). 
133 Milner to Law, 02/12/1916. BL/53/4/29. 
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Accordingly, the more significant development was that of personnel. Aside 
from his ministerial colleagues, Asquith could boast few Unionist supporters. 
Law received much criticism from the front of the Prime Minister's style of non- 
leadership, most notably from Wilson - an entrenched anti-Asquithian - and 
John Baird. 136 Selborne claimed that Asquith's `greatest asset was his 
imperturbability. ... For the rest he was quite hopeless as a war 
P. M. '. 137 Many 
agreed with such denigration of Asquith. By December 1916, 'Squiff' had 
become anathema to most Unionists, and his incompetence had become a truism 
to the likes of Hewins, F. S. Oliver, Amery, Carson, Milner and Willoughby de 
Broke. 138 Meanwhile, his eventual successor, Lloyd George, had advanced in 
Unionist hearts during the war by his dynamism, promotion of conscription and 
recognition of total war. 139 As early as October 1915, the Unionist Chief Whip, 
Talbot, had informed his leader that `so far as the House of Commons is 
concerned, Lloyd George would become leader of a majority of the Tory Party. ' 
What is more, Talbot's only reservations had emanated from a fear that Lloyd 
George would be opposed by the bulk of the Liberal, Irish Nationalist and 
Labour Parties, and thus that a general election would have been unavoidable, 
with the emotional issue of conscription to the fore. 140 Steel-Maitland had ccme 
to similar conclusions five months later, telling Law that should Asquith be 
replaced, it was `only Mr. Lloyd George who need be seriously considered' from 
the Liberal Party, but that he was `seriously discredited among large bodies of 
Labour opinion' and that the bulk of the Liberal Party would view his accession 
136 For example, Wilson to Law, 29/12/1915; Baird to Law, 25/11/1915. BIJ52/l/65,51/5/48. 
137 Selborne Memorandum, Summer 1916. Boyce, Crisis, pp. 185-6. 
138 For instance, F. S. Oliver to Carson, 09/06/1916 (draft). Oliver Papers, 24852, ff. 42-6. 
139 Martin Farr, `A Compelling Case for Voluntarism: Britain's Alternative Strategy, 1915-1916', War 
History (2002), pp. 279-304; Michael Fry, `Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: 
Lloyd George replaces Asquith: the issues underlying the drama', Historical Journal, xxxi (1988), 
pp. 609-27. The former argues that it was the issue of `consumption' that drew Lloyd George and the 
Unionists together, the latter that conscription formed the most forceful link. 
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as `the successful accomplishment of an unwarranted intrigue'. 
141 Therefore, 
neither Chief Whip nor Party Chairman viewed Unionist opinion as an obstacle 
to a Lloyd George administration. When Unionist MPs were canvassed at the end 
of 1916, an overwhelming majority recorded their wish to see Asquith replaced 
with Lloyd George. 142 
It is unnecessary here to examine the vacillations of Unionist ministers - most 
famously Long and the so-called "Three-C's" (Robert Cecil, Chamberlain and 
Curzon) - as to the choice between Asquith and Lloyd George. What their 
hesitancy established was that the contest was close-run and contained certain 
contradictions. From a personality point of view, Balfour, Cecil, Chamberlain, 
Curzon, Crawford, Long and Lansdowne undoubtedly favoured the urbanity of 
Asquith to the ruggedness of Lloyd George. Cecil and the languid Lansdowne 
were enticed by his refinement and Whiggish statesmanship, Long flirtatiously 
courted, if not actually wooed, by Margot Asquith. 
143 A key consideration was 
the issue of loyalty, which extended to the issue of ministerial duty, and the 
prospect of an intrigue left Lansdowne with a `nasty taste in my mouth', while 
Crawford feared that the nature of Lloyd George's accession would be 
'embarrassing'. 144 
Backbench opinion was certainly only too happy to have traded in an old, if 
slick, model for something less predictable but virile, as evinced in the declining 
influence of the ginger groups. 145 Equally noteworthy, however, was the 
141 Steel-Maitland Memorandum, `The Political Situation', 31/03/1916. SM GD/193/306/84-88x. 
142 Godfrey Locker-Lampson to Beaverbrook, 23/02/1917. Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/G/2/9. 
143 Margot Asquith to Long, 17/04/1916,18/04/1916. Long Papers, MS Add. 62404, ff. 144-5,163-5. She 
addressed him as `My dearest Walter' and offered unctuous flattery. 
144 Lansdowne to Law, 01/12/1916 (copy). Lansdowne Papers, Further Correspondence `B' (88/49). 
Crawford Diary, 04/11/1916. Vincent, Crawford, p. 363. See also Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A 
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appointment of Milner to the War Cabinet of five, which epitomised the changes 
in both personnel and Cabinet constitution. He came with a clean slate, being 
distanced from past Unionist failings in government - both during the war, when 
he had not previously been offered a position, and in the Balfour administration 
of 1902-05, when he had been but had refused. R. J. Scally certainly goes too far 
in equating the events of December 1916 to mid-1910 so directly and in 
constructing a concrete `Social-Imperialist' link between Lloyd George's 
coalition plans of 1910 and 1916. Nevertheless, the anti-party sentiment of the 
radical right and the issue of efficiency was addressed head on in the 
appointment of Milner. 146 Significantly, he possessed the confidence of many 
trouble-makers, including Amery, F. S. Oliver, Steel-Maitland and Carson, and 
many who were in a position to pose a threat, like Chamberlain and Selborne. He 
also epitomised efficiency, operating - as he always seemed to - with a 
kindergarten of sidekicks, who served to oil the machinery of state. 147 
It was fundamentally on the basis of these appointments that Unionist 
dissentients were contained. With such men of drive and administrative ability at 
the helm, charges of ineffectiveness carried little weight, and under such 
circumstances it was largely Lloyd George's supposed defects of character that 
posed the greatest danger. While his Marconi dealings had been studiously 
ignored in the light of his capabilities during war, he nevertheless possessed a 
capacious cupboard of skeletons. On the formation of Lloyd George's 
Government, Crawford, Cave, Robert Cecil, Long and Finlay (to name but a few) 
had been afraid of his underhand style. 148 Through 1917 and 1918, there is little 
to suggest that, as far as personality went, many hatchets were buried. Faults 
145 Stubbs, `Impact', p. 29. 146 R. J. Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976), 
pp. 4-9,21-2,338-46. 
147 P. A. Lockwood, 'Milner's Entry into the War Cabinet', Historical Journal, vii (1964), pp. 129-32. 
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perceived in Lloyd George's character as Prime Minister were precisely those 
observed before December 1916. Indeed now they were accentuated, because as 
national leader he possessed greater license to exhibit his shortcomings. 
Convincing signs of Lloyd George's personal ambition - like the routine 
character of his resignation threats during the Asquith coalition, and his timely 
transfer to the infant Department of Munitions, at a time when it could hardly 
crawl, and equally timely departure, at which point it was full-grown and only 
too likely to trip - were hard to forget. 
'49 
Specific grievances aggravated such distrust. Although it has been convincingly 
argued that British policy-makers were not divided on a `Westerner' versus 
`Easterner' basis (nor on a simple `Brass-hats' versus `Frock-coats' premise), 
old-style Conservatives deplored Lloyd George's treatment of the generals. 
150 
Ranks closed behind Generals Haig and Robertson when Lloyd George sought to 
pursue an Eastern policy and marginalise the military commanders of the 
Western front. This quarrel re-emerged in August 1917, when Haig and 
Robertson believed (rightly) that Lloyd George and Milner were weakening their 
offensive on the Western Front, leading Robert Cecil to complain that `it is the 
old story. The soldiers believe the "little man" is intriguing with the French or the 
Italians or someone. ' 151 This resulted in the bizarre alliance between Asquith, the 
generals, the anti-Lloyd George Liberal press (Daily News, Daily Star, and the 
Nation) and the extreme right-wing press (the Morning Post, the Globe, and 
National Review), against the Prime Minister (himself supported by such diverse 
148 Robert Cecil to Selborne, 10/12/1915. Boyce, Crisis, pp. 151-2; Long to Law, 09/12/1916; Robert 
Cecil to Law, 09/12/1916. BLJ81/1/29,31. 
149 For instance, `Interview with Asquith' by Austen Chamberlain, 29/06/1916. AC/12/35. 
150 See David French, British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-16 (Allen & Unwin, London, 1986), pp. xii, 
244-7; Idem, The Strategy of the Lloyd-George Coalition, 1916-18 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), 
pp. 286-8. 
11 Chelwood to Lloyd George, 29/08/1917. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49738, ff. 142-3 
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publications as the Daily Telegraph and Daily Chronicle). 152 Two months later, 
and also again in early 1918, Cecil and Long were alarmed at the establishment 
of a Supreme War Council, which threatened to undermine the authority of CIGS 
Robertson, with the placement of Wilson as the British representative in Paris. 
153 
But, Lloyd George had been selected as a substitute for Asquith, and minds were 
thus decided also by the image of the ex-Prime Minister on the sidelines keeping 
warm for another run at office. At a high-water mark of Unionist misgivings in 
February and March 1918, Balfour drew attention to this 
You must not expect perfection. You see Lloyd George's faults; and they are not difficult 
to see. But do you think he can be improved upon out of our existing material? Is there 
any one of his colleagues in the present War Cabinet you would like to see in his place? 
Is there any member of the late Government you would like to see in his place? '-"4 
This consideration mollified Unionist malcontents in these troubled months, 
when the German army was collecting its forces for a last massive offensive. 
Once more, the underlying trouble emanated from Lloyd George's methods of 
government, especially his abuse of the honours system - most horribly in the 
form of a peerage for Lord Beaverbrook - and his appointment to government 
positions of the press barons (Northcliffe, Rothermere and, again, Beaverbrook). 
This was supplemented - as always - with divergence from the military High 
Command. Bar Balfour, the whole Cecil clan (Hugh, Robert, Salisbury, 
Selborne) was outraged, and Chamberlain, emboldened by the encouraging 
words of friends and government dissidents, was prompted to launch a colossal 
Commons assault upon the Prime Minister. While it was a resounding success, 
152 J. M. McEwen, "`Brass-Hats" and the British Press During the First World War', Canadian Journal of 
History, xviii (1983), pp. 59-60. 
153 Robert Cecil to Balfour, 18/11/1917. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49738, f. 164. Balfour to Long, 
10/11/1917,14/11/1917. Long Papers, MS Add. 62422, ff. 131-3,134. 
154 Balfour to Robert Cecil, 12/02/1918. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51071A, ff. 40-6. 
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Chamberlain refused to take the necessary steps against Lloyd George and Law 
to ensure change. Partly, no doubt, this was Chamberlain `playing the game' (and 
`losing it' as `F. E. ' might have added): he abandoned intimidation at an early 
stage and resorted to appeals through Curzon, Milner and Carson. 
155 In any case, 
it is questionable whether he - like Carson, Salisbury and others - could have 
carried the wider party. For, although there was widespread indignation at Lloyd 
George's promotion of the newspaper magnates (for instance within the UWC), 
and whilst Chamberlain received a rapturous reception, Milner considered he was 
barking up the wrong tree. Amery, meanwhile, felt that Chamberlain was still 
living as if in the 1880s, with his obsession with `good form'. As F. S. Oliver 
quipped, he must have counted someone at Madame Tussaud's among his 
maternal ancestors. 156 Furthermore, Chamberlain and others were anxious as to 
who might be the likeliest beneficiary of any governmental upheaval. 
157 
The standoff, as already visualised by Balfour, materialised in spring 1918. The 
`Maurice Debate' placed before Unionists a direct choice between Asquith and 
Lloyd George, in the guise of a vote of censure against the government 
manufactured by the Prime Minister out of a motion for a Select Committee put 
down in Asquith's name. The distress originated from concerns that Lloyd 
George was yet again maltreating the military commanders, this time by 
misrepresenting the strength of the British army in France. The Prime Minister 
managed to see off his adversaries, remarking disarmingly to his Unionist 
colleagues that `this time [he had] been caught out telling the truth' (which, of 
iss Verbatim letters from Chamberlain to Curzon, Milner and Carson, 21/02/1918. Carson Papers, 
MIC/665/B/39/4; AC/15/7/7. 
156 Amery diary, 04/03/1918. Barnes, Amery Diaries, pp. 207-8. For the backbench dissent see Salisbury 
to Law, 22/02/1918. BL/82/9/13; Evelyn Cecil to Curzon, 22/02/1918. Curzon Papers, f. 112,121a, 
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course, even in this case he had not). 158 It was only partly this mischievous wit 
that saved him, and more the fact that, despite its sympathy with the military 
commanders, the UWC was unready to endorse Asquith to any degree. 
159 After 
all, Carson had remarked only a few months earlier that he `certainly [didn't] 
want Asquith back' . 
160 If anything, as one Unionist remarked, the contest 
established the Lloyd George government `more firmly in the saddle than they 
[had] been for some time past'. 161 
Throughout the coalition, the party's commitment to Lloyd George faced only 
one explicit and prolonged threat. This was from the National Party, which broke 
away from the Unionist Party in August and September 1917. Without a broad 
base of support, it attracted few, including a small clutch of disaffected peers, 
their sons and nephews, and a smaller group of MPs (Henry Page Croft, Viscount 
Duncannon, Richard Cooper, Colonel R. H. Rawson, Major Rowland Hunt, 
Major Douglas Carnegie and Major Alan Burgoyne). 162 All were parliamentary 
small fry, with the possible exceptions of Beresford and Cooper. Indeed, such 
was this the case that the Chief Unionist Whip in the House of Lords confessed 
he had not even heard of one of its members in his House. 163 While the 
Conservative Agents' Journal described party members as `well-meaning 
political mediocrities', 164 Lord Wolmer considered one member `semi-witted' 
(he was not so generous about the others). 165 For what reasons did the party fail 
to attract the mainstream? 
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At the time of the National Party's arrival serious grievances were being aired 
within Unionist circles. Accordingly, the new party was not predestined to fail. In 
August 1917, Law was forced by his backbenchers to demand the exclusion of 
Arthur Henderson from the War Cabinet after the Labour leader determined to 
attend a socialist peace conference in Stockholm. 166 Cabinet appointments also 
aroused considerable resentment amongst the Unionist Party in summer 1917: 
Lloyd George attempted to shoehorn Churchill, the bogey of the Unionist Party, 
back into war administration; the appointments of Edwin Montagu (India Office) 
and Christopher Addison (Ministry of Reconstruction) were scarcely more 
popular. Such was the concern, that Steel-Maitland claimed that he would `not be 
a bit surprised to see a "bust up" by Christmas', especially at the NUA or local 
level. 167 In the meantime, Long and Derby were pitted against Milner over the 
Corn Production Act (which had antagonised farmers and the landed interest), 
the public was dissatisfied by the response to the submarine menace, and tariff 
reformers cried out for the implementation of the Paris Economic Conference 
resolutions. Because of such dissent, Long was `pretty confident that the great 
bulk of our Party would go over' to the National Party, if it found itself with a 
persuasive leader. 168 Unionist agents thought the new faction `would undoubtedly 
detach many active spirits who were dissatisfied about home rule and other 
matters' . 
169 Even Talbot admitted that he was afraid the National Party would get 
a following `to a certain extent amongst our own people in the country'. 170 
What is more, in both its programme and its organisation, the National Party 
carefully directed its efforts at the nation. Croft attempted to employ the Tariff 
Reform League (TRL) - for whose organisation committee he had previously 
166 Turner, British Politics, pp. 213-15,442. 
167 Steel-Maitland to Chamberlain, 27/07/1917. AC/12/149. 
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served as chairman - to provide an infrastructure. Matters were arranged for the 
TRL and the British Empire Union to convene general meetings in the wake of 
the National Party manifesto. It also considered seriously the wording, style and 
programme of the manifesto so as to broaden its appeal. Duncannon, for instance, 
asked F. S. Oliver (the author of the manifesto) to `avoid using the word 
"soldiers" too often', claiming that Croft had spoken `of the fear of militarism 
which is already abroad in the country -& and that we must not give any ground 
for that fear'. 171 
However, by its inability to win over a credible leader, most especially Milner, 
the new party squandered these advantages. Milner's non-participation was 
confirmed, though certainly not determined only, by his involvement in the War 
Cabinet. Not only did his absence deny the movement the leader it desperately 
required, but he also took with him many. others, including William Ormsby- 
Gore (his PPS), who professed `agreement with [the National Party] 
programme', but proclaimed that `wherever Milner leads I shall follow and 
whatever party he is in, I shall be in'. 172 Sentiments like these were not confined 
to Milner's staff. Internal party developments also swayed opinion. Milner's 
connections with patriotic Labour, which were cementing themselves into 
concrete cooperation with the Unionist Party, had stolen what thunder Croft 
might else have delivered, depriving it of the opportunity of widening its base of 
appeal to Unionists with radical leanings. How many, if any, more supporters 
might otherwise have been won over is probably slight. Unlike the British 
Worker's National League (BWNL), which possessed very capable, if marginal, 
economic thinkers on both the Unionist and Labour wings, the National Party 
171 Duncannon to Oliver, 25/07/1917,28/07/1917; Croft to Oliver, n. d. [September, 1917]. Oliver Papers, 
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had few of such insight. 173 Moreover, by its membership, as by its programme, it 
offered little appeal to patriotic labour and could at best attract the attention of 
imperialist Unionists with no particular loyalty to the Government. It is 
noteworthy that, although the UWC and UBC remained influential, an attempt to 
establish a distinct alternative party failed miserably. It was anathema to coalition 
politics. The far more successful BWNL cooperated openly with the Government 
and outwardly represented the partnership between labour and Unionist within its 
ranks. The National Party did neither, offering reluctant and qualified support to 
the Government, whilst representing merely a small minority of just one party. 
Sympathisers like Edward Wood and Dougal O'Malcolm consequently favoured 
the reformation of existing parties rather than the establishment of an entirely 
new outfit. Wood hoped `to arrive at the same goal as the "National" Party' by `a 
simultaneous reform of all parties', and so produce `a new, less-rigid "party 
system" - by the cooperation of men of all parties', this last a sentiment to be 
echoed in Law's conference speech in November. 174 Pertinent issues were being 
pursued in other ways. 175 What is more, while few may have been alienated by its 
programme, this in itself concealed a flaw. For, as Wolmer noted, Law, Asquith 
or the Labour leader Stephen Walsh could equally well have issued the 
manifesto. Or, as the sympathiser Lloyd remarked, the rebels seemed `to have 
left the party rather like a child that goes out of Church on tip-toe because it is 
feeling sick rather than as one who renounces an abandoned dogma'. 176 Such 
factors kept Lloyd and others within the main congregation of the coalition. 
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When the genesis of Croft's movement is appreciated, its oblique focus was 
perhaps unsurprising. It evolved out of an effort from June 1917 to `frighten' 
Lloyd George into appreciating the need for a proper military offensive. Most 
particularly, this took the outrageous shape of the promotion of Wilson (until 26 
June no less a man than the British Army's Chief Liaison Officer at the French 
headquarters) as a parliamentary candidate. Masterminded by Duncannon 
(Wilson's aide de camp), dinner parties were arranged for well-wishers, 
including F. S. Oliver, Croft, Maxse, Gwynne, Guinness and Goulding, and a safe 
parliamentary seat was pursued. It came to nothing, partly because it was for 
Wilson and supporters like Lord Esher (British Emissary in Paris) no more than a 
sideshow to their official careers, partly because Carson kept failing - seemingly 
deliberately - to find Wilson a seat in Ulster. The purpose of the mid-summer 
`crusade' was to impel the prosecution of the war, encourage a proactive policy 
towards Bulgaria, Turkey and Servia, and resolve the question of manpower. 177 
Similarities in personnel and timing prove the growth of Croft's party out of this 
fundamentally military seed. Subsequently, intricate socio-economic policies 
were in short supply. The National Party ended up neither a civilian nor a 
military party, but a civilian party with military pretensions (or perhaps vice 
versa), which suited few, save a few hardcore Unionists returned from the front. 
Despite the gloomy forebodings of party leaders, Unionist grassroots' reaction 
revealed both disinterest in the National Party's politics and a marked loyalty to 
the coalition in spite of its problems. In mid-August, a party whip recorded that it 
was not `making much headway' and had failed to `collar' the TRL. 178 There was 
some little concern locally, most notably in London, 179 but there was a paucity of 
consideration offered it elsewhere. The Herefordshire North Unionist 
177 Henry Wilson diary, 28/06/1917,29/06/1917,04/07/1917,05/07/1917,10/07/1917,22/07/1917. 
Wilson Papers, DS/MISC/80/7. 
178 Bridgeman to Caroline Bridgeman, 16/08/1917. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 121. 
118 
Association, in what were unusually political and extensive discussions, merely 
recorded the receipt of the National Party circular and so dismissed it out of hand 
without any consideration. 180 Meanwhile, it was not until mid-November that the 
NUEC was asked by Joseph Lawrence to take steps to combat the activities and 
methods of the new group, and even then these were not acted upon. 181 Finally, 
and ironically given its disruptive objectives, the National Party, through its 
failure, only served to bolster party unity and the leadership of Law and Lloyd 
George. Because, if Unionists were always wary that the choice lay between 
Asquith and Lloyd George, then Croft's efforts did little to dispute this concept, 
even did much to reinforce it. This offered great solace to those who considered 
that in Law as party leader with Milner and Lloyd George as war leaders, they 
had already unearthed the best talent. 
The Future Idea of Party 
In March 1918, Austen Chamberlain claimed that the shadow of a general 
election was diverting Lloyd George's attention away from the war and towards 
his own position, and Chamberlain was not `disposed to give him a blank 
cheque'. 182 In many ways this was demonstrative of Unionist perspectives on the 
objectives of the coalition administration, namely that its brief was the 
prosecution of the war and, at most, smooth demobilisation in its aftermath. This 
was made manifest, for example, when representatives at a party meeting in 
Newcastle resolved to `strongly demand that the issues [in a general election] 
should be limited to the successful prosecution of the war, the Peace Terms, & 
any necessary legislation required'. As Younger commented upon this: 
179 CAJ, xlvi, October 1917, pp. 141-3. 
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`obviously the idea was not to trust the P. M. beyond that, & only to support him 
on a limited programme. After that the Electors [are] again to be appealed to. ' A 
few weeks later, Younger added the `very strong feelings' against an election 
expressed by the Yorkshire Provincial Division and in Glasgow. 
183 For some, 
even an early election fought on a "win the war" coalition cry aroused the alarm 
that supporters would have to be encouraged to vote for non-Unionist candidates, 
`with which, on everything but the war they may be at total variance', an 
encouragement that would not necessarily be easy to retract. 
'84 
Lloyd George unquestionably possessed many merits attractive to Unionists. As 
J. C. C. Davidson appreciated (though with the discerning eye of hindsight, one 
suspects), `it would have been very difficult for many Conservatives to resist 
Lloyd George, because he had at that time the immense prestige of a national 
leader' and a readiness to lead a `national' party - `a repetitive speech which you 
will find in all Conservative leaders' speeches'. 185 Such phraseology was 
alluring, with its references back not only to the one-nation Conservatism of 
Disraeli and the Tory democracy of Randolph Churchill, but also to the national 
cohesion and exertion associated with the war, and the patriotism of 1914-18 that 
offered a unique opportunity to resolve the class issue. 186 What made it a more 
sustainable projection was the evolution of the Lloyd George coalition into an 
anti-socialist force after the Russian revolutions of 1917.187 The remaining 
question, of course, was just how sustainable it was. 
Notwithstanding specific advantages to the party, Neville Chamberlain gathered 
`that all Unionists [did] not regard with pleasure the notion of permanently 
183 Younger to Law, 06/09/1918 (BL/84/1/9), 20/09/1918,23/09/1918 (BU95/2). 
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enrolling under L1. G. 's standard, and among them may be reckoned "Yours 
trooly". ' Although "Yours Trooly" disliked Lloyd George for personal reasons - 
a distaste that can have been only supplemented by his brother's outlook in early 
1918 - Neville's reservations were mirrored elsewhere. 
188 Two major dangers 
attended the establishment of any longer-term partnership: Lloyd George and his 
followers had to be trusted in a personal sense; the future of the Unionist Party 
and its principles had to be safeguarded against the impact of continued dilution. 
The first requirement was uncertain. Even in July 1918, Long was informing his 
leader that Lloyd George seemed `really determined to split our Party as his own 
is split' and, having already broken one party, there was no reason to believe that 
he would refrain from doing so again, should the necessity or opportunity have 
arisen. 189 With little apparent alteration in mood since December 1916, Robert 
Cecil and Curzon were against joining with him on the ground that he was `such 
a dirty little rogue'. Nonetheless, although character faults were cited frequently, 
party motives loomed large, Balfour advising Robert Sanders that Cecil was 
actually against Lloyd George because he wanted `a small exclusive Unionist 
party'. 190 This rationale appeared to extend also to Curzon, who expressed 
concern that Milner, `not a Conservative or Unionist in the ordinary sense', 
should represent party opinion on the committee formed to draft an election 
programme. Consequently, Curzon informed his leader that he must `entirely 
dissent' from the idea that `our Party should merge its identity in some new party 
or should pledge its future allegiance after peace has returned'. 191 By November, 
although he was judging the old party programmes as `obsolete', Balfour was 
187 Turner, British Politics, p. 194. 
188 Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 23/03/1918. Self, Neville Chamberlain, p. 260. Chamberlain had 
served as Director of National Service under Lloyd George, but felt that he had been mistreated by the 
premier. 
189 Long to Law, 17/07/1918. BL/83/5/17. 
190 Sanders Diary, 03/03/1918. Ramsden, Tory, pp. 101.2. 
191 Curzon to Law, 25/02/1918. BL/82/9/16. 
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still warning Derby that opposition could be expected from `men like Walter 
Long and ... "my own family"' . 
192 
It is evident that from spring to November 1918 the party was obsessed with its 
ability to retain at least its long-term independence. Law sought to ameliorate his 
party supporters by appointing a `Conservative' policy committee upon which 
were to serve the Party Chairman Younger, the obscure Lord Clyde and the 
traditional Tory squire Long. They duly reported in predictably Conservative 
style advocating tariffs, protection against dumping, modification of the terms of 
the disendowment of the Welsh Church, and the reconstitution of the House of 
Lords. These were viewed as minimum gains to ensure the future of Unionist 
Party principles. Conversely, the Liberal proposals on nationalisation of railways, 
a minimum wage and no-food taxes were ditched. Together they indicated that 
any coalition would have to enjoy a distinctly Unionist flavour. 193 
Curzon's distrust of Milner was symptomatic of the divisions within the party 
wrought by coalition politics. While Milner never lacked support from the 
Birmingham, tariff reform, or imperialist groups, many traditional Tories 
remained suspicious of his collectivist inclinations. Increasingly the party was 
split between those who displayed a readiness to work (however tenuously) 
alongside patriotic Labour and those who sought to retreat to the comforts and 
dependability of Toryism after the war. 194 The old guard was best personified in 
Long. Anxious that Roland Prothero (President of the Board of Agriculture) was 
being cornered on the land question by the socialists and Arthur Lee (a Unionist, 
but an adamant supporter of Lloyd George), Long considered that the party was 
192 Curzon to Law, 08/11/1918. BL/95/2; Derby diary, 03/11/1918. Derby Papers, 28/1/1. 
193 Barry MacGill, `Lloyd George's Timing of the 1918 Election', Journal of British Studies, xiv (1974), 
pp. 118-20. 
194 For a wider discussion see Chapters III and V below. 
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losing its landowning and farming backbone - its 'mainstay'. 
195 He, however, 
remained in the minority, and widespread satisfaction with co-operation in 
government with patriotic Labour leaders (pacifists such as Ramsay MacDonald 
being excluded) put a heavy-duty nail in the coffin of the Whig-Unionist alliance 
proposed by Hugh Cecil in 1915. Instead the Unionist Party would have to go it 
alone, in association with Lloyd George and/or with patriotic Labour. 
Such developments were also symptomatic of a wider change, namely 
indifference towards the idea of 'party'. Earlier in the war, Milner had hoped that 
many of the younger Unionists `who [were] not hidebound partisans and [did] 
not care at all about the machine' would be ready to work alongside patriotic 
Labour, and create a further parliamentary grouping. 196 The irony, that those 
ostensibly against `party' were in fact intent upon precisely that, seemed lost on 
its adherents. This was no mere oversight: disillusion was directed less against 
the notion of parliamentary organisation and electoral choice, but rather towards 
the two-party system, which stretched back from the Unionist-Radical divide to 
that of Tories and Whigs of the previous centuries. 197 Antipathy towards the 
party system, indeed, had strong antecedents in the Edwardian period: the 
`radical right' of the pre-war era had possessed an almost equal distaste for the 
mandarins of their own party as for the politics of Liberal and Labour. 198 While, 
as Geoffrey Searle has claimed, their attitudes `[seemed] to foreshadow the 
fascism of a later generation', they actually found much greater expression in the 
195 Long to Cave, 01/06/1918. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62497, f. 36. 
196 Milner to Willoughby de Broke, 01/10/1915. Willoughby de Broke Papers, WB11/11. 
197 For instance, see Milner's memorandum, `Some Notes on the Present War Situation', 12/03/1916. 
Milner Papers, 352/66-72. 
198 See Paul Kennedy, The Pre-war Right in Britain and Germany' in Paul Kennedy & Anthony Nicholls 
(eds. ), Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany before 1914 (Macmillan, London, 
1981), pp. 10-12; Geoffrey Searle, `The Revolt from the Right in Edwardian Britain' in ibid., pp. 22-6. 
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dissentient voices of Unionism in 1915-18.199 Their hatred of flaccid leadership, 
of corruption, of alien influence, was made into a persuasive package by the war, 
a war that proved correct the pre-war programmes of the National Service 
League and the Navy League (at least to their advocates). Many were won over 
to the impulses of national efficiency, the utilisation of imperial opportunities, 
and the active prosecution of the war, although they still did not form a coherent 
or united force. 200 The xenophobic outbursts of Maxse and the like were too 
strong for some, but the war had also attested to their conviction that the two- 
party system was incapable of dealing effectively with real administrative 
demands. Even the hidebound Unionist Austen Chamberlain could claim that 
`tho[ugh] a party man ... I don't give a d-n for party now'. 
01 
The type of candidate attracted and selected for the 1918 general election 
compounded this non-party sentiment. The khaki colour of the `Coupon' election 
determined that many of those returning from the front to forge political careers 
found their home in the Unionist Party. This was pertinent in the cases of Oswald 
Mosley and Walter Elliot, both of whom were adopted as Unionist Coalition 
candidates. Elliot was said to have answered a telegram requesting him to stand 
in the election with the enthusiastic response, `Certainly, which party? ' Mosley, 
meanwhile, wrote (admittedly in memoirs written many years later during which 
he had travelled some distance from the Conservative Party) that he `knew little 
of Conservative sentiment, and cared less. ... I had joined the Conservative Party 
because it seemed to me on its record in the war to be the party of patriotism. '202 
This reveals a perceptible benefit of the war and coalition for the Unionist Party, 
in that they both reinforced the association between the party and patriotism, 
199 Geoffrey Searle, `Critics of Edwardian Society: The Case of the Radical Right' in Alan O'Day The 
Edwardian Age: Conflict and Stability, 1900-14 (Macmillan, London, 1979), p. 94. 200 For this movement before the war see John Hutcheson, Leopold Maxse and the National Review, 
1893-1914 (Garland, London, 1989), pp. 144-79. 
201 Austen Chamberlain to Milner, 12/12/1915. Milner Papers, 351/288-91. 
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which earned them both candidates and votes. 203 Indeed, coalition specifically 
did so. For during the war, as Steel-Maitland had warned Law in early 1915, 
public opinion cared little about the actions of the opposition, and much about 
those of the government . 
204Thus, once in government, they could express their 
patriotism persuasively. The other sharp edge of the sword, however, was that by 
welcoming patriots with only faint loyalties to the party, it perhaps also lent itself 
to the cleavages of post-war Conservatism. 205 
Due to the patriotic truce, `coalitionism', and the demands of war, the notion of 
'party' had been sustained artificially throughout the war. Immediately on the 
adoption of coalition, Law reminded his parliamentary supporters of the 
importance of the maintenance of the party organisation. 206 With the 
abandonment of registration work, due to the advent of the Registration Act in 
March 1916, the National Society of Conservative Agents wondered anxiously as 
to the future of the party machinery. 207 The response was a Central Office 
circular to local association chairmen `on the subject of the necessity of 
maintaining our Party organisation'. Yet, this constituted little more than a call 
for organisation for organisation's sake. Somewhat surprisingly, this rather tame 
directive was expressly followed in constituencies such as South Ealing and 
Herefordshire North. 208 However, even though these requests continued to 
receive nominal accord, as the war progressed their impact could - and did - 
only lessen. 09 
202 Oswald Moseley, My Life (Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1968), p. 90. 
203 See below, especially, pp. 171-174. 
204 Steel-Maitland `Memorandum on the Political Situation', February 1915. SM GD 193/306/78-83x. 
205 D. H. Close, `Conservatives and Coalition after the First World War', Journal of Modern History 
(1973), pp. 248-9. 
206 Younger to Law, 13/04/1916. BL/52/4/12. 
207 National Society of Conservative Agents, Council, 16/03/1916, (485/3). 
zos South Ealing UA, General Committee, 25/08/1916, (Acc. 1338/1); Herefordshire North UA, Financial 
and Advisory Committee, 21/09/1917, (K78/2). 
209 For organisational developments see below, pp. 231-237. 
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Moreover, by 1918, it was far from clear what should be the purpose of any such 
organisation. Local opinion was sought periodically during the war, on the issues 
of compulsion in April 1916, franchise reform in autumn 1917 and Irish Home 
Rule in April 1918210 These canvasses were undoubtedly an attempt to keep the 
parliamentary party aware of developments within the country and foster the idea 
of an attentive leadership, but the process was never likely to provide more than 
slight reassurance to supporters that they were not being completely ignored. 
Increasingly, the attention of local associations was directed towards party policy 
rather than organisation. As early as May 1917, the NUEC was asked that `steps 
should be taken to prepare a programme for the next General Election, and 
strongly urged that we should be well fortified with an aggressive attack', and the 
Council approved the formation of a sub-committee for such a purpose 211 A few 
months later, Basil Peto lamented that he could not see a `determination on the 
part of the present Government to approach [the national imperial interests] with 
a clear-cut national policy that would afford the key to their solution". 212 These 
transparent calls for tariff reform were echoed six months later with suggestions 
that Law meet the NUEC prior to the conference, in order that a `clearly defined 
policy' be made `by a re-affirmation of Unionist Principles, leading up to a 
National Ideal'. The Leicestershire Provincial Division passed a resolution 
asking that the Conference be private - presumably in the hope that the patriotic 
truce would not prohibit a good old-fashioned argument on party policy. 213 Such 
demands became increasingly routine business for the NUEC214 As it was, local 
associations had to be content with Law's pronouncement at the NUA 
Conference of November 1917 that, they were `looking into a fog. It is absolutely 
futile to make plans for conditions which you cannot foresee. ' This frank advice 
210 Steel-Maitland to Austen Chamberlain, 12/04/1916. SM GD/193/170/1/397-8. 
211 NUEC, 08/05/1917. This sub-committee did not appear to report. 
Zit Peto to the Chairman of Devizes UA, EC, August 1917, (2305/1). 
213 NUEC, 13/11/1917. See also SUA, Central Council, EC, 07/11/1917, (Acc. 10424163). 
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was not always sufficient to prevent dispute. 215 Indeed, by July 1918, calls for an 
elucidation of policy emerged also from the Yorkshire and Eastern Area 
Councils, and from Cheshire. 216 
The party was certainly staring into a fog as the war progressed, in which only 
bare outlines of traditional Unionist principles could be discerned. In a revealing 
correspondence between Salisbury and Selborne - revealing because it exposed 
rather than penetrated the haze - Salisbury cast doubt on the future role of the 
`Unionist or Conservative or anti-Radical Party'. Issues of nomenclature were 
peripheral but not irrelevant, demonstrating the ongoing difficulties of self- 
perception. Selborne conceived the party as having two main functions: `to 
defend certain capital institutions and in everything else to go slow'217 However, 
what could it now defend? The Union, the established Welsh Church and House 
of Lords had all but been abandoned. So much so, that Wolmer considered that a 
distinct Conservative/Unionist Party could' continue but that it would `inspire 
more respect than enthusiasm'. 218 The patriotism of war and the responsibilities 
of government moved even diehard Unionists like the youthful Ormsby-Gore 
towards a reconsideration of politics. Having continued to challenge the Liberal 
government's policy towards Welsh Church disestablishment in March 1915, by 
summer 1916 he was informing Steel-Maitland that `I find it practically the 
universal opinion that the old lines of cleavage between parties will be difficult 
214 For example resolutions from the Middlesex and Sussex Divisions. NUEC, 09/04/1918. 
215 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. The General Committee of the Glasgow UA was told with some force 
that it was pointless to discuss the future of the party, which must be left in the hands of the leaders. 
27/05/1918, (Ace. 10424/73). 
216 Yorkshire Area, EC, 05/04/1918 (JAR); Eastern Area, AGM, 12/07/1918 (Are/7/1/6); Cheshire 
Division, Council, 28/06/1918, (Are/3/6/3). 
217 Salisbury to Selborne, 04/09/1916 and reply 12/09/1916. Boyce, Crisis, pp. 196-8. 
218 Wolmer to Smith, 28/09/1917 (copy). Wolmer Papers, c. 1010, ff. 35-9. 
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nay disastrous to resurrect. That is to say Home Rule versus Ulster Unionism, & 
the Welsh Church. '219 
Certainly as far as the Church was concerned, the rather swift progression, from 
absolute opposition to disestablishment to specific attempts to prevent 
disendowment, indicated that it could hardly have remained a fundamental party 
doctrine for long. 220 The disestablishment bill had been placed on the statute 
book in September 1914, but with a postponing amendment, which was itself 
withdrawn in July 1915. Although High Churchmen such as Bridgeman sought 
to delay the bill's operation until peacetime so that they `could attack [the 
scheme] the moment peace was made', opposition was minimal. 
221 Increasingly 
it could be found upon the agenda only of the Hotel Cecil. Even here, the threat 
of running Chamberlain for Prime Minister had more to do with other political 
grievances of February/March 1918 than the attendant issue of the Welsh 
Church222 At the 1917 NUA Conference, neither Law nor any of the delegates 
deemed it necessary even to mention the Welsh Church, and this silence was 
repeated at the next conference in 1920223 A year later, a party meeting 
convened to discuss the terms of continued coalition gave no debate to the issue 
despite a letter of reservation from Robert Cecil being read out. 224 Together with 
the scant attention given the Church within local associations, this denoted 
abandonment rather than unspoken faithfulness. 
The case of Home Rule was different. Little before the war suggested that the 
principle of the Union would have been surrendered by 1920. The frequency and 
ferocity of Irish controversies during the war indicated that Unionism was alive 
219 Ormsby-Gore to Steel-Maitland, 23/05/1916. SM GD/193/170/1/429-30x. 
220 Even in 1914 the debate has been described as having resembling `a formal and unreal pageant'. 
Kenneth Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922 (University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1970), p. 271. 
221 Bridgeman to Law, 16/07/1915. Williamson, Modernisation, pp. 88-9. 
222 See above, pp. 112-113. 
223 NUEC, 30/11/1917,10/06/1920,11/06/1920. 
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and well, and that the old temptress of the Union was still able to awaken the 
aged passions of the party, most notably in June 1916 and spring 1918. On the 
former occasion, sentiments yet again generally reflected pre-war divisions (as 
they had in September 1914). 225 However, by the end of the war, within the 
Unionist leadership such alignments were near departed. For instance, by April 
1918, Selborne, Long, and Midleton had all taken refuge in the vagaries of 
federalism, alongside Chamberlain, Londonderry and Carson. Even Salisbury 
was not set against it. 226 Only Curzon and Balfour opposed such a scheme, and 
both accepted `the inevitability of partition. 227 In such quarters, Home Rule was 
advanced by the demands of wartime governing which translated it into a method 
by which to utilise Ireland's largely untapped manpower during Ludendorff s 
final offensive and by the necessity of maintaining civil order. Irish conscription 
made the choice for Unionists very bare indeed between European victory and 
the Union. While the party had been suspicious of Lloyd George's efforts to 
make Ireland subservient to relations with the USA in summer 1916,228 in spring 
1918, with Russia out, there seemed little alternative. The launch of the massive 
German offensive in spring 1918 made Irish conscription irresistible and with it 
Home Rule. Accordingly, the strategic and security grounds for retaining Ireland 
within the Union that had been enunciated during the first three years of war 
paled 229 The resignation of the leadership to Home Rule in 1918 also reflected 
several other developments: the primacy of the Empire above Ireland; 230 the 
impact of the Irish Convention of 1917 in deconstructing the Unionist alliance 
224 `NUA Report of Party Meeting, Connaught Rooms', 12/11/1918. BL95/3. 
225 Stubbs, `Unionists and Ireland', pp. 876-82. 
226 Salisbury to Carson, 21/02/1918. Carson Papers, MIC1665/A/26/48. 
227 Londonderry to Lloyd George, 13/08/1918 (copy). Londonderry Papers, D/3099/2/7/28. John Kendle, 
Walter Long, Ireland and the Union, 1905-1920 (Glendale, Dublin, 1992), p. 150. 228 Lansdowne to Curzon, 11/06/1916. Curzon Papers, f112,117, ff. 23-5; Memorandum by Salisbury, 
13/06/1916; Memorandum by Long, 13/06/1918. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49758, ff. 304-8; 49777, 
ff. 163-9. 
229 Memorandum by Arnold White, 05/06/1916. Curzon Papers, f 112,176, ff. 26-60. 
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and marginalising the recalcitrant Ulstermen. 231 Long's chairmanship of the 
Cabinet Committee on Ireland in 1918, like Midleton's commitment to the Irish 
Convention, characterised the surrender of southern Unionists to the idea of 
Home Rule. As did the general election manifestoes of 1918, in which Unionism 
was represented only by allusion to the non-coercion of Ulster. 32 
In the country too, there was a considerable move towards approval for a 
settlement, with Central Office reporting that grassroots opinion confirmed that 
the one area of agreement was that in the event of a Home Rule Bill, `the 
safeguarding of Ulster [was] essential'233 Nevertheless, attitudes were divided. 
Interestingly, and perhaps understandably, many constituency chairmen were 
unready to commit their associations to the support of federalism, believing 
themselves ignorant of its implications, and finding the concept too complex. 234 
This was perhaps symptomatic of the divergent speeds of the Unionist leadership 
and its grassroots supporters, namely that the followers found themselves several 
steps behind their leaders. Thus, the party's progression away from its traditional 
principles was by no means organic, with traditional doctrine still possessing 
considerable appeal to the rank and file members. The House of Lords and 
Ireland continued to be viewed as capital issues by representatives at NUA 
Conferences in 1917,1920 and beyond. The re-emergence of the Irish question at 
the forefront of grassroots concerns in mid-1920, suggested that a latent 
Unionism was still evident within this party stratum. 
Was `coalitionism', therefore, merely a hollow commitment? Had it actually 
gripped the party grassroots? How should we understand the views expressed by 
230 See below, p. 156. 
231 D. G. Boyce, `British Opinion, Ireland, and the War, 1916-1918', Historical Journal, xvii (1974), 
pp. 588-9. 
232 For instance, Astor Election Card, December 1918. Astor Papers, 529; Joseph Nall circular to 
Unionists in Manchester Hulme Division, 06/11/1918. Derby Papers, 17/2. 
233 Sanders to Law, 03/05/1918. BU83/3/11. 
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the Chairman of Stockton Unionist Association, that sober elements of society 
were `heartily sick ... at party politics run on the old 
lines' ? 235 The idea of fusion, 
spoken of within (and heard outside) the Lloyd George circle in spring 1918, 
received very few adherents. 236 Certainly, the almost universal employment of 
anti-party rhetoric in the November 1918 campaign should not disguise the 
coalition's true potential. This was routine business for the campaigning 
Conservative/Unionist Party, traditionally employed so as to characterise the 
Liberals as dominated by party and sectional rather than national interests. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of pacifists and Asquithian Liberals (and, of 
course, there was a strong distinction between these camps - if one that the 
majority of Unionists refused to appreciate), the great mass of Unionists worked 
alongside Liberals in recruiting work and, increasingly, in campaigning. There 
was an acknowledgement of the benefits of anti-socialist pacts at the municipal 
level, although often this emanated from constituencies in which such methods 
had been endorsed prior to the war. 237 
Despite the attention devoted to the difficulties between the two major partners 
of the coalition, it is evident that Unionist associations and prospective 
candidates generally acquiesced, albeit reluctantly, in the coalition election 
campaign. For instance, in the constituencies of Epsom and Reigate, joint 
committees for the election campaign were established with local Liberals. 38 In 
Oxfordshire North, the Liberal candidate was fully supported even though he 
offered Liberal policies such as a just rather than vindictive peace, tempered free 
trade and social reform. 239 Undoubtedly this `coalitionism' was due in no small 
measure to two political factors. First, many coalition pacts were established on 
234 See BL file 83/3/11. 
235 Appleby to Londonderry, 02/09/1918. Londonderry Papers, D3099/7/1. 
236 James Reid (prospective Unionist candidate) to Chairman of Middlesborough UA, 29/04/1918, (JAR). 
237 For instance, Sheffield Park UA, Municipal Committee, 31/08/1914,07/10/1914,29/09/1919, (2210). 
238 Epsom UA, EC, 17/10/1918, (7085/1/1); Reigate UA, General Council, 13/11/1918, (353/3/1/1). 
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the basis of one parliament only, which may have encouraged Unionists to 
acquiesce in a temporary non-party solution but hardly inspired confidence in its 
long-term survival. 240 Second, the agreement brokered by Younger as to the 
small number of seats the Lloyd George Liberals were to contest with coalition 
support can only have soothed Unionist dissentients. For, it was somewhat easier 
for a Unionist candidate to call for `old Party questions to be subordinated to [the 
coalition]', when it was his rival and his rival's supporters who were making the 
real sacrifice 241 Recognising a bargain when he saw one, Younger gleefully 
accepted Freddie Guest's opening request for 150 seats only thankful that the 
`beggar hadn't asked for more'. 242 Guest (the Lloyd George Whip) was no mug, 
and, whether he appreciated that his chief could muster only this number of 
candidates, 243 or merely overestimated the bargaining strength of the Unionist 
Party, the outcome confirmed the Unionists' comparative strength. Against these 
150 Lloyd George Liberals, only a total of eighteen Unionists candidates were 
run and, much as Guest might have complained, this was a small proportion. 
Furthermore, much anti-coalition sentiment was intensified by clumsy Central 
Office edicts, which displayed scant appreciation of the interests of Unionist 
candidates or local associations, let alone the provincial pretensions of Alderman 
Archibald Salvidge and company. 245 In the majority of cases, Unionist candidates 
retreated. As the Chairwoman of Bosworth women's association explained, 
although they might terribly regret the fact that there was no Unionist candidate, 
`on this occasion we are not voting for the man but for National Unity'. 46 
239 Oxfordshire North UA, EC, 16/11/1918, (0.132). 
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Middlesborough Unionists recorded that their candidate had been withdrawn 
because `National exigencies demanded a Government of Coalition forces'. 247 
It would be wrong to consider coalition at the end of 1918 as doomed to failure, 
for it operated - at the very least in part - as an anti-Bolshevik combination. 
Notwithstanding this, or the genuine, if pragmatic, wish to be associated with 
Lloyd George, the future boded ill for the partnership. War, and patriotism, had 
done much to negate the damaging features of coalition: Steel-Maitland, 
Selborne and Carson had been kept comparatively quiet; without the not 
inconsiderable diversion of the war, consensual party policies were likely to 
become easier not harder. When the national stakes were not so high, Unionist 
dissent would be more difficult to contain. What is more, a discernible breach 
had opened between the party leadership, the rank and file MPs and the 
constituencies. Having been denied any real part in the prosecution of the war 
(except in the very peripheral matter of electoral reform), local associations had 
hardly moved with enthusiasm to the new party positions on the House of Lords 
and Ireland. When such matters resurfaced, as they frequently did, there would 
be great potential for disharmony. 
247 Middlesborough UA, AGM, 10/02/1919, (JAR). 
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III 
PATRIOTISM AND ANTI-SOCIALISM 
'In opposition to the ragged standards of a crazy and criminal 
cosmopolitanism, we will raise the banner of Nationality, 
Motherland and Empire. ... Those who are not with us are 
against us. ' 
- Victor Fisher in the British Citizen and Empire Worker, 
26/01/1918.1 
'1 must say, I think it would surprise the French people to see 
one of our leading Socialists with a top hat. ' 
- Comment of 17`h Earl of Derby on meeting Victor Fisher. 
2 
In 1917 the Bolshevik revolution in Russia made manifest to many within the 
British political establishment that the Labour movement represented a 
formidable threat. Government efforts to avert industrial action and preserve 
production at full capacity struggled to cope with opposition aroused amongst 
trade unions against measures such as conscription and, more particularly, the 
`combing out' of non-essential domestic war workers. The Labour Party, 
meanwhile, which had won merely 42 seats in December 1910, was to win 142 
seats in 1922,191 in 1923 and become the government in 1924. While the extent 
1 Copy in Wraxall Papers, 947/551. 
2 Derby diary, 23/10/1918. David Dutton (ed. ), Paris 1918: The War Diary of the British Ambassador the 
17th Earl of Derby (Liverpool University Press, Liverpool, 2001), p. 285. 
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to which the Labour Party was actually thriving remains a matter for debate, 
much of this chapter is concerned with contemporary perceptions of this menace 
and the responses formulated. It seeks to understand how the Unionist Party tried 
to counter socialism and forge a realistic appeal to the working class. The first 
section deals with the party organisation and formal means of incorporating the 
working-class into the party structure. The second and third parts investigate the 
impact war had upon the nature of party propaganda in relation to patriotism and 
socialism. The final section questions whether the war encouraged a new open- 
mindedness amongst Unionists and what impression this had upon the appeal that 
they extended to the working-class voter. Although the chapter has been divided 
thus, a linking argument is developed, for, while the first and final parts express a 
certain failure of the party to adapt through its organisation and its co-operation 
with patriotic labour, the middle sections suggest that, propitiously, the war 
served to underline Unionist principles and forge an effective response to the 
Labour Party, if only perhaps one specific to wartime. 3 
Come, Join Us 
Prior to the war, two obstacles lay before enthusiasts in the field of working-class 
integration: a pervasive obscurantism evident at all levels within the party and an 
unconvincing commitment by working-class men in their involvement. Neither 
had been easy to rectify. Predictably, in the case of working-class aspirants, 
vested interests played a significant role: MPs and candidates may perhaps have 
been willing to support the adoption of such nominees outside, but rarely inside, 
their own constituencies. Meanwhile, local association chairmen and executive 
committees frowned (not unnaturally) on the implication that the hand of Central 
3 For Unionist approaches to an extended electorate see Chapter IV, for Unionist attitudes to collectivism 
Chapter V. 
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Office might be further strengthened, and likely feared the loss of the 
subscriptions of members or candidates that frequently constituted a considerable 
portion of their annual income. 
The funding of working-class candidates was also problematic. The payment of 
MPs had aroused considerable antipathy in the party. The 1911 report of the 
National Union Association (NUA) Council had claimed that the expenditure of 
£250,000 on the salaries of MPs was `an adroit device to placate the Labour 
Party', and that `the high principle of gratuitous public service [had] been 
ruthlessly shattered' .5 During the war, 
hostility towards payment of members 
persisted, now under the scrutinising glare of the need for public economy. It was 
a topic raised persistently by Midleton to the Retrenchment Committee through 
much of 1915. Only when the Labour MP Jimmy Thomas agreed that salaries 
could be abolished but on the proviso that the `unnecessary costs of the Royalty' 
would also be discontinued was Midleton silenced. 6 
Some action had been taken in 1911 to make possible the candidacies of 
`workingmen', with the launch of a `general fund' consisting of donations from 
the parliamentary salaries of Unionist MPs. However, objections were raised 
even to the provision of `facilities' for such nominees, undoubtedly due to 
anxieties that these might entail Central Office dictating which constituencies 
should run the subsidised candidates .7A year later, when Oliver Locker- 
Lampson of the Unionist Workingmen Candidates' Fund (UWCF) sought 
nomination of such a candidate in `a safe and suitable seat', his resolution was 
4 For instance, City of Sheffield Divisional UA received more than half of its income from Unionist MPs 
(£750). AGM, 01/11/1912,15/03/1915, (LD/2107). 
5 NUA Conference, November 1911, Report of Council. 
6 `Memorandum on the Retrenchment Committee' by Midleton, 23/02/1916. Lansdowne Papers, Named 
Correspondents. 
7 NUA Conference, November 1911, (resolutions 17 and 18). The word `facilities' had to be removed 
before the Conference would adopt the resolution. 
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made subject to a crushing amendment by Arthur Clifford (representative for 
Yorkshire Cleveland). The amendment stipulated merely that `all Unionist 
organisations should select and support with all their power the best candidate 
they [could] find to represent their constituency, irrespective of his social or 
financial status. ' This aversion to positive discrimination, which resurfaced 
frequently in the twentieth century in the Conservative Party's handling of 
female, gay and ethnic-minority nominations and candidates, certainly reflected a 
determination at the grassroots' level not to surrender prerogatives recently 
acquired by the development of a quasi-democratic party structure. 8 This 
oligarchic emotion was certainly relied upon by one persistent critic who 
remarked that to seek to impose unwanted candidates upon local associations was 
inherently unacceptable .9 Such was the apprehension that, at the 
1913 conference 
a resolution pledging `the greater attention of the Party towards the problems of 
the working-classes' was not even offered any time for debate. 
The UWCF was not a complete failure; by 19111 it had funded the candidacies of 
three working-class men on four occasions - E. Ashton Bagley (Lancashire, 
Farnsworth), James Reid (Middlesbrough) and Ben Dent (Dewsbury and 
Macclesfield) - and by the end of the year it still had £300 in the coffers. 
1° But, 
remaining outside the party apparatus proper, like the Anti-Socialist Union and 
Trade Union Tariff Reform Association that both also sought the nomination of 
`workingmen', it lacked the financial stability and political leverage to run a 
significant number of candidates. " Beyond such narrow circles, the truth 
a John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (Longmans, London, 1978), pp. 58-62, 
passim. 
9 NUA Conference, November 1912. The critic was again Clifford. 
10 Barry M. Doyle, `Who Paid the Price of Patriotism? The funding of Charles Stanton during the Merthyr 
Boroughs by-election of 1915', English Historical Review, lxxxix (1994), pp. 1216-17. 
11 Kenneth Brown, `The Anti-Socialist Union, 1909-1949', in Idem., Essays in Anti-Labour History: 
Responses to the Rise of Labour in Britain (Macmillan, London, 1974), pp. 248-49; Leo Amery to 
Northcliffe, 12/07/1909,19/12/1911. Northcliffe Papers, MSS Add. 62157, ff. 153,162. 
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remained that Unionist commitment to such candidates rarely extended beyond 
the rhetorical. 12 With the Representation of the People Bill close to the statute 
book, a representative at the 1917 Conference spoke of the need `to pat the 
working man on the back and to make him feel that he is something beyond a 
cog in the machinery of the party, and see if we cannot make him a crankshaft'. 
A second spoke of the possibility of putting suitable working-class candidates 
before the executive committees in suitable constituencies. 13 Law offered his 
concurrence - going so far, ironically, as to remark that the party had to give 
more than `lip-service' to the issue - but the conference did not adopt any 
procedure to ensure that working-class men were selected. The result was that 
just one such Unionist working-class candidate was run in a winnable seat in the 
1918 election. 14 This was A. R. Jephcott (Birmingham, Yardley), who went so far 
as to classify himself as the only Unionist workingman standing throughout the 
country. It was, as he remarked, a 'disgrace'. 15 
Two other chief means remained by which working-class supporters could be 
attracted into the party, namely the creation of labour committees (both at the 
national and local level) and the fostering of Conservative clubs. In the case of 
clubs, considerable efforts had been expended by 1914. Of the twenty-four West 
Midland's constituencies listed in a Midland Conservative Union `Constituency 
Book', all possessed at least one club. Their effectiveness, however, was highly 
questionable. On the eve of the war, J. T. Hughes, agent for St Pancras West, 
reported that London clubs were more difficult to make appealing than provincial 
ventures due to the number of other attractions offered in the metropolis. As he 
12 NUA Conference, November 1912. 
13 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. Resolutions 4 and 5. 
14 J. M. McEwen, `The Coupon Election of 1918 and the Unionist Members of Parliament', Journal of 
Modern History, xxxiv (1962), pp. 294-306. Several coupons were granted to patriotic working-class 
candidates, through the BWNL. 
15 Birmingham Post, 29/11/1918, p. 5. 
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went on to note, even good attendance hardly ensured a group of hardcore 
Unionist activists or even voters, with membership often being determined less 
by the attractions of political debate and more by the quality of the beer or 
whisky. 16 Hence, obsession with the price and potency of whisky by the 
St Andrews Conservative Club in 1915 and 1916 is likely to have represented 
less a concern with wartime prices and controls, or a thoroughly dedicated 
commitment to non-partisanship in politics, than as an appreciation of the true 
priorities of its members. 17 A similarly apolitical situation had prevailed 
elsewhere. Central Office was informed that, of the five extant clubs in the 
Worcestershire West Division, `no praise would be too high' for the `Coventry' 
and `Dowdeswell' Lodges but, that while `Britten' Lodge was strong numerically 
it was `of very little practical use politically'. Meanwhile, Worcestershire South 
claimed of its seven Conservative clubs that `to a certain extent they help to keep 
the Party together, but that is the most that can be said for them'. 18 Only in 
Liverpool, where Archibald Salvidge had managed to forge a working-class 
Unionist identity and tradition specific to that district, was the story very 
different. 19 The war years offered scant opportunity for the further development 
of such clubs. Many wound down their activities entirely, which deprived the 
party in some cases of committed activists, in others of hard cash 
2° The Grand 
Lodge and many other branches of the National Conservative League were 
dissolved in 1914.21 By 1919, therefore, it was still necessary for the Eastern 
16 Report of the MCAA, 01/05/1914, in CAJ, July 1914, p. 103. 
17 St Andrews Conservative Club, and AGMs, 1914,1915, (Acc 10424/112). 
18 Midland Union Notebook, n. d., [1913-1917], (Are/MU/29/3). 
19 Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, Behind the Political Scene, 1890-1928 (Hodder & Stoughton, 
London, 1934); Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1971). 
20 For instance, the City Carlton Club had to postpone fund-raising during the war. This was not 
insignificant, as the Club had provided £500 to Long's Union Defence League in 1913, as well as 
supporting the local Junior Imperial League. City of London UA, City Carlton Club, Political Committee, 
02/06/1913,23/06/1913, (487/3 1). 
21 Neal McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular 
Conservatism, 1918-29 (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1998), p. 112. 
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Area to pass a resolution reminding its members that `the interests of the 
Conservative Party would be enhanced by closer attention being given to the 
aspirations of working men as expressed in Conservative Clubs, Friendly 
Societies' Councils and similar organisations. ' 22 Even in December 1920, the 
Agent for Cornwall T. W. Ainge was lamenting the fact that they were still 
`raising a race of billiard players and not politicians'. 3 
Labour committees offered a second avenue by which to incorporate the working 
classes into the party organisation. It was hoped in addition that such bodies 
could provide ideas, education and assistance in the formulation of Unionist 
policies towards trade unions, propaganda and social reform. Some few attempts 
at the local level to involve `workingmen' had emerged before the war, for 
instance in Reigate where three had been elected to the executive committee in 
mid-1912 24 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 1918 Representation of the 
People Act this became a more pressing consideration. The disappointing 
response was perhaps presaged by the persistence of a climate in which local 
associations rarely went far out of their way to foster the involvement of the 
labouring classes. For example, six months after the Armistice, though the 
Eastern Area Committee floated the idea of electing working-class 
representatives to the NUA Council, no nominees were secured to make this 
possible. 5 Central Office officials were compelled to stalk the nation insisting on 
the creation of labour committees, but to little avail, for by the mid-1920s such 
bodies had been established in fewer than one third of constituencies and often 
boasted less than twenty members. ' 26 Somewhat ironically, a railway strike upset 
plans to convene the first Unionist Labour Conference in Southport, proof, if 
22 Eastern Area, AGM, 16/05/1919, (Are 7/1/6). 
23 Cornwall Divisional Papers, AGM, 09/12/1920, (Are/1117/1). 
24 Reigate UA, EC, 31/07/1912, (353/3/2/1). 
25 Eastern Area, AGM, 16/05/1919, (Are/7/1/6). 
26 MCAA, 22/01/1920. (CCA/3); McCrillis, Conservative, p. 110. 
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proof were needed, of the distance the party still had to cover. 27 What is more, it 
can hardly be denied that labour committees remained a rather basic means of 
attracting working class support, unless they were given a voice and input 
considerable enough to transform party rhetoric, a status they were unlikely to 
achieve. 
Appealing to the Working Classes 
The failure to further involve the working-classes on labour committees, political 
clubs and as parliamentary candidates, perhaps underlines how significant 
methods and types of propaganda became to the Unionist Party. The party had 
long sought to portray itself as the party of patriotism. In their own ways, 
Disraelian imperialism, Chamberlainite tariff reform, Unionist sentiments per se 
and the conservation of the constitution were all expressions of this. Associated 
with this, at times rather tenuously, was the idea of one-nation Conservatism. As 
a party handbook had audaciously put it, while radicals and socialists set class 
against class, `Unionists stood for the union of classes in the nation for the 
common good. '28 It had been implicit in much of this that the interests of all, 
most especially those of the working classes, were best represented through 
national means. George Franklin MP claimed that `the Conservative Party had 
always been a national party bound together, not by any one class', to which the 
Factory Acts were testament. 29 This conception of Unionism continued into the 
war, for example in the words of F. S. Oliver: `Union: union in its broadest sense 
and meaning: union not merely between states; ... union not merely against 
external danger; ... union not merely of peoples (in the various states) i. e. class 
27 Trade Union Sub-Committee of the Lancashire Division, 16/11/1919, (Are/3/13/1). 
28 Lillian May Bragge, (ed. ), The Unionist Workers' Handbook (London, 1912), pp. 136-8. 
29 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 15/03/1913. Cutting in City of Sheffield UA, 14/03/1913, (LD/2107). 
141 
to class. Our aim is a close knit and interwoven society. '30 Bentinck spoke of a 
`Commonwealth' of classes as well as of nations. 31 Accordingly, the concept of 
Unionism as a promoter of national and class unity was more than merely a 
consequence of its post-war desire to redefine its Irish Unionism (as has recently 
been argued). 32 
Before the war, however, there had been difficulties concerning the acceptance of 
such propaganda: in 1900, as Robert Blake showed, the electorate had not taken 
the road that led from patriotism to imperialism. 
33 In the ensuing years, even the 
party itself had not taken the road that led from imperialism to tariff reform. 
What, if anything, therefore made wartime patriotism more profitable for the 
party? First, the unity of the party did so. Significantly, the Unionists were the 
only party not to split over the commitment to war. The irreconcilable breach in 
December 1916 between Asquith and Lloyd George, and their respective 
followers, was the culmination rather than inception of Liberal divisions. From 
the very first day of war, the party leaked dissidents, including John Burns, John 
Morley, Charles Trevelyan, and Edmund Harvey, over the decision to join the 
European conflict, and Richard Holt, John Simon and others over conscription. 
34 
The Labour Party was equally fiercely divided, with parliamentary leaders such 
as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden resisting the moves of the Trades 
Union Congress to endorse Britain's role in the war. 35 
The most overt test of Unionist solidarity on patriotism emerged with the 
publication of Lansdowne's infamous `Peace Letter' in the Daily Telegraph on 
30 Michael Pollard, `Politics From the Inside: a life of F. S. Oliver 1864-1934', Sheffield University, Ph. D. 
(2002), p. 278. 
31 Lord Henry Bentinck, Tory Democracy (Methuen Co., London, 1918), pp. 137-8. 
32 Stephen Evans, `The Conservatives and the Redefinition of Unionism, 1912-21', Twentieth Century 
British History, ix (1998), pp. 1-27. 
33 Robert Blake, The Conservative Partyfrom Peel to Thatcher (Fontana, London, 1985), pp. 163-4. 
34 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-35 (Collins, London, 1966), passim. 
35 For instance over conscription, Turner, British Politics, pp. 78-81. 
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29 November 1917. The letter queried the likelihood of a total Allied victory, 
lamented the continued loss of life and called for a thorough re-examination of 
war aims. Some approval emanated privately from Lansdowne's Unionist 
colleagues. St Loe Strachey observed that the Spectator had uttered similar 
words concerning `peace with the German people', the only difference being that 
it spoke with a sterner voice than did Lansdowne; Robert Cecil judged the letter 
to differ from President Woodrow Wilson's pronouncements only in degree 
rather than spirit; Wood `didn't quarrel with the substance, but thought its 
moment of promulgation singularly ill-judged'; meanwhile, Craik, Frederick 
Banbury, Thomas Gibson-Bowles and Guinness empathised with Lansdowne's 
ideas. The views of the latter group are intriguing, for while Cecil had written a 
Cabinet memorandum of his own some months earlier, urging the greater 
consideration of a negotiated peace, Banbury, Craik and Guinness were hard-line 
members of the Unionist War Committee (whose brief was the unrelenting 
prosecution of the war). Generally, however, while noting such sympathy for 
Lansdowne's views, Sanders believed the overwhelming sentiment within the 
party to be one of `indignation'. 36 The NUEC received no notification of 
sympathy from any local associations. 
Largely, it seems, this mindset sprang from continued confidence in the 
capability of the Lloyd George coalition to deliver an Allied victory. The 
transformation of Crawford's views represented this well: in November 1916, he 
and Lansdowne had agreed `about an armistice, that it w[oul]d be folly to impose 
terms so impossible of achievement that no discussion c[oul]d ensue'; twelve 
36 Strachey to Austen Chamberlain, 05/12/1917 (Copy). Strachey Papers, S/4/517; Robert Cecil to 
Balfour, n. d. [December 1917]. Balfour Papers, MSS Add. 49738, ff. 175-6; Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, 
All the Way (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1949), p. 144. Cecil told Lloyd George that his attitude to the 
letter 'seemed to depend largely on the military position'. Andrew Roberts, 'The holy Fox': The Life of 
Lord Halifax (Phoenix, London, 2004), p. 12; Gibson-Bowles to Lansdowne, 05/12/1917. Lansdowne 
Papers, Misc. 'Peace Letter'; Sanders Diary, 01/12/1917. John Ramsden (ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: the 
Political Diaries of Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (Historian's Press, London, 1984), pp. 92-3. 
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months later, Crawford distanced himself from Lansdowne's pronouncements, 
describing them as reflective of a vain and Whiggish mind, and that `he doesn't 
want to be forgotten. He now stands a good chance of being adored by our 
enemies and execrated by the British people. '37 For his sins, Lansdowne was 
virtually excommunicated from Unionist circles, with only very bare assurances 
of the endurance of personal friendship from Law and Chamberlain. By 
coincidence, the NUA Conference met the day following the publication of the 
letter, `drowned [Lansdowne] at once' and became a virtual ritual of disavowal 
of his conciliatory approach. 38 The assembly, though convened in the absence of 
press representatives, passed a resolution permitting the communication to the 
newspapers of the section of Law's speech dealing with the letter. In it, the party 
leader described it as a `national misfortune' that the letter had been published, 
claiming that `he [disagreed] absolutely not only with the arguments but with the 
whole tone of his letter', and insisted on the need to secure the future security of 
Britain and the Empire. 39 Indeed, the prevalence of this sentiment of outrage at 
Lansdowne's remarks suggests that war `pessimism' was less pervasive than 
several recent historians have suggested (if on a parliamentary rather than War 
Cabinet or General Staff level) 40 
War rendered patriotism more convincing to both Unionist politicians and their 
audience. As Wolmer told Hugh Cecil, there was a distinction between 
`nationalism, patriotism and jingoism'. The first `was a set of ideals which have 
their origin in race and history... Jingoism[, ] on the other hand, aims at 
37 Crawford Diary, 14/11/1916,01/12/1917. Vincent, Crawford, pp. 365,381,401. 
38 Neville Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 01/12/1917. Robert Self (ed. ), The Neville Chamberlain 
Diary Letters, vol. 1: 1915-1920 The Making of a Politician (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000), pp. 236-7. 
39 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
40 See most especially Douglas Newton, `The Lansdowne "Peace Letter" of 1917 and the Prospect of 
Peace by Negotiation with Germany', Australian Journal of Politics and History, xlix (2002), pp. 16-39; 
Brock Millman, Pessimism and British War Policy, 1916-1918 (Frank Cass, London, 2001), passim. Both 
works suggest that the Lansdowne letter moved with, rather than against, the tide of general government 
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domination of other nations and is really in theory opposed to nationalism. For 
instance, the Hapsburgs and their statesmen could be described as jingoes but 
could never be described as nationalists. Patriotism I would describe as that 
which prompts men to make sacrifices for their state. 41 Bentinck, likewise, felt 
that Britain was fighting for a `spiritual ideal' 42 These convictions were 
important in distancing the Unionist Party from jingoistic and expansionistic 
nationalism, whilst substituting in their place a sacrificial patriotism. The latter 
element was fundamental in ensuring party unity and was substantiated in the 
demands for equality of sacrifice through national service, the forfeiture of party 
advantage for national unity, and a readiness to surrender personal gain through 
the rejection of industrial action by workers and extraordinary profits by 
employers. A local association chairman, for instance, advised Unionists in 
Hampshire that, through observing the truce, they could display the `instincts of 
patriotism which were at the very rcot of our Conservative principles'. 
3 No 
doubt, with Britain's shores threatened seriously for the first time in a hundred 
years, such ideas had appeal. It was also an area within which the party displayed 
its qualities of flexibility and opportunism. For, despite majority party opinion 
supporting Britain's intervention in August 1914 on the grounds of national 
honour, Unionist public pronouncements (including the right-wing papers) soon 
swung into line with the stance of government and press. Specifically this meant 
emphasising (as many recruitment and propaganda posters did) the story of 
Belgium and of `sacrifice' for the weak. 44 
sentiment, and that the overwhelming tide was of pessimism rather than optimism in regard to a 
successful conclusion to the war. 
al Wolmer to Hugh Cecil, 02/07/1917. Wolmer Papers, c980, ff. 62-7. 
42 Bentinck, Tory Democracy, pp. 58-9. 
43 Hampshire North UA, 27/02/1915, (NHCA/1/4). 
44 For initial attitude, A. J. A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Retrenchment 1896- 
1914 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984), p. 359 and above p. 53. Lansdowne emphasised the 
Belgian issue as early as 22/09/1914 (The Times); the Birmingham Daily Post transformed its original 
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As is explained in Chapter V, for many Unionists the desire to give something 
back to the country for which they were unable to donate their lives was 
passionate. The rhetoric of sacrifice later permeated two generations of 
Conservatives, including Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Edward Wood, 
Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan. Notwithstanding true generosity of spirit, 
this sentiment of sacrifice was pushed as far as it could go. An appeal to women 
in Lancashire encouraged them to vote for freedom, `and show the world that 
they have no thought of betraying the gallant men and boys who have given their 
... very heart's blood 
in this sacred cause'. 5 (Note that the cause had now even 
become `sacred'). Waldorf Astor, meanwhile, linked women's `loving sense of 
the duty of compensating for the precious lives of the lost with their special 
instinct for protecting the lives to be born'. 6 Central Office literature reminded 
voters in 1918 that they were `trustees' for those who had sacrificed their lives 
and that therefore they must discount their selfish motivations; the wealthy had 
already born the financial burden of the war. 47 
The nature of wartime politics also permitted this patriotic image to be promoted, 
for while the truce dictated non-partisanship it inherently endorsed patriotic 
expressions. Political meetings and party literature were often directed to events 
surrounding, and justification for, war. 48 Accordingly, Unionist Lecture Societies 
in Hammersmith and Sheffield each took British patriotism and the origins of the 
war as their focus 49 Opportunities to differentiate Unionist patriotism from 
Liberal unpreparedness for war were not wasted, with local associations 
basis of national security into defence of vulnerable Belgium (editorials, 03/08/1914,04/08/1914, 
07/08/1914). 
as Augustine Hailwood to Members of Ardwick UA, 28/10/1918. Derby Papers, 17/2. 
46 Waldorf Astor to the Electorate in Sutton, 14/12/1918. Astor Papers, 529. 
47 `Trustees for the Silent'; `War, Wealth and Labour', NUA Pamphlets and Leaflets [P&L], 1918/4, 
1918/33 
48 For instance, Hammer and Crook, 1914-15. 
49 West London Observer, 08/03/1915. Cuttings in Bull Papers, Hammersmith; Sheffield Brightside UA, 
AGM Report, 31/05/1915, (LD/2101). 
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criticising Haldane and McKenna, while eulogising men such as Lord Roberts. 50 
At the very least, they spoke darkly of the fact that they could not presently 
discuss Liberal failures. 51 In Norwich, a `Young Unionist Brigade' was formed 
`for patriotic purposes during the war'. 52 Organisations such as the Primrose 
League not only maintained their organisational machinery through patriotism 
(canvassing for National Registration and the Derby Scheme) but also delivered 
lantern-slide shows and lectures on patriotic themes. 53 
Of all the endeavours to impress on the public the party's contribution to the war, 
none exceeded the creation and perpetuation of the myth that the Liberal 
Government had relied on opposition encouragement and reinforcement in its 
actions of early August 1914. Indeed, Steel-Maitland claimed (admittedly as part 
of his crusade to abandon opposition for coalition politics) that throughout the 
first seven months of war the party had `never touched the public imagination, 
except for a brief moment when the letter from the Leaders of the Opposition to 
the P. M. was published and was fresh in the public mind' S4 In May ' 1915, 
Baldwin told his constituents that the publication of the Law communication 
confirmed the commitment of the Unionist Party towards any war in which the 
nation was threatened SS George Smith MP went one stage further, two years 
later, in an annual speech to Cornwall Unionists, claiming: `It was one of the 
most historic hours in the whole history of England when Lord Lansdowne and 
Mr Bonar Law set out that afternoon in August 1914 to call on the Prime 
Minister and offer the wholehearted support of the Unionist Party in England in 
any emergency that might be necessary (hear, hear). Under the terms of the truce 
one ought not to speak as to what would have happened if another Party had been 
50 Reigate UA, Merstham Branch, EC and AGM, 24/11/1914, (353/5/2/2). 
sl Devizes UA, AGM, 13/02/1915, (2305/1). 
52 Norwich South UA, EC, 26/09/1914, (SO 122/1). 
53 Martin Pugh, The Tories and the People, 1880-1935 (Blackwell, London, 1985), pp. 175-76. 54 'Memorandum on Political Situation' by Steel-Maitland, February 1915. SM/GD193/306/78-83x. 
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in power (laughter). '56 As this exemplifies, the story served simultaneously as 
positive endorsement of Unionist patriotism and as condemnation of Liberal 
irresolution and Labour pacifism. Even in August 1918, this tale was advanced 
by the National Review and the Spectator, both of which claimed that the letter 
had decided the mind of Cabinet and Britain's entry into war. 7 It was also a 
chronicle promulgated vociferously during the coupon election, with Lawrence 
Hardy telling a meeting of Ashford Unionists, that `the Unionist Party could 
claim that they had acted unswervingly and of set purpose since the beginning of 
the war. It was on Mr Bonar Law's assurance on the fateful Sunday that they 
could rely absolutely upon the Unionist Party that the Govt could go 
forward. .., 
58 This fable was the most concrete and powerful message of its type, 
but was constantly supplemented with an emphasis on the constant nature of 
Unionist support for the Liberal and Coalition Governments. S9 But, as the 
Conservative Agents' Journal concluded, it was the letter that would `stand as 
evidence of the fact that [our] Party, as ever, puts King, Country and Empire 
before everything else' . 
60 
Ironically, this particular myth was bolstered by the Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee (PRC). Quixotically, a report of the informal meeting of Unionist 
chairmen and agents held on 14 December 1914 was published as a PRC 
pamphlet. This was the occasion on which Law broadcast the support offered to 
ss Worcestershire West UA, AGM, 16/05/1915, (956/6). ' 
56 Cornwall Provincial Division, AGM, 01/03/1917, (Are/11/1/1). Both the latter meetings were reported 
in the local press. 
57 Asquith to Strachey, 11/08/1918. Strachey Papers, S/11/6/1. National Review, October 1917, 
pp. 242-50, August 1918, pp. 726-52. 
58 Kent Messenger, 02/11/1918. 
59 For instance, Gleanings and Memoranda [G&M], November 1916, p. 40; Bridgeman speech in 
Oswestry Advertiser, 16/10/1918. Cutting in Bridgernan Papers, 4629/1/4/7. Bradford Central UA, AGM, 
23/02/1915, (JAR). 
60 Conservative Agents' Journal [CAJ], April 1916, pp. 128-9. Interestingly, the letter's capacity for good 
publicity was acknowledged when it was written, with Lloyd persuading Lansdowne to write `Copy' in 
the corner so as to remind Asquith that they could publish it as an ultimatum if the government did not 
act. Lloyd to Colvin, 18/05/1934 (copy). Lloyd Papers, 17/36/90. 
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the Liberal Government in the letter of 2 August. Not only was the Unionist 
Party's initial patriotism emphasised, but an eager audience was informed that `in 
[the letter] we gave a definite pledge, and I do not think that any will deny that 
we have kept that pledge, both in the letter and the spirit. ' Self-praise continued: 
`no political party has ever more sincerely and wholeheartedly tried to serve the 
country than we have done during this war', while warmongering was sidelined - 
`there never has been any difference between us and our opponents in the 
detestation of war. '61 Quite why Liberal representatives on the PRC (including 
the Chief Whip) agreed to the publication of such a speech is debatable. As it 
was, it worked in favour of the Unionist Party, with the publication of the letter 
arousing conjecture as to its effect, for as the Irish Nationalist Tim Healy 
remarked, `I was very glad Bonar Law published his letter to Asquith, as only for 
it wd. never, with a split-Cabinet, have declared War. 62 Such speculation 
allowed the Unionists something of a free hand in its interpretation. 
While the publication of Law's speech to Unionist agents was the most overt 
sponsorship of Unionist patriotism, it is evident that the PRC served to bolster 
the position of the party in a more subtle way. The ambition of many of its 
leaflets, pamphlets and posters was to establish the legitimacy of Britain's 
involvement in the war, such as one entitled `Belgium': `The men of Belgium 
are fighting for the cause of LIBERTY - our cause as well as theirs. WILL 
YOU FIGHT FOR BRITAIN AS THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR 
BELGIUM? '63 Other pamphlets carried speeches of leading Unionists such as 
Law and Balfour alongside Asquith, and only less often Arthur Ilenderson and 
John Redmond. Two such speeches saw Law explaining that `the honour and the 
61 PRC publication 27, `A United Nation', [December 1914]. 
62 Healy to Milner, 26/12/1914. Milner Papers, 340, ff. 320-23. 
63 PRC publication 2, `Belgium', 08/10/1914. The emphases here, as in subsequent quotes, are from the 
original documents. 
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interests of Great Britain - and, believe me, they go together - alike forbade 
[peace]'. 64 Obviously, as far as publicity went, the representation also of the 
Liberal Party (continuously), the Labour Party (frequently) and the Irish 
Nationalist Party (fleetingly) offered opportunities for their advancement as well, 
but, by validating Britain's position in the European conflict, it necessarily 
promoted most successfully the party of patriotism. Several PRC posters could 
hardly have been more beneficially drawn by Unionist Central Office, including 
the famous `Daddy, what did vou do in the Great War? ' (see PRC Poster 79 
below). This was altered only slightly in successive Unionist general election 
campaigns with the word `Daddy' merely substituted for `Liberal' or `Labour' 
candidate. 
Crucially, therefore, the state offered the most fervent sponsorship to patriotic 
expressions. At the heart of much of the domestic mission of the Ministry of 
Information, the PRC, the National War Aims Committee and other propaganda 
vehicles was the necessity of defending Britain's entrance into and continuance 
in the war - both preconditions for any beneficial exploitation of Unionist 
patriotism. 65 Moreover, these propaganda apparatuses were more potent, and 
more relied upon than any of their predecessors. A secondary realm was that of 
the patriotic press, which, as Brock Millman and Cate Kaste have pointed out, 
augmented these government-inspired steps. This press lobby was a formidable 
body, comprising the Gwynne, Beaverbrook, Blumenfeld, Northcliffe and 
Rothermere papers, and it outgunned the pre-war Anti-Socialist Union run 
principally by Blumenfeld. Personal links, especially strong in respect of 66 
64 PRC publications 5 and 6, "To a Victorious Conclusion": The Prime Minister's Appeal to the Nation', 
[October 1914]; `To the Men of Great Britain', October 1914. 
65 See M. L. Sanders, & Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda During the First World War, 1914-18 
(Macmillan, London, 1982); Brock Millman, Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain 
(Frank Cass, London, 2000). 
66 Millman, Dissent, pp. 34-54 
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Maxse, Gwynne and Blumenfeld, could be mobilised to ensure that no respite 
was given to Liberal failures or that the anti-conscriptionist movement was 
disrupted (often physically). 67 After December 1916, Lloyd George's links with 
the press - though otherwise distasteful to many Unionists - enhanced the ability 
of the Government to mould a patriotic press. 68 These newspaper magnates and 
editors helped to popularise the war and create stereotypes of `patriots', 
`slackers' and aliens. Such stereotypes conformed to the pre-existing Unionist 
vernacular, for instance in the sphere of electoral reform where the `patriot' (the 
active serviceman or hard-working munitions worker) deserved the vote, whist 
the `slacker' (the conscientious objector or striking Clydesider) did not. 69 Also, 
through their personal roles in the Government, Unionists were able to further 
this objective. For example, the Attorney-General Carson by-passed the Home 
Office in December 1915, when ordering raids to counteract sedition on the 
National Labour Press and on the offices of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) 
and the Daily Herald. The result was the confiscation of the printing works of the 
ILP magazine Forward. Other Unionist law officers ('F. E. ' and Cave) authorised 
the suppression of the pamphlet `Truth and the War' by E. D. Morel of the Union 
of Democratic Control. 7° Subsequently, the pacifist Nation was suppressed and 
serious consideration given to restraints being placed on the Daily Herald. As 
Tom Jones was moved to complain, whilst the left-wing press was repressed 
whenever it spoke out against the government, the Tory papers (most especially 
the irascible Morning Post) always escaped scot-free. 1 The adoption of Carson's 
67 Lady Edward Cecil to Blumenfeld, 18/03/1915; Chaplin to Blumenfeld, 09/07/1915. Blumenfeld 
Papers, CEC/ 1, CHAP/ 11. 
68 J. Lee Thompson, Politicians, the Press and Propaganda: Lord Northcliffe and the Great War 1914-18 
(Kent State University Press, Kent Ohio, 1999), pp. 181-82, passim. 
69 Herefordshire North UA, Finance and Advisory Committee, 23/03/1917, (K78/2). 
70 Carson took advantage of the fact that, officially, the Home Office controlled only the Metropolitan 
Police Force, but not provincial bodies. Millman, Dissent, pp. 64-5,75. 
71 Godfrey Locker-Lampson to Cave, 17/04/1917. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62496, ff. 82-3. Tom Jones 
Diary, 11/01/1918. Keith Middlemas (ed. ), Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary: Volume 1 1917-1925 
(Oxford University Press, London, 1969), pp. 45-6. 
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proposal to send trade union members across to the Western Front was merely 
another instance of pro-patriotic activity through the state. By 1918 three 
hundred workers were despatched each week. 72 
This development of government-endorsed patriotism reached its acme in the 
creation of the `officially unofficial' National War Aims Committee (NWAC) in 
June 1917, established as the result of a near consensus in the Lloyd George 
government on the need to avert the fate of Russia and undermine pacifism. The 
NWAC, like the PRC, mobilised the party machineries to further its cause, 
working especially closely with the Unionist and Liberal Parties, and with the 
British Workers' National League (BWNL).? 3 It also promoted the fairly 
rudimentary strategy of patriotic violence to upset pacifist gatherings - most 
commonly through the agencies of the BWNL and the National Federation of 
Discharged Soldiers and Sailors. And, although Patrick Hannon of the British 
Commonwealth Union questioned the NWAC's effectiveness, believing it to be 
`regarded by the people generally as the official protagonist of the Coalition 
Government', it retained a greater distance from government than agencies such 
as the PRC, and accordingly was likely viewed as more independent 74 After the 
war, Scottish Unionists acclaimed both its capacity and its structure in suggesting 
that the `Government[, ] being national and non-party in composition, might with 
great public advantage take action on similar lines to those followed by the War 
Aims Committee' in order to counteract `active revolutionary propaganda'. 75 
And there was much in NWAC propaganda for Unionists to acclaim. For, so as 
72 Millman, Dissent, pp. 240-41. 
73 Epsom UA, General Council, 31/10/1918, (7085/1/1); Worcestershire West, UA, EC, 20/09/1917, 
(956/6). 
74 Memorandum, `Industrial Unrest' by Hannon, n. d., [1918]. Hannon Papers, Box 13. 
75 SUA Western Division, EC, 04/06/1919, (Acc. 10424/28). 
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to counteract wartime pacifism it had to condemn socialism and defend 
capitalism. 76 
Historians concerned with the language of patriotism employed by the Unionist 
Party in the pre-war era have been eager to point out that the nation they referred 
to most frequently was `England' 77 This served partly to enhance their depiction 
of the Liberal party before the war as an awkward amalgam of Irish 
revolutionaries, Scottish radicals and Welsh demagogues, but it also reflected the 
natural home of Unionism: southern England. As the Central Office and electoral 
expert Sidney Rosenbaum stressed, the home of Unionism lay south of the 
Severn and the Trent. 8 Notwithstanding this, it was an inconsistency that the 
party that most prided itself on the Union and the Empire should use the name of 
merely one of their components, a contradiction that can but have exacerbated 
the party's dismal performances outside England. The war necessitated a change 
of phraseology. In relation to the Irish Union, Unionist politicians were careful to 
tread the thin line between provoking party confrontation over the issue and 
bowing to the inevitability of home rule. Meanwhile, industrial disputes within 
the mines of South Wales and shipyards of the Clyde emphasised the 
contribution that all areas of the United Kingdom could and did make to the war 
effort. Therefore it was no longer `England', but `Britain', and, increasingly as 
the war continued, no longer `Britain' but the `British Empire'. Although old 
habits died hard and the term `England' was voiced frequently, resort was usually 
found to the word `nation', a suitably non-specific term. 
76 W. S. Sanders, `Is the Capitalist to Blame? ', NWAC Searchlights No. 4 (1918). 
77 Robert MacKenzie & Allan Silver, Angels in marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England 
(Heineman, London, 1968); Hugh Cunningham, `The Conservative Party and Patriotism', in Robert Colls 
and Philip Dodd (eds), Englishness: Politics and Culture, 1880-1920 (Croom Helm, Kent, 1986), 
pp. 283-307 
78 S. Rosenbaum, `The General Election of 1910 and the Bearing of the Results on Some Problems of 
Representation', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, lxxiii (1910), pp. 487-8. 
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Such developments were not inconsiderable, as they transformed Unionist self- 
perception, and also encouraged a wider application of their patriotism. In the 
first case, by their participation in government, and by the espousal of `nation' 
rather than `England' because of war, the Unionists were better positioned to 
appeal to the country as the party of the 'nation'. In November 1917, Law spoke 
of leading a `national' party that might attract the support of all classes across the 
Kingdom. 79 This was likely one of the reasons behind the re-emergence of Tory 
Democracy in some circles. 80 Flimsy though such ideals remained, they were 
important in persuading the party that it must be inclusive, especially within the 
extended franchise. Ironically, whilst enhancing this national concept of 
patriotism and party, the war served also to strengthen local and specifically rural 
identity. As Nicholas Mansfield has argued, because much recruitment in the 
countryside was based on local territorial forces, community identities were 
reinforced. One consequence of this, considering the continued authority of 
traditional deference into the interwar period, was to strengthen connections 
between the local political leaders who headed the Yeomanry and their 
subordinates. The Unionist Party was particularly well placed to benefit from 
such a development: by 1916, of the 154 Unionists who were serving or had 
served with the forces, 48 had been attached to their local Yeomanry, compared 
to only 9 Liberals and no Labour members. 81 Indeed, as evinced in the debates on 
food production and the redistribution of seats, the imagery of war (as drawn by 
poetry, propaganda and popular literature) was very patriotic, very English and 
very rural (see PRC Poster `Your Country's Call' below). 82 This was the 
79 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
80 For instance Sanderson to Salisbury, 25/10/1917. Salisbury Papers (4) 80/156-7. Sanderson to 
F. S. Oliver, 02/12/1917,13/12/1917,17/12/1917. Oliver Papers, MS 24855, ff. 147,173,177-78. 
81 Nicholas Mansfield, English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900-1930 (Ashgate, Aldershot, 
2001), p. 117, Chapter IV passim. Figures developed from The Constitutional Year Book for 1919 
(National Unionist Association, London, 1919). 
82 Caroline Dakers, The Countryside at War, 1914-18 (Constable, London, 1987), pp. 12-15. 
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constituency to which Baldwin appealed so successfully in the 1920s, as a 
"Worcestershire man". He carried this association to the grave, being buried in 
Worcester Cathedral rather than Westminster Abbey or St Paul's, where his 
fellow Prime Ministers rested. 
In terms of its wider application, war served to develop two further valuable 
facets, the first being the cause of Empire, which had long been a principal 
component of Unionist electoral strategy and tenets. When war broke out 
Beatrice Chamberlain rejoiced, `The Empire has stood together! My father 
[Joseph] is vindicated. ' 83 Subsequently, the contribution of the self-governing 
dominions and India towards the war effort - both in military personnel and 
resources - allowed for the more persuasive propagation of the idea of Empire 
unity and solidarity. As the Vice-Chairman of the British Empire Producers' 
Organisation somewhat cynically remarked, few factors offered such `an 
effective source of cohesion in any group of States ... [as] a common enemy, 
if it 
be formidable enough and satanic enough' . 
84 Moreover, with the emergence of 
eastern theatres of war (most especially in 1917 and 1918 in the Middle East) the 
war became a truly imperial conflict. 85 
Steel-Maitland appreciated that the war was `causing old subjects to be seen from 
new angles', because India and the Dominions had responded `sparing neither 
blood nor treasure'. 86 Increasingly, political and industrial groups adopted the 
language of the Empire, including the Empire Parliamentary Association and the 
83 Peter Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain, Entrepreneur in Politics (Yale University Press, London, 1994), 
p. 668. 
84 Edward Saunders, A Self-supporting Empire (Nisbet & Co., London, 1918), p. 5. 
85 John Mackenzie has shown the emphasis placed on empire (most especially the Middle East) by 
wartime cinema films and that such a medium was both naturally popular and peculiarly capable of being 
manipulative. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 
1880-1960 (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988), pp. 74-7. 
86 A. L. Smith et al, The Empire and the Future, with an introduction by Arthur Steel-Maitland 
(Macmillan, London, 1916), p. xii. 
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British Commonwealth Union. Endeavours were made to promote such Empire 
unity on both the micro and the macro political level: A. L. Smith (friend of Steel- 
Maitland and Master of Balliol College, Oxford) proposed that parties of 
working-class students visit the Dominions, so that they could, on returning, 
educate their communities about how the Empire worked together; many backed 
the idea of imperial emigration. 87 Meanwhile, for Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr and 
F. S. Oliver of the Round Table movement, the years were pregnant with the 
opportunity to advance their ideas of a federal parliament. 88 The Imperial War 
Cabinet, which welcomed the Prime Ministers of Canada, South Africa and 
Australia into the confidence of the British War Cabinet, reflected both the 
fellowship of war and possibilities for the future. 9 Indeed, this grand 
embodiment of a loyal unified Empire was critical in permitting - though not 
enforcing -a development of perceptions on the Union with Ireland. The latter, 
as such, became a lesser priority, certainly subordinate to wider imperial 
development. Not only would Unionists never again imperil the Empire for the 
sake of the Irish Union, but the sense of imperial responsibility displayed by the 
dominions suggested that the Union was a crude means by which to retain Irish 
loyalty and goodwill. 
Party literature attempted to keep these imperial sentiments alive into the post- 
war world, reminding its readers of the Empire contribution: `Brothers in Arms 
and Brotherhood in Peace'. 90 The principal purpose of this pamphlet, 
nonetheless, was to urge a second development, namely future imperial 
cooperation in the economic field. Law asked the Unionist conference of August 
1916 for patience and a fresh outlook because, whilst party men might be 
87 A. L. Smith, `The People and the Duties of Empire' in Idem., Empire, pp. 29-45. 
88 See for instance, Curtis to Law, 01/11/1915. BL/51/5/1; Philip Kerr, `Commonwealth and Empire' in 
Smith, Empire, pp. 69-89; Steel-Maitland Memorandum, 06/11/1918. Milner Papers, 129/279-86. 
89 See for example PRC Poster 58 below. 
90 `Empire Preference', P&L, 1918/10. 
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frustrated at the slow process of fiscal reform, the majority of the nation had 
reached the conclusion that Germany should never again be allowed to abuse 
British markets as they had before the war 91 Attempts were made to distance the 
discussion from the traditional free trade versus tariff reform argument that had 
long shaped political-economic debate. This permitted a wider acceptance by 
many Liberals of the need to protect at least the vulnerable sections of British 
industry. 92 As the Sheffield Unionist George Franklin asserted, the issue was no 
longer a question of free trade or tariff reform but of the need to obtain the best 
deal for the Empire and Britain's Allies; Laming Worthington Evans claimed that 
protection `must be looked at, not as [a] Fiscal theory, but as [a] practical 
policy'. 3 Meanwhile, Colonel E. W. Pickering (Coalition Unionist candidate for 
Dewsbury) explained that although he had been a Conservative free-trader before 
the war, the question now could `only be settled after consulting and conferring 
with our colonies, who have stood by us in this war... '94 Such an advance was 
considerable, for tariff reform had proved an obstacle to both party unity and 
electoral prospects before the war. A massive breach had opened between 
`whole-hoggers' and moderate tariff reformers over the protection of British 
agriculture and the `cheap loaf. This had distracted tariff reformers into centring 
their debate on merely a single aspect of the tariff programme. 
Not only did the war consolidate the Unionist Party behind a scheme for tariff 
reform but it also greatly strengthened such an appeal to the nation. For the 
conflict was the ultimate proof of the pre-war Unionist claim that Germany had 
Wartime party literature linked the issue of prospered under a system of tariffs 95 
91 G&M, September 1916, p. 19. There is no report of this conference in the CPA at the Bodleian Library. 
92 See below, pp. 320-322. 
93 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 30/03/1916. Cutting in City of Sheffield UA, 27/03/1916, (LD/2107); 
Worthington Evans Election Manifesto, December 1918. Worthington Evans Papers, c. 892, f. 57. 
94 Dewsbury District News, 07/12/1918. ne 
95 `Ourselves versus Germany: Germany's Greater Progress', P&L 1914/23 
157 
Germany's preparation for war with British economic interests. Before the war, 
`organised German trade attack had captured the British dye industry - on which 
the livelihood of at least a million and a half workpeople depended. ... Would 
you like the Germans to repeat the trick, as they mean trying to? ' 96 The 
recognition of the value of anti-German arguments in the Coupon Election of 
1918, most famously including `Hang the Kaiser', suggests that the case for a 
protectionist policy, which was at once defensive for Britain and offensive 
against Germany, had electoral appeal. The store set by imperial preference and 
Empire solidarity, in the manifestos of Coalition Unionist candidates in 1918, 
illustrates the significance of this development. Accordingly, Tariff Reform 
League campaigns now possessed far greater potential, urging `Britain for the 
British: Our Imperial Markets for our Imperial industries. The successful 
Unionist candidate in Rotherham (Frederick Kelley) deliberately tailored his 
language, referring to the `Economic Boycott' of Germany rather to than tariff 
reform. 98 
In the Edwardian period, as Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver have shown, 
there was a twofold appeal by Unionists to the working classes: to their self- 
interest and to `traditional emotions'. 99 Frequently, literature concentrated on just 
one such theme (such as factory legislation) and at times they were interrelated (a 
strong Navy to safeguard a cheap loaf; anti-Alien legislation to protect the British 
worker). '°° However, the Unionist propaganda of the war points towards two 
fundamentals. First, appeals to the sentiment of patriotism were likely much 
more effective than previously, partly due to the agencies by which they were 
96 'How the Huns Prepared for their High Explosives', P&L, 1918/3 
97 Tariff Reform League: 'Proposals for Posters and Pamphlets', February 1917. Hewins Papers, 
64/181-7. 
98 F. A. Kelley to Hewins, 26/10/1918. Tariff Commission Papers, TC/6/1/14. 
99 McKenzie, Angels, pp. 58-62. 
100 For instance, `Labour and Dreadnoughts', P&L, 1914/4. 
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supported, partly as a result of the environment from which they emerged. 
Second, the war made popular many of the developments that forged a link 
between individual self-interest and the emotional appeal of patriotism. This can 
rarely have been done so subtly as in the pamphlet `Should there be a Levy on 
Capital? ' This sought to mobilise the millions who had invested in war bonds 
against the Labour Party, reminding readers `Remember that those who Saved 
Money helped to save the Empire'. lol Equally notable was appreciation of the 
connection between on the one hand desire for vengeance against Germany (at 
least partly through a boycott of its industry and anti-alien legislation) and, on the 
other, Britain, its Empire and economic co-operation. 
101 `Should there be a Levy on Capital? ', NUA Pamphlet 1889, June 1919. 
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Pacifism and Bolshevism 
The benefit (or rather hindrance) of hindsight, which reminds the historian 
incessantly that the Liberal Party was to divide irrevocably and then be displaced 
speedily by a powerful Labour movement, can tend to obscure the true concerns 
of the time. After all, Labour won only 42 seats in December 1910, and by- 
election results in the period 1910-1914 offered few fresh grounds for 
enthusiasm. In addition, the short-term nature of much Unionist thought in the 
pre-war era - determined most especially by a commitment to the Union, which 
overshadowed other questions - renders an understanding of longer-term agendas 
problematic. 102 Before the war, unsurprisingly, the overwhelming store of energy 
was reserved for the Liberal Party, which was both historical enemy and present 
government However, a quick solution was sought in a divorce of the unholy 
marriage of the Liberal-Nationalist-Labour alliance. 
103 The Unionist role was to 
be neither suitor nor adulterer, but malevolent troublemaker, pointing out 
inconsistencies and breaches in faith. The Labour leader Ben Tillett, for example, 
was quoted in 1911 as preferring Tories to Liberals. 
104 Hitting the enemy with a 
rival's fist rather than one's own was deemed to inflict a heavier blow and such 
manoeuvres proliferated with time. By February 1914, the party magazine 
Gleanings and Memoranda was devoting much attention to the discrepancies 
between Labour and Liberal opinion: reciting Snowden's attack on the 
demagogic style of Lloyd George's land campaign; highlighting the comments of 
the Liberal Postmaster General, Herbert Samuel, that Labour men alone could 
102 The Union was used intentionally for this purpose in regard to the controversial issue of tariff reform 
that threatened to wrench apart the party in 1913. For example, see Strachey's correspondence with Hugh 
Cecil (November 1912) and Austen Chamberlain (November 1913). Strachey Papers, S/413/21, S14/3/22; 
S/415/3. 
103 Eastern Daily Press, n. d. [April 1912]. Cutting in Roberts Papers, MC/655/30,791x2. 
104 National Union Gleanings, xxxvi, January 1911, p. 17. 
163 
not be trusted to rule the nation and Empire; quoting the Daily Herald: "`It is still 
a common superstition in political circles that the Liberal Party is more kindly 
disposed towards Labour than the Tory Party"'. los Similarly, reservations of 
Radical MPs concerning nationalisation were cited not only as a check to the 
Liberal Government, but also to illustrate the latter's divergence from Labour. 106 
Conversely, the party was eager to display the parallels between the Radical and 
Labour parties, in an effort to tar them with the same socialist brush. For such 
purposes, Robert Cecil was asked by Gwynne to write a series of six articles for 
the Morning Post on the class warfare at the heart of Liberal policies. 107 Snowden 
was reported praising Lloyd George for using the socialist methods advocated by 
the Labour Party to obtain funds for social reform. 108 Consequently, both the 
Labour and Liberal parties were depicted as being dominated by class prejudice. 
The First World War removed the necessity of persisting with such a policy, for 
coalition government, and the opposition of the majority of the Liberal Party to 
pacific Labour, rendered it a less effective weapon. What is more, the patriotic 
truce - and indeed Unionist desires for domestic unity - determined that only 
those political sections opposed intractably to Britain's part in the war could be 
denounced. This point is noteworthy for, in this regard, the war encouraged the 
Unionist Party to redirect its efforts against the Labour rather than Liberal party. 
Certainly, this was furthered partly by the nature of Liberal and Labour 
dissidence, the latter being far more organised and less individualistic or 
intellectual. It was also advanced by the fact that Labour dissension was more 
pervasive and more active politically. 
105 G&M, February 1914, pp. 119-21,146-47. See also, P&L, 1914/143. 106 G&M, xxxviii, January 1912, pp. 83-84. 
107 Gwynne to Robert Cecil, 08/09/1913. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 22-3. 
108 National Union Gleanings, xxxvi, April 1911, p. 326. 
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Throughout the war, patriotic language constituted the most conspicuous method 
by which to isolate pacific Labour. As early as August 1914, when establishing 
the basis for the political truce, the NUEC had inserted the caveat `that no 
meetings should be held except where there were Socialist attacks or a "Stop the 
War" propaganda. ' 109 While only a minority of the Labour movement actually 
opposed the war (most notably and implacably the ILP), attempts were made to 
characterise as unpatriotic any part of the movement not associated specifically 
with patriotic labour. llo In 1918, Patrick Hannon, the Honorary Secretary of the 
British Commonwealth Union, spoke of the need to create `a national scheme of 
propaganda to counteract the increasing activities of the poisonous missionaries 
of Pacifist and Bolshevist doctrines who are now energetically at work in almost 
every part of the United Kingdom'. Hannon lumped together the anti-national 
movements as being in `close harmony' and possessing a common purpose, 
including the ILP, the UDC, the Herald League, the Shop-Stewards' movement, 
Sinn Fein and the `Fellowship of Reconciliation'. Against this threat, was ranked 
the NWAC, the `Women's Party', the Navy League, the BWNL, the Merchant 
Seamen's League, the Seamen and Firemen's Union, the British Empire Union, 
and certain Labour leaders, such as Tillett. lll The creation of such a Manichean 
demarcation between the national and anti-national movements was certainly 
symptomatic of right-wing thinking! 12 
From the outset, Unionist Party literature sought to caricature as `pro-German' 
any prominent Labour individuals (MacDonald, Keir Hardie, Snowden) who 
qualified their support for Britain's entry into the war or the war effort. They also 
109 NUEC, 06/08/1914. 
llo In fact, even the Union of Democratic Control and ILP declarations called for British victory, but, as 
Paul ward has noted, `the anti-war left was defined by its opponents'. Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union 
Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left 1881-1924 (Woodbridge, 1998), p. 129. 
111 Memorandum, `Industrial Unrest', [1918]. Hannon Papers, Box 13. 
112 Speech by Londonderry to the Empire Producers' Federation, reported in Evening Standard, 
25/07/1918. Londonderry Papers, D/3099/10/16. Croft to the Editor, Morning Post, 06/08/1917. 
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expounded the idea, held by Hannon, that individuals were either for or against 
the war, with the inescapable corollary being (for them) that individuals were 
either for or against the nation. As such, they tended to lump together all 
undesirables into an alliance of danger: syndicalists, Sinn Fein supporters, 
Germanic sympathisers and pacifists. The Easter Rising of 1916 became an 
insurrection mounted by a Sinn Fein, Germanic and syndicalist combine, and 
Sinn Fein was merely an Irish arm of the German menace. 113 Not only should the 
ILP Conference of 1916 have illustrated to observers that they `[took] their 
inspiration from a philosophy which is divorced from national sentiments as it is 
remote from realities', but also that they aspired to cooperate with German 
socialists. 114 Two pamphlets produced by Central Office in 1918 were 
characteristic of this. They sought to establish the relationship between the ILP 
and international, more specifically German, socialism: MacDonald and 
Snowden had been praised by German newspapers and had justified Germany's 
rationale for war. Indeed, they were responsible for `Pro-German Agitation 
Cunningly Introduced For International Socialist Meditation. ' 115 Such methods 
had the potentiality to dismiss various Unionist opponents with a single blow, 
each tainted by association with the others. This also affected attitudes of the far 
right to post-war international solutions, with Ian Colvin arguing that the League 
of Nations was promoted by Bolshevik, German, Jewish and Labour agents. 116 
In part, at least, this was a version of the `Hidden Hand', which was promoted by 
the extreme right (most notably the `Vigilantes' Pemberton-Billing and Arnold 
White). They purported to believe that German influences were undermining the 
113 G&M, May 1916, p. 37. See also speech by Leslie Scott reported in Liverpool Courier, 05/12/1918, 
p. 6. 
114 G&M, April 1916, p. 30. 
lls `What is the I. L. P.? ' and `The Voice of the Pacifists', P&L, 1918/11,1918/12. 
116 Colvin to Lloyd, 13/05/1918. Lloyd Papers, 9/3. 
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British establishment through a variety of frequently outlandish means. 117 
However, private correspondence would suggest that this simplified battle 
between `good' and `evil' was not constructed consciously. In December 1916, 
Bridgeman informed his wife that the inspiration behind the Merseyside strikes 
was a German `evil influence', and Sydenham blamed the same stimulus for the 
resources of pacifists, strikers and Irish dissidents a year later. 118 Colvin reported 
to Milner that the public should be made aware of the `desperate nature' of 
socialist propagandists, and that the Government must be ready to pursue 
activists, or else German influence would only gain an even firmer foothold. 
119 
Strachey argued duplicitously that a gulf of difference existed between the Ulster 
Volunteer Force who had primed their guns in order to defend the Union, and de 
Valera's men who wished `to help their German allies'. 120 The Bolshevik 
revolution had occurred only because Lenin was mad and Trotsky was Jewish 
(and, therefore, incapable of turning down a German back-hander). 121 
Certainly, Unionist obsession with the alien question suggests that an innate 
conviction was held that such agencies were pervasive and influential: powerful 
sub-committees reported to both the Unionist Business Committee and the 
Unionist War Committee on the alien influence. 122 William Joynson-Hicks even 
took the extreme measure of obstructing a wartime Vote of Supply in an effort to 
insist that the alien issue was tackled forcefully. 123 Typical was Long's 
pronouncement that it was `better [to] intern a dozen innocent people than leave 
117 James Hayward, Myths and Legends of the First World War (Sutton, Stroud, 2002), pp. 151-62. 
lls Bridgeman to Caroline Bridgeman, 19/12/1916. Philip Williamson, The Modernisation of 
Conservative Politics: the Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman, 1904-1935 (Historian's Press, 
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119 Colvin to Milner, 04/06/1917 and reply. Milner Papers, 354/120-25. 
120 Strachey to Salisbury, 06/09/1918 (copy). Strachey Papers, S/13/2/7. Also, see Henry Duke's War 
Cabinet Memorandum on de Valera and Germany, 14/07/1917. Merrivale Papers, c. 715150. 
121 Strachey to Sydenham, 29/08/1918 (copy). Strachey Papers, S/13/18/5. 
122 For the UBC Sub-committee on Aliens and the 'Report of the Enemy Influence Sub-Committee of the 
UWC', see Hewins Papers, Boxes 25-32 and 61/83-7. 
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one active unscrupulous pro-German at large'. Typical also was its cross-the- 
board application, this time in relation to Sinn Fein. 124 Indeed, on one occasion, 
Long even went so far as to console the Home Secretary, Cave, with the fanciful 
counsel that criticism of his lenient approach towards aliens was inspired by 
German money. 125 
The arrival of the Russian revolution added yet another ingredient to this mixture 
of dissent. Initially, the revolution of February 1917 was greeted equivocally. 
The subsequent evolution of perspectives is well represented in the views of the 
Unionist MP for Sheffield Ecclesall, Samuel Roberts. He welcomed the original 
revolution, believing that it had removed hindrances to Russia becoming a 
committed and organised fighting ally. 126 A year later, with Russia's contribution 
formally withdrawn, the same MP related that it was only due to the `falsity of 
Russia' that peace had not yet arrived. 127 This reflected an environment in which, 
whatever the political merits of soviets or tsars, the paramount consideration for 
all was the maintenance of an eastern front against the Central Powers. Having 
recently returned from a mission to Russia, Milner believed that the spring 
insurrection was directed against `the muddle' of a bureaucracy incapable of 
assuring food supplies to its citizens, still less prosecuting an efficient war. 
Accordingly, he could not consider it unjustified or unnecessary. 128 This 
emphasis on Russia's fighting capacity explains the reluctance to attack the 
Bolshevik influence openly until it was conclusively shown that their 
government would be even less effective than its predecessor as a military ally. 
Russia's increasing pacifism - completed in the negotiated peace with Germany 
at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918 - lossened the stopper from the vitriol that could 
124 Long to Hewins, 19/05/1918. Hewins Papers, 68/248-49. 
125 Long to Cave, 04/08/1918. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62497, f. 96. 
126 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 01/04/1917. Cutting in City of Sheffield UA, 30/03/1917, (LD/2107). 
127 Ibid., 30/03/1918. 
128 Milner to C. A. Enoch, 12/04/1917 (copy). Milner Papers, 354/65-7. 
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now be splashed liberally on all dissidents. Gershom Stewart MP told Cheshire 
Unionists that the revolution was `one of the most deplorable events in the whole 
universe (hear, hear). They were devoid of common sense or common honesty'; 
Archibald Boyd-Carpenter assured Unionists in Bradford that the chaos in Russia 
was an inevitable consequence of socialism. 129 By the time of the 1918 general 
election, even Lloyd George, who had urged diplomatic approaches to the 
Bolshevik Government and advocated their sitting at the Peace Conference, was 
attacking the Labour Party as being run `by the extreme pacifist, Bolshevik 
group' . 
130 This was a theme played deafeningly loud by the Unionists throughout 
1918 and culminated in the coupon election propaganda. B. F. McDonald 
(Unionist candidate, Lanark Bothwell), for instance, alleged that what 
Bolshevism had done for Russia, Labour hoped to do for Britain - `make the 
nation an automaton nation under officials'. 131 With election literature in mind, in 
August 1918 the Publications Sub-Committee of the NUEC asked specifically 
that pamphlets and leaflets should be prepared `showing the result of Socialism 
under Bolshevik rule', and that for this purpose authentic information was 
required. 132 Basic efforts were made to contradict the benefits of socialism - the 
Bolshevik revolution had resulted in `No power to the Proletariat ... 
The 
Nationalisation of Wealth - Wealth has been destroyed, not nationalised. ' The 
Russian people had been the naive victims of a German conspiracy. 133 
Notwithstanding Unionists' apparent confidence in the capacity of the British 
people to appreciate the failure of the revolution to usher in a new `millennium', 
129 Cheshire Guardian, 15/01/1918. Cutting in Cheshire Provincial Division, AGM, 12/01/1918 
(Are/3/6/3); Bradford West UA, AGM, 28/02/1918, (JAR). Boyd-Carpenter was elected for Bradford 
North in 1918. 
130 Chris Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-liar Coalition 1918-1922 (St 
Martin's Press, London, 1990), p. 8. 
131 Liverpool Courier, 29/11/1918, p. 6. 
132 Report of Publications Sub-Committee, NUEC, 09/07/1918. 
133 'What Bolshevism Has Done for Russia it would like to do for you', P&L, 1918/21 
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concern was rife at its capacity to spread. 134 As early as April 1917, Milner told a 
Canadian friend that `I feel more sure that the end is nearing than I do what kind 
of end it will be. The social structure in all the old European countries shows 
ominous cracks - least of all perhaps in England, though even here there are 
some signs. ' 135 Before the October revolution, Curzon and Long also privately 
expressed anxieties that civil disobedience would extend towards Britain. 
136 The 
strength of Unionist criticism of the international socialist conference in 
Stockholm revealed the prevalence of fear even before the Bolshevik victory in 
Russia. Cave was requested by Milner to scrutinise all working-class gatherings, 
137 as they could not but `turn into a pacifist and revolutionary meeting'. William 
Raebum (prospective Unionist candidate for Dumbartonshire) chastised Law for 
expecting loyal support if he `viewed with indifference & complacency a man of 
Cabinet rank [Henderson] being allowed to take with him traitors & cowards & 
attending Socialistic & Pacifist Meetings in the Capital of our closest ally'. 
139 
Similarly, Duncannon, on the adjournment of the House of Commons on 
1 August 1917, moved to call attention to the fact that at a crucial juncture of 
hostilities, the War Cabinet was permitting one of its members to proceed abroad 
on a pacifist mission. 139 
These various strands of patriotism were harmonised most resoundingly in 
December 1918. Worthington Evans informed his prospective voters in 
Colchester that the Labour candidate had laid bare his want of patriotism by 
making no mention in his manifesto of the punishment due Germany or of 
reparations. He also claimed that the Labour candidate had ILP backing, and 
134 Bridgeman Diary, 03/08/1917. Williamson, Modernisation, pp. 120-1. 
135 Milner to Glazebrook, 21/04/1917 (copy). Milner Papers, 354/55-9. 
136 For Curzon, see Scott diaries, 19-21/04/1917. Trevor Wilson (ed. ). The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott 
(Collins, London, 1970), pp. 279-80. 
137 Milner to Cave, 31/08/1917. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62496. 
138 Raeburn to Law, 31/07/1917. BL/82/2/14. 
139 House of Commons debates, 01/08/1917. Ilansard, 5 `h Series, xcvi, 2181-6. 
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`indeed [that] he had to fly the Red flag over his Committee room'. Worthington 
Evans, conversely, pledged to have the Kaiser punished and German aliens 
expelled from Britain. 140 As to retribution for Germany, the story was the same 
across the country: M. J. Wilson (Yorkshire, Richmond) felt `no pity or mercy' 
for the Germans; George Lane-Fox (Yorkshire, Barkston Ash) insisted on 
reparations `even if it meant putting back the clock of German progress and 
commerce for a hundred years'. Likewise, the Conservative candidates and press 
attacked any moves of clemency by opponents of Coalition candidates as friends 
of the `bestial hordes' (Sheffield Daily Telegraph); Frederick Jowett had taken 
`every opportunity to bless the Boche' (Bradford Argus); there would be `no 
tenderness [shown] to Mr Ramsay MacDonald's German friends' (Arthur 
Griffith-Boscawen in Birmingham, Dudley). 141 The Liverpool Courier alluded to 
`A Straight Fight' between the Coalition, which sought `to exact stem justice 
from the guilty Teutons', and the Labour Party, who were for befriending `the 
unrepentant butchers of Europe. 142 Such campaigns, in fact, epitomised the link 
that the party was able to constructbetween self-interest and patriotism. As the 
Labour MP J. R. Clynes argued, `in effect, the votes were bought', most notably 
through the creation of a causal link between the punishment of Germany and the 
economic interest of Britain. 143 
It is notoriously problematic to evaluate propaganda and policy direction in terms 
of their impact. The risk is for the argument to become cyclic, namely that a 
general election success might be validated by the dissemination of certain 
propaganda, the impact of such programmes themselves being estimated 
primarily by the electoral success achieved. In addition to the usual difficulties of 
140 East Anglian Daily Times, 04/12/1918. Cutting in Worthington Evans Papers, c. 892, f. 30. 141 Keith Dugdale, `Conservatives, Liberals and Labour in Yorkshire, 1918-29', Sheffield University, 
M. Phil. thesis (1976), pp. 50-1; Birmingham Daily Post, 28/11/1918, p. 5. 
142 Liverpool Courier, 30/11/1918. p. 4. 
143 j .R Clynes, Memoirs 1869-1924 (Hutchinson & Co., London, 1937), II, pp. 272-3. 
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assessment, the massive extension of the franchise with the Representation of the 
People Act 1918 made traditional methods of estimation less effective. Despite 
this, in the short-term, there can be no doubt that patriotism was a root of 
Unionist success. Both historians and contemporaries have acknowledged the 
significance of war propaganda, which reinforced the patriotic message of the 
Unionist Party. For the contemporary, `total' war propaganda proved the 
significance of such methods, an impression felt into the immediate post-war 
years and beyond. In some sense this was driven by aspirations for its potential 
success, more it was driven by apprehension at its capacity to `appeal to the 
animal in man, wrapped up in a mantle of democratic phrases'. 144 Either way, its 
impression was felt. Historians have acknowledged, meanwhile, that in simple 
terms of patriotism, and in comparison to the domestic audience of the German 
government, Allied propagandists preached to a very receptive audience. 145 Paul 
Ward is only the most recent in a long line of historians to point towards the 
impact of patriotism on the result of the coupon election result - in this case 
relating to `the success of appeals based on both women's domesticity and their 
patriotic activism'. 146 The doyens of Liverpool and Manchester Unionism 
recorded that women voted overwhelmingly in favour of their party along with a 
significant majority of returning soldiers. 147 Most significantly, by December 
1918 victory had been achieved, and, as the diplomat Cecil Spring-Rice had 
commented - somewhat unhelpfully in the difficult early stages of the war - `the 
real propaganda [was] facts and events'. 148 In the post-war years, the party 
144 McCrillis, Conservative, pp. 146-47. 
145 j 
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campaigned against the Labour Party's pacifist, pro-German and anti- 
conscription stance of 1914-18.149 
Wartime by-elections also indicate the electoral capacity of patriotism. 
Curiously, given Unionist fears, the most significant threat was posed not by 
Labour candidates but by independent `ultra-patriots'. The only seat contested 
and lost by a Unionist during the war was not forfeited to Labour but to the 
independent `Vigilante' Pemberton-Billing (Hertfordshire East). The mining 
candidate James Winstone, backed by MacDonald and following in the esteemed 
path of Hardie, lost the solid Labour seat of Merthyr Tydfil to the patriotic 
BWNL candidate Charles Stanton. The success of such `ultra-patriots', combined 
with the fact that commitment to the political truce determined that the Liberal 
and Unionist parties contested many fewer seats than Labour, would suggest that 
patriotism was a sure vote winner during the war. The proximity of the 1918 
general election to the conclusion of hostilities related it to the wartime 
atmosphere. Indeed, Samuel Samuel - fighting in the East End of London and 
alert to the potential of the nationalist card - feared that the National Party might 
out-manoeuvre Unionists on the right by committing itself to post-war 
conscription and radical anti-alien legislation. 150 
What however were the longer-term implications of these patriotic sentiments 
and propaganda for the Unionist Party? The war certainly made more convincing 
the idea of the Unionist Party as `national' both in the sense of patriotic and non- 
class, if perhaps only to a Unionist audience. The emergence of Baldwin's 
specifically rural `Englishness' as an image of Conservatism in the 1920s has 
little particular antecedence in the war years. However, Baldwin did point 
149 `Labour Leaders on the PEACE TREATY', NUA Pamphlet 1907, (August 1919); `What the "Labour" 
Party has done', (December 1919). 
150 Samuel Samuel to Bull, 27/11/1918. Bull Papers CAC, 4/18. 
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expressly to Dominion contribution to the war as assuring and defining the future 
of the Empire and the Commonwealth and, if Austen Chamberlain was not 
listening, he could also have mentioned the industrial protection of the 1920s as 
another offshoot. 151 Perhaps, most prominently, in conjunction with the anti- 
socialist response outlined above, patriotic language served to clarify the national 
manner by which sectional appeals could be constructed through into the 1920s. 
Because of the rapid rise of the Labour movement in the years immediately 
preceding, and during, the war, the Unionist Party was fortunate (almost 
unquestionably so) in the timing of the war in providing for such a fruitful 
counter to the Labour Party. 
The Third Way: Working With the Labour Movement 
The emergence of a strong patriotic labour wing during the war certainly could 
only bolster efforts to marginalise the Labour Party and it was in the alliance 
formed with the BWNL that the positive and negative aspects of patriotism 
versus pacifism were pulled together most overtly. 152 However, several key 
questions must be answered about the nature of this wartime cooperation 
between Unionists and labour. What precedent, if any, existed before the 
coalition and war? Did it represent moderation more of Unionist or of Labour 
actors? To what extent was it spurred on by the Bolshevik revolution and the 
desire to create alliances that could be perpetuated beyond the conclusion of war? 
lsl Philip Williamson, Stanley Baldwin. Conservative Leadership and National Values (Cambridge 
University Press, Canbridge, 1999), pp. 274-75 and Chapter VIII `Country and Empire'. 
152 For the BWNL, see John Stubbs, `Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour, 1914-18', English Historical 
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Dissent, pp. 110-18. The BWNL emerged out of the Socialist National Defence Committee in 1915, 
before becoming first, the British Workers' National League in 1916, and then the National Democratic 
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How widely supported was the movement amongst Unionist MPs and the rank 
and file? Most importantly, what impact did it have on the ability of the Unionist 
Party to appeal realistically to the working classes? 
Precedent existed only in the margins of the Unionist Party. For Milner and 
Steel-Maitland, gravitation towards labour was propelled not only by the war but 
also by their `social-imperialist' thought, nurtured by friendships with left 
intellectuals and connections formed in the `collectivist' milieu of All Souls 
College Oxford. 153 Beyond this, there was scant basis for suspecting any 
convergence of thought or sympathy before the war. A recent historical tendency 
to emphasise the organic movement of certain Labour figures to patriotic 
positions adopted during the war is relevant more to their personal views than to 
Unionist pre-war perceptions. 154 Many of those who later received endorsement 
from the wartime coalition, and sometimes specifically from Unionist elements, 
had been attacked before the war as revolution mongers. Charles Stanton, to be 
backed in a by-election by the funds of the BWNL, the National Service League, 
the Unionist Party and Tory newspapers, had been quoted only three years 
previous as remarking `What we need up here is more violence'. In 1912 
Gleanings and Memoranda had garnished Tillett's socialist language with the 
lss extravagant menus from luxurious restaurants that rendered him a hypocrite. 
Despite such weak antecedence, the BWNL won considerable sympathy from 
Unionist: Milner, Steel-Maitland, Astor, Amery, James F. Hope and Worthington 
Evans were involved most intimately with the movement; Central Office was 
substantially engaged, with Younger attending the policy committee, John 
153 Ewen Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), pp. 44-5. See also Chapter IV above for collectivist thought. 
154 For instance see Martin Pugh, `The Rise of Labour and the Political Culture of Conservatism, 1890- 
1945', History, xcvii (2002), pp. 514-537. It is supported, somewhat tenuously, in certain autobiographies 
such as Clynes, Memoirs. 
155 G&M, xxxix, July 1912, pp. 23-6. 
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Boraston and Sanders giving consideration to the electoral bargain, and 
Richardson (previously editor of the Unionist journal Our Flag) composing the 
committee's brief; 156 the Whips Office was engaged through the auspices of 
Bridgeman; Law, Long, Talbot, Wolmer and Austen Chamberlain all favoured 
the cooperation. 157 An interesting meeting in October 1917 discussed to which 
Unionist MPs an appeal to serve on a joint (Unionist and BWNL) general council 
might most propitiously be made. As a preliminary, a clutch of old guard and 
diehard Unionists were excluded from consideration (Bull, Cooper, Ernest 
Jardine, Joynson-Hicks, Ronald McNeill, A. H. Stanley and Lords Thynne, 
Robert and Hugh Cecil). Those deemed suitable and approachable numbered 
forty-six, and the list was made up of several cliques, including the pre-war 
Unionist Social Reform Committee (Baldwin, Charles Bathurst, Griffith- 
Boscawen, John Hills, Samuel Hoare, J. A. Hope, Wood) and the wartime 
Unionist Business Committee (Hume-Williams, Leslie Scott, de Pennefather, 
Gershom Stewart). 158 Steel-Maitland recorded of the dinner held on 26 October 
1917 that: 
We met, talked about the programme, and general approval was given to it and to the idea 
that they were the kind of people with whom we could work. We let [Unionist Council 
members] know that we had talked over these political questions with [Victor] Fisher in a 
friendly way, but did not mention that there was any definite alliance. As a result, 
everyone, with I think one exception, was friendly and willing to see them go ahead, and 
at the same time quite convinced that it was as unwise to try and form any public 
alliance. 159 
156 Miss Page to James Hope, 30/08/1917 (Copy). SM GD193/99/2/91. 
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Some few weeks later, at the NUA Conference of 30 November 1917, Law 
offered his endorsement to the co-operation. What explained this eagerness to 
foster wider Unionist participation? No doubt, the Bolshevik revolution 
encouraged action against the socialist threat wherever possible, and insecurities 
concerning military victory may also have played their part. However, the early 
and continued consideration given to electoral arrangements indicates that, at 
least in some degree, aspirations existed for cooperation in peace as well as war. 
What therefore brought the BWNL and the Unionist Party together? 
Through the war effort, certain elements of the Labour movement were 
welcomed into coalition government and into the hearts of many on the right. 
Within the coalition, Henderson, George Barnes, John Hodge, and George 
Roberts all reached Cabinet rank, while George Wardle, William Brace, 
Stephen Walsh, J. R. Clynes and James Parker all performed ministerial roles. 
Simply through this medium of shared responsibility, Unionist leaders warmed to 
their colleagues. In August 1917, Bridgeman thought that, with the exceptions of 
Henderson (who had just returned from Russia and was to remove himself from 
the government shortly afterwards) and Clynes, all the Labour men in 
government were 'sound' . 
160 Even Clynes impressed Crawford with his `strong 
and mollifying effect upon the trades unions'; Crawford lamented his 
administrative incapacity only after Clynes had succeeded him as Food 
Controller. 161 The aptitude for, and moderation in, governing displayed by such 
Labour leaders also moderated fear of a Labour administration, Selborne going 
so far as to exclaim that it might well be preferable to the Radical version. 162 
160 Bridgeman to Caroline Bridgeman, 01/08/1917. Williamson, Modernisation, p. 120. Bridgeman served 
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Several factors served to shape the timing of such opinions. Unionists 
undoubtedly were pleasantly surprised to discover the patriotic, moderate and 
competent character of the Labour leadership in the first few years of coalition. 
Such grounding, meanwhile, was provided in the Asquith coalition, when the 
mandarin features of their Liberal colleagues caused fiercer ire amongst Unionist 
ministers than did any political tendencies on the part of the Labour men. For 
instance concerning the adoption of conscription, criticism was frequently 
levelled at Asquith for not pursuing the issue more eagerly and for failing to by- 
pass obstacles, whilst little was directed at Henderson who, in the form of 
warnings of labour distress at the notion of industrial conscription, was at the 
least the spokesman for these obstacles. Although such developments were 
evident, the views of Arthur Griffith-Boscawen MP reflected Unionist 
conceptions of this political convergence. Having served as Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions from December 1916, he paid tribute to his 
two Labour chiefs: Barnes, because, `though called a Labour Member, there was 
nothing of the modern Socialist-Labourite about him. I should describe him as 
being really an old-fashioned and very cautious Scottish Whig'; Hodge, who 
was really a rampaging and most patriotic Tory workingman'. 163 Such 
politicians were acceptable, it would seem, only if they were not Labour men. 
To some extent, as depicted in the Punch cartoon `The Real Voice of Labour', 
the war fostered the notion that at heart the workingman was patriotic and honest. 
This had long been a party ideal. Before the war, Lord Roberts, Milner and the 
intellectual Arthur Boutwood had all been convinced that a `latent' patriotism 
and morality resided in the workingman, choked only by hardship and poverty. 164 
The huge number of voluntary recruits to the front, especially in the first six 
163 Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, Memoirs (John Murray, London, 1925), p. 195. 164 J. H. Grainger, Patriotisms, Britain 1900-1939 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986), pp. 39-40. 
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months of war, served to renew such a confidence in the homogenous nature of 
the British population. More especially, experience on the front allowed Croft to 
talk passionately of the bond of respect and understanding forged between the 
various social classes fighting in France, which he held to be a microcosm of 
society. War had an `ennobling influence', and he thus distinguished soldiering 
from politics, for in the army `one speaks straight and straight men listen to 
you'. 165 Wood spoke of the `confidence between Officers and men' fashioned at 
the front and enthused concerning `what might be done in the industrial world, if 
the same spirit of mutual trust and confidence which exists in the trenches could 
reign in our workshops at home'. 166 Even those who had no personal familiarity 
with such developments wished the idea sustainable: Milner told anaudience in 
Leeds that `the fellowship of the trenches would be a bond between Englishmen 
of the most various classes in the future'; the equally inexperienced Selborne and 
Steel-Maitland supported such a heart-warming thesis. 167 Colonel John Gretton 
MP, instead, considered that `the real jarring note [came] from the suburban 
middle-class, the West Kensington type', who chattered rather than partook of 
their share of the national effort. 168 
The war, meanwhile, encouraged an ideological convergence around state 
intervention in industry. 169 This was inspired by the wartime necessities of the 
maintenance of production and the avoidance of domestic civil unrest. Certain 
sections of the Unionist Party moved towards a more interventionist attitude to 
165 Croft to Blumenfeld, 1 November [1916? ]. Blumenfeld Papers, CRO/8; Henry Page Croft, Twenty-two 
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industrial relations, which, whether through the state or through other means, 
stressed the importance of sacrifices by both employers and employed. Collective 
bargaining became a catchword, with Astor, Neville Chamberlain (as Mayor of 
Birmingham) and Steel-Maitland expending much energy on the adoption of 
such methods. Steel-Maitland also worked alongside the Worker's Education 
Association (WEA) and manufacturers such as Dudley Docker in attempts to 
urge compromise between employers and workers. 
170 Bridgeman sought to create 
a `Church Labour Programme' and worked through the Church of England 
Men's Society to bring managers and employees together. 171 Even the landed 
Tory Salisbury co-operated with the left-wing economist Alfred Zimmern in 
efforts to promote co-partnership schemes with the backing of the WEA. 
In 
An analysis of BWNL propaganda reveals much about the real character of this 
particular entente. At its heart was patriotism, and in this respect BWNL 
literature differed little from that of the Unionist Party. Speaking of class conflict 
and international war, Victor Fisher, the President of the BWNL, told an 
audience that `you cannot profitably quarrel over the arrangement of the furniture 
while your homesteads are burning. ' He denounced the Labour Leader, 
Snowden, MacDonald, and Charles Trevelyan. 173 The BWNL Chairman 
J. A. Seddon explained that the pacifism of Labour's pre-war politics had 
crumbled when they `learned that Prussian militarism must be destroyed root and 
branch, and the only way to destroy it is to fight it'. 174 Further, he campaigned for 
industrial conscription, reminding his readers both that patriotic trade unionists 
169 See Chapter V. 
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deemed conscientious objectors to be `national blacklegs' and that blacklegs 
were disposed of by trade unionists, a radical suggestion for a man who had been 
Chairman of the Trades Union Congress in 1914. Significantly for the wartime 
alliance, the BWNL also embraced the Empire. Fisher argued that the war had 
proved the commitment and solidarity of the Empire, and that `from this time 
forth we will seal such a pact with our brethren in every sense of the term that 
this free Empire of Britons the world over shall remain dissoluble and 
indestructible. '175 Indeed, were it not for the flexibility of the term 'British' 
during the war, the League's title might have been more confessedly prefaced 
with that of `Empire'. This brought them into line both with wartime enthusiasm 
for Empire and with long-held Unionist principles. 
Crucially, BWNL leaders leaned heavily on the Unionist Party in other areas. 
The strikes that occurred on the Clyde and in South Wales `were comparatively 
small, and were the work of a few well-known mischief-makers', and, 
accordingly, the British working classes had exhibited their, devotion to the 
nation, and `all classes have commingled in the trenches, and have perhaps 
learned to understand one another better. ' 176 The pacifist workingman was the 
exception, and himself often the victim of the deceitful schemes of disloyal trade 
union leaders. 177 Such a characterisation of Labour leaders as subverting and 
defiling an otherwise loyal working-class through Machiavellian and demagogic 
means differed little from pre-war or wartime Unionism. It had been a persistent 
. pre-war theme that, as Lord Hindlip (chairman of Worcestershire Unionist 
Association) claimed, Hardie and the like purposely promoted strife. 178 Rather 
tenuous efforts had been made to emphasise the failure of strike action to achieve 
175 Fisher, Before and After, p. 6. 176 Seddon, Why British Labour Supports the War, pp. 10-11. 
177 Victor Fisher to Milner, 22/11/1915. Milner Papers, 351/199-201. 
178 Worcestershire West UA, AGM, 18/05/1912, (956/6). 
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its desired goals, including the fact that during 1913 the outcome in many cases 
had been an increase rather than decrease in hours (actually only in seven percent 
of instances). 179 Despite protestations to the contrary, such an interpretation 
continued to hold sway throughout the war, with union leaders who were ready 
to mobilise their members in industrial action still characterized as revolutionary. 
Given added piquancy and credibility due to the Bolshevik revolution, 
complementary accusations of pacifism and pro-Prussianism were levelled. 
In other respects too, the war failed conspicuously to usher in a more coherent 
appreciation of the issues at stake. While the realisation continued from before 
1914 that unions had a role to play within the labour world, 180 their political 
character was still questioned and feared. Between 1911 and 1914, Wolmer and 
others had campaigned vigorously to divorce the trades unions from the Labour 
Party, arguing that the principles of the latter in no way represented the interests 
of trade union members, and that members should be allowed choice as to 
whether they wished to contribute to the political fund. 181 More candidly, Lloyd 
had sought to establish a trade union movement that would reflect Unionist 
economic policy without being officially affiliated to the party. ' 82 After the war, 
the Midland Union passed a resolution questioning whether Section Three of the 
Trades Unions Act of 1913 `has not failed to carry out its object of relieving 
Members of Trade Unions, in political disagreement with the Labour Party, from 
contributing to political funds, it being found in practice that few men will face 
the odium thrown upon them by Labour politicians, as a result of applying for an 
179 G&M, February 1914, pp. 106-8. 
180 Steel-Maitland to Whittaker (Chairman of Lancashire Provincial Division), 17/10/1914. Derby Papers, 
D/31/1. 
181 `Have Trade Unionists The Right To Think? ' [1913]; S. Aspinall (Secretary of Bryn Conservative 
Workingmen's Mutual Protection Association) to Wolmer, 27/12/1913. Wolmer Papers, c. 982, ff. 68, 
185-86. 
182 Lloyd to Buck (Agent for Staffordshire West UA), 25/06/1912; 01/07/1912. Lloyd Papers, 18/3. 
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exemption form'. 183 Attitudes to trade unions, therefore, matured little during the 
war. Unionists were ready to praise union leaders when they tried, most 
especially when they succeeded, to steer their workforces away from 
confrontation over pay or conditions. It was hardly surprising that much applause 
should have been showered upon J. H. Thomas on the occasions of his refusal to 
use industrial clout to oppose the Military Service Bill and on his firm 
containment of the railway workers in September 1918. Nor when James Sexton 
and Havelock Wilson were commended for dissociating their dockers' and 
seamen's unions from the Bolshevik-friendly Liverpool and Derby branches of 
the Trades Union Congress. 184 Hodge was quoted with approval in party 
literature in urging that `old customs and prejudices must be dropped by both 
sides if victory in the industrial field is to be attained. On the workmen's side, old 
customs of a restrictive character must be cast aside; on the other the employer 
must realise that the workmen or workwomen must receive an adequate share of . 
the resulting gain. ' 185 This was hardly revolutionary talk. Such vague assurances 
of fairness could have been gleaned effortlessly from many a Unionist speech 
before or during the war, and, given the propensity of BWNL members to feast 
heartily on Milner's vocabulary, it is not impossible that they were. 
Perhaps most noteworthy for the effect the partnership had upon the development 
of Unionism, the basis of the social policy of the BWNL in many spheres was the 
findings of the pre-war Unionist Social Reform Committee (USRC). The 
USRC's housing plan was adopted wholesale, as were - in spirit rather than letter 
- its restrictions in application of a minimum wage. Where the BWNL went 
beyond such solutions, as in the establishment of a minimum price for wheat and 
183 Midland Union Conservative Association, AGM, 05/12/1919. (Are/MU/2/5) 
184 G&M, July 1916, p. 77. Millman, Dissent, pp. 105-6. Strachey to Havelock Wilson, 30/08/1918. 
Strachey Papers, S/8/7/i. 
185 G&M, September 1916, p. 34. 
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meat, and the municipalisation of canals, it really reflected little beyond a 
moderation of wartime procedure and an adoption of Milnerite `gas and water' 
socialism. New initiatives adopted by the joint BWNL/Unionist General Council, 
such as local authority provision of milk for schoolchildren and government 
grants to fund the school uniforms of the poor, were piecemeal. Substantive 
reforms, including anti-alien legislation, tended to be but an extension of 
Unionist policies. On the other hand, the Unionists successfully opposed more 
radical policies, including state farms (the emphasis instead to be on the 
perennial solution, the `cooperative' scheme), public works to counteract 
seasonal unemployment (the answer rather to lie in imperial cooperation and 
emigration) and the tripartite division - between state, capital and labour - of a 
company's profits exceeding a datum line (no alternative proposed). 186 While not 
turning their backs entirely on socialist principles, BWNL members qualified the 
expediency of free trade: it was appropriate only between mutually trusting and 
respecting nations, and thus the `League stands for Economic Defence'. 
Betraying the unease concerning food supply, Fisher made the strange claim for a 
trade union leader that the first priority must be agriculture. (an overwhelmingly 
un-unionised industry), the labourer receiving an adequate wage and the farmer 
proper security. '87 Therefore, the BWNL toed the Unionist line on all major 
issues and, as such, was of very little assistance in providing the party with 
distinctive policies to appeal to the working classes. 
Finally, increasingly, and unsurprisingly considering the policies illustrated 
above, the BWNL divorced itself from the majority Labour Party. The League 
campaigned vigorously against the proposal to send delegates from the Labour 
Party to the International Socialist Conference at Stockholm in August 1917, and 
186 Memoranda of meetings between BWNL and Unionist representatives, 26/10/1916,26/04/1917, 
15/08/1917,11/10/1917. SM GD193/99/2/252,134-38,221-26,153-58. 
187 Fisher, Before and After, p. 11. 
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Havelock Wilson (later a Vice-President of the League) refused even to permit 
his union members to transport Henderson to the Conference. 188 But what, on the 
surface, was perfect propaganda material (see Punch cartoon) actually also 
brought severe concomitant limitations. For, there was the sense that the Unionist 
Party wanted it both ways. Despite the repugnance felt for `pacific Labour' and 
the desire that the BWNL should display its revulsion for this, Neville 
Chamberlain rightly appreciated that by divorcing itself totally from the larger 
Labour movement, Fisher's League `destroyed its usefulness' to the party. 189 
What Unionists really wanted, of course, was a working-class Tory who looked 
like a Labour man, a wolf in sheep's clothing, eager to devour its youthful 
socialist prey, yet sufficiently camouflaged to get near enough to do so. 
In fact, ignoring historical and titular differences, there was little that really 
separated the Unionist Party -md the BWNL beyond a determination that they 
should not be perceived as one. The very basis of cooperation indicates that 
while the war ushered in a greater open-mindedness amongst Unionists, it did 
little to develop a specific moderate counter to socialism. It is not apparent either 
that it won over many voters to the Unionist cause for, as Central Office advised 
Law, those who voted for a BWNL candidate were overwhelmingly likely to 
have voted for an official Unionist candidate if one were in the field. 190 Indeed, 
suspicions were expressed in Stourbridge that, by the end of the war, the BWNL, 
instead of offering a sane alternative to the Labour Party, was actually 
outflanking the Unionist Party on the right. The Midland Union heard in summer 
1918 that `local Unionists were very much upset by the fact that they had not 
been consulted [over the adoption of a BWNL candidate], and especially as they 
disapproved of the policy of the League and, moreover, they thought that they 
188 Douglas, `The National Democratic Party', pp. 537-38. 
189 Neville Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 16/02/1918. Self, Neville Chamberlain, p255. 
190 This is backed up by the findings in Douglas, `National Democratic Party', pp. 541-42. 
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had a candidate locally whom they were keenly anxious to run. ' 191 The difficulty 
was wrought partly by internal politics, with the Midland Union unhappy at 
dictatorial Central Office methods and attempting to forge for itself a more 
prominent provincial role. 192 However, Birmingham Unionists were concerned at 
the very nature of the alliance. Neville Chamberlain, who had fashioned his own 
cooperation with local Labour leaders earlier in war, argued that he had `been 
much concerned about the tactics of the B. W. L. who publicly displayed the most 
bitter hostility to the Labour Party, and [that] last February he had represented to 
the Central Office that this attitude might bring about the alienation from the 
B. W. L. (and therefore from any allies of theirs) of a large section of patriotic 
Labour men who would not be prepared to break with their official Party. He had 
therefore urged further investigation and if necessary reconsideration of the 
whole question. ' 193 As it was, Fisher got the coalition coupon despite having only 
equivocal Unionist support, before (and perhaps as a result) failing anyway to 
win in Stourbridge. 
The one area in which the BWNL possessed the capacity to be of real value to 
the Unionist Party beyond the war years was through its provision of 
`workingmen' candidates. Nonetheless, as Sanders noted `in one division after 
another our party shies at them'. 194 In Rotherham, although no Unionist 
candidate had been accepted until the run-up to the election, a `Business' 
candidate was selected rather than a BWNL contender. 195 A month later, Sanders 
recorded that the relationship with the League was getting `more and more 
191 Midland Union, General Purposes Committee, 19/06/1918, (Are/MU/2/5). 
192 Neville Chamberlain to Steel-Maitland, 08/11/1915. SM GD193/165/2/46-7x; Midland Union, General 
Purposes Committee, 28/06/1918,25/10/1918,02/04/1919. 
193 Midland Union, General Purposes Committee, 28/06/1918. See also Austen Chamberlain Papers, 
correspondence from Steel-Maitland and Victor Fisher, July and August 1917, AC 12. 
194 Sanders Diary, 09/06/1918,23/07/1918. Ramsden, Tory, pp. 105-07 
195 RotherhamUA, EGM, 04/10/1918,18/10/1918, (JAR). 
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difficult. Our people won't have them in any places. ' 196 Partly in anticipation of 
such difficulties, and certainly due to an increased confidence in the Lloyd 
George coalition and its electoral sustainability, there was a dramatic reduction in 
the number of constituencies categorised as suitable for BWNL candidates. In 
February 1917, it had been suggested that BWNL candidates contest - with 
Unionist backing - as many as forty-nine seats (including many in two-member 
divisions). When the election actually arrived in December 1918, the coupon was 
granted to only twenty BWNL candidates. 197 
As in the party's refusal to adopt working-class nominees, there was a continued 
tendency amongst Unionists to offer only `lip-service' to the integration of 
labour. On the other hand, the importance of the Unionist dalliance with the 
BWNL during the war materialised in the stall set by anti-socialist rhetoric in the 
1920s. The League represented the swansong of the (Joseph) Chamberlainite and 
Milnerite endeavour to win the working classes over to a complete Unionist 
platform, through positive policies of national applicability. The alternative was 
the appeal to self-interest along sectional lines and the marginalisation of the 
Labour Party through propaganda directed at its anti-patriotic stance. It was 
variations on these latter policies that were to be pursued most effectively in the 
1920s and as the BWNL floundered - both within itself and in its relationship 
with the Unionist Party - so it bolstered this approach. 
196 Sanders Diary, 13/07/1918. Ramsden, Tory, p. 106. 
197 Memorandum [by James F. Hope? ], 03/02/1917; Memorandum by Steel-Maitland, n. d. [1917]. SM 
GD 193/99/2/18-32,63-4; Douglas, `National Democratic Party', p. 541. 
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Tommy: "SO YOU'RE GOING TO STOCKHOLM TO TALK TO FRITZ, ARF YOU'! WI'. I_L. I'M 
GOING BACK TO FRANCE TO J; /(; //"/ 111M. " 
`The Real Voice of Labour' 
Punch Cartoon, 15 August 1917 
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IV 
ELECTORAL REFORM 
`The National Union has always supported the right of women 
to vote [interruption and correction] ... on every occasion at least in recent years by a majority. Therefore there is no 
unwillingness in this particular Association to admit them. ' 
- George Younger at the NUA Conference, 30 November 1917. 
The Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform was appointed by Asquith in 
August 1916 to enquire into methods of registration. It reported in January 1917 
and recommended many radical alterations to the electoral system. Most notable 
among these was a special register for servicemen, universal male suffrage based 
on a simple residency qualification, redistribution of parliamentary seats to 
establish uniform constituencies of 50,000 to 70,000 population in Britain (but 
not Ireland), and the enfranchisement of women over the age of thirty, if they or 
their husbands already possessed the local government vote. Three months later, 
the Representation of the People Bill, which adhered in the main to the 
Conference's proposals but provided also for second votes under a business or 
university franchise, was introduced into parliament. This chapter will seek to 
understand Unionist attitudes to reform, in particular the emphases that were 
placed upon the various electoral questions. In the light of the findings, an 
analysis of party approaches toward the mass electorate may better be 
discovered. Having done this it will seek to evaluate how successful the party 
was in accomplishing its goals and evaluate the effects of its achievements. This 
chapter does not attempt to chart in detail the process of the reform, but seeks to 
concentrate on the implications of the actions of rank and file Unionists, as it is 
190 
through such means that the party's priorities and attitudes towards issues of 
class and voter behaviour may best be evaluated. ' 
The Vote for `Tommy' 
The first point that must be made is that the pot of electoral reform had been 
simmering away in Unionist minds throughout the war. The decision of the 
Asquith Government to revive controversies over plural voting in autumn 1915 
had stirred Central Office to request agents to distribute out-voter cards in the 
constituencies in which their plural voters resided in order to provide a proper 
understanding of their numbers and politics. 2 As the year progressed, the Party 
Chairman and the National Union Executive Committee (NUEC) had continued 
to devote attention to the implications of any such reform. The out of date 
electoral register had also acted as a stimulus: a system incapable of recording 
the votes of servicemen was anathema to Unionists in terms both of principle and 
of politics. Most especially in the tempestuous climate of 1916, a credible 
register became required as a means by which to keep open the option of a 
general election and, in turn, an alternative war government. This undoubtedly 
constituted at least part of the motivation behind the Unionist War Committee's 
demand that the government revise the register as a precondition for the 
prolongation of parliament. 3 
Summing up the conclusions of the National Union's (NUA) Sub-Committee on 
Electoral Reform in February 1917, the Party Chairman Younger recorded that 
1 For details of the reform process see Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-1918 
(Routledge, London, 1978). The various extensions to the life of parliament, that in the strict sense 
constituted reform, are dealt with in Chapters I and II. 
2 Chelmsford UA, EC, 07/05/1915, (D/7J96/1). 
3 David Close, `The Collapse of Resistance to Democracy: Conservatives, Adult Suffrage, and Second 
Chamber Reform, 1911-1928', Historical Journal, xx (1977), p. 898. 
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the party did `not take up an antagonistic position to a reasonable extension of 
the franchise' 4 Did this represent a new confidence in the working classes and an 
extended electorate? Reactions before the war to the changing nature of 
constituencies, most especially the advent of large numbers of lodger voters, 
would suggest otherwise. This particular franchise was held by those who paid 
rent of more than £10 per annum on a room, and as such was the chief means by 
which the poorest sector of the electorate was enfranchised. Partly due to Liberal 
electoral reform proposals, partly in response to the changing nature of 
constituencies, Unionists had increasingly appreciated the necessity of an appeal 
to the lodger 5 However, such recognition had frequently been mitigated by 
palpable apprehension at the emergence of a larger working-class electorate in 
the constituency, which had ramifications both for the organisation (the cost of 
registration) and electoral fortunes. Especially affected had been constituencies 
in and around London, leading one association to complain that the division's 
. 
social and electoral complexion had become `very obscure'. 
Hardly surprisingly, therefore, Central Office regarded the possible advent of 
universal male suffrage with trepidation. In 1912 it had estimated this as likely to 
produce a loss to the party of 106 seats in England and Wales, 8 a pessimism 
continued into 1917: the effect of the new male franchise would add 30% to the 
urban electorate and 20% in rural areas; three-quarters of these new voters would 
be aged twenty-one to twenty-six - `young men of no fixed political opinion and 
over one million of these would belong to the labouring classes' .9 The reference 
to this new youthful electorate was no accident, for, unrestrained by family or 
4 Electoral Reform Sub-Committee of the NUA, 24/02/1917. 
5 Herefordshire South UA, August 1911 Circular, (B 19/1). 
6 Norwood UA, EC, 23/11/1911, (IV/166/1/3). 
Chelmsford UA, EC, 07/05/1915, (D/ZJ96/1). 
8 Neal McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular 
Conservatism, 1918-29 (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1998), p. 13. 
9 Notes on the Report of the Speaker's Conference, by Steel-Maitland, 03/02/1917. SM GD/193/202. 
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financial responsibilities young men were believed to be easy prey for socialist 
hawks. 10 Probably with such fears in mind, influential Unionists considered that 
there were `strong arguments' for a higher general qualification age of twenty- 
five. ll Within parliament too, as the Daily Telegraph recorded, initial attitudes to 
the prospect of electoral reform were sceptical, with the majority of a divided 
party feeling that the circumstances were not fit for such reform. 
12 Steel- 
Maitland, free of the shackles of the party chairmanship, claimed that the 
interests of the party had, `wittingly or unwittingly, been gravely jeopardized [by 
its leaders]' and predicted a loss to the party of sixty-three seats. 13 
Opinion outside the confines of Central Office and parliament was also firmly 
against the Speaker's proposals. Derby told Law that it was `quite evident that 
the feeling [in Lancashire was] very much opposed to the Speaker's proposals' 
and pointed to a meeting of the provincial branch of the NUA as proof. '4 
Meanwhile, when canvassed by the NUA, only four associations, five chairmen 
and twenty-three agents wrote in support of the Speaker's Report, while, eighty- 
one associations, nine chairmen and one hundred and sixty-nine agents expressed 
their disapproval. ls 
10 This was most especially the case in the post-war era when, as a response, gender-based emphases were 
placed upon youthful virility in Conservative circles. David Jarvis, The Conservative Party and the 
Politics of Gender, 1900-1939' in M. Francis & I. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds. ), The Conservatives and 
British Society 1880-1990 (Cardiff University Press, Cardiff, 1996), pp. 180-87; David Jarvis, `The 
Shaping of the Conservative Electoral Hegemony, 1918-39', in Jon Lawrence & Miles Taylor (eds. ), 
Party, State and Society: Electoral Behaviour in Modern Britain Since 1920 (Scolar, Aldershot, 1997), 
pp. 137-39. 
11 NUA Sub-Committee on Electoral Reform, 20/02/1917. Memorandum by Gretton, enclosed in Gretton 
to Long, 17/02/1917; Long to Mount-Edgcumbe, 12/06/1917. Wraxall Papers, 947/675,947/676. Indeed, 
Duncan Tanner has argued the importance of the new youth vote, for a new younger electorate was 
created whose electoral consciousness was forged in a period of Labour growth, both industrially and 
politically. Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp. 385-92. 
12 Daily Telegraph, 02/03/1917. 
13 McCrillis, Conservative, p. 224; Steel-Maitland to Long, 03/02/1917. Wraxall Papers, 947/675. 
14 Derby to Law, 15/05/1917. BL 8 1/6/13. 
15 NUEC, 08/05/1917. 
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The assistance these statistics can provide to the historian is marginal: there is no 
proper breakdown of standpoints towards the various main themes of the 
Speaker's Report, such as universal male suffrage, women's suffrage, the 
abolition of the second vote, proportional representation (PR) or redistribution. 
16 
Other interrelated issues further complicate a full understanding of Unionist 
opinions. The first was the nature of the Speaker's Conference, because, as Lord 
Claude Hamilton remarked (with some grounds), the conference was 
`unconstitutional and unrepresentative'. Hugh Cecil, who rarely missed an 
opportunity to raise the debate onto an intellectual level too elevated for the 
majority of his colleagues in parliament, dwelt forthrightly on the `grossly 
unconstitutional' function of the conference. 17 More generally, dissatisfaction 
centred on the issue of Unionist representation. The Conservative Agents Journal 
reported that `although sorely tempted we do not intend to indulge in useless 
criticism of the capacity of the Unionist representatives on the Speaker's 
Conference', before doing precisely that: John Simon and his fellow Liberal 
delegates had `completely hoodwinked the unfortunate representatives of the 
Unionist Party'. 18 A `Wales Agent' believed that the Unionist delegates were 
`very much in the hands of the Radical and Labour Members'. 19 Tempers were 
raised to the extent that the Chairman of the NUA, Harry Samuel, was attacked 
in the NUEC and in parliament for abandoning the positions for which he had 
been selected to defend in the Speaker's Conference. 20 Certainly, the resignation 
of three diehard Unionists (Salisbury, Fredrick Banbury and James Craig), and 
the arrival, on their departure, of a `more conciliatory disposition' (in the words 
16 Regarding women's suffrage, a small majority held sway in favour, and of those who dealt with 
proportional representation, opinion was entirely in the negative. 
17 House of Commons debates, 15/05/1917,22/05/1917. Hansard, 5th Series, xciii, 1497-1500,2187-98. 
18 Conservative Agents' Journal [CAJ], April 1917, xliv, p. 54. 
19 CAJ, April 1917, xliv, p. 65. 
20 House of Commons debates, 22105/1917, xciii, 2178-87. NUA Sub-Committee on Electoral Reform, 
24/05/1917; NUEC, 07/06/1917. 
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of the conference's chairman), suggests that Tory views were not presented 
uncompromisingly. 21 
Such rancorous abuse of Unionist representatives was no doubt provoked also by 
the patent similarity of the Conference's proposals to the radical programmes of 
the pre-war era, and this served only to foster the sense of injustice. Agents in the 
midlands and London considered that those who had sat on the Conference 
should even treat the Fabian Society to dinner. 22 Nevertheless, just as a retailer is 
unwise to be impolite to prospective clients, even if they are as yet only window- 
shopping, with universal male suffrage likely, Unionists were wary of publicising 
any disapproval they harboured. Indeed the NUA Council was careful to ensure 
that the press was informed that `the Unionist Party is not in any way hostile to 
an extension of the franchise or the general principles of the Bill, but are going to 
suggest some practical amendments. '23 
Analysis of resolutions passed within local associations is more revealing. None 
of the constituencies studied recorded specific hostility towards universal male 
suffrage. Various reservations did however temper their enthusiasm, and it is 
apparent by the timing and nature of Unionist demands for electoral change that 
confidence in mass male enfranchisement was severely qualified. The first was 
the store put by the soldiers' franchise, which emerged on an agenda that 
included only limited electoral reform. As early as December 1914, the NUEC 
had requested the government to ensure that the serviceman was properly 
registered. 4 Moreover, a difference in intention existed between the desire to 
21 James William Lowther, A Speaker's Commentaries, I, (London, 1925), p. 198. 
22 CAJ, July 1917, pp. 104-6; October 1917, pp. 141-3. Even Bull - who had been a Unionist delegate at 
the Conference - appreciated the resemblance. Bull Diary, July to December 1917 (retrospect). Bull CAC 
Papers, 4/14. 
23 NUA Sub-Committee on the Representation of the People Bill, 24/05/1917. See also, Maidstone UA, 
AGM, 27/03/1917, (U1634/A/2). 
24 NUEC, 10/12/1914. 
195 
ensure that soldiers were not disenfranchised by the act of fighting, and an 
inclination toward the enfranchisement of soldiers and sailors per se. For 
instance, the Cornwall provincial division recommended that `to ensure [the 
votes of servicemen] it would be well for the party to prepare lists of all who 
were away on duty, irrespective of party, so that if a register had to be compiled 
hurriedly none of these valiant men would be deprived of their electoral rights'. 25 
Consequently, here the service franchise was interpreted largely as a matter of 
principle and of non-party priority. Also, the register needed to be updated so as 
to allow for the possibility of a credible general election threat, which itself was 
necessary to urge on military conscription. In autumn 1916, Salisbury became a 
focus for such basic plans, receiving proposals from Unionist agents across the 
country26 Such schemes were inherently conservative and practical in nature, 
seeking only to adapt the process of registration to provide for absent voters. 
Inherent was the understanding that tinkering with the edges rather than 
revolution of the fundamentals was required in the electoral system. Indeed no 
link was acknowledged between such an amendment and wider franchise reform, 
and many such resolutions were undoubtedly efforts to pre-empt any fuller 
discussion of the matter. 
On the other hand, lay the consideration by the Metropolitan Conservative 
Agents' Association of spring 1916. Various proposals, including one to ensure 
the enrolment on the electoral register of all servicemen who had gained the vote 
previous to, or during, the war, were surmounted by a resolution urging that `the 
fact of enlistment shall constitute a War Service Franchise, irrespective of any 
statutory period or condition of Franchise applicable to Civilians. ' In accordance 
25 Cornwall Provincial Division, AGM, 02/03/1916, (Are/1117/1). 
26 E. Murch (agent for Widnes) to Salisbury, 23/08/1916; W. Pile (agent for Camborne) to Salisbury, 
27/09/1916; C. G. Briggs (agent for Plymouth) to Salisbury, 12/10/1916. Salisbury Papers, (4)78/52a-c, 
108-13,133-4. See also Somerset Division, AGM, 02/02/1917, (Are/11/6/1). 
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with this, it was recommended that a `Roll of Honour' should be prepared on 
which were to be placed the names of all men who had served in the war. 
7A 
note at the bottom of the resolution drew attention to `consideration as to whether 
"fall age" [the discounting of age qualifications for war workers] is advisable as 
to the effect on other classes, say Munitions workers'. The question of 
expediency in this regard suggests that soldiers and sailors were believed to 
possess greater electoral reliability than other classes of war workers. Elsewhere, 
equally radical proposals were put forward: the Chairman of the Cornish 
Division, J. C. Williams, informed the NUEC that all soldiers should receive the 
vote including those previously excluded by age (sixteen to twenty-one year 
olds) . 
28 This combined, somewhat awkwardly, with the desire to raise the general 
age of qualification for civilians to twenty-five, to promote a franchise heavily 
weighted towards the military vote. 
Two additional questions emerge: was the enfranchisement of servicemen merely 
an attempt to thwart the Liberal and Labour parties? Was the link between the 
soldiers' vote and mass enfranchisement acknowledged, and, if so, how was 
universal suffrage perceived? The explicit suggestion that all fighting men, 
whether Unionist or not, deserved the vote was one that earned common assent 
through conscientious purpose. The element of political pragmatism was 
reflected elsewhere. Astor informed Salisbury that a meeting of discharged 
soldiers was unanimously in favour of universal manhood suffrage at twenty-one, 
and that members were mainly middle-class (lawyers, shopkeepers, tradesman) 
and not socialists. 29 The exuberant confidence in the morals and improvements 
evident in the trenches, led to the championing of soldiers' views above and 
27 MCAA, Special Registration Committee, 10/03/1916, Association, 07/04/1916. 
28 NUEC, 09/03/1916. Bristol West UA asked the NUEC to persuade the Government to enfranchise 
servicemen before the end of the year. NUEC, 12/10/1916. 
29 Astor to Salisbury, 11/07/1916. Salisbury Papers, (4)77/148. 
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beyond their comrades at home. As in the realm of social reform and 
reconstruction, where the government appealed overtly to the transformed 
character of the fighting warrior, electoral reform was pushed as a palliative for 
the returning soldier. `Tommy might be simple, but he was not a fool', warned 
one Unionist agent, and `Tommy' wanted the vote. 30 
Electoral calculations also played their part. Selborne spoke of a general desire 
among the parliamentary party to see the service franchise as `a deliverance from 
the domination of the Trades Union influence', a belief founded on an 
expectation that experience in the trenches had relieved many of the class hatred 
that permeated trades unions. 31 And `deliverance' was needed indeed from this 
spectre, for, as one Central Office official informed Steel-Maitland in 1917, trade 
union membership had swelled by two million since 1913 whilst the National 
Insurance Act was driving men into such combinations. Central Office, itself, 
pointedly referred to the good that the soldiers' vote would do in the boroughs, 
no doubt in appreciation of the fact that `the views held by men at the Front were 
likely to undergo a very material change as a consequence of the War. '32 
Similar motives lay behind the moves to disenfranchise the conscientious 
objector, as the Morning Post roared: `While nothing but relentless pressure has 
sufficed to induce the Government to enfranchise the fighting men effectively, no 
pressure or persuasion prevails with them to disenfranchise the shirkers. ' The 
deprivation of the vote would be `a small price to pay' for cowardice and 
safety. 33 The Unionist MP Leslie Wilson sought to ensure that all fighting men 
30 Unionist agents in the north of England and the home counties appealed for a Special Register on the 
same lines. CAJ, October 1916, pp. 228-35. See also, Truro and Helston UA, 22/03/1916, (JAR). 
31 Selborne to Salisbury, 12/09/1916. D. G. Boyce (ed. ), The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord Selborne's 
Domestic Political Papers (Historian's Press, London, 1987), pp. 198-200. 
32 Gales to Steel-Maitland, 26/02/1917. SM GD 193/202/31-2x; Speaker's Registration Conference 
Report regarded from the point of view of the future, 21/02/1917. SM GD 193/202/90-ix; Electoral 
Reform Sub-Committee of the NUA, 24/02/1917. 
33 Morning Post, 28/06/1917. Editorial. 
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received the vote: if you could fight, you could vote. Rowland Hunt held the 
same view with perhaps reverse psychology: if you could not vote, you would 
fight, a rather feeble threat of mutiny if soldiers were denied the vote. 
34 It was 
powerful enough to incite an uncompromising resolution at the NUA Council 
and mobilise not only local associations but also the Unionist War Committee 
(though the UWC, in general, was uncharacteristically subdued on issues of 
electoral reform). 35 As was the drive to disenfranchise naturalised enemy 
residents in Britain, who had not even been given the opportunity to serve for 
their adopted country. 36 
To what extent confidence in the service vote was based on fact rather than 
fiction is debatable. Unionist minds seemed to concentrate on the volunteer army 
produced in the first year of war. Little concern was expressed that 'Kitchener's 
Army' might have differed very radically in its views concerning a war that they 
had joined eagerly, and a sitting government they had served voluntarily, from 
those who were conscripted into battle later. Perhaps, Unionists had read and 
taken to heart Ian Hay's bestselling The First Hundred Thousand (1915) and its 
sequels, which celebrated the alacrity with which volunteer recruits adapted to 
the military situation and so placed the war firmly in the world of schoolboy 
adventure and morality. 37 Certainly, confidence did not continue unabated. As 
early as June 1917, Salvidge was alluding to the basis of the propaganda of the 
Discharged Soldiers and Sailors Federation (DSSF) as a `revolutionary 
movement', whilst pointing to its capacity for danger. 38 The same month, 
34 Pugh, Electoral Reform, pp. 112-13. 
's NUA Council, 10/07/1917. For the UWC see report in CAJ, July 1917, p. 100. Resolutions were passed 
advocating the disenfranchisement of conscientious objectors in Chelmsford, Monmouthshire, 
Harborough and Newark. 
36 Chelmsford UA, EC, 06/06/1917, (D/7J9611). 
37 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977), p28. The 
real name of the author (who later became a Conservative MP) was Ian Hay Beith. 
38 Salvidge to Derby, 19/06/1917. Derby Papers, 8/3. 
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Sanders recorded with concern that a strike on Clydeside had been organised by a 
returned soldier. 39 After the passage of the reform bill, Younger warned Law (as 
part, admittedly, of a campaign of pessimism aimed to postpone an early 
election) that he had heard from the front that the soldiers would vote for peace 
owing to disgruntlement at the high wages on the home front. Such convictions 
were not bolstered either by the increasing radicalism of the DSSF. In the wake 
of sizeable meetings in Scotland, Younger feared it would `prove another 
disturbing factor'. 0 W. A. Gales, Central Office agent for the Home Counties, 
claimed the DSSF were `a source of trouble in many places and [that] if their 
organisation [was] fairly good they might influence many Absent Voters 
al [servicemen] against the Government' 
Despite these misgivings, the party's primary motives in moving towards 
franchise reform can be perceived. While John Turner has argued that reform 
was propelled largely by the political struggle between the front and backbenches 
of autumn 1916, Neal McCrillis has suggested that it was rather the concern for 
the vote of the servicemen that was at the root. 42 Certainly, in the main, it was 
this latter sentiment that held sway most compellingly throughout the war, and 
most certainly in the earlier stages when the issue of universal manhood suffrage 
had not yet been settled. Indeed, serious attention was devoted to the service vote 
far earlier at the local than the parliamentary level. These grassroots' steps in 
1915 and 1916 showed the motivations behind the service vote to be electoral 
politics and wartime conscience, rather than merely the means by which to 
ensure the possibility of a general election threat in late 1916. More generally, 
39 Sanders diary, 10/06/1917. John Rarnsden (ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: the Political Diaries of Robert 
Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (Historian's Press, London, 1984), pp85-6. 
40 Younger to Law, 23/09/1918,24/09/1918. BU95/2. 
al `Synopsis of Confidential Reports by Unionist Central Office Agents on the Progress of the Coalition 
Campaign', 03/12/1918. BU95t2. 
42 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: coalition and conflict (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1992), pp. 117-20; McCrillis, Conservative, pp. 11-12. 
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Unionist preoccupation with the service vote became linked irrevocably (and 
largely to their chagrin) with male suffrage, which itself was later coupled to 
female suffrage. In fact, most other electoral developments resulted directly from 
consideration given to the service franchise. Male suffrage had become a 
certainty and, while opinions differed as to the best means by which to 
accomplish the ends, nevertheless the remaining goals were the same - the 
containment, for as long as possible, of the effect of the universal male vote. 
What is more, confidence in (and reliance on) the military vote, which propelled 
the discussion on reform, revealed the party's short-term electoral priorities. For, 
as Unionists must only have realised, the soldiers' vote was only a temporary 
phenomenon, which would rarely - and hopefully never - be repeated in such 
magnitude or intensity. Taken together with Unionists' stance on the coalition, 
and with their attitudes to PR and House of Lords reform, this suggested that the 
main concern of the parliamentary party was victory at the next election. 
Safety Valves for the Boiler 
It was essentially on the lines of containment that the Central Office worked its 
campaign of amendments to the Representation of the People Bill. The starting 
point of dealing with the Speaker's Conference was the appointment by the NUA 
of two sub-committees to investigate electoral reform, one briefed to look 
specifically at the findings of the Conference. 3 Importantly, its terms of 
reference did not extend beyond consideration of the Speaker's Report. The sub- 
committee was directed to contemplate the `probable effect on the party and 
should not be motived [sic] by any preconceived opinions either in favour of the 
proposals or against them'. Where hardships existed they were to be redressed. 
43 NUEC, 08/02/1917. Serving upon this were Harry Forster, Gretton, Steel-Maitland, Imbert-Terry, 
Joseph Lawrence, Charles Marston, Percy Woodhouse, Younger, Boraston and W. Jenkins. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, they were informed that `the only firm basis of fact on 
which to build is the last [December 1910] General Election' . 
44 
As Martin Pugh has noted, virtually all amendments tabled by Unionists can be 
traced directly to the report of this sub-committee. 45 Initial actions were spurred 
on by a complaint to the NUEC that less than half of the Unionist members 
actually voted on the Speaker's Report on 28 March 
46 Even these were split 
almost down the middle, for (79) and against (64) the proposals. Partly no doubt 
because of this apathy, within a month a group of Unionist MPs had been 
brought together who were pledged to the amendments approved by the NUA 
47 
Although it is not evident who served upon this committee, it was organised by 
Younger, John Gretton and Sanders, and whips were issued through Central 
Office. 8 In June the NUA Council was informed that Central Office had 
successfully arranged 160 amendments. There was much back-slapping for the 
crucial issues of proportional representation, the business vote, redistribution of 
agricultural areas and the disenfranchisement of lunatics and prisoners. 
But, what did these achievements actually represent? In the first place it must be 
noted that Central Office work was hampered by the efforts of the Cabinet `to 
keep one step ahead of the party all the way', emanating from several political 
and personal motives. 49 While confident of its passage, Long informed Talbot 
that care was needed, for, `after all, this Bill involves what is practically 
revolution'. He feared that Asquith's men `would take advantage of any 
opportunity to cause trouble ... [But] apart from this it is not of them that we 
44 NUA Sub-Committee on Electoral Reform, 20/02/1917. 
45 Pugh, Electoral Reform, pp. 105-6. 
46 NUEC, 17/04/1917. These figures included those away on military service. 
47 NUA Sub-Committee on the Representation of the People Bill, 24/05/1917. 
48 Ibid., 01/06/1917; NUEC, 07/06/1917. For an example of an extant whip's notice, see whip of George 
Younger concerning efforts to re-commit the Representation of the People Bill to the Alternative Vote, 
04/12/1917. Boyle Papers, MC 477/2,753x. 
49 Pugh, Electoral Reform, p. 105. 
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have to think, it is of the opponents on our own side and I beg of you not to 
suggest a course which will give them a very effective weapon with which to 
attack us. '50 Necessarily, the spectre of fully mobilised party machineries was 
unwelcome from whichever side these might arise. But, the lack of goodwill 
between the principal proponent of the bill in the Cabinet (Long) and' Central 
-Office personnel (most particularly Steel-Maitland) tended to cool 
further the 
already frosty relationship. Steel-Maitland, no longer allied to Central Office 
. officially, was nevertheless the 
fulcrum of much of its activities and his critical 
attitudes were advertised widely. 51 The rupture reached a perilous point when 
Long threatened to expose him to the Cabinet for breaking government secrecy if 
he revealed an official memorandum on reform to Central Office, and Long 
subsequently denied him an interview to establish a rapprochement. 
52 
-Complications in Central Office were exacerbated by conceptions of its role, 
with Long reminding Law: 
[Central Office] are approaching the matter from an altogether wrong point of view. The 
'Reform Bill is a Bill of the Government - you are a Member of the Government, and the 
Central Office officials are your servants, paid and appointed by you to carry out your 
policy - not to dictate to you and your colleagues what your policy should be. ... I feel 
that the Central Office ought to work with all their strength in support of the Government 
Bill while making amendments of a reasonable character if they please. 53 
Differences between Central Office and Unionist ministers reached their zenith 
in the debate on conscientious objectors. Initially Government whips were put 
out against their disenfranchisement, but the NUA manufactured `a strenuous 
50 Long to Talbot, 09/05/1917 (Copy). Enclosed in Long to Law, 09/05/1917. BU81/6/12. For other fears 
of Unionist ministers see, Godfrey Locker-Lampson to Cave, 18/04/1917. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62496, 
ff. 93-4 
sl McCrillis, Conservative, p. 224. See above for the press, and below for the store set by Steel-Maitland's 
comments in Finlay's thoughts. What proportion of Steel-Maitland's pique was merely unhappiness 
under Long is questionable. 
52 Pugh, Electoral Reform, p. 92. 
203 
fight', after which the measure was ultimately carried . 
54 Faced with such 
obstacles, in straight political terms it was, therefore, some achievement. 
Notwithstanding this, the party needed little encouragement to temper 
democracy. Finlay, the usually reticent Lord Chancellor, put forward the most 
basic reservation to universal suffrage. He deprecated `one man one vote' in 
exchange for PR and redistribution, as Unionists would `be garnering no 
adequate equivalent for the abolition of the plural vote', and redistribution `must 
come in any event [and] Steel-Maitland says the Unionists wd. not gain by it' ss 
The key here was the issue of one man, one vote. At its most basic level this was 
a call to retain plural voting, as PR would, by abolishing small constituencies, 
negate the claims of businessmen to have two votes (one in the constituency of 
their residence and one in that of their business). It had resonance however for 
the woman's vote as well. Pugh's research has expounded the general 
inconsequentiality of war in determining perspectives on female suffrage. Even 
Asquith, one man famous for an apparent u-turn during the war, was as uncertain 
in his championing of women after 1918 as he was equivocal in his opposition 
prior to the war. 6 It is difficult to decipher the extent to which war had a specific 
influence within Unionist circles. At the NUA Conference in November 1917, 
Younger was interrupted and forced to retract a claim that the National Union 
had `always supported' the case for female suffrage. In fact, resolutions in favour 
of the female vote had been approved only when the suffrage had been confined 
to women who appeared already on the electoral registers for County and 
Municipal Councils. In any case, women's suffrage tended to be low down upon 
the list of priorities, and support was often personally based S7 For instance, 
53 Long to Law, 26/05/1917. BUS 1/6/18. 
"4 NUEC Report, 09/04/1918. 
ss Finlay to Salisbury, 10/11/1916. Salisbury Papers (4) 78/136. 
56 Pugh, Electoral Reform, pp. 134-53. 57 NUA Conference, November 1911. 
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Robert Cecil, perhaps aided by his awkward lanky gait, was at once able to keep 
one step in front of his party colleagues over female suffrage, whilst, in relation 
to the Welsh Church, remaining a couple of steps behind. His requests that the 
`spiritual interests' of women be incorporated into the electorate had been 
received coolly and riders had been attached to his resolutions in 1911 and 1913 
advising that no such constitutional change should be enacted without `the 
express sanction of the electors'. 8 
What, therefore, explains the failure (55 against 385) of Banbury's Commons' 
amendment to keep women off the franchise? 59 Why did the Lords allow 
women's suffrage through their House? Unquestionably, the condition of the 
anti-suffrage movement had been transformed by the war. This was amply 
demonstrated by the enclosure that the anti-suffragist Arnold Ward despatched to 
. 
Austen Chamberlain. It was a letter signed by six leading Unionists, including 
Chamberlain, Long and `F. E. ', that expressed their readiness for the issue of 
women's suffrage to be put to a referendum. Nevertheless, it was dated not 1917, 
but 1911.60 In the meantime, Long, Chamberlain and `F. E. ' had subsequently 
recanted their opposition to the women's vote. What is more, although a 
referendum had been one of many options open to the anti-suffrage movement 
before the war, it now represented the last resort. The European conflict had 
weakened this male-dominated movement, whilst wartime coalition government 
had blurred a division on party lines, all the time allowing sympathisers of the 
women's cause (Balfour, Robert Cecil, Selborne and Law) nearer the centre of 
power. 61 As the tide turned towards female enfranchisement, some sought to 
swim with, rather than against, the flow. But, whilst some wished, wisely as it 
58 NUA Conference, 13/11/1913. Resolution 25. 
59 House of Commons debates, 19/06/1917. Hansard, 5`h Series, xciv, 1751-4. 
60 Ward to Chamberlain, 08/05/1917. AC 15/1/35b. 
61 Brian Harrison, Separate Spheres: the opposition to women's suffrage in Britain (Croom Helm, 
London, 1978), pp. 204-8. 
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turned out, not to excite the opprobrium of the future electorate, an equal number 
believed that to break their anti-suffrage pledges could only discredit them in 
their constituencies 62 
Then again, on an ideological level, there can be no doubt that the war had some 
part to play in the consolidation of Unionist opinion behind the female vote. 
Unionist suffragettes were encouraged by the fact that women had filled in the 
ranks in factories during the war and that the State had been obliged to rely on 
the `brute force' of women to maintain its supplies. 
63 This principle was 
acknowledged in the Conservative Agents' Journal: `public opinion will demand 
that every man who has taken on service shall have a voice in the settlement of 
the issues at the conclusion of peace. ... Nor 
is it unlikely that the women's 
agitation will not be revived. It will not be easy to deny the claims, logically, of 
the woman who helped her country in nursing, munitions, or doing unpleasant 
work with the sole object of releasing men to go to the front. '64 This redefinition 
of citizenship, which championed `militarily useful service' and accordingly 
blurred the traditional gender-based arguments, undoubtedly swayed some 
Conservatives. 65 
Despite such developments and sentiments, pragmatism played a more 
considerable part in the transformation of viewpoints. As Crawford commented 
with his usual combination of cynicism and lucidity: 
We are assured that [women's] war work has been so wonderful that they are entitled to 
the vote. In point of fact the war has demonstrated the inability of women to perform the 
essential tasks. They cannot dig ironstone or win coal, or make steel, build ships, erect 
62 For the latter, see Blair to Law, 28/03/1917. BLl81/4/32. 
63 Lady Frances Balfour, 'Women and the Next General Election', Fortnightly Review, ci (May 1917), 
pp. 898-9. 
64 CAJ, April 1916, p. 127. 
65 Nicoletta Gullace, 'The Blood of Our Sons': Men, Women and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship 
during the Great War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), pp. 170-8. 
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machinery, navigate the oceans - still less can they fight by land, water or air. They 
perform the subordinate functions fairly well - no more can be said. 
In doing so, he mocked the conversion of so many peers on the `abstract merits 
of the case'. This included Derby, who, as Douglas Haig memorably remarked, 
felt the impression, like a cushion, of the last person who sat upon him. Instead, 
Crawford viewed the extended franchise as a `bulwark' against revolution. 
66 This 
practical argument was also at the forefront elsewhere. Selborne viewed female 
suffrage as a `steadying influence' upon an electorate augmented with the service 
vote. 67 He prophesised, moreover, that it would be `the most stable and 
conservative element in the constitution'. The NUA Council delegate Sidney 
Turner claimed at the 1917 party conference that women were `conservative by 
nature' 68 In reminding delegates that he made this assertion speaking as a doctor, 
Turner revealed one justification (in this case, pseudo-biological) for conceiving 
women to be inherently moderate. An equal franchise for men and women was 
viewed in West Derbyshire `as the only safe means of securing future general 
good Government throughout the country ' 69 
Prior to 1914, many within the party had been unready to acknowledge the 
possible benefits of the female vote. Arguments along class lines were at the 
forefront of some concerns, including one raised by a representative from 
Holborn that, under mass women's enfranchisement, 30,000 of the 300,000 
enfranchised in London would be charwomen: `Could there be a more fruitful 
field for Radical lies than here? If emotional women were once admitted to the 
66 Crawford diary, 10/01/1918; 11/12/1917. John Vincent (ed. ), The Cranford Papers: the Journals of 
David Lindsay, Twenty-seventh Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, 1871-1940 (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 1984), pp. 385,382 
67 Selborne to Salisbury, 25/08/1916. Boyce, Crisis, p. 195. It must be noted that Selborne had long been a 
supporter of women's suffrage. 
68 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
69 Derbyshire West, Quarterly Meeting, 10/01/1918, (JAR). 
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parliamentary franchise, the country would, he believed, go to destruction. ' 
70 In 
April 1917, the NUEC was still seeking to make certain that any women's 
suffrage was based upon property qualifications (either through their husbands or 
personally) 71 These reservations revealed a continued scepticism as to the ability 
of the woman voter to counteract the vote of the radical working classes. Lord 
Chaplin considered that the Australian experience suggested that the result would 
be, in fact, the converse of what Selborne hoped: on the Labour side, women 
voted with their husbands wholesale; on Conservative/Liberal wings `the 
women's vote was nothing like its full strength' 
72 With similar motives, 
Midleton expressed `considerable suspicion' concerning Selborne's franchise 
proposals, which would mean that `every working man is to have two votes in his 
house'. Such were his misgivings that he concluded that the author of the scheme 
was probably unwell 73 The political susceptibility of women was therefore a 
powerful counterweight to their supposed conservative nature. However, it is 
evident that, after the fears excited by the Russian revolutions and increased 
industrial agitation, Unionists were ready to adopt almost any method in order to 
temper a mass male electorate. 
In other, more traditional spheres, this was also the case, most particularly in 
regard to plural voting and PR. A resolution passed in Chelmsford illustrated the 
weight that Unionists placed upon plural voting. It noted `grave concern [at] the 
threatened surrender of the ownership vote by the Leaders of the Party', and 
requested their Member (Ernest Pretyman) to do all within his power to 
safeguard the privilege. It concluded that the franchise was worth 1,500 votes in 
70 NUA Conference, November 1911. Resolution 22. 
71 Lawrence Tipper at the NUEC, 17/04/1917. 
72 Chaplin to Curzon, 04/01/1918. Curzon Papers, f112,121a, ff112-4. See also the fear by one NUA 
Council member (Nochie) that women were likely to follow the example set in Australia and form an 
`unholy alliance' with certain political parties. NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
73 Midleton to Salisbury, 09/09/1916. Salisbury Papers (4)78/81-2. 
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the constituency, `whose disenfranchisement would seriously affect our 
majority' . 
74 Some estimates of plural voting's net influence placed it at 500,000 
votes in favour of the Unionist Party, 75 and many local associations recorded the 
devastating effect of its abolition. 6 Amendment after amendment was moved by 
Unionist MPs seeking both to obstruct and destroy any moves to abolish the 
second vote, to attempt to make it applicable to land as well as business interests, 
and to reduce the qualification to £5? ý 
Only the predominance accorded plural voting can explain the evolution of the 
controversy over PR. Panic was spread by the Report of the NUA sub- 
committee, which clarified the danger to the second vote inherent within PR. 
Therefore in July, 137 Unionists turned out against the scheme, and only 42 in 
favour; 60 who previously had not voted on the issue entered the Noe-lobby. 8 
Ominously, the debate over PR reflected differing interpretations of the 
safeguards most required under a mass electorate tainted with a socialist threat. 
Essentially the battle lines were drawn between the two houses of parliament. 
The Commons party appeared ready to place its confidence in the returning 
soldier, and with safeguards within a first-past-the-post system. It is apparent, 
accordingly, that for MPs the fear of revolution existed not so much in the long- 
term, but rather as an immediate consequence of demobilisation, syndicalism and 
challenging reconstruction work due after the war. The priority therefore was 
victory at the next election rather than the dilution of the Labour (and, of course 
more pertinently, Unionist) capacity in subsequent contests. Conversely, Unionist 
peers kept one eye much more firmly on the long-term political future than did 
their Commons colleagues. It was in some degree the `Peers versus the People' 
74 Chelmsford UA, EC, 26/01/1917, (D/Z/96/1). 
75 Maidstone UA, AGM, 27/03/1917, (U/1634/A/2). 
76 National Society of Conservative Agents, 23/05/1917, (485/4); Worcestershire West UA, AGM, 
20/09/1917, (956/6); Midland Union Notebook, (Are/MU/29/3). 
77 Pugh, Electoral Reform, pp. 110-11. 
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mark two. The House of Lords, robbed of its veto in 1911, was determined to 
emasculate the predominance of the Commons by the establishment of a robust 
second chamber and/or the enfeeblement of the first House. The former goal, 
being reliant on legislative impulse from the executive and lower house, was 
uncertain, the latter more achievable and realistic. Among the arguments 
employed for PR, the peers alluded to the representation of minorities, and the 
promotion of civic pride and responsibility. More avowedly though, Salisbury 
made specific reference to `the reduction of huge House of Commons majorities' 
as an incentive79 
A fierce discussion also raged between two parts of the Unionist Party 
organisation. On one side was a clutch of Unionist MPs, including Mark Sykes 
and Leslie Scott, and a united Tory national press infected with the spirit of 
wartime coalitionism, to whom PR presented a means by which to marginalise 
the party organisations and so perpetuate the new ideal of consensus politics. 
0 
Pitted against them were the party organisers, such as Percy Woodhouse, Charles 
Petrie and Salvidge. As usual, none was more forward in asserting the role of the 
party's foot-soldiers than Salvidge, who felt PR to be an effort `to destroy the 
influence of our Party organisation' from which, if necessary, Lloyd George 
could get his `revitalising power' 81 Hostility displayed at a local level was more 
honest, pointing to the deplorable effects it would have upon the Unionist 
cause. 82 However, the feature that most marked the cleavage between supporters 
7' Ibid., pp. 115-16. 
79 House of Lords, 17/12/1917. Hansard, xxvii, Burnham, 201-09, Salisbury 163-76. 
80 Observer, 13/01/1918, Editorial; Daily Telegraph, 16/05/1917, Editorial; Roger Adelson, Mark Sykes 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1975), pp. 259-60. 
81 Salvidge to Derby, 02/06/1917; Woodhouse to Derby, 07/05/1917. Derby Papers, 8/3,16/11; Petrie to 
Law, 13/10/1917. BL/82/5/7. 
82 Glasgow UA, General Council, 27/05/1918, (10424/73); Reigate UA, EC, 03/04/1918, (353/3/2/1); 
SUA Western Divisional Council, 13/04/1918, (Acc. 10424/28); Cheshire Provincial Division AGM, 
12/01/1918, (Are/3/6/3). See also Hayes Fisher to Harnet (Chairman of MCAA), 17/11/1917, (MCAA 
Papers, CCA/2). One exception was in Yorkshire, where PR was promoted as a means to end Liberal rule 
in the area, Yorkshire Post, 16/05/1917. Editorial. 
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and resisters of PR was in fact the issue of security. In the main, the party 
caucuses, organisations and MPs were unready to forfeit a system from which 
they had profited significantly in the past, and which they hoped to be capable of 
mastering, even under a radically different franchise. Its advocates anticipated 
that PR might further wreck the party system, while denying a radical or 
revolutionary government the chance to win a majority. 
The internal party discourse concerning class and gender was qualified, almost 
universally, with the condition that any such reforms had to be tempered by the 
reconstruction of the second chamber. 83 A resolution approving modest female 
enfranchisement was passed by the NUEC, for example, only when a rider was 
appended accepting the accompaniment of House of Lords reform. 84 Indeed, in 
spite of the store set by the retention of the plural vote, beneficial redistribution 
of seats and the destruction of PR schemes, the emphasis on House of Lords 
reform severely qualified the professed confidence in the enfranchisement of 
men or women. Demands for second chamber reform did not emerge in a 
vacuum. Ever since the Parliament Act had denied the upper house the right of 
veto, the need to temper single-chamber government had been seen as paramount 
by Unionists, most especially in the intense debates about the Irish Union. The 
irresolvable dilemma had been quite how to construct the second chamber so as 
to permit it genuine clout. The party had long since forsaken the notion that it 
represented constitutional conservatism, advocating referenda as early as 1910 
under the assumption, it would seem, that the electorate could not fail to come to 
its senses, if forced to reconsider controversial legislation. 
83 SUA Western Divisional Council, 10/10/1917, (Acc. 10424/28). The Metropolitan Division of the NUA 
offered its approval of the extension of the male franchise only on the basis that it be accompanied by 
second chamber reform, NUEC, 08/05/1917. 
84 NUEC, 17/04/1917. 
21'1 
Revealingly, the 1917 party conference witnessed a contentious debate over the 
exacting of a pledge from the government to initiate second chamber 
reconstruction before the passage of the Representation of the People Bill. The 
starting point was a resolution moved by the chairman (Harry Samuel), on behalf 
of the NUEC, pressing the party leaders to realise that, in view of the probable 
early passage of the reform bill, `it [was] essential that the Government should 
give effect to the preamble of the Parliament Act by establishing a reformed 
Second Chamber possessed of adequate powers immediately on the Report of the 
present House of Lords Conference being received. ' Chaplin felt that the 
resolution did not `go far enough', and that the Second Chamber should be 
reformed in advance of the passage of the reform bill. His reasoning was the 
estimated strength of the Labour Party after the passage of the franchise bill, 
which would have the support of a majority of voters throughout the whole 
country, and the ease with which the honest working classes would be misled by 
`the extreme sections' of the Labour Party. 85 In seconding the amendment, 
Selborne pointed to the present case of `concealed single chamber government' 
and to the failure of the Commons over the franchise bill, which threatened to 
swamp agriculture. 86 
Opinion at the conference was split, a majority demanding a pledge to enforce 
second chamber reconstruction, with one representative emphasising that it was 
necessary for the security of the Empire `that a safety valve [was] put on to the 
boiler before the temperature goes up'. Halford Mackinder MP felt that nothing 
could be lost by exacting a pledge, as it would merely grant Law more leverage. 
Harry Foster MP reassured Selborne and Chaplin that the Lords would `have the 
85 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
86 Selborne's contribution was unsurprising considering that he devoted much of his political attention to 
the House of Lords ever since his promising Commons career was brought to close by his inheritance of 
the family earldom. 
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support of this Conference in the action they [hoped] to take'. The most decisive 
intervention, nonetheless, was that of the Party Chairman Younger who 
professed to disagree with Selborne `almost entirely', in that the reform bill was 
so advanced as to make such a pledge an absurdity. Significantly, the conference 
was persuaded against demanding a pledge in the face of Younger's intervention 
and support from the government minister Worthington Evans, who pointed out 
that the Lords would `be represented to the country as refusing to allow soldiers 
and sailors to have a vote, until something else happens. That something else ... 
is not within our power. ' 
Why was reconstruction of the second chamber abandoned so timidly? The most 
plausible explanation is that there was a widespread appreciation of the pervasive 
intransigence within the Unionist leadership over this issue. As Godfrey Locker- 
Lampson (Under Secretary at the Home Office) claimed, it `was a sanguine man' 
who demanded a pledge from Law concerning second chamber reform. 87 In July 
1917, both former and sitting party chairmen (Steel-Maitland and Younger) 
colluded to steer the NUA Council away from a party conference on House of 
Lords reform, in the knowledge that their leader would refuse to attend. 88 This 
factor was compounded by a more tangible disinclination against repeating the 
clash between the two houses of parliament. For, in the House of Lords, the spirit 
of the pre-war era lived on. Selborne demanded specifically that the second 
chamber's authority should be extended beyond powers of revision `in respect of 
social, political and economic changes which are introduced under the disguise 
of finance'. The overt reference here was to the 1909 budget that had fired up 
scepticism regarding the integrity of the House of Lords, as in the language of the 
1911 diehards. Lord Northumberland, in a letter to Lord Halsbury, asked whether 
87 Godfrey Locker-Lampson to Cave, 23/04/1917. Cave Papers, MS Add. 62496, ff. 120-1. 88 NUA Council, 10/07/1917. Note between Steel-Maitland and George Younger, 10/07/1917. SM 
GD/193/390/13. 
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franchise reform was to be accepted as inevitable `or are we to make one last 
fight for what is left of the British Constitution? '89 Suspicions were rife (and 
rightly so) that the House of Commons was being as protective of its own 
position now as the peers had been jealous of theirs in 1911 
90 
A third contributing factor to the defeat of second chamber reform was the 
disparate notions of how best to effect its reform. In January 1914, Robert Cecil 
had acknowledged that `beyond a unanimous conviction that the present House 
will not do there is no agreement in the Party on the subject'. Some, he claimed, 
were for a purely elective chamber, others for secondary election, a few for 
nomination, and adherents of the hereditary principle numerable. The issue, 
however, could not be left over if the Unionist Party got into power 
91 Such 
, 
diversity - even confusion - continued to reign within the party. On taking up a 
position on the conference considering the 'reform, Austen Chamberlain reported 
that while he was `afraid of being too Radical for my party or friends', Talbot 
had assured him that this was "`impossible - they all seem to have given up the 
hereditary principle"' 92 For Selborne, the danger of revolutionary change being 
initiated by temporary majorities encouraged him to recommend a directly 
elected chamber and one endowed with the prerogative of referendum, 
commenting `I do not believe that a nominated Chamber of Max Aitkens 
(experience shows that they are always composed of party hacks) could be more 
trusted to do its job than the present House of Lords. '93 Hugh Cecil, too, 
requested that the House of Lords become non-partisan, be appointed equally by 
leaders of the majority and minority in the Commons, and that its basis not be 
89 Northumberland to Halsbury, 30/03/1917. Halsbury Papers, MS. Add. 56375, f. 181. 
90 Strachey to Lansdowne, 16/10/1917. Lansdowne Papers, Alphabetical Correspondence. 
91 Memorandum by Robert Cecil, January 1914. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51075B, ff. 46-8. 
92 Austen Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, 20/10/1917. Robert Self (ed. ), The Austen Chamberlain Diary 
Letters, 1916-37 (Royal Historical Society, London, 1995), p. 56. 
93 Selborne to Salisbury, 12/04/1917. Salisbury Papers (4)79/111-17 
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`party' 94 The only common ground Wolmer could find with Selborne and Cecil 
was the non-partisan nature of the chamber, but he suggested nominees selected 
by parishes and voted in by PR. 
95 That a group of like-minded peers (trustees of 
the great Hotel Cecil, no less) could come to no agreed solution spoke volumes 
for the party's dissonant voices in this area. In fact, it represented a climate in 
which requests for second chamber `reform' were - if only because the 
alternatives were so palpably deficient - in substance demands for 
`reconstruction' of its powers. 
One considerable upshot of the treatment meted out to second chamber reform 
was its impact on post-war politics. Even in 1924, the Unionist MP and historian 
J. A. R. Marriott was lamenting that `no student of political institutions [could] 
regard the present condition of the Legislative Body in England without grave 
concern. '96 Perhaps more than in any other area, second chamber reform 
reflected the command of the Unionist leaders over the party rank and file and 
the dominance of Lloyd George over his Unionist Cabinet colleagues. 
Accordingly, the post-war party discord fostered by Selborne emanated at least 
partly from the refusal of the Unionist leadership to press the topic on the Prime 
Minister properly during the war. Meanwhile, by refusing to countenance such 
reform, Lloyd George was perceived as distracting the Unionist Party from its 
central constitutional principles, the more so in the light of increased syndicalism 
and coalition by-election defeats. As one resolution remarked (of many passed in 
94 Memorandum on House of Lords reform by Hugh Cecil, n. d. [October 1917]. Salisbury Papers, 
(4)80/167b 
95 `A New Second Chamber', by Wolmer, n. d. [1917]. Wolmer Papers, c. 1010, ff. 84-6. 
96 J. A. R. Marriott, The Constitution in Transition, 1910-1924 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924), p. 17. For 
House of Lords reform in the post-war era see, Neal McCrillis, `Taming Democracy? The Conservative 
Party and House of Lords' Reform, 1916-29', Parliamentary History, xii (1993), pp. 260-1. 
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local associations), any delay in the implementation of second chamber reform 
would result in `unjustifiable risk'. 97 
Some broader conclusions can also be made. First, that it was likely far easier for 
the Unionist Party to approach the controversial issue of franchise reform in war 
than peace. The sheer diversity of opinion, as described above, left the party open 
to the most intense disputes, of benefit neither to the internal dynamic nor to the 
public image of the party. Yet in the years 1917-18, patriotism and the war effort 
tempered infighting. Second, as in the emergence of a Unionist commitment to 
the service franchise, the rejection of PR revealed a party confident in its long- 
term electoral capacity and ready to ignore opportunities to hedge. Third, and 
most fundamental for understandings of the party approach to class and 
democracy, was the concentration upon safeguards within the democratic 
electoral system (plural voting, women's enfranchisement, redistribution) rather 
than outside it (House of Lords reform). This was in sharp contrast to the resorts 
to traditional conservatism in. 1911. As illustrated below, this confidence 
displayed in the democratic system had considerable gains. Thus, when any 
Unionist rewards in the interwar period are attributed to the reforms of 1917-18, 
this belief must be remembered. This reflected, moreover, a Unionist 
commitment to coping with democracy through restraints placed inside the 
structure and, therefore, also a commitment to dealing with the mass electorate as 
best they could. 
97 A resolution proposed by Ernest Pretyman to Unionist in Essex, Chelmsford UA, EC, 25/02/1919, 
(D/Z/96/1). Attention was paid to constitutional reform in many constituencies, including Oxfordshire 
South (19/06/1920), Oxford Conservative Club (05/03/1921), Norwood (01/10/1920,18/03/1921), 
Chelmsford (25/02/1921), Bradford (16/03/1921), Oxfordshire North (22/06/1920), Monmouthshire 
(15/04/1921). 
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Redistribution 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the redistribution of seats has not been accorded 
the same historical attention as has been devoted to the male and female 
franchise. The latter both play a significant part, among other things, in 
understanding the development of long-term electoral patterns, democracy per se 
and the evolution of class-based politics. Moreover, the intricate detail of 
discussions prior to petitions, the petitions themselves, and the considerations of 
the Boundary Commissioners, left the vast majority of contemporaries - as it 
leaves many historians - overwhelmed (and probably underwhelmed too). In 
some degree, the approach here reveals the complications in approaching the 
subject. It is impossible to catalogue every campaign, or indeed every subtle 
nuance of a single one. In several instances individual case studies will have to 
illustrate general trends, where possible a broader brush can be employed. This 
section will seek to understand how and why Unionists became interested in the 
scheme, how their views were promoted, what this suggested about their attitudes 
to class and electoral politics. Finally, it will investigate the effect of 
redistribution upon the party's fortunes. 
So often for the Conservative Party the sugar drink taken with the sour pill of 
franchise reform, redistribution has been acknowledged as providing the party 
with a lifeline to the future. Michael Kinnear's analysis, that placed the number 
of seats gained by the Conservative Party by redistribution at thirty-four, has 
received backing from both John Ramsden and Chris Cook. 98 The party 
possessed a long history of successful manipulation of the reform process, dating 
back to Disraeli in 1867-8 and Salisbury in 1884-5. In more recent times, too, 
98 Michael Kinnear, The British Voter: An Atlas and Survey Since 1885 (Cornell University Press, New 
York, 1968), pp. 70-2; Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment: Electoral Politics in Britain, 1922-29 
(University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1975), p. 4; Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 122-3. 
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redistribution had received considerable attention. Irish over-representation had 
become a common gripe amongst Unionist politicians by the Edwardian period, 
with Gleanings and Memoranda pointing to the electoral anomalies that 
maintained the Radical party in power 99 In 1913, Clive Morrison-Bell MP, the' 
Unionist in-house expert on redistribution, argued that England should be 
properly represented: `had anybody ever considered where the Conservatives got 
their strength from? It was not from Ireland, Wales or Scotland. England was the 
only place that kept the Union alive and was going to beat Home Rule. ' 100 It 
should not be hard, he informed a colleague, to earn the support of an audience, 
`if you say you are only asking that 10% of the population should have 10% of 
the members'. lol Interestingly, Morrison-Bell's pamphlet Irish Electoral Model 
was considered powerful enough as a propaganda tool to be disseminated to 
Unionists in Cheshire by the provincial division. 102 The December 1910 results 
demonstrates why this was hardly unexpected, for, when southern Ireland was 
excluded from the calculations, the Unionist Party won 47.3% of the vote and 
48.2% of the seats. In the same election, the Irish Nationalists (against whom the 
campaign was directed) received 2.5% of the vote and a staggering 12.5% of the 
parliamentary seats, which held the balance of power in the Commons. 103 As was 
mooted by one cartoon in a party journal, it was the Irish voter who was `the 
REAL plural voter'. 104 
As in the reform of franchise and electoral systems, sectional interests played 
their part, in this case geographic. Political activists, of whatever shade, were ill- 
disposed to the forfeiture of their parliamentary representation. The gathering of 
99 National Union Gleanings, February 1911, pp. 162-3 
loo NUA Conference, November 1913. Resolution 23. 
'o' Clive Morrison-Bell to Ernest Pollock, 1912. Hanworth Papers, c942, ff. 18-19. 
102 Cheshire Provincial Division, Agents meeting, 10/02/1914,04/04/1914. 
103 Figures taken from Kinnear, The British Voter, p. 70. 
104 See cartoon below. 
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Unionist chairmen, agents, candidates and MPs to discuss the issue sought to 
thwart this particularly individual preoccupation. This endeavour was in most 
cases the offspring of a Central Office campaign to garner the opinions of 
Unionist agents around the country with the purpose of ensuring agreement 
within the party, though it is evident that rank and file organisers required little 
encouragement. In part because expert local knowledge was required to provide 
for a credible proposal, but also probably because the vast majority of the party 
hierarchy felt there were bigger fish to fry, the rank and file were capable of 
sponsoring their own programmes and cajoling their parliamentary 
representatives into action. As such redistribution was the child of the party 
organiser and therefore signified one area in which the weakness of the Unionist 
rank and file in regard to their parliamentary representatives, and their party 
leaders, was to some extent inverted. In certain cases local associations were 
sufficiently independent to reject Central Office plans for redistribution. 
'05 
It is evident that local Unionists were on their toes with regard to redistribution 
for across the country they launched themselves into the fray with alacrity. In 
Lancashire, agents from Accrington, Burnley and Clitheroe assembled to 
formulate redistribution proposals before meeting representatives of the local 
Liberal and Labour parties. 106 Similar meetings were convened in Berkshire, 
Cheshire, central London, Herefordshire and Worcestershire, which allowed for 
agreement to be reached before other interested bodies were approached. 107 It 
was, therefore, only in Yorkshire that fears were expressed concerning the prior 
organisation of rival parties in regard to redistribution, when in Unionist circles 
105 Darwen UA, EC, 09/05/1917, (PLC/2/2/1). 
106 Clitheroe UA, EC, 31/05/1917, (DDX/800/1/1) 
107 J . E. Smith (Honorary Secretary of Westminster UA) to Boraston, 06/06/1917, (487/17). Herefordshire North UA, Finance and Advisory Committee, 15/06/1917, (K78/2); Newbury UA, EC, 07/06/1917, 
(JAR). 
219 
`the movement had been very slow in places'. 108 The effect of such organisation 
is debatable. In Barkston Ash, members had been urged to watch developments 
regarding the Boundary Commissioners closely even before parliament had 
considered the Representation of the People Bill, let alone given consideration to 
redistribution specifically. Such was their local expertise and confidence that 
they scotched the scheme proposed by Central Office in favour of their own. 
Their efforts to modify the Commissioners' scheme so as to keep the division 
agricultural in character nevertheless failed. 109 This seems to have been an 
isolated incident, as it is evident elsewhere that such exertions reaped rewards. In 
Cheshire for instance, Alan Sykes MP told a meeting of agents and chairmen that 
it was mandatory for success that they worked as a team. The result was, that, 
although a severe divergence of opinion emerged in their private assembly, 
Unionists here were capable of tendering a petition with one accord to the 
Boundary Commissioners. 110 
The outcome of the Boundary Commissioners' work exemplifies the extent to 
which agriculture emerged as a beneficiary. While the number of English county 
seats rose by just one, the average population figures display the comparative 
over-representation that rural areas received under the new system. In county 
seats, the average population was slashed from 77,708 to 68,287 (England), 
75,608 to 71,604 (Scotland) and 68,807 to 67,015 (Wales). Meanwhile, the 
average population of borough seats rose from 69,780 to 73,456 for England 
(including London), 63,013 to 73,177 for Scotland and 62,925 to 71,394 for 
iOS Yorkshire Area, EC, 05/04/1918, (JAR). 
109 Barkston Ash UA, EC, 06/02/1917,04/06/1917,05/02/1918, (JAR) 
110 Cheshire Provincial Division, EC, 11/06/1917. No representative had been present from Hyde 
Division. 
220 
Wales! " For English county seats, this represented a percentage decrease in 
population of almost 9%. 
It is important to note that other factors beyond Unionist rank and file 
organisation played their part. First, while from the nature of the initial moves it 
is evident that the parliamentary party was not united in its intentions towards 
redistribution, Unionists did combine behind the schemes for agricultural 
representation. The arrival of the bill dealing with the instructions to be given to 
the boundary commissioners suggested that Unionist ministers were unconcerned 
with their terms of reference. It was left in the capable hands of Long to 
mastermind a mini-coup in order to ensure that the commissioners considered 
area as well as population. While an amendment by Sanders to this end was 
overturned, Cave accepted another, in even more vague terms, proposed by John 
Mason. 112 The basis of this move was again the NUA, which felt that a standard 
unit of 70,000 population for each member would `seriously affect agricultural 
areas'. This committee also placed on record Lloyd George's statement of 
23 February 1917, which admitted that the nation `showed a lamentable 
indifference to the importance of the agricultural industry and to the very life of 
the nation, and that is a mistake which must never be repeated' . 
113 A resolution 
passed by Unionist agents was thus consistent in recounting agriculture `as the 
main artery of our National life', and subsequently demanding that the reform 
bill be amended accordingly. "4 
No doubt in government and parliament the party was favoured by having friends 
in high places, namely Cave and Long who both were sympathetic to the 
111 Figures developed from Report of the Boundary Commissioners [1917, Cd. 8756]. 
112 Sanders diary, 10/06/1917,15/06/1917. Sanders introduced the idea of a population differential 
between agricultural and borough seats (60,000 for the former, 80,000 for the latter). Ramsden, Tory 
pp. 86-7. House of Commons Debates, 22/05/1917. Hansard, 5`h Series, xciii, 2144-55. 
113 NUA Sub-Committee on Electoral Reform, 24/02/1917. 
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agricultural (and Unionist) cause. Convincing others was a different tale. 
Nonetheless, the utilisation of the words of Lloyd George by the NUA in its 
argument, and the Punch cartoon `Self-Protection', reflected well the 
convergence of Unionist policy, national opinion and government attitudes 
towards agriculture. This was something employed to the full in public 
discussion. The Somerset MP and Central Office official, Sanders, also drew on 
Lloyd George's expressions: `agriculture is really the Cinderella of our 
industries. It is quite true at the present you are down on your knees to 
agriculture', and yet it did not have its rightful influence. Similar to the 
arguments put forward in standing against the Corn Production Bill, agriculture 
was represented in neither the Cabinet nor parliamentary committees. Its 
treatment `as a poor sister' meant it would lose twenty to forty seats. And this 
would be especially mistaken as the expansion of ploughed land would result in 
emigration to the countryside! 15 The element of sentiment should not be ignored 
either: the fluidity of wartime politics and the universal desire to build a better 
Britain on sounder foundations made such an appeal persuasive. 
As such the Unionist Party was greatly favoured by the timing of redistribution. 
The submarine menace that had forced Britain to depend increasingly upon its 
own food resources had, by 1917, ushered in a new respect for the nation's 
agricultural industry (as indeed it had done also for women). This was 
substantiated legislatively in the corn bill of 1917 that offered farmers a 
guaranteed price for their wheat in return for the ploughing up of land previously 
lying fallow. It was also evinced in the comparative protection of the agricultural 
industry from conscription, with guarantees being sought and gained that labour 
114 National Society of Conservative Agents, Council, 23/05/1917. 
115 House of Commons Debates, 22/05/1917. Ilansard, 5`h Series, xciii, 2144-55. For the Corn Production 
Bill, see Chapter V. 
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would not be appropriated for military purposes. 116 Generally, this transformation 
of sentiment allowed for Unionists to argue with much greater legitimacy of the 
necessity for proper parliamentary representation of agriculture. It also permitted 
Unionists to forecast the enlargement of rural populations under schemes to 
increase harvests and resettle ex-soldiers on the land, an urban diaspora that 
would never actually materialise. 117 
It is manifest as well that this prevailing sensitiveness towards the agricultural 
industry led to various other interest groups advocating its position. Such was the 
case in Cheshire where local municipal bodies sponsored the scheme enunciated 
by Sykes on behalf of the Unionist Party. In language redolent of Unionist 
petitioners, Colonel Dixon, delegate for Cheshire County Council, argued that 
`agriculture was now more to the front than ever and it was necessary for 
agriculture to be properly represented by people who understood agriculture'. 118 
In fact, the Unionist scheme - whose `chief object was to segregate the rural and 
industrial areas', as the representative of Eddisbury Conservative Association 
claimed - was supported by the county council root and branch. Meanwhile, the 
Chairman of Knutsford District Council supported the scheme not `from a 
political point of view, but as citizens of the Empire'. The significance of such 
backing was a near unanimity that practically compelled the Boundary 
Commissioners to support Sykes' scheme. 119 
The links between the party and rural constituencies continued to run deep, for 
instance Lawrence Tipper served both as Chairman of Worcestershire 
116 Herefordshire North UA, Finance and Advisory Committee, 22/09/1917 (K78/2); Chelmsford UA, 
EC, 16/03/1917, (D/Z/96/1). 
117 Chaplin to Matthews, 01/01/1918 (copy). Chaplin Papers, D/3099/1/J/39. 
"' Stockport Advertiser, 03/08/1917. 
119 Ibid., 03/08/1917. See also the resemblance between the boundaries in the map drawn up by Sykes 
(Cheshire Provincial Division, Report of Meeting of Unionist Chairmen and Agents, July 1917) and that 
of the Boundary Commissioners in their report (cited above). 
223 
Agricultural Society and as a leading local Unionist. 120 The Conservative elder 
Chaplin, for long the Chairman of the (national) Chamber of Agriculture, worked 
alongside its secretary Matthews in petitioning MPs in favour of agricultural 
seats. 121 Crucially, the NUA believed that while 30% would be added to the male 
electorate in urban areas, in the counties this would be only 20%. As, in their 
minds, the number of new voters hostile to the party would be six against four, 
the party would therefore be less adversely affected in rural than in urban 
areas. 122 
The strengthening of the representation of agriculture fitted into a wider 
appreciation of the electorate at which Unionists wanted to aim. Central Office 
policy was `that areas which were mostly Tory were not [to be] included with 
areas that were overwhelmingly Radical, so that the Tories would be swamped'. 
As a result Unionists sought to shoehorn industrial areas into Radical/Labour 
strongholds. Cornish Unionists, for example, requested that the districts 
dominated by the clay and mining industries be amalgamated into one division. 
The reasons for this were enunciated after the Boundary Commissioners had 
reported, with the agent lamenting that `the true representative character of the 
constituencies would be weakened by the unnatural merging of agriculture and 
mining industries in the same constituencies, and Labour was robbed of its 
undoubted right to have one constituency area which would have included the 
whole of the tin mining and clay industry of the county. ' More pertinently of 
course, Unionists had been robbed of their indefeasible right to a rural division 
untainted by mining and clay industry interests. No doubt, the overwhelming 
reflection was that it would be better to create one stronghold of socialism than 
have several divisions vulnerable to its influence. 
120 Norris Foster to Steel-Maitland, 08/08/1917. SM GD/193/17512/1/105. 
121 Matthews to Chaplin, 09/06/1917. Chaplin Papers, D/3099/1/J/37. 
122 NUA Sub-Committee on Electoral Reform, 20/02/1917. 
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A similar sentiment held sway in Cheshire, where the basis was that they should 
`find out the Tory strongholds, and the parts which they would not mind parting 
with, so as to get the Radicals into one fold and keep them there'. The agent for 
Eddisbury, in seeking to extend his division to the required size, professed that 
`they could not go Northwich way, as they must keep the Radicals in one dump'. 
Sykes, the architect of the Cheshire scheme, thought likewise, contending that 
`the salt towns were all Radical and they must be kept together, and that it was 
obvious they would have to sacrifice the Northwich Division, and possibly 
Crewe would not come out too good. ' Meanwhile, the increasingly industrial 
area of Sandbach was to be consigned to the manufacturing town of 
Macclesfield, which in any case would `be no worse off' than previously. 123 in 
Kent, strong opposition was put forward against the Liberal scheme of an 
industrial division to include Maidstone and the Medway towns, because it was 
feared that this would hand a seat directly to the opponents. 124 
Notwithstanding the successes set out above, some areas felt short-changed. The 
Glasgow Herald claimed that, although `the importance of home food production 
to the life of the nation' had been displayed by the war, the opportunity to 
represent agriculture adequately had `been allowed to slip'. The situation was 
especially grave in Ayrshire, where the Boundary Commissioners had `allowed 
the great industrial community of Kilmarnock to dominate and control the county 
division of which it is to form a part, although hitherto it has been the leading 
member of a group of burghs separate from the county'. Likewise, the inclusion 
of Port Glasgow and Renfrew into the Renfrewshire County division was 
123 Cheshire Provincial Council, 05/05/1917,24/10/1917; Memorandum of Meeting of Cheshire Unionist 
Chairmen and Agents, June 1917. 
124 Maidstone UA, Special EC, 13/07/1917, (A11113). 
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lamented, because the area had thus `been transformed to a great extent into a 
workshop'. 125 But these Scottish areas were the exception. 
A second area of gain, in addition to agricultural seats, was in the proliferation of 
suburban seats. The most extreme example was in Wandsworth. This area of 
south London had witnessed a considerable increase in population in the late 
Victorian and Edwardian years. 126 Previously having one seat, it was granted five 
under the redistribution: all were middle-class seats, 127 and in the interwar period 
all five returned Conservative members at general elections, except on only one 
occasion in Wandsworth Central. Moreover, the populations of the five seats 
were considerably less than the average for English Borough seats. 128 Most 
especially in suburban London and the Home Counties, this trend was extended: 
Lewisham, Hammersmith and Fulham received 6 rather than 3 MPs; Kent, 
Surrey, Essex and Middlesex 40 rather than 15.129 Notwithstanding research that 
has demonstrated that suburban seats were not necessarily Unionist/Conservative 
by nature, they remained bastions of Conservatism in this period and in the 1920s 
and 1930s. '3° 
There were parallel gains in class-based seats for the Labour Party (a `substantial 
increase' in mining-dominated seats - up from forty-four to sixty-six), 131 but not 
for the Liberal Party. Equally, it is easy to ignore the spheres in which the 
Unionist Party fell short of making any gains. They failed singularly to achieve a 
proper rearrangement of seats in Ireland, on which so much store had been set. 
125 Glasgow Herald, 06/10/1917. Editorial. 
126 Henry Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections, 1885-1910 (Macmillan, London, 1967), p. 28. 
127 This is going by the classification of Turner, British Politics, p. 472, explained pp. 452-4. 
128 Report of the Boundary Commissioners. 
129 Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 123. 
130 Franz Coetzee, `Villa Toryism Reconsidered: Conservatism and Suburban Sensibilities in Late- 
Victorian Croydon', Parliamentary History, xvi (1997), pp. 29-47; J. P. Comford, `The Transformation of 
Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century', Victorian Studies, vii (1963), pp. 35-66. 
131 Duncan Tanner, `Class Voting and Radical Politics: the Liberal and Labour Parties, 1910-31' in 
Lawrence, Party, State and Society, p. 115. 
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Indeed the overwhelming response within the party to the Conference's 
proposals had been that Ireland must be included in any legislation. For instance, 
objections to a resolution of support for the Speaker's Report had been palliated 
in the Western Divisional Council of Scotland only by a promise by the chairman 
that a day of debate would be devoted to the question of its applicability to 
Ireland. 132 In both the immediate post-war years and, more appreciably, in the 
longer term this was to be of little consequence however: Sinn Fein's 
overwhelming success at the ballot box was not matched by a powerful phalanx 
in Westminster because their representatives refused to endorse the United 
Kingdom parliament through their attendance. 133 What was more, the 
constitutional resolution of the Irish problem (through the Government of Ireland 
Act 1920) permanently removed Irish representatives at Westminster from 
outside six counties of Northern Ireland. 134 Therefore, as Ramsden has noted, the 
balance of power at Westminster enjoyed by the Irish Nationalist Party before the 
war was removed and with it went seventy to eighty anti-Unionist seats. 135 In 
fact, of the twelve seats left in Ireland, at least ten were always Unionist, whilst 
the Irish Nationalists who won the other two only rarely actually took up their 
136 seats. 
Redistribution, the most unsung of the political developments during the war, 
consequently had a substantial impact upon interwar electoral results. The most 
noteworthy reason for giving the matter only fleeting attention - that it 
represented no wider trends but merely the arbitrary decisions of local bodies and 
132 SUA Western Divisional Council, 28/02/1917, (Acc. 10424/28). For rank and file opinion see also 
Somerset Division of NUA, AGM, 02/02/1917, (Are/11/6/1); Berkshire South UA, EC, 22/02/1917, 
(JAR); Cornwall Provincial Division, AGM 01/03/1917, (Are/11/7/1); Sheffield Central, Special 
Meeting, 20/02/1917, (LD/2103). 
133 D. G. Boyce, `Northern Ireland: The Origins of the State' in Peter Caterall & Sean McDougall, The 
Northern Ireland Question in British Politics (Macmillan, London, 1996), p. 19. 
134 D. G. Boyce, The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868-1986 (Macmillan, London, 1988), p. 60. 135 Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 122-3. 
136 McKibbin, `Class and Conventional Wisdom' in Idem., Ideologies of Class, p. 263. 
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nameless commissioners - has been refuted here. For the representation that 
agriculture was to receive was a direct result of wartime politics, of the nation 
`bowing' to this ancient industry. Rarely before or after can it have been so feted. 
Redistribution may have possessed another less quantifiable significance, namely 
that by shaping the character of constituencies to which Unionists had to (and, in 
many cases, wished to) appeal, it also determined, in some degree at least, the 
nature of the interwar party and its appeal. Accordingly, the agricultural and 
middle-class integrity of a core of seats partly shaped the parameters within 
which Unionism would have to advance. 
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IT'S TIME I PUT SOMETHING 
INTO MY O` N 
'Self-Protection 
Pºººich 2 May 1917 
;O 
lit, 
The Party Machinery 
As has been seen in Chapters I and II, the war did much to stifle political debate 
within the party organisation and in so doing it also constrained the capability of 
the machinery upon which the party relied, most especially with regard to 
finance, grassroots activism, and official constituency appointments. The most 
palpable goal of the party generals was to inspire their foot-soldiers to prevent 
total organisational atrophy; the next purpose - and frequently it was merely a 
means by which to reach the first - was to encourage it to be primed for a general 
election. On both of these counts the Liberal Party failed miserably, the ruptures 
of provincial Liberal organisations wrought by inner-party divisions certainly 
being made less manageable by wartime lethargy. 137 
The most obvious injury inflicted by war on local party organisations was that of 
finance. As such, the Guildford Unionist Association was told in mid-1917 that 
`subscriptions were not at all on the same scale as previously', and an 
extraordinary circular was sent out in an attempt to rectify the problem. 138 In 
North-West Wiltshire, meanwhile, income was reduced by a third during the 
war. 139 One major contributing factor was the reluctance of party subscribers to 
continue their payments through a cataclysmic war and a political truce. 140 When 
individuals wished to make donations they were, not unnaturally, more inclined 
to bolster the coffers of the Exchequer through war savings than their local 
political organisations. This tendency was exacerbated by the inability of the 
137 See Keith Dugdale, `Conservatives, Liberals and Labour in Yorkshire, 1918-29', Sheffield University, 
M. Phil. (1976), pp. 56-7; Turner, British Politics, pp. 374-80,406-7; Edward David, `The Liberal Party 
divided 1916-18', Historical Journal, xiii (1970), pp. 512-13. Also see the 1918 Unionist gains made in 
areas where Liberal machinery withered, Michael Hart, `The Liberals, the War and the Franchise', 
English Historical Review, viiic (1982), pp. 820-32. 
138 Guildford UA, Finance Committee, 19/05/1917, (1213/2/2). 
139 Wiltshire North West UA, AGM, 30/04/1920, (2436/1). 
140 South Ealing UA, General Council, 25108/1916, (Acc. 1338/1) 
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reduced wartime organisation to pursue smaller subscriptions as actively as 
previously. 141 
Nonetheless, local organisations were able to remain solvent for several diverse 
reasons. Crucially, the political truce and coalition sanctioned reduced 
expenditure. Aside of salaries the most considerable outlay for local associations 
before the war had been on printing literature and convening meetings. During 
the war, whilst recruiting methods demanded that expenditure on the latter 
continued unabated (at least until the advent of conscription), little was spent on 
publications. 142 Moreover, in many cases, money was conserved through 
diminished payments to salaried staff - as many as 149 constituency agents were 
on active service at some stage during the war. 143 So great, indeed, were the 
savings through reduced wartime expenditure that, even in divisions in which 
subscriptions decreased, possibilities arose to increase the association's 
balance. ' Conversely, financial determinants also dictated that in more parlous 
cases drastic measures had to be executed: in Palmers Green no annual general 
meeting was held in 1918 due to its likely expense; after the resignation of its 
secretary, North Norfolk resolved not to replace him, `owing to the large number 
of subscriptions which had been withdrawn since the commencement of the war'; 
Reigate Unionist Association dispensed wholesale with the services of its 
agent. 145 The financial stability of the constituencies was decided also by the 
141 Herefordshire North UA, Finance and Advisory Committee, 16/06/1916, (K78/2); Devizes UA, 
Finance Committee, 31/12/1914, (2305/1). 
'a2 See accounts for Worcestershire West UA, 16/05/1914,16/05/1915 and 26/08/1916, which 
demonstrate that once recruiting for volunteers had subsided, expenditure on meetings did the same. 
(956/6). 
143 For instance, in January 1916 the Glasgow divisions lessened the remuneration for their organising 
secretaries. See Glasgow UA, Joint EC report, n. d. [1920? ], (Acc. 10424/10 (I)). NUA, The 
Constitutional Year Book for 1919 (London, 1919), pp. 496-500. 
144 Oxfordshire North UA, Finance and Executive Committee, 23/05/1917. In Lincoln, a pre-war deficit 
of £280 (increased to £353 in mid-1915) was reduced to £16 by 1919, UA, Finance Committee, 
02/06/1915, AGM, 14/03/1919, (JAR). 
145 Palmers Green UA, EC, 18/04/1918, (Acc. 1158/2); Norfolk North UA, Finance Committee, 
24/11/1917, (UPC/243/643/x3); Reigate UA, Finance Sub-Committee, 19/10/1915, (353/3/2/1). 
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generosity of contributions made by candidates and MPs, who provided £200 to 
£250 per annum in most cases. In Burton-on-Trent, Captain Ratcliff MP was 
understood to contribute almost the entire income of the local association. It was 
rare, though not unheard of, for the war to witness reductions in these 
contributions. What is more, when contributions of MPs or candidates did 
decline (for instance Captain Jackson reduced his subscription to Herefordshire 
North by half, from £100 to £50, in March 1917) they remained the easiest 
components to increase after the war. 146 
As Ramsden has noted, however, an outwardly attractive financial standing often 
actually `concealed a real weakness' in that, while expenditure could be reduced 
with ease during the war, income could only be revived by years of patient 
activity. 147 Neither was the problem in this regard one merely of economics. The 
dispositions of subscribers, along with reduced financial and administrative 
capacity, tended to result in the neglect of smaller subscribers, in favour of more 
certain and more substantial sources. The St Paul's Ward of Blackburn Unionist 
Association provided a good case in point. While its finances showed a 
noticeable improvement in stability in the years 1911-1913, the first two years of 
war witnessed a marked decline in income, and importantly, an even more 
striking reduction in the number of donors. Income dropped from £13-1-6 
(1913), to £9-14-6 (1914) and then £4-2-3 (1915). More especially, from 1913 to 
1915, the number contributing more than one shilling fell from 51 to 32, whilst 
the number contributing less than one shilling plummeted from 329 to 67.148 
Thus, much hard work in building up connections with the electorate - in this 
case mainly small shopkeepers and skilled artisans - wasted away. This was the 
146 Midland Union Constituency Notebook, 1903-1918, (Are/MU/29/3). 
147 Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 124. 
148 Figures developed from Register of Members and Subscriptions, Blackburn UA, St Paul's Ward, 
1906-1915, (DDX/1371/1). 
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situation elsewhere as well. In Hampstead, membership declined from 794 
(1914) to 659 (1916) and 569 (1918), whilst the subscription list fell off from 459 
(1914), to 287 (1916) and 224 (1918). 149 With this went a decline in activism as, 
once strayed, many returned only with lethargy, if at all. In Nottingham 
Rushcliffe the subscription list fell off from a high-water mark of 121 in 
1912-13, to a low of 66 (1918-19) and two years of peace only returned it to 
78150 Subscriptions in York were, in 1918, a third of their pre-war level and were 
151 not to recover until 1924. 
This diminished activism and capacity was offset, to a degree, by war work. 
Various recruiting agencies (both for soldiers and money) proved hard 
taskmasters for local associations, to the extent that one agent felt the pressure to 
be `ten times as bad as an Election campaign'. 152 A leading provincial Unionist, 
meanwhile, went as far as to remark that the demands of recruiting and war 
savings' committees made him feel as if `the past three years [had] been rather 
like a continuous election'. 153 It seems that Derby had been taken at his word in 
stipulating to the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee that recruiting canvasses 
were to be `instituted and worked with the intensity of a General Election'. 154 
Notwithstanding these pronouncements, it is evident that both the war and the 
political truce diminished rank and file activism. Even hardcore activists such as 
Colonel Berrington (later Chairman of Bewdley Unionist Association) felt that 
whilst he would support his Member Baldwin he could not accept the 
chairmanship of a polling ward: `I do not propose to take any part in politics till 
after we have won the War as I consider every united and individual interest 
149 Hampstead UA, Annual Reports, (JAR). 
'50 Rushcliffe UA, Account Book, 1909-21, (JAR). 
151 York UA, Ledger Book, 1910-38, (JAR). 
152 J. Buck to Lloyd, 22/11/1915. Lloyd Papers, 18/3. 
153 Woodhouse to Derby, 14/12/1916. Derby Papers 16/11. 
154 PRC minutes, 11/10/1915. MS Add. 54192B. 
234 
should be concentrated on this the all important object. ' 
Iss The Primrose League 
limited its activities to patriotic assistance, the Junior Imperial League wound 
down entirely. 156 Elsewhere, the political truce was cited as provoking a general 
lack of interest in party politics and, thus, a retardant effect upon activities. 
157 In 
addition to a peculiarly apathetic and extended electorate, this must account for 
the failure of Unionists in many districts to perform full canvasses in the general 
election of 1918. Eleven days before polling started, Yorkshire Unionists had 
made `no great progress' in this regard and difficulties were also experienced in 
the east midlands, Home Counties and north London. 158 
It is important not to overemphasise the war's impact upon Unionist 
organisation. A constituency notebook kept current from 1911 to 1918 by the 
Midland Union provides details of activity persisting during the war in its thirty- 
three constituencies. The most remarkable detail relates to the personal contact 
between Central Office and the constituencies through personal visits of area 
agents. In this area, four hundred and fifty-seven visits were made between 
August 1914 and December 1917 (which averages out at just less than fourteen 
per constituency). While less than the pre-war average, this suggests that systems 
of organisation and regional control were maintained to a considerable degree. In 
some cases these visits related to the death of MPs, candidates or party grandees 
(such as the eleven visits afforded Worcestershire East in the last five months of 
1914 after the almost simultaneous death of Joseph Chamberlain and the contest 
of a local by-election). Replacements had to be found for those candidates 
155 Colonel Berrington to Dixey (Honorary Treasurer Worcestershire West UA), 15/02/1918. Berrington 
Papers, 705/24/746. 
156 For instance, Maidstone Junior UA, 25/10/1914, (U/1634/A/2/3/2); Martin Pugh, The Tories and the 
People, 1880-1935 (Blackwell, London, 1985), pp. 175-6. 
157 Philip Ashworth (prospective Unionist candidate for West Staffordshire) to Lloyd, 27/02/1916. Lloyd 
Papers, 9/2. 
158 'Synopsis of Confidential Reports by Unionist Central Office Agents on the Progress of the Coalition 
Campaign', 03/12/1918. BL 95/2. Together, these constituted half of the responses received. 
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serving at the front. Having joined the local yeomanry, John Lyttleton, for 
example, was indisposed to contest a by-election at Droitwich, and a total of 
thirty-four visits, 1915 to 1917, were required. Pre-war systems were also kept up 
to a moderate extent in Yorkshire, where forty-six of the fifty member 
associations continued to pay subscriptions to the Area Council, as did twenty- 
159 one of thirty-one affiliated clubs. 
In the main, it is evident that the Representation of the People Bill played a 
prominent part in preparing the party organisation for the 1918 election and the 
post-war political struggle. 160 Until the Registration Act of March 1916, updating 
the electoral register remained the only political activity that dared to operate 
unadorned by a veil of patriotism. It was a perfect exercise for the organisational 
machine - ensuring the retention of agents beyond the period when they would 
otherwise have become superfluous, offering a flavour at least of routine politics 
for the party faithful, and providing a dry run for Unionist canvassers. With the 
loss of registration, the party started to fall into disrepair (as illustrated in Figure 
2 below). It was left to the reform bill to act as a crank on the party machinery 
and a means by which to reinvigorate the local associations and to bring the rank 
and file members back into active politics. The political truce, and more 
especially uncertainties regarding the timing of a general election, coalesced to 
licence political apathy until the end of 1916. However, the spectre of universal 
suffrage dictated an awakening in the vast majority of local associations. In 
August 1916, the National Society of Conservative Agents, which had spent the 
vast majority of the war seeking desperately to justify its existence, eagerly 
carried a resolution asking for all areas to consider electoral reform. 161 In such 
circles, the relief was palpable - they were after all a body of men for whom 
159 Yorkshire Area, Council, 02/0211917, (JAR). 
160 The results here bolster research as in Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 123-4. 
161 National Society of Conservative Agents, Council, 09/08/1916. 
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canvassing and registering was not only a way of life but also a career. Several 
constituencies nevertheless refused to allow electoral reform to disturb their 
wartime slumbers. 162 Within the machine as a whole, the cogs creaked and turned 
slowly. In two London divisions - Strand and St Georges (Hanover Square) - 
only one meeting was convened after August 1914, until consideration of the 
reform bill shook members into shape, after which four meetings were convened 
in 1917 and thirteen in 1918. Before 1917, the number of meetings was similar 
elsewhere: Monmouthshire (none), East Grinstead (none). 
The effect of war upon the local associations can be observed through the simple 
medium of the number of days on which meetings were held. In those 
constituencies where records survive in a sufficient manner to make proper 
analysis possible, the details are revealing. 
163 
Fib 
Jan 1912 to July 1914 Aug 1914 to Dec 1918 
Number of 661 523 
Meetings 
Annual 256 118 
Average 
The role of the Registration Act (1916) in furthering, and the Representation of 
the People Bill in arresting, wartime political apathy can be seen below. 
162 Of those associations analysed, East Grinstead, Gipsy Hill UA, Hatfield, Woolwich West, Kincardine 
and Deeside, and Southgate held no meetings at all during the war. Clapham South held its last meeting 
of the war in spring 1915, Bristol West in spring 1915. 
163 The calculations were made from forty-nine constituencies. 
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Figure 2 
Year 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Number of 
Meetings 
236 247 224 102 72 124 179 
Redistribution had a profound influence, as Unionist bodies were forced to 
consider not only the most advantageous way to redraw constituency boundaries 
but also, in the aftermath, the formation of new divisions and associations. The 
official line was that a reformation should be commenced within constituency 
associations in order to realign them with the new boundaries. 164 Accordingly, 
area and provincial bodies had to consider the alteration of rules. The Midland 
Union, in abeyance since July 1914, received a letter from Younger requesting its 
assistance in the alteration of rules and the election of representatives to the NUA 
Council so as to reflect the new franchise. 165 
What was the significance of this organisational resurgence? Evidence suggests 
that even in those associations that wound up almost entirely during the war, 
such as Accrington and Ashford, the machineries were re-established sufficiently 
by 1918 to allow the integration of women. 166 Equally, wider organisational 
efficiency was brought into question in late 1918. Nonetheless, although fears 
arose that the party systems were `worse - not for wear, but for inactivity', 
167 
such reproaches can be distracting for several reasons. By the time of the 1918 
general election, agents and activists tended to expect business as usual in their 
organisations, and, in any case, many of these appeals for activism were at heart 
164 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
165 Midland Union of Conservative Associations, General Purposes Committee, 19/08/1918. (MU2/5) 
166 Accrington UA, 18/02/1918, (JAR). The decision had been made in November 1914 to continue only 
with social gatherings during the war. Ashford UA, 12/04/1918, (JAR). 
167 Yorkshire Area, Council, 24/02/1921 (Report), (JAR). See also Bradford City, EC, 18/02/1918, (JAR). 
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merely encouragement for betterment. This denigration in the immediate post- 
war years, moreover, was often actually the very bare expression of uneasiness 
with the coalition. 168 Finally, party apathy was contrasted unfavourably with the 
great strides made by the Labour party in a manner that in reality more reflected 
Unionist fears and the rising vitality of the Labour movement, than any particular 
disintegration of Unionist organisation during the war. 169 
It can be categorically stated that the revival of Unionist organisations allowed 
the party to react successfully to the redistribution of seats in 1917. Furthermore, 
the party was assured of a stable, united structure to be taken into the general 
election of 1918, which must account at least in part for the paucity of local 
infighting (and perhaps, in some instances, for the capacity of local associations 
to disobey Central Office diktats in putting up their own candidates against the 
coupon). This can be contrasted with the dismemberment of the already fragile 
machinery of the Liberal Party by the time of redistribution. Finally, it provided a 
response, however insufficient, to the growth in trade union membership during 
the war, which ensured that the Labour movement also enhanced its 
organisational capacity and membership during the war. 
New Wine in Old Skins? 
In response to electoral changes, the Somerset Division of the NUA was typical 
in its pragmatism in recording that although opposed to reform during war `our 
duty now is to make the best of them'. 170 Events at the NUA Conference of 1917 
sustain this image of expediency, with the delegate Liddell Armitage speaking at 
168 Oxfordshire South UA, AGM 19/06/1920,31/05/1919, EC, 15/10/1919, (S. Oxon. Con 1/3). See 
Chapter II. 
169 Reigate UA, South East Division Women's Committee, 07/05/1920, (353/5/1/1). 
170 Somerset Division, AGM, 15/02/1918, (Are/11/6/1). 
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once of the `horrible nemesis' of having to advocate the inclusion of women (as 
he had been `guilty of the most strenuous opposition to Women's Franchise') and 
also of the fact that this policy, once adopted by the party, should be 
accomplished within the organisation. Another representative Herbert Williams 
seconded the resolution with equal disdain, but predicted the necessity of 
attaching the women's influence to that of the Unionist Party. 171 Such 
pragmatism sits comfortably with the Burkean image of conservatism as a 
practice in the art of postponement rather than of ideological inflexibility. 172 And 
few can have carried this image of conservatism and pragmatism as far as the 
Duchess of Atholl, who transformed herself from a prominent anti-suffragette 
into one of the first woman MPs. 173 
There can be no doubt that the electoral reforms put an increased burden on party 
organisation, but they were also significant in dictating a greater professionalism. 
The enlarged electorate made the registration of voters a considerably tougher 
challenge, and one result of this was the appointment of professional agents in 
those few areas in which they were previously lacking. Polling district agents 
were appointed for example in Oxfordshire South, to manage the two annual 
registrations now required and to assist in the increased workload of the 
division. 174 However, the natural outcome of escalating expenditure caused 
urgent subscription appeals in several areas, with the extra cost of registration of 
voters under the widened franchise cited . 
175 As a consequence both of this and of 
an intensification of the fear of socialist methods (especially in relation to the 
extended electorate), propaganda grew in significance in comparison to the 
11 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
172 See for instance Harvey Glickman, 'The Toryness of English Conservatism', Journal of British 
Studies, i (1961-2), pp. 111-43. 
1" Beatrix Campbell, The Iron Ladies: Why do Women Vote Tory? (Virago, London, 1987), p. 46. 174 Oxfordshire South UA, EC, 03/08/1918, (S. Oxon. Con. 1/3). 
175 EW Willis (Chairman of Rochester UA) to Salisbury, 17/09/1917. Salisbury Papers, (4)80/99; 
Circular Letter from Chairman of St Georges UA, 30/01/1919, (487/8). 
240 
traditionally elaborate organisational activity of registration. 176 The evolution of a 
coherent and compelling Unionist anti-socialist rhetoric, as analysed in Chapter 
III, was therefore opportune. 
How the party specifically responded to the new female electorate was more 
problematic. A considerable number of constituencies already had, prior to the 
war, some representation of women, frequently through Women's Unionist 
Associations (WUA) or Women's Unionist and Tariff Reform Associations 
(WUTRA). In the Midlands, twenty of the thirty-three constituencies had pre-war 
women's associations. However, their political contributions had varied 
radically: in Worcestershire East, the WUA had been self-supporting, had had its 
own paid secretary, branches in all polling districts and 3,500 members; in 
Shropshire North, the WUTRA had been `very active and works splendidly 
during Registration time'. Meanwhile, it had been recorded that the women's 
organisation in Birmingham Handsworth `would be useful if it were not almost 
entirely stultified by its respectability, and if it would take some interest in local 
matters'. 177 Similarly, the roles of women had been diverse locally. They had 
been utilised as a prop upon which the central association could rely for 
assistance in the distribution of literature, which in Worcestershire West had 
been carried out `largely through the agency of the Women's Association'. 178 In 
another Midland division however, although there had existed a WUA 
organisation with some 5,000 members, `only 200 or 300 are worth anything in 
the way of assisting the Unionist Association and, even then, care has to be 
exercised as to what kind of work they are given to do. Their canvassing is 
unreliable. ' In fact, it had been said, that the only benefit of involving them (with 
176 Darwen UA, Consultative Committee, 10/01/1918, (PLC/2/2/1). 
177 Midland Union Notebook, 1908-1918, (Are/MU/29/3). 
178 Worcestershire West UA, Women's AGM, 20/04/1912, AGM, 16/05/1914, (956/6). 
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the irresistible allure of a badge and a certificate) was so that the other side could 
not get hold of them. 179 
It was in such a climate of diversity that the Unionist organisation sought to 
update itself for the new electorate. Protracted discussion, much of it heated, was 
necessary at the NUA Conference of 1917 to agree upon a means by which 
women might be brought into Unionist politics. The final resolution, agreed 
unanimously, claimed `that it [was] of the greatest importance to establish 
without delay in each constituency, the means of bringing women voters into the 
closest association with the Unionist organisation for essential purposes. ' 180 Two 
interrelated matters require consideration here: first, the timing, level and nature 
of the integration; second, the extent to which such moves determined an 
appreciation of the best manner by which to appeal to women electors. 
Within this study, of the 49 constituencies in which it can be divined, 36 had 
adopted a means to integrate women into their associations by the end of the war. 
In twenty-two of these cases, women were welcomed into a joint association with 
men, whilst the remainder maintained (or constructed) separate organisations for 
the different sexes. Of those associations that failed to provide for women by 
1918, the majority were to give women a role by the end of 1919. It might be 
noted, however, that these associations were far less likely (by 3 to 11) to form 
joint organisations, suggesting that in some quarters there persisted a reluctance 
to work alongside women. Where associations maintained separate organisations, 
joint councils and executive committees were established usually with one third 
women representatives. Frequently, however, such representations continued to 
be dominated by the wives of leading pre-war Unionists. Of the twelve women 
members on the executive committee in Chelmsford, no less than nine were 
179 Midland Union Notebook. 
180 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
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wives, sisters or daughters of sitting male members. 181 A similar reliance was in 
evidence in Wood Green and in the Midland Union; in Epsom the dependence 
was specifically upon the wives of members of leading local members. 182 As in 
the lack of enthusiasm for working-class inclusion, this implies that the party 
failed at this stage to attract a new breed of members. 
Notwithstanding these reservations, the speed with which women were adopted 
into the organisation was symptomatic of Unionist pragmatism. It reflected 
concerns also at the political susceptibility of women. Norris Foster (a 
Birmingham Chairman) insisted on the immediate integration of women since if 
it were delayed, then the women would be incorporated into other parties, or 
perhaps more disturbingly might `run [an] Organisation of their own & [be] able 
to turn any election'. 183 The focus of his concern was that the Labour Party was 
already seeking to entice Co-operative Party women into their system. 'TM In turn, 
such anxieties evolved into a debate over whether women inhabited `separate 
spheres'. It was appreciated that `the method of organising must differ from those 
which have proved successful with men. The introduction of such a large 
feminine element in the political arena must of necessity bring domestic 
legislation to the front to the exclusion of Imperial affairs. ' 185 Sidney Turner 
alluded to the fact that women's branches would be `capable of taking into 
consideration questions like housing and all those things and advising the general 
committee of the Association. ' 186 Herbert Williams felt that as women were `less 
experienced in the arts of politics, [they would] be in grave danger of 
181 Chelmsford UA, AGM, 27/03/1918. 
182 Epsom UA, General Council 31/10/1918, (7085/1/1); Wood Green UA, Women's Conservative 
Association, Committee, 11/06/1919, (Acc. 1158/5); Midland Union, General Purposes Committee, 
02/04/1919, (AreIMU/2/5). 
183 Norris Foster to Steel-Maitland, n. d. [December 1917]. SM GD193/175/2/1/72. 
184 Norris Foster to Steel-Maitland, 17/12/1917. SM GD193/175/2/1/70. 
las CAJ, January 1918, p. 7. 
186 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
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exploitation, particularly by the sentimental Socialist'. 
187 The prevailing 
sentiment was that women should be enticed from the ivory towers into which 
they had been ushered and be acquainted with the true nature of politics. A year 
or so after peace had returned, Lady Baxter urged Scottish Unionists `that the 
women should, be fully informed of the horrors of Bolshevism, and said that it 
was neither wise nor kind to protect them from such knowledge however 
unpleasant. ' 188 Meanwhile, a resolution was passed by the Midland Union 
emphasising `the urgent importance of the Political Education of Women and the 
desirability of organising them to take their share in combating the insidious 
work of the revolutionary force now so active in this Country. ' 
189 
The method by which best to appeal to women also excited a keen internal 
debate. One Welsh agent prophesied that politics `appear as a sort of religion to 
most women', namely that it might be difficult to convert them, but once 
involved there would be no lapsing. 190 Certainly, it was an immeasurably 
different challenge from that of before the war, when women were viewed as, at 
best, a conduit through which to attract the male vote. 191 One response was 
decided by pragmatism. For, as Steel-Maitland's association chairman advised 
him, to establish two sets of offices, officers and staff was wasteful. Steel- 
Maitland approved, although he believed that `experience alone, however, will 
show whether canvassing can be done indiscriminately in any given polling 
district, or whether for these purposes, arrangements should be made so that the 
women should be canvassed by the women, and the men by the men. I am 
inclined to think this will not be necessary, but the possibility ought to be borne 
187 NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. Resolution 4. 
188 SUA Eastern Division Council, 21/01/1920, (Acc. 10424/43). 
189 Midland Union, AGM, 05/12/1919, (Are/MU/1/5). 
190 CAJ, April 1918, p. 55. 
191 Midland Union Notebook. (Wolverhampton South); Jarvis, `The Politics of Gender' in Francis, The 
Conservatives, pp. 175-6. 
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in mind. ' 192 As it was, experience in London suggested that `no special point is 
seen in the canvassing of women by women; on the contrary a large amount of 
time and power would be wasted by adopting such a course. ' Instead, a few 
special meetings for women had been held to `good effect'. 
193 Such 
considerations were not insignificant, for they played a part in the capacity of the 
party to appeal to women voters. At a higher level as well, consideration was 
given to the women's vote: the Central Office agent for the Home Counties 
argued that if polling day was a Saturday, the lower middle classes and middle 
classes would fail to poll as it was their most busy day, whilst all the working- 
class areas would poll. 194 The store set on the women's vote can be witnessed in 
the demand for `a very strong appeal' to be issued to women to record their 
votes. 195 In Yorkshire, special meetings were initiated in 1918 in efforts to 
interest women. 196 
This research bolsters, in some ways, the work of David Jarvis, which asserts that 
1918 was a watershed in requiring the Unionist Party to confront its demons 
concerning class and gender. 197 While he is quite right to question the 
Conservative response to female enfranchisement as being `a straightforward 
success - another feather in the cap of popular Toryism', it is nevertheless too 
easy to overlook the foundations of their integration. The response catalogued 
here was overwhelmingly that of acceptance of the necessity of bringing women 
into Unionist machinery without delay. For a party previously opposed to the 
enfranchisement of women, the Unionist response of pragmatism came like an 
192 Norris Foster to Steel-Maitland, 17/12/1917 and reply. SM GD193/175/2/1/70-1. 
193 'Report by MCAA on Questions of Election Procedure as set forth by Mr. Machlachlan's 
Memorandum', Metropolitan Conservative Agents' Association, n. d. [March 1919]. 
194 'Synopsis of Confidential Reports by the Unionist Central Office Agents on the Progress of the 
Coalition Campaign', 03/12/1918. BL95/2. 
195 Ibid. 
196 'Synopsis of Confidential Reports', 06/12/1918. BU95/2. 
197 David Jarvis, 'British Conservatism and Class Politics in the 1920s', English Historical Review, cx 
(1996), pp. 61-82. 
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epiphany. Moreover, the adoption of women into the internal party debate and 
machinery took place concurrently with a panic regarding the socialistic 
revolutionary threat, and therefore shaped the nature of appeals to this new 
electoral element. 
Electoral Reform and the Coupon Election 
A fierce argument, flavoured with pedantry, has gathered around the effect of 
electoral reform. The employment of multifarious techniques, including 
sociological, qualitative, quantitative, local and ahistorical, makes a complex if 
rich tapestry. The greatest difficulty to be surmounted in the debate rests on the 
fact that there was no general election between 1910 and 1918. This is worsened 
by the fact that the 1918 election is regarded commonly as being extraordinary 
both in terms of, its proximity to the war and of the distribution of coalition 
`coupons'. Viewed as such, there was no typical election between 1910 and 
1922. In fact, it would be possible to go further down this route and argue that 
the single-issue elections of January and December 1910 (fought on the budget 
and the House of Lords respectively) were also exceptional, if in lesser 
degrees. 198 If, perhaps, the discounting of so many election results appears 
unhelpful and even destructive, this does at least at once explain the difficulties 
encountered by historians in this realm, as well as displaying the basis on which 
the majority of them have approached the issue. 
Intriguingly, it is a debate in which the Unionist Party plays little part. In almost 
all the studies, the assumption is made that the doors to the party were kept 
firmly shut, with prospective and actual voters allowed neither in nor out, whilst 
198 Such an interpretation would have bearing on the Liberal successes of 1910 in that as traditional 
Liberal issues were deployed (House of Lords reform), New Liberalism was not tested as a force with 
which to resist the rise of Labour. 
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the Liberal and Labour parties scrapped outside between themselves for the 
popular vote. Behind this lies a belief that the emergence of class politics was the 
crucial factor in the fortunes of the Liberal and Labour parties. In one corner 
stand historians like Ross McKibbin who hold that the ascendancy of the Labour 
Party was based in the pre-war period upon trade union membership and 
organisation, and upon the failure of the Liberal Party to attune itself to a class- 
based electorate. 199 Such views are epitomised in the work of Matthew et al. 
While relying on an analysis of post-war elections, they imply that there existed 
before the war a vast core of the working classes (40-50%) who, while as yet 
disenfranchised, had their ballot cards already marked with a cross next to the 
Labour Party. 200 Some of this persuasion have steered clear of anti-chronological 
statistical critiques. They have at times, nonetheless, had to rely heavily on the 
unproven assumption that the majority of the disenfranchised pre-war electorate 
were working-class and inter alia prospective Labour voters, a conjecture that, if 
accepted, seems to render rather pointless the entire debate. 201 Against this is set 
a strong phalanx of historians, such as Peter Clarke, who see the fortunes of the 
two parties resting either on longer-term phenomena or in particular on wartime 
199 Ross McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1973), pp. 237-44; 
George Bernstein, Liberalism and Liberal Politics in Edwardian England (Allen & Unwin, London, 
1986). 
zoo H. C. G. Matthew, Ross McKibbin, & J. A. Kay, 'The Franchise Factor in the Rise of the Labour Party', 
English Historical Review, xci, (1976), pp. 732-33,734-35,741-47. There have been fairly convincing 
arguments put forward against this regarding the pre-war franchise: if the wider franchise was so 
important then those areas with the lowest franchise before 1918 should have shown a marked turn 
against the Liberals, they did not. Meanwhile, wartime inertia in the Liberal grassroots can be held 
responsible for defection to both the Labour and Conservative camps (Michael Hart, 'The Liberals, the 
War and the Franchise', English Historical Review, viiic (1982), pp. 820-32). Moreover, those disqualified 
previously under the old registration system were frequently single middle-class men, rather than 
working-class groups. Therefore, no new sub-class of voters was added in 1918 and the Unionist Party 
only possessed a small advantage as the party of property (Duncan Tanner, `The Parliamentary Electoral 
System, the Fourth Reform Act and the Rise of Labour', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 
lvi (1983), pp. 206-19; Duncan Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1990), p. 128). Finally, the Labour was the party of trade unionists before 
the war, and this sector of the working-class `were overwhelmingly likely to be enfranchised already' 
(Peter Clarke, `Liberals, Labour and the Franchise', English Historical Review, xcii, (1977), pp. 582). 
201 Keith Laybourn, `The Rise of Labour and the Decline of Liberalism: The State of the Debate', History 
lxxx (1995), p. 213. 
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Liberal divisions. 202 In fact, such is the strength of the latter argument that many 
who have sought to counter it have been ready to acknowledge the role of the 
war and, to a lesser degree, the rise of the Labour Party as spasmodic and 
203 regional. 
Two key questions emerge in respect of this study: first, the condition of the 
Unionist Party before the war; second, the significance of the coupon in the 1918 
election. Without seeking to ask the unanswerable question, namely what would 
have happened if the war had not occurred, it is possible to enquire what would 
have occurred in a general election in 1915. By-elections certainly provide a key 
and while they are notoriously problematic material from which to draw wider 
electoral conclusions, nevertheless the sixteen Unionist successes in the period 
1910 to 1914, in both their number and nature, offer a picture of stable recovery 
if no certain future electoral landslide. 204 Ramsden and Kinnear have viewed 
them as redolent of a Unionist revival based on increasing party unity behind 
Law's leadership and strong organisation, which was the prelude to a "probable 
Unionist victory" in 1915 if war had not intervened. `05 Both David Dutton and 
Ewen Green reach entirely different conclusions. 206 The latter views their 
prospects of success as at the best precarious. In a contention that runs 
completely against that of Ramsden, the by-election gains are viewed as only 
202 The war is believed to hold the key in: Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1971), Introduction; Michael Bentley, The Climax of Liberal Politics: 
British Liberalism in Theory and Practice 1868-1918 (Edward Arnold, London, 1987), pp. 150-3; and 
most famously in Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party 1914-35 (Collins, London, 1966). 
Meanwhile, Tanner holds the war responsible in part, along with a disparate and regional growth of the 
Labour Party. Tanner, Change, pp. 420-30. 
203 Laybourn, `The Rise of Labour', pp. 225-6; McKibbin, `Conclusion', The Ideologies of Class. 
204 They certainly offered much more cause for encouragement than the by-election successes of 1908, 
which papered over Unionist difficulties concerning tariffs and the Government's pensions policy. 
205 Ramsden, Balfour and Baldwin, p. 86. 
206 David Dutton, His Majesty's Loyal Opposition: The Unionist Party in Opposition 1905-15 (Liverpool 
University Press, Liverpool, 1992), pp. 298-9. 
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superficial . 
207 The sixteen wins are whittled down to only five of consequence. 
Of the other eleven, two victories remained marginal (a factor which in itself 
does not consider the swing to the Conservatives - the crucial factor in general 
election predictions), meanwhile the other nine victories were in three-cornered 
contests, and in seven of these the opposition vote was split between Labour and 
the Liberals. 208 However, as three-cornered contests (between the Unionist, 
Labour and Liberal parties) were becoming more, not less, common, victory 
under such circumstances did not pale automatically. 
209 A Punch cartoon of July 
1912 lucidly sketched the possibilities, depicting the Unionist candidate milking 
a cow (the electorate), whiles the Liberal and Labour candidates tugged 
fruitlessly at its horns and tail210 If, by 1914, Labour still did not contest a huge 
number of seats, the number was nonetheless rising. Thus it would be quite 
possible to reach the opposite conclusion from that of Green, namely that success 
in three-cornered contests signalled good portents for Conservative survival 
under the threat of Labour, rather than illusory victories in what must indefinitely 
207 Ewen Green, The Crisis of Conservatism, 1880-1914 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1995), 
t268. 
08 In fact, Michael Kinnear's research, which considers the swing in these by-elections, proffers wider 
significance of the results and as such dates Unionist recovery before the war. Kinnear, The British Voter, 
72. 
09 The short-term and long-term prospects for the `Progressive Alliance' were questionable. For, whilst 
the alliance may have been 'still intact in 1914' (Tanner, Change, pp. 344-8), the portents were less 
salubrious in areas such as Norfolk, Leicestershire and Sheffield. Tony Adams, 'Labour Vanguard, Tory 
Bastion or the Triumph of New Liberalism? Manchester Politics 1900 to 1914 in Comparative 
Perspective', Manchester Region History Review, xiv (2000), pp. 28-9; Bernstein, Liberalism, pp. 4,66-82; 
Helen Mathers, 'The City of Sheffield, 1893-1926' in Clyde Binfield et al (eds. ), The History of the City 
of Sheffield 1843-1993, Volume 1: Politics (Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield), pp. 63-7. Bernstein 
argues that the commitment of rank and file Liberals to the pact was weak due to the preponderance of 
middle-class nonconformity within the party and because of suspicions concerning Labour's attitude to 
the role of trade unions and unemployment. Mathers' research demonstrates that the 'Progressive 
Alliance' was being supplemented by anti-socialist pacts formed at the municipal level in Sheffield, 
which were operating regularly in elections by 1913. Even in Lancashire, at the local level these were in 
operation, for instance Blackpool UA, EC, 10/10/1912,10/03/1913, (PLC/5/1/1). Duncan Tanner has 
argued that, in the longer-term, the alliance was likely to continue to fail to satisfy 'statist' Labour 
supporters. Tanner, Political Change, pp. 424-26. 
210 John Ramsden, An Appetite for Power: a history of the Conservative Party since 1930 (Harper Collins, 
London, 1998), p. 220 
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have remained a two-party system. This was, after all, a constituent in 
Conservative success of the 1920s. 
The other evidence offered by Green in relation to the position of the party on the 
eve of war is equally open to debate. Steel-Maitland's pre-war prediction of 
Unionist difficulties (whilst beneficial in being made to a Canadian uninvolved in 
British politics) reflected the frustration of a party manager several steps ahead of 
his colleagues on the social questions of which he was writing. 
211 Moreover, they 
fly in the face of other declarations to the contrary. 212 Meanwhile, reservations 
made later by Steel-Maitland concerning the effect of the abolition of plural 
voting upon the party were made retrospectively and constituted more part of a 
campaign to defend plural voting rights in the climate of 1917 than anything 
else. 213 Indeed, many of these predictions, enunciated in the expectancy of the 
abolition of plural voting, tend to underline the importance to the party of this 
part of the electorate. 214 As such, the preservation of this elite class of voters, 
admittedly in reduced numbers and diluted by the extended electorate, claims 
recognition as a force in inter-war politics. 
If the Unionist Party was stronger in 1914 than is frequently held, the 
significance often placed upon the coupon in the 1918 general election can serve 
to play down the position of the party at the end of the war. The role of the 
coupon is a thorny historical question. This is due in part, no doubt, to the 
strength of historical views on the role of the Coalition Government in the period 
after the war, including the Treaty of Versailles and the Black and Tans in 
211 Steel-Maitland to Arthur Glazebrook, 24/12/1913 (copy). SM GD193/159/6/9-1lx. 
212 For instance Eastern Area, AGM, 06/03/1914 (Are/Eastern/7/1/6); Hampshire North UA, AGM, 
28/02/1914, (NHCA/1/4); Truro UA, Annual Report, 22/10/1913, (JAR). Although all these reports were 
public statements, they displayed much greater confidence than had previous reports. 
213 `Memorandum to the NUCA Executive Committee on the Report of the Speaker's Conference', n. d. 
[1917]. SM GD/193/202/11x. 
214 Ramsden views plural voting as a considerable basis for the inter-war party in Balfour and Baldwin, 
pp. 119-25. 
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Ireland '215 along with 
lamentation at the collapse of the Liberal Party (it was, 
after all, Asquith who coined the term `coupon'). It is important however to 
distinguish between the effect of the coupon upon the various elements of the 
coalition. For, while the work of John Turner and Roy Douglas certainly proves 
that the letter of endorsement greatly assisted those in receipt of it, its 
significance to a Labour or Liberal candidate was obviously of a different degree 
to that of a Unionist216 Therefore, it would be perfectly consistent to argue, as 
below, that the coupon was beneficial to its recipients and that it did not play a 
particularly substantial role in the Unionist gains of 1918. 
As has been shown elsewhere, in Manchester the coupon had very little part in 
Unionist victories, since in one case a Liberal with the coupon was defeated217 
Indeed, in Britain as a whole (the coupon did not operate in Ireland): of the 
eighty-three Unionist candidates that stood without the coupon, fifty were 
elected. 218 What is more, an overemphasis on the coupon can obscure other 
developments such as can be witnessed in Gloucestershire. Here, James Agg- 
Gardner, standing as Coalition Unionist candidate with coupon for Cheltenham, 
was able to toy with his Liberal rivals, preserving a silence concerning the 
agreement made by the prospective Liberal candidates Jameson and Williams to 
withdraw from the contest, `so as to keep off other Liberals'. 219 It was not, 
though, the coupon that empowered him to act so successfully. Rather, the 
Liberals were peculiarly susceptible to such exploitation, because a united party 
215 J. M. McEwen, `The Coupon Election of 1918 and the Unionist Members of Parliament', Journal of 
Modern History, xxxiv (1962), p. 294 
216 Turner, British Politics, pp. 421-7; Roy Douglas, `A Classification of the Members of Parliament 
Elected in 1918', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, xlvii (1974), pp. 74-94. 
217 Trevor Wilson, `The Coupon and the British General Election of 1918', Journal of Modern History, 
xxxvi (1964), pp. 40-1. The coupon was given to only three of the eight Unionist candidates. However, all 
eight were elected. 
218 Kinnear, British Voter, pp. 70-2. Of the 362 Unionist candidates granted a coupon, 332 were elected. 
219 Agg-Gardner to Packer (Unionist Agent for Cheltenham), 19/11/1918. Agg-Gardner Papers D5130, 
ff. 6-7. 
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or local -association would not have discovered itself in such a position. 
Moreover, it was coalition government (and the confusions and non-party 
sentiments it inspired), rather than the coupon, that exacerbated Liberal divisions. 
The proximity of the election to the war can only have confused Liberal voters 
and activists who, in Clapham, supported the Coalition Unionist Harry Green in a 
June by-election before. opposing his successor Arthur du Cros six months 
later. 22° Unionists in Harborough were sufficiently strong to reject out of hand an 
effort to construct a local pact by which Unionist backing for the sitting Liberal 
candidate P. J. Harris in Harborough would ensure Liberal support for C. E. Yate 
in Melton. 221 Yate was returned unopposed by the Liberals; Harris was defeated 
convincingly by the Unionist candidate Keith Fraser. Where local Unionists 
forced Coalition Liberal candidates to provide promises regarding their future 
conduct, this was because they were in a powerful enough position to do so. 222 In 
fact, the longer-term impressions of the coupon may have been of greater 
significance to the Unionist Party than its impact in 1918. For instance, Unionists 
were favoured by being over-represented in middle-class and mixed-class 
constituencies and as such were able to establish themselves better within these 
areas, whilst Coalition Liberals were over-represented in working-class, rural and 
mining constituencies. 23 
This leads to the most notable point regarding the coupon, namely that the 
coalition provided such a powerful platform. After all, there was little gain to be 
had in distributing coupons that bore questionable patronage (indeed they might 
have proved the kiss of death), and no coalition has seen fit to issue them in a 
220 ClaphamUA, AGM, Annual Report, 05/06/1919, (CCA/11). 
221 Harborough UA, Management Committee, 23/11/1918, (JAR). 
222 This was the case in Pudsey and Otley, where the Liberal candidate Barrand was forced to pledge to 
consult the `majority of the electors' if he was to deviate from Coalition policy. Keith Dugdale, 
`Conservatives, Liberals and Labour in Yorkshire, 1918-29', Sheffield University, M. Phil. (1976), p. 48. 223 Turner, British Politics, pp. 409-10. 
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similar manner since. The strength of the coalition record and programme can be 
seen in the desperate clutches of wild-eyed Liberals for coalition status. 
224 While 
the general election of November 1918 was not a wartime contest, it was 
however certainly khaki in colour, and the vast weight of contemporary opinion 
indicates that issues relating to the war were of the greatest importance. Of 144 
constituencies canvassed by Central Office, as to the issues in which the electors 
were most interested, the top four topics were all war-related: indemnities from 
Germany (132), the punishment of the Kaiser (107), the repatriation and 
exclusion of enemy aliens (102) and adequate pensions for soldiers and their 
dependents (69). Below this languished housing reform (45), agriculture (29) and 
industrial protection (25). 225 In Scotland, the traditionally powerful issue of drink 
lay fifth in the queue behind three war-related issues and housing226 Even taking 
into account the natural bias that the compilers may have incorporated into their 
reports, war matters stood clearly at the very centre. 
227 In the issues at its core as 
in its timing, the election was wartime design etched onto a peacetime electorate. 
Consequently, the trends concerning patriotism, for instance in wartime by- 
elections, continued to hold sway 
? 28 The reaction of defeated Liberal and Labour 
candidates bore out the same view, 
229 as did the performance of independent 
patriotic candidates. To provide one instance: Henry Hamilton Beamish 
(independent Conservative and NFDSS) campaigned in Clapham on a 
xenophobic nationalist platform and polled 19% of the vote even whilst up 
224 See efforts by the Liberal candidate Cohen in Fairfield. Liverpool Courier, 20/11/1918. 
225 `Summary of Reports from Unionist Agents', 04/12/1918. BL195/2. 
226 'Extracts from Confidential Reports by Unionist Central Office Agents', 06/1211918. BL/95/2. 
227 Also, for instance, see the concerns expressed in Oxfordshire North, where a candidate was selected 
having assured association members that he prioritised 'Germany having fought in a brutal manner must 
now suffer for it'. Oxfordshire North UA, Council, 28/08/1918. 
228 See above, pp. 173-173. 
229 Wilson, `The Coupon', pp. 39-42. 
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against both Unionist and Asquithian candidates. 
230 As has been detailed in 
Chapter III, this mood of patriotism favoured the Unionist Party in many ways. 
In relation to the franchise reforms this had a special significance. It has been 
shown that the relationship between women and patriotism was intimate during 
the general election of 1918,231 and that its effect was exacerbated by the 
comparative over-representation of women in the electorate of 1918 (due to the 
simple fact that relatively more women than men were at home and thus able to 
vote). Moreover, as Turner has noted, the enfranchisement of women was the 
major contribution of the 1918 reforms, and, while they did not necessarily vote 
against Labour as a gender, the sharp class-bias of the female franchise worked 
against the interests of the Labour party in the short term (as Unionists hoped it 
would). 232 Contemporary opinion certainly testified to the number of women who 
polled for the Conservative cause. 
233 Indeed, the ability of the Conservative Party 
to appeal to a female sector of the electorate has been demonstrated as having 
had a longer-term impact upon inter-war electoral politics. 234 It is in relation to 
this that the significance, as shown above, of the party's pragmatism and 
concentration upon securities within the electoral system must be viewed. It was 
largely these that won them the profitable redistribution of seats and the 
continuation of plural voting. Such factors, when combined with a perceptible 
increase in confidence and unity among Unionists, go far to explain the 
consolidation of the party's electoral fortunes in the inter-war period. 
Socio-economic structural developments during the First World War also played 
a part in shaping the longer-term electoral pattern. By reducing the internal points 
230 McCrillis, Conservative, p. 38. 
231 Paul Ward, "'Women of Britain say go": Women's Patriotism in the First World War', Twentieth 
Century History, xii (2001), pp. 23-45. 
232 Turner, British Politics, p. 434, Chapter XI passim. 
233 See above p. 147. 
2 Jarvis, `Politics of Gender', pp. 180-87; idem., `Electoral Hegemony', pp. 137-39. 
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of difference (based on skills and remuneration) within the working class, they 
restructured its life and political culture. The narrowing of middle-class salary 
differentials and increased middle-class consciousness offset this, however, to 
some degree. 235 During the period 1914-18, along with the decline of the upper 
classes, there was an intensifying self-consciousness of the middle classes 
alongside white-collar workers, who together rose from 12% to 22% of the 
population. 236 The very fact that after the war the `Middle-Class Union' assumed 
such a title displayed an overt, aggressive confidence in the economic, social and 
cultural objects it sought to defend. It was certainly in the light of these 
developments that the construction of a Conservative appeal to `the man on £500 
a year' was made and prospered. 
237 Allied further to this were the huge increases 
in direct taxation wrought by war, which vastly enlarged the number of voters 
interested economically in the cost of government. 
238 
Such developments, the emergence of a greater number of middle-class seats and 
the re-clarification of Unionist appeals to this sector of society were mutually 
supporting. This research does not - indeed cannot - deny that the franchise 
reform of 1918 was the defining transformation in the fortunes of the Liberal and 
Labour parties. Nevertheless, it does reveal the significance of wartime events 
upon reform and the ability of political groups to define the constituents to which 
they wished to make their appeal. Unionist success in 1918 was not based on the 
235 Bernard Waites, A Class Society at War: England 1914-18 (Berg, Leamington Spa, 1987), pp. 24-6, 
279. Trevor Griffiths, The Lancashire Working Classes, c1880-1930 (Clarendon, Oxford, 2001), 
pp. 317-19. 
236 George Robb, British Culture and the First World War (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), p. 89. 
237 McKibbin, 'Class and Conventional Wisdom', pp. 267-9. McKibbin argues that part of the basis of the 
deflationary policy of the Conservative Party in the 1920s was the homogeneity of its middle-class 
membership. 
238 Post-war national politics therefore came to mirror much more closely pre-war municipal politics in 
regard to the emergence of parties (or combinations) representing socialism and anti-socialism. Due to the 
significance on municipal registers of rate-payers, appeals to the self-interest of voters were manifest in 
the pre-war era. Jarvis, `British Conservatism', passim. 
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political machinations of November and December 1918. For the Liberal Party, 
the `coupon' was merely the piece of paper that broke the camel's back. 
256 
i 
N 
.Y 
i 
t 
{I; 
The Triangular Test' 
Piurch Cartoon 10 July 1912 
U 
iah 
.. rj 
Fý P+ 
f+ w 
M1 
j 
O 
V 
ý- 
I; 
257 
V 
COLLECTIVISM 
As a general principle it is safe to say that the State will secure 
better results by encouraging men to better themselves ... than 
by superimposing reforms. ... [But] remember that war 
conditions will not come to an end with the conclusion of 
hostilities, and that in several directions it will certainly be 
necessary to invoke the organisation of State action to meet 
them. There is little difference of opinion as to such necessity in 
the case of housing. 
- George Lloyd & Edward Wood, The Great Opportunity (John 
Murray, London, 1918), pp. 79-80. 
In spite of its pre-war divisions, the Unionist Party was the only major British 
political party to remain overwhelmingly united over the war. Most noticeably, 
this was on the issue of the causes of war and the necessity of pursuing it through 
to victory, but, more pertinently, on all the major questions regarding state 
intervention, the party's solidarity was retained: national service, press 
censorship, increased war taxation, the Defence of the Realm Acts. Although 
opinions differed as to the helpfulness of certain issues, the ethical entitlement of 
the state to pursue such policies was challenged only rarely. Where divisions did 
emerge, such as over the failure of the party leadership to insist upon the 
adoption of the protectionist resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference, the 
reasons were political not ideological. For this reason, and the unifying impact 
that a national dynamic impressed upon the party's economic and social image of 
the post-war world (most dramatically through unanimity over tariff reform), the 
Unionist Party was not disposed towards internal division as was the Liberal or 
258 
Labour Parties. Furthermore, this unity on wartime collectivism should not be 
underestimated; it permitted the party to play its patriotism to the fore, to appeal 
to a new electorate with one voice and through its role in government, as John 
Turner has shown, the party was able to employ the state to its advantage. 
' At the 
very worst, the emergence of divisions within the party were delayed until the 
post-war coalition. 
War: the Bringer of Change 
Despite his astute and unprejudiced conclusions, Paul B. Johnson wrote of the 
`dismal science' of laissez-faire, seemingly without irony, and vilified Austen 
Chamberlain for his post-war economy drives. 2 He is not alone among historians 
in becoming somewhat agitated in regard to the issue of state intervention. In 
part, at least, this is due to its profound impact: wartime collectivism has been 
viewed as the knock out blow to a Liberal Party that may or may not have been 
tottering on its feet already. The failure of reconstruction after the First World 
War, meanwhile, is viewed as exceptionally disappointing in comparison with 
the products of the Second World War (the National Health Service et al), with 
the promises made by politicians, and in the light of the sacrifices made in its 
name. Of course, the sacrifices were made not principally in the name of a better 
Britain, but rather British military victory, and the fact that many historians have 
accepted almost verbatim the political and motivational pronouncements of war 
leaders has shaped the debate. 
1 John Turner, British Politics and the Great War: coalition and conflict (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1992), Chapter XII. 
2 Paul B. Johnson, Land Fit for Heroes: The Planning of British Reconstruction, 1916-19 (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968), pp. 444-54. 
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Other contemporary and more general prejudices have also determined the nature 
of the debate. The dominance of the macroeconomics of John Maynard Keynes 
in the post-1945 period (perhaps more in retrospect than actuality) has served to 
bolster the notion of state intervention in the economic and social life of the 
nation. It is, moreover, an issue vulnerable to being hijacked for current political 
purposes. The success of Thatcherism in installing and maintaining itself in 
government, and its influence upon the Labour government of Tony Blair and the 
post-1997 Conservative opposition, has created a fault-line along which many 
historians divide. As such, many interpretations of the party's development in the 
last hundred years have emphasised either a latent individualism eager to rid 
itself of the shackles of liberal wets and sentimental aristocrats, or of a party 
sharing in a consensus based around moderate state collectivism. 3 
As Kathleen Burk has written, the First World War `caused striking changes in 
the organisation and procedures of British government'. Most considerably, 
these were wrought by wartime necessities such as the recruitment and 
enlistment of soldiers, the production of munitions and the provision of supplies 
for home and military consumers. Naturally, these developments challenged the 
principles previously maintained by political parties both as to the prosecution of 
the war and as to the mark they might leave on post-war legislation. At the centre 
of the debate over state intervention rests the influence of total war upon society. 
Famously promoted by Richard Titmuss, as part of a more general thesis, was the 
argument that society was transformed through the range and extent of its 
3 An example of a Thatcherite apologist account is Matthew Fforde, Conservatism and Collectivism, 
1886-1914 (Edinburgh University, Edinburgh, 1990). For the alternative interpretation see for instance 
Mark Garnett & Lord Gilmour, `Thatcherism and the Conservative Tradition' in M. Francis & 
1. Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds. ), The Conservatives and British Society 1880-1990 (Cardiff University 
Press, Cardiff, 1996), pp. 78-93. 
4 Kathleen Burk, `Editor's Introduction' in Idem. (ed. ), War and the State: The Transformation of British 
Government, 1914-19 (Allen & Unwin, London, 1982), p. 6. 
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involvement in the war 5 Meanwhile for R. H. Tawney, and in a different sense 
Martin Pugh, war measures were adopted ad hoc and later abandoned with as 
much ease and lack of consideration as at their conception during the war. 
6 Here, 
the emphasis will be upon several features of the debate. First, did the war affect 
a transformation in Unionist conceptions of state intervention? Second, in what 
degrees were perceptions actually reconceived or were wartime expediencies an 
absolute master? Third, what, if any, impact did this have upon the party's 
fortunes, methods and capacity to appeal to a mass electorate? 
When considering Unionist attitudes towards state intervention in the Edwardian 
era the fanaticism evident between free traders and tariff reformers can mask the 
fact that more subtle and nuanced motives, expectations and intentions were in 
evidence than these bare economic doctrines. A second complexity 
acknowledged, at least implicitly, in any analysis of divisions over tariff reform, 
is that the Unionist Party - like any party that embraces a variety of interests and 
sectors of society - was not one-dimensional. For instance, the pre-war party was 
an amalgam containing members of the anti-collectivist Anti-Socialist Union 
(ASU) and Liberty and Property Defence League, and the interventionist 
Unionist Social Reform Committee (USRC), along with a majority who were 
allied to none. 
While the determination of what should be included in a discussion of 
collectivism is problematic, it is necessary to appreciate that the Edwardian 
$ Richard Titmuss, `War and Social Policy, in idem, Essays on 'The Welfare State' (Unwin, London, 
1964), pp. 75-88. This was developed in Andreski's mass participation ratio. Stanislav Andreski, Military 
Organisation and Society (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968). 
6 Martin Pugh, Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-1918 (Routledge, London, 1978); Martin Pugh, 
`Domestic Politics' in Stephen Constantine, Maurice Kirby & Mary Rose, The First World War in British 
History (Edward Arnold, London, 1995), pp. 9-21; RH. Tawney, `The Abolition of economic controls, 
1918-21', Economic History Review, xiii (1943), pp. 1-30. Tawney's argument was based around the 
premise that reconstruction was fragile institutionally, Philip Abrams' that collectivist legislation as a 
result of the war was minimal. Abrams, 'The Failure of Social Reform: 1918-1920', Past and Present, 
xxiv (1963), pp. 43-64. 
261 
Unionist Party viewed social reform and national defence as two sides of the 
same coin. Accordingly, Unionists argued that when the toss went up from the 
Liberal Party, social reform always came out on top, to the detriment of national 
defence. Inherent in this interpretation was the concept that the primary duty of 
the state was the defence of its citizens. Partly because of this, and partly because 
the issue was at the core of divisions within the Liberal Party, conscription sits at 
the centre of this aspect of state intervention during the First World War. As 
Turner has noted, outside parliament `conscription was treated by those whose 
opinions have become historical sources as predominantly an ethical question'. 
8 
Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the legacy of anti-conscriptionists 
reflected not all, but merely some, of the ethical concerns pertaining to it. 
9 Turner 
has dismissed `determined conscriptionists' on the Unionist benches as treating 
rational objections to its implementation `as obstacles to be outflanked rather 
than serious intellectual problems to be tackled'. 10 Beatrice Webb felt the likes of 
Curzon and Milner `[lacked] imagination' on the issue. " These commentators 
imply that Unionists were unwilling, or lacked the capacity, to confront the 
ethical and socio-economic impact of state intervention in this area. To refuse to 
appreciate the thought and consideration given to the moral and practical 
implications of conscription is, however, to suggest one of two things: either a 
party rigid ideologically, dominated by the personnel and ideas of the pre-war 
National Service League; or a party swayed so singularly by the war that it was 
ready to bow to any measure to bring about victory, without considering its 
impact upon the present or future balance between the individual and the state. 
Frederick Scott Oliver, Ordeal by Battle (Macmillan, London, 1915), p. 209; and, for instance, see the 
extolling of Churchill as opposed to Lloyd George in Chapter I and III. 
8 Turner, British Politics, p. 64. 
9 For instance, see John W. Graham, Conscription and Conscience, A History 1916-19 (Allen, London, 
1922). 
10 Turner, British Politics, p. 64. 
11 Norman Mackenzie (ed. ), The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: Volume III Pilgrimage 1912-47 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978), p. 64. 
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Various factors foster suspicions that the party's commitment to conscription 
overshadowed any qualifications they felt. The first was the apparent unanimity 
of the party, to which Chapter II testifies. While discrepancies of opinion 
emerged over the means by which the measure should be adopted and the priority 
it was given, there was little divergence on its necessity. The only notable 
dissident was the serial rebel Hugh Cecil who made clear his reluctance to 
approve of a general scheme of compulsion even during war and his utter 
abhorrence of peacetime national service: `to submit to the burden of universal 
military service for a hundred years in order at the end to finish a great war in 
one year rather than two seems to me positively silly. '12 A second feature that 
frustrated proper consideration of wider implications was the moral benefit to the 
serviceman, for whom fighting for one's country was deemed by many Unionists 
to be a source of inspiration and social cohesion. Of course, in this regard there 
was an apparent confusion between the moral dividends due those who had 
enlisted voluntarily in 1914 and 1915 and those who were conscripted later. 13 
Nevertheless, compulsion became both a means by which to utilise the nation's 
manpower and a method by which to redefine the relationship between the 
individual and the state. Indeed, it was partly for such purposes of national unity 
that compulsory training was promoted by the party before the war, as it `would 
be a democratic system, as there would be no class exemptions whatsoever. The 
duke's son and the cook's son would equally be obliged to serve. ' 14 This belief in 
the ability of comradeship in the trenches to transcend class differences was also 
witnessed after the war in heated debates on the Imperial War Graves 
Commission. Despite disagreements over whether the soldiers' headstones 
should be uniform, overwhelmingly the party encouraged the notion that there 
12 Hugh Cecil to Law, 09/11/1914. BL/35/2/18. 
13 See above, pp. 178-179,195-201. 
14 The Campaign Guide 1914 (NUA, London, 1914). pp. 200-1. 
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should be strict limits set as to the cost of any private memorials so as to 
`perpetuate the idea of community of sacrifice'. 15 The candour with which these 
social and moral benefits of national service were acknowledged was 
compounded by the fact that the press - most notably the Northcliffe papers - 
hijacked the question, impressing an over-simplified design upon a detailed 
policy. 16 As Chapter III has shown, the Unionists may have been ready to utilise 
the press and the caricatures it sketched (of `slackers and `patriots'), but to accept 
the latter as their full comprehension would be misleading. 
This does not deny that in certain circles the matter was treated naively. For 
example, Robert Cecil - as excessively matter-of-fact as his brother was abstract 
- felt that `once you know your requirement [of men] you have merely to see 
what result the present system is bringing in and if it is insufficient the case [for 
conscription] is complete'. 17 As the general staff demanded between fifty and 
seventy divisions and this figure could not be met through the voluntary method, 
compulsion thus became inevitable. However, for a majority of Unionists the 
situation was not so black and white, and instead, at the forefront was the sense 
of even-handedness. Anxious as to the methods of the Parliamentary Recruiting 
Committee, Steel-Maitland and Talbot worked hard to ensure that unfair pressure 
was not exerted upon individuals under the voluntary system. 18 Similarly, 
Selbome lamented that anti-conscriptionists did `not mind what pressure [was] 
put, or in what revolting form the pressure [was] put, on men to enlist as long as 
the pressure [was] not legal'. 19 Therefore, from the outset, Unionists were eager 
is Birmingham Daily Post, 27/11/1918, Editorial; House of Commons debates, 17/12/1919,22/03/1920, 
04/05/1920. Hansard 5`h Series, cxxiii, 485-509; cxxvii, 80-1; cxxviii, 1929-65. 
16 In fact, Milner, foreseeing this particular danger, tried but failed to guard against it. 17 Robert Cecil to Selborne, 10/12/1915. D. G. Boyce (ed. ), The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord 
Selborne's Domestic Political Papers (Historian's Press, London, 1987), pp. 151-2. 
'a Roy Douglas, `Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the Parliamentary 
Recruiting Committee', Journal of Modern History, xli (1970), pp. 571,575-6. 
19 Selborne to Robert Palmer, 27/10/1915. Boyce, Crisis, p. 154. 
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to ensure that the state did not assume unlawful or immoral claims upon its 
people. On the other hand, a matter sufficiently powerful to mobilise Unionist 
members of the Cabinet was the ethical inconsistency in re-engaging the time- 
expired soldier before the enrolment of men who had not yet served their 
country. 2° The conscription of married men before the pool of single men was 
exhausted was again viewed as prejudicial on the grounds of morals (that the 
single man had less to lose, having no wife and family) and efficiency (releasing 
yet more dependents upon the state). 21 It is evident, therefore, that the Unionists - 
with their historical, parliamentary, and grassroots links to the military - tended 
to discover inequalities at variance with those alleged by Liberal and Labour 
objectors. This partly explains why Unionists humoured the Derby Scheme. For, 
although it was moral blackmail of the first water, it was at least universal and 
was perceived as a concise preface to conscription. 
Many of these convictions, moreover, involved impracticalities, one being the 
conscription of Ireland. In addition to considering Ireland as an untapped 
manpower resource, Unionists held that special treatment for this part of the 
United Kingdom undermined the Union, especially so in relation to compulsion - 
the acid test of citizenship and patriotism. 22 However, it posed the colossal 
challenge of civil disorder, a threat many felt to be overwhelming even without 
enforced enlistment. Indeed, it created the absurd prospect of wasting as many 
soldiers upon, as would be gained through, its enforcement. Equally problematic 
was the inclination against the re-call of time-expired soldiers that denied the 
army a body of men already trained in (and, for that matter, morally committed 
20 `Re-engagement of time expired men and proposed compulsory Bill', Memorandum by Long, enclosed 
in Long to Balfour, 10/08/1915. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49777, ff. 137-42. Selborne to Robert Palmer, 
27/10/1915. Boyce, Crisis, p. 154. 
21 Memorandum by Long enclosed in Long to Balfour, 05/04/1916. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49777, 
ff. 151-5. 
22 For the archetypal Tory view see John Gretton to the Editor, Morning Post, 10/11/1916. 
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to) military service. Nonetheless, such efforts do highlight the significance of the 
moral component of `equality of sacrifice' inherent in their perspective and it is 
evident in fact that the party almost in its entirety insisted that all men should do 
their duty, including 'slackers'. 23 
In other instances, practical considerations were considered. Sydenham professed 
sympathy with Runciman and McKenna over conscription, as the needs of the 
economy must limit the number of men that could be put into the field. 4 The 
eminent Conservative and protectionist economist William James Ashley 
imagined dangers in a universal scheme, arguing that due to the significance of 
the export trade to Britain's economy, and the necessity of manufacturing 
munitions, men should be conscripted from industries that were currently slack, 
such as the building trade. 25 Inherent failures in the system spurred on Milner, 
for, although through the voluntary method approximately one and a half million 
men had been enlisted, this represented only two fifths of the number that 
national service could have yielded, and moreover they were `not the right two- 
fifths' (not the fittest)26 Social order was another motivation, Austen 
Chamberlain sensing that the country was `eager for drastic action ... [as] 
it 
would be far more acceptable to the people immediately concerned, if the action 
were universal in this sense, [and] that we asserted the right of the state to claim 
the services of any citizen'. 7 
Additionally, despite the notion that the state possessed the right to introduce 
universal compulsory military service, few suggested the all-out conscription of 
labour. Most particularly this was because of an appreciation of industrial 
23 Conservative Agents' Journal [CAJ], January 1916, pp. 81-2. 
24 Sydenham to Strachey, 31/12/1915. Strachey Papers, S/13/18/2. 
25 Memorandum by Ashley, 01/09/1915. Ashley Papers, MS. Add. 42245, ff16-18. 
26 Milner to Oliver, 24/09/1915. Milner Papers, 351/30-1. 
27 Chamberlain in Cabinet, 16/06/1915. Cited in Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The 
Experience of the British System since 1911 (Andre Deutsch, London, 1979), p. 83. 
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difficulties involved even in military conscription. Lord Cromer, although an 
avowed compulsionist, acknowledged the necessity of working towards it slowly 
and quietly so as not to excite `acute class controversy'. 
8 Meanwhile, Gwynne 
forwarded to Law a memorandum drawn up by one of his Morning Post 
correspondents regarding a resolution against conscription passed unanimously 
by a meeting of Bristol trade unionists. Gwynne contended nonetheless that the 
resolution should not be understood as an indication that the trade unions would 
never accept conscription, but rather as showing their confidence in the voluntary 
system, along with fear that labour might be `bounced' into it. 
29 In spite of this 
over-optimism as to the labour movement (largely due to faith in the patriotism 
of the people), Unionists did realise the need to carry labour, and demands to 
conscript the whole labour force were few and far between. An extreme example 
came from Amery who deemed that `the really equitable way, of course, would 
be to enlist everybody and run the essential industries under military law, paying 
the ordinary workmen as privates and the directing staff as officers. '30 Even he 
felt this `Prussian' scheme was impracticable politically. 
It has been established, therefore, that it was not a straightforward dispute 
between on the one hand those opposed on moral, religious and pacific grounds 
or in terms of citizens' relationship to the state, and, on the other, those who 
sought to enlist all. Rather it was a matter of walking along different sides of the 
same street. The party accepted Law's argument that conscientious objection was 
a matter not of religious denominations, but `of man's heart and conscience'. 31 
By disregarding Joynson-Hicks' limitation of conscientious objection to 
28 Cromer to Curzon, 27/08/1915. Curzon Papers, f112,114b. 
29 Memorandum by J. D. Irvine, enclosed in Gwynne to Law, 17/09/1915. BU51/3/16. Similarly, Talbot 
believed that labour would support compulsion if, and when, the Derby Scheme failed. Talbot to Law, 
16/10/1915. BU51/4/16. 
30 Amery to Selborne, 13/01/1915. Selborne Papers, 93/18-21. 
31 John Rae, Conscience and Politics: The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military 
Service, 1916-1919 (Oxford University Press, London, 1970), pp. 42-5. 
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members of a religious body, `one of whose fundamental tenets is an objection to 
all war', the party acknowledged secular conscience, if not political objection, to 
the European conflict as sufficient grounds for exemption. For the renowned 
legal historian A. V. Dicey, the deepest problem was rectifying the paradox that, 
while many objectors were `men of most respectable character', `the evil which 
their conduct produces, and is meant to produce, is to create opposition to a war 
in the righteousness whereof the vast majority of British subjects heart and soul 
believe. '32 The conclusion he reached was that the supreme moral authority of 
the state must be recognised, whilst the state must avoid interfering in an 
individual's conscience unless such interference was essential for the defence of 
the realm. The state, he reckoned, had got it about right. 
This presumption in the right of the state to enlist the individual in its quest for 
military victory was mirrored in an easy acceptance of press censorship and the 
Defence of the Realm Acts (DoRA), which introduced what was in effect a 
revolution in statecraft. DoRA was allowed merely a few moments debate before 
being propelled into law by the swiftness of wartime events. In the subsequent 
years of conflict, many smaller measures (and almost all wartime legislation was 
smaller in scope) were to receive vastly more consideration. For Unionists 
however, the longer-term reaction to DoRA revealed a party persuaded of its 
necessity. Even the firebrand editor Maxse could manage something approaching 
moderation in concluding that `the drastic domination of "Dora", which threatens 
every writer who has a soul above licking our Prime Minister's boots, is nothing 
to the present reign of terror in Bolshevika. '33 Only Hugh Cecil, and he some few 
years after the Armistice, feared that Britain might `drift in the direction of 
32 A. V. Dicey, `The Conscientious Objector', Nineteenth Century and After, February 1918, ccccxcii, 
pp. 357-73. 
33 Maxse, `The Problem of War Government', National Review, March 1918, (421), pp. 97-106 
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Socialism' through regulations like DoRA, which was itself a `Socialistic 
measure'. 
34 
Meanwhile, the inclination of many Unionists towards the right of the state to 
control freedom of speech borrowed much from Dicey's interpretation of the 
latter privilege as `little else than the right to write or say anything which a jury, 
consisting of twelve shopkeepers, think it expedient should be said or written'. 
5 
Such philosophies lent themselves well to the firm containment of domestic 
dissent through press censorship and the marginalisation of pacifists. A 
substantial second factor was that on the majority of issues Unionist publicists 
were on the right side of the subjective practice of censorship. When describing 
war blunders in July 1915, Steel-Maitland considered that `the real blame lies 
with the man who commits, not with the man who exposes, [them]', but naturally 
on this occasion he was referring to the failure of Liberals to prosecute the war. 
36 
The latter rationale acted as a stimulus for backbench Unionist criticism, which 
was averse to strict control of the press. Distress was articulated on a practical 
and political level, namely that the general public were denied access to the true 
dimensions and challenges of the war and, as such, were not cognisant of its 
demands (nor indeed of Liberal incompetents). These were questions of degree 
however and not related to the ethical question of the deliberate formulation of 
public opinion and the curtailment of free speech. When the boot was on the 
other foot, the Unionists felt no qualms about ruthlessly stamping out dissent. 
Similarly, draconian anti-alien legislation was pursued and greeted with a 
cavalier disregard for the ancient principle of habeas corpus. 37 
34 Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservative Ideals (NUA, Westminster, [1923]), p. 12. 
35 Ian Fletcher, "`This Zeal for Lawlessness": A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution and the challenge 
of popular politics, 1885-1915', Parliamentary history, xvi (1997), pp. 315-20. 
36 Memorandum regarding the machinery of war by Steel-Maitland, July 1915. SM 
GD 193/164/3/1/31-36x. 
37 See above, pp. 167-168. 
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Of course, such regulations were explicitly wartime expedients and as a result 
carried of necessity few repercussions for peacetime. Even so, Unionists were not 
beyond perceiving the punishing slipper of the nanny state concealed up the 
sleeve of `Dora'. Its potentially all-embracing remit provoked suspicions. It was 
for such reasons that the Summer Time Bill (1916), a seemingly rudimentary and 
unthreatening wartime measure, excited opposition. J. W. Spear MP complained 
that farming would be impaired, and Samuel Samuel MP believed that 
`individuals [would] suffer' on the days on which the clocks were changed. More 
volubly, the libertarian wing was mobilised. Frederick Banbury MP repeated 
some outdated agricultural arguments, and asked the Home Secretary what 
should happen if he were to arrive for a train without adjusting his watch; he 
would likely miss it, Cave replied. But Banbury's conclusion was more avowedly 
individualist: 
Parliament can do all sorts of things, but why should Parliament interfere with the private 
life of the people? If in the past they had given less time to all these grandmotherly ideas 
and grandmotherly legislation, and had taken a little more trouble to see what was going 
on abroad ... we should 
be in a very much better position to-day. 
Here again was that Tory shibboleth re-emerging, that the state could and should 
concentrate on national security rather than fussing over the lives of its people. It 
was one of many occasions on which the libertarian wing was forced to examine 
the inherent contradiction of advocating national defence, whilst being reluctant 
to permit the state to manage the nation even for this purpose. Banbury found an 
ally in Hugh Cecil, whose specific target was wartime state control: if the 
measure was brought in under DoRA, `it would be a most flagrant abuse of 
authority. The Defence of the Realm Act certainly was not intended to force 
upon the country all the little devices that philanthropic crotcheteers may invent 
from time to time. ' He concluded like Banbury with a scare: if the state was to 
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interfere on this point, at what stage was it to be restrained from intervening in 
the life of the individual? What, he asked - hoping to stretch the bounds of 
credulity - about the rates of wages? 
38 
Several key issues emerge from what was a minor debate on a minor topic. First, 
it demonstrated the libertarian wing to be still vocal, but to a misleading extent. 
With the possible exception of the maverick Liberal W. M. Pringle, who 
seemingly aspired to obstruct all parliamentary legislation and could filibuster 
with the best of the Irish Nationalists, Banbury was the most raucous and 
troublesome backbencher; hardly a measure was passed without his - 
overwhelmingly destructive - contribution. His trusty steed, Hugh Cecil, with 
stooping shoulders and scholarly traits, approached the war in a singularly 
academic fashion. Yet, despite such eloquence and scaremongering, the debate 
revealed the primacy accorded the prosecution of the war above any other 
consideration. On this occasion, it was due to the prospect of wartime economies 
in fuel, assistance to the munitions industry and greater efficiency in the 
management of harbours, that the measure won the vocal support of the Unionist 
MPs James Craig, R. J. Neville, Owen Philipps and C. E. Yate. The second 
important feature was the incentive for state control provided by the war effort, 
which was an argument employed frequently with regard to almost all wartime 
legislation. Its fundamental component was efficiency and it impacted not only 
upon transport, the production of munitions and the management of industry, but 
also upon education and liquor. 
Overwhelmingly the areas in which Unionists were enthusiastic for state 
intervention were industries that were either too intricate or too backward to 
function satisfactorily in wartime conditions without assistance, and in certain 
cases state control of industry was universally acknowledged as necessary. Most 
38 House of Commons debates, 08/05/1916, Mansard 5th Series, lxxxii, 343-6. 
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prominent were the efforts of the Unionist Business Committee (UBC) to force 
the government to take control of the production of munitions. 39 When 
considering Lloyd George's bill for government involvement in the mobilisation 
of the engineering industry, William Bull argued that `legislation of [this] drastic 
nature will require very careful consideration', but his main concern was that 
adequate compensation should be provided. 40 It was little surprise to discover the 
likes of Milner approving government control of wartime industry, but the 
appearance of the traditional Tory squire on a similar platform was more 
unexpected. The main drive behind such Unionist demands was industrial 
capacity. As early as February 1915 the UBC was demanding that the 
government protect the aniline dye, optical glass and other industries. 1 Dyes, 
used in the production of explosives and thus a critical wartime commodity, later 
became the central focus of the Industrial Sub-Committee of the UBC. There 
were calls also - from Shirley Benn MP who wrote to the Prime Minister on 
behalf of the UBC - for the government to take control of shipping, while 
42 members urged the regulation of railway rolling stock. 
Unsurprisingly, in some business quarters there was concern. The manufacturer 
Dudley Docker attacked Lloyd George's interference in the munitions business 
as `appalling' and blamed a South Wales strike squarely on Lloyd George's 
`disgraceful preachings during the past ten years' 43 Unionist representatives 
(most especially the UWC and the UBC) were co-opted to protect the interests of 
commerce and business: Carson promised to fight the government `to a finish' 
over plans to tax the insurance premiums of extant policies' 44 In addition, a 
39 See Chapter II. 
40 Pall Mall Gazette, 10/03/1915. Cutting in Bull Papers, Hammersmith. 
41 General Purposes Sub-Committee of the UBC, 01/02/1915; UBC EC, 22/04/1915. Hewins Papers, 26. 
42 UBC EC, 07/12/1915,02/02/1916. Hewins Papers, 26. 
43 Dudley Docker to Steel-Maitland, 19/07/1915. SM GD 193/165/1/179-80. 
44 Gretton to Hewins, 13/07/1916. Hewins Papers, 60/21. 
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proposal by Lloyd George to nationalise the shipping industry across-the-board 
was met with concern from another UWC member that private companies would 
react by cancelling all orders for new ships 45 More generally, however, British 
business reacted to such developments with `reluctant acquiescence'. 46 This 
abandonment of `business as usual' in 1915, a nostrum coined by Churchill but 
always looked upon with the utmost suspicion in Unionist circles, resulted in one 
of the better-known outcomes of war administration, namely the advent of 
businessmen into government. Notwithstanding some (continued) disquiet by the 
Cecils and Bentinck as to Lloyd George's employment of plutocrats in high 
places, 47 the vast majority of the party supported the integration of businessmen - 
provided of course they did not run newspaper concerns. Law was unusually 
forward in this regard, promoting his fellow Scotsman Ian Maclay for the 
management of shipping. 
What motives lay behind the enthusiasm? Certainly, it was encouraged by 
disillusionment with `mandarin' politicians who had failed to prepare 
appropriately for war and seemed incapable of redeeming themselves since the 
onset of hostilities. 8 What was more, as the state assumed greater responsibilities 
in industry so did the heads of business become more suitable candidates. 
Finally, a genuine friendship had been developing between the Unionist Party 
and the businessman prior to the war, a relationship advanced further by this 
trend 49 So much so that in Nottingham Rushcliffe Unionist Association, the 
candidate selection committee were told that `they were not looking for a 
as Walter Guinness to Carson, 07/12/1916. Carson Papers, MIC/665/B/13/9. The suggestion was made to a 
Labour deputation, the support of whom Lloyd George wished to attain for his new premiership. 46 Jonathan S. Boswell & Bruce R. Johns, `Patriots or Profiteers? British Businessmen and the First World 
War', Journal of European Economic History, xi (1982), pp. 423-445 
47 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924: the beginning of modern British politics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971), p. 67; Lord Henry Bentinck, Tory Democracy (Methuen 
Co., London, 1918), pp. 62-5. 
48 See Chapter II above. 
49 John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (Longmans, London, 1978), pp. 98-9. 
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politician, but for an educated business man, with a business training. '50 As John 
Stubbs has shown, the business core of the UBC was significant in exposing the 
party's progress away from its agriculture-centred nucleus towards a more 
s' business orientated one 
This ready acceptance of the right - and indeed duty - of the state to provide 
security for its population and the extension of this to necessary industries 
differentiated the party most noticeably from the Liberals. As has been 
convincingly argued, the challenge to the Liberal Party in these years came less 
from straightforward collectivism - which it had pursued in the pre-war era - but 
rather in the contest between `consumptionist' and `economist' approaches. 52 The 
`limited liability' rationale of the latter strategy was to ensure that Britain could 
avoid economic exhaustion and ensure the nation's economic strength after the 
war, but it was augmented by a failure within some circles to appreciate the 
demands, and indeed existence, of `total' war. 3 Consequently, the Liberal Party 
divided on the grounds not only of whether radical measures should be adopted 
to resolve the dilemma, but also, in some numbers, on the dilemma's very 
existence. 
The degree to which Unionists appreciated the reality of total warfare and its 
uncompromising claims, and the premium they put upon industrial capacity and 
efficiency, was evident in the role they accorded the state in industrial disputes. 
The notion of arbitration drew on several wartime themes, including the idea of 
harmony between the classes. Most importantly of course, it was motivated by 
the necessity of maintaining output in key industries such as munitions, 
so Nottingham Rushcliffe UA, Emergency General Meeting, 09/11/1918, (JAR). 
sl Stubbs, `Impact', pp. 23-5, passim 
52 Martin Farr, `A Compelling Case for Voluntarism: Britain's Alternative Strategy, 1915-1916', War 
History, ix (2002), pp. 282-3. 
53 David French, British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (Allen & Unwin, London, 1982), 
pp. 172-3; Idem., British Strategy and War Aims, 1914-1916 (Allen &. Unwin, London, 1986), pp. 243-5. 
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coalmining and shipbuilding. As Law appreciated, `the trade union organisation 
was the only thing between us and anarchy, and if the trade union organisation 
was against us the position would be hopeless. '54 When asked by a delegate at 
the 1917 NUA Conference whether the government would take measures to 
prevent labour unrest, he replied that `he might as well ask us if we are alive... ' 
55 
The policy was to co-opt the agencies of employers and the employed into a 
government-sponsored system of arbitration, and, to further this end, wage 
regulation boards were extended from the 1909 Trades Board Act, by the 
Ministry of Munitions Act 1916 and the Corn Production Act 1917. So catholic 
did its embrace become that even the Liberal Party adopted arbitration with some 
eagerness. 56 Regarding the action of miners in South Wales in summer 1915, 
Steel-Maitland, although critical of the Liberals for their half-hearted application 
of the Munitions Act to the district, felt that the government was right to 
intervene. In fact, he implicitly held that the government's role should be that of 
arbitrator, offering a compromise so that both the trade union leaders and 
employer representatives could return to their members with modest gains. " This 
represented a transformation in Unionist attitudes in many respects. In 1913, 
even the open-minded USRC Committee on Industrial Unrest had concluded that 
compulsory arbitration was `no real and practical way of dealing [with] industrial 
disputes'. The failure of European statesmen to avert war in August 1914 could 
only have put an even blacker contrast to their pessimistic conclusion that 
`bargaining [could not] abolish strikes and lock-outs any more than diplomacy 
sa Johnson, Land Fit for Heroes, p. 403. 
ss NUA Conference, 30/11/1917. 
56 Indeed perhaps with too much conviction, for the backing they continued to offer it after 1918 may 
have left the Liberals without an interest in the battle that waged between capital and industry. For the 
Liberal response to the socialist threat see Michael Bentley, The Liberal Response to Socialism, 
1918-29' in Kenneth Brown (ed. ), Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour in 
Britain (Macmillan, London, 1974), pp. 42-74. 
57 'Memorandum on the South Wales Coal Strike' by Steel-Maitland, July 1915. SM GD193/73/6/1-22x. 
Philip Kerr felt likewise, hoping that the Munitions Act would be implemented to its fullest extent, most 
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[could] abolish war' S8 Accordingly, there is much truth in the argument 
developed by Keith Middlemas that, during the war, there emerged a 
commitment to solve industrial disputes through the agencies of government. 
59 
Several further debates revealed the extent to which the party would go in the 
direction of government control for the sake of efficiency. The first was over 
state control of liquor, where even by the end of the war much of the party was 
not reconciled to government interference. This was despite the fact that only in 
Carlisle did the state run the whole trade, whilst elsewhere the Central Liquor 
Control Board possessed only very limited powers and only within crucial 
wartime bases, such as ports. On the surface the discontent reflected merely the 
continued political role of `the trade', but more general attitudes to individual 
liberty and the right of the state were also to the fore. 0 Notwithstanding the 
continued political strength of the drink trade within the party, the licensed trade 
bowed to wartime efforts for state control, by pursuing its financial interests in 
accepting wholesale compensation through nationalisation rather than partial 
ownership (admittedly under the expectation that total nationalisation was 
unlikely). 61 However, an equally powerful consideration for Unionists was the 
belief that, as before the war, the radicals were endeavouring to `pursue their 
course of punishing the licensed trade ... to extremities'. 
62 Old guard Unionists, 
such as the Duke of Rutland and Lord Lansdowne, believed wartime state 
management to be little more than a camouflage behind which the temperance 
movement was manoeuvring for the long-term goals of liquor restriction and 
particularly regarding strikes. Memorandum `The Industrial Outlook' by Philip Kerr, August 1915. Cave 
Papers, MS Add. 62495, ff. 159-68. 
5' John Hills, William James Ashley & Maurice Woods, Industrial Unrest: a practical solution. The 
report of the Unionist Social Reform Committee (London, 1914), pp. vi, 8. 
59 Middlemas, Politics, pp. 18-20, passim. 
60 John Turner, `State Purchase of the Liquor Trade in the First World War', Historical Journal, xxiii 
(1980), pp. 589-615. 
61 Younger to Law, 04/01/1917. BUS 1/2/8. 
62 Campaign Guide 1914, p. 105. 
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even prohibition. 63 This itself was founded on an assumption that formed the 
basis for the most pervasive views, namely that Unionists simply did not consider 
it necessary for the state to regulate alcohol. 
To some extent this reflected a continued confidence within the trade that the 
voluntary principle could provide shorter opening hours and the less alcoholic 
drink. 64 Moreover, as illustrated in Chapter I, many Unionists considered that 
there were more prominent problems to be confronted (munitions and 
conscription) before the government sought to dictate what people drank. For the 
most pervasive sentiment was that the workingman was inherently trustworthy 
and that to deny him his beer was wilfully to incite him. 
5 From the late 
nineteenth century, the temperance movement was criticised as exemplifying the 
supremacy of liberty-denying nonconformity within the Liberal Party, and as 
illustrating middle-class attempts to impress its moral superiority upon the 
working classes. Accordingly, the party endeavoured to associate itself with the 
working-class culture of pubs, gambling and sports in urban areas, and sought 
(largely successfully) to form an alliance between the party and the 
workingman's pint. 6 For instance, in the 1922 Newport by-election, drink was 
`the only issue worthy of the name' and, indeed, it was the most intoxicating 
appeal that the party had been able to make in this region for many years. 
67 
63 Lansdowne Memorandum to Law, 06/04/1915; Rutland to Law, 16/04/1915 BV37/1/9,37. The same 
views can be found in Gwynne to Wilson, 12/04/1915. Keith Wilson (ed. ), The Rasp of War: hie Letters 
of ILA. Gwynne to Lady Bathurst, 1914-1918 (Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1989), p. 78; Gleanings and 
Memoranda [G&M], February 1917, pp. 126-7. 
64 Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool, Behind the Political Scene, 1890-1928 (Hodder & Stoughton, 
London, 1934), p. 140. 
65 For instance, in Sheffield Brightside the controls on licensed premises were attacked as early as 
December 1914, see UA, EC, 18/12/1914. (LD/2101). 
66 Jon Lawrence, `Class and Gender in the Making of Urban Toryism, 1880-1914', English Ilistorial 
Review (1993), pp. 634-9. 
67 John Ramsden, The Newport by-election and the fall of the Coalition', Chris Cook & John Ramsden 
(eds. ), By-elections in British History (UCL Press, London, 1997), pp. 28-9. 
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In terms also of war management, this permissive strategy was considered 
judicious: the workingman was not likely to bite the hand that filled his glass. It 
therefore reflected a link between traditional libertarianism and war management, 
in that the state could better keep the working classes on side by allowing them 
their drink. With genuine concern, Unionist MPs such as F. De Pennefather 
(Kirkdale) and James Fortescue Flannery (Maldon) sought to ensure that supplies 
and taxes did not deny the farm labourer his beer or cider. 68 Shortly after the 
armistice, Rowland Burdon wrote to Law expressing the dangers in County 
Durham of liquor restrictions: workers were leaving work early to make sure 
they could get their beer, a mass walk-out was likely. 69 The Chairman of 
Bradford and Shipley Unionist Association informed John Boraston at Central 
Office that `the revolution in Russia if not altogether due to, was considerably 
fostered, owing to prohibition of liquor', which gave `thought for grave 
reflection' about the attitude of the returning soldiers who would find that whilst 
fighting for their country, the `Government [had] filched their liberties away'. 0 
The elements of industrial efficiency and state control were encapsulated in the 
debate on agriculture. The Corn Production Bill, introduced in summer 1917, 
proposed that a fixed price be accorded wheat, whilst a minimum wage of 
twenty-five shillings per week would be established for agricultural labourers. 
The incentive was falling grain imports from Canada and the United States, 
caused by German submarines. By December 1916 the situation had reached 
crisis point: in the previous three months, the Empire had lost 524,574 gross tons 
of shipping while the harvests in Canada and the USA were anyway much 
68 Pennefather to Hewins, 14/04/1916. Hewins Papers, 59/151-2; H. S. Syrett [Ministry of Food] to Flannery, 25/06/1918. Flannery Papers, D/DU/861/15. 
69 Rowland Burdon to Law, 03/06/1919. BU97/4/5. 
70 J. E. Fawcett to Boraston, 18/06/1917 (copy). Lloyd George Papers, F/6/2/34. 
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reduced. 71 So concerned was Gwynne that he felt that on the matter of 
submarines rested the nature of the peace that Britain would be able to achieve. 
2 
The problem was to worsen further as Germany removed what few restrictions 
she had placed on her submarines, and during the spring and summer of 1917 the 
destruction of ocean-going tonnage trebled. 
In 1915, it was specifically with such fears in mind that Selborne had proposed 
that a minimum price for wheat should be introduced by the government for the 
following three to five years, in order to encourage farmers to grow grain. 3 
While going short of recommending compulsory ploughing, a generous 
guaranteed price was viewed as the only way to encourage farmers to cultivate in 
a manner which, `from the point of view of pure business, they are indisposed to 
do'. The authors of the scheme, Milner and Selborne, were disappointed to 
discover that their Unionist colleagues were unsupportive. After one particular 
Cabinet, Selborne noted that, with the exception of Chamberlain, `my own 
political friends dislike the scheme quite as much as the hidebound Cobdenites, 
tho' for different reasons. '74 One motivation for Balfour was a defensiveness 
about the Admiralty's record, and he asserted that such measures were 
unnecessary because the submarine menace of June and July 1915 was under 
control 75 Law apparently agreed in principle with the measure but `was not 
prepared to make a capital question of it', and thus imperil Asquith's coalition 
government by forcing such a measure upon McKenna or Runciman. 76 
Underlying such immediate political and practical considerations lay more acute 
71 Lord Ernle, Whippingham to Westminster: the reminiscences of Lord Ernle (John Murray, London, 
1938), p. 28 1. 
72 Gwynne to Carson, 29/04/1917. Carson Papers, MIC/665/B/28/35. 
" Selborne to Balfour, 15/07/1915,09/0811915,20/08/1915. Balfour Papers, MS Add. 49708, ff. 256-7 
74 Selborne to Milner, 04/08/1915 and reply. Milner Papers, 350/247-8,252-6. 
75 Ernle, Whippingham, pp. 273-81. 
76 Milner to Selborne, 30/07/1915 (copy). Milner Papers, 350/222-4. 
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political differences which, in his pique, Selborne considered to represent `the 
dislike of any interference with landlords and farmers' 
?7 
When Roland Prothero (President of the Board of Agriculture) introduced the 
Corn Production Bill in summer 1917, it met with fierce criticism from the 
parliamentary party. This is not to suggest that the party was opposed root and 
branch, for a considerable section was fully in favour. As early as July and 
August 1914, Charles Bathurst and Richard Cooper had each proposed the 
necessity of government management of food production, Bathurst advocating 
inducements to farmers to encourage the area under tillage, Cooper urging the 
government to take control of production and distribution. 
8 Other agricultural 
experts, including Jesse Collings and Christopher Tumor, supported state 
intervention at least to the point of a guaranteed price. 9 However, such was the 
unease within some agricultural circles that the Asquithians Lewis Harcourt and 
Lord Crewe were able to exploit Chaplin as a weapon against the Lloyd George 
Government. 80 Why was this? 
Undoubtedly there were various attendant evils at the time: controversial Cabinet 
appointments, new departments, and impediments placed by the government in 
the way of the Paris Economic Conference (PEC) resolutions. Nonetheless, the 
continued level of concern, first sensed at Cabinet level in 1915, and then felt 
through much of 1917 and 1918, revealed that this was not a protest limited to 
the political wrangles of summer 1917.81 Reluctance to encroach upon the 
farmers' independence certainly reflected a strange dichotomy of standards, by 
77 Selborne to Robert Palmer, 06/08/1915. Boyce, Crisis, p. 142. 
'a For Bathurst see House of Commons debates, 27/03/1914, Ilansard, 5`h Series, 1xvi, 152. For Cooper, 
see Cooper Papers, 74798/1- 
79 Jesse Collings, The Great War: its lessons and its warnings (Rural World Publishing Company, 
London, 1916), pp. 100-1; Christopher Tumor, Our Food Supply: Perils and Remedies (Country Life, 
London, 1916), pp. 140-6. 
80 Milner to Selborne, 29/06/1917. Milner Papers, 354/138. 
81 See Chapter II and below 
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which Unionists considered it acceptable to compel the citizen to fight - and 
quite possibly die - for his country, but not to oblige the ploughing up of 
grassland. When the matter came before the Cabinet in 1917, Long continued to 
oppose state intervention and had to play his best hand in order to amend the bill. 
Never reticent in conveying his views to his colleagues, Long's endeavours at 
this hour - including almost identical longhand appeals to Carson, Hewins, 
Balfour, Cave and Bull - exceeded all previous enterprises. For him the matter 
was not a straight one of economics, but rather that the government was 
compelling experts to act against their better judgement. Six months after the bill 
had passed he recorded that in his village, `plough after plough [are] smashed in 
fruitless efforts to break up land wh[ich] will not be broken up. ' Meanwhile, he 
contended, the farmer (and landed interests more generally), possessing few 
representatives, required him to act as a self-appointed rural affairs' `expert'. He 
himself complained of being poorly represented in the press and set out to 
establish a means by which he could get better coverage for his concerns and to 
gain the attention of the right-wing press so that `they could see striking 
illustration of [the] folly of ploughing certain grass land'. 82 Why could the 
government not allow decisions to be made at a local level, Long lamented, 
instead of this `half-baked, bastard socialism'? 83 
These concerns were mirrored on the Unionist backbenches. Colonel 
W. E. Weigall (Horncastle), whilst supporting a resolution to provide the 
government with the capacity to supervise the agricultural industry, reminded the 
minister that `the grass farm and the arable farm are as different as iron and brick 
works. ' 84 The contrast drawn by Weigall was no accident: the Unionists had 
always represented themselves as the defenders of, and experts regarding, 
82 Long to Bull, 26/03/1918,21/08/1917,25/08/1917,19103/1918. Bull CAC 4/17. 
83 Long to Blumenfeld, 06/04/1918. Blumenfeld Papers, LONG/W/10. 
84 House of Commons debates, 13/06/1917. Hansard 5 `h Series, xciv, 1009-15. 
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agricultural interests. What did the government know of operating a farm? 
Precisely the same arguments had been used before the war against Lloyd 
George's Land Taxes, when the Chancellor had been asked why he knew nothing 
of mangel-wurzel - an obscure beet used as cattle food, of which of course very 
few Unionists had any knowledge either. Even more prominent was the wider 
issue of a bureaucratic state. This had particular bearing on the question of 
farming, as rural Unionists held that agriculture was terribly under-represented in 
government and the civil service. 85 It had relevance, however, in all economic 
and social spheres. At a later stage, Weigall laid bare his distrust of central 
government in a request that local committees rather than central government 
decide the level of production required from a particular farm. 86 
This scepticism continued well after the bill had become law, becoming a 
common gripe of the Spectator. Strachey and his journal had a long free trade 
heritage and the challenge of war tempered this but slightly. For, although ready 
to acknowledge the need for the taxation of `excess profits', the Spectator 
disliked government interference on any larger basis. Therefore, 'the root cause of 
food shortages in January 1918 was the Food Controller and his department, and 
most especially the artificial prices instituted. It was, moreover, `a result which 
every student of political economy could have predicted months or years ago, 
and many economists did predict'. 87 Aside of the bureaucratic and agricultural 
factors, a further reason posited by the Spectator was the economic. When 
parliament was voting the scheme money, Banbury moved an amendment 
limiting expenditure to £500,000: `if we pass this resolution without any limiting 
words the whole of Great Britain and Ireland may be taken over by the 
RS For instance, see views on redistribution of seats, Chapter IV. 
86 House of Commons debates, 31/07/1917. Hansard, 5`h Series, xcvi, 1052. 
87 Spectator, 12/01/1918, pp. 31-2. 
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Government and farmed by the State. ' 88 Experience showed, he concluded, that 
governments did not manage business efficiently and that bureaucracy was 
expensive. 
On this occasion Banbury spoke for a very considerable section of the party. 
Especially, many Unionists still balked at the idea of a minimum wage and most 
notably its socio-economic rather than its wartime foundations. A report by a 
UWC sub-committee (including Bathurst, Mark Sykes, Banbury, Gretton and 
Joynson-Hicks) briefed to look at the question of food supply proposed a 
guaranteed minimum wheat price, but offered only piecemeal suggestions - 
including the employment of women and German prisoners on the land - as to 
how to fund it 89 They might as well have plucked off the shelves a dusty copy of 
the USRC report of 1913. `F. E. ' and Leslie Scott even made much of their 
involvement in the pre-war conclusions of the USRC on the minimum wage and 
the fact that they were `no recent converts'. 90 They still remained close to the 
USRC line that despite the duty of the state to work towards a proper minimum 
(or subsistence) wage, the individual had no right to expect to receive this at the 
expense of other individuals or the community. 91 The implementation of a 
national minimum wage that would impinge upon these interests therefore could 
not be countenanced. Accordingly, many Unionists preferred the prospect of 
Agricultural Wages Boards rather than a national minimum wage. James Agg- 
Gardner (Cheltenham) appealed for Prothero to `consider once again before he 
inflicts upon agriculture the burden, friction, turmoil, jealousy and the cost of a 
system of wages boards and the minimum wage'. His proposition was for a 
decentralised and voluntary scheme whereby farmers would have to tender their 
88 House of Commons debates, 13/06/1917. Mansard, 5`h Series, xciv, 1083-90. 
89 UWC report on the agricultural industry, 14/11/1916. Carson Papers, MIC/665/B/12/14. 
90 House of Commons debates, 23/07/1917. Hansard 5`h Series, xciv, 724-30,956-63. 91 Hills, Industrial Unrest, pp. 3-5. 
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wage-bills to the government only in the event of their wishing to receive a state 
bonus. Agg-Gardner reflected wider agricultural opinion in underlining the 
`almost impossibility' of establishing a minimum wage level for a group of 
workers that `vary in degrees from the highest skilled ploughman or herdsman 
down through various grades of agricultural labourer'. Lawrence Hardy, Scott 
and Basil Peto were concerned that the local boards would view the datum line of 
25 shillings per week as the minimum that could be awarded to the workers and 
that wages would soar. 92 
On the other hand, other members were not reluctant to roll out the old Tory 
guns: Gretton (Rutland) described the minimum wage clause as `an absolute dead 
letter' because the efficient labourer had no problem earning 25s per week; 
J. W. Spear (Tavistock) drew attention to the elderly who would be denied work. 
This was complemented by concern that as the tenant could profit from the 
legislation, why should not the landowners be allowed to raise rents for five 
years without the permission of the Agricultural Boards. 93 Even the open-minded 
Wood objected to the bill, fearing that it was being hijacked by social reformers; 
he considered the `main object' of the bill was to increase production and that the 
regional diversity of wages made a national minimum wage the `height of un- 
wisdom'. Hence, the overriding sentiment was that if a minimum wage was 
necessary it should not be passed for social reasons, namely to provide for the 
improvident or the exceptionally large family. Such was the dissatisfaction that 
Unionist dissidents were won over to the corn bill only by the spectre of a 30 
shillings wage. 94 So upset was the party journal Gleanings and Memoranda at the 
efforts of G. J. Wardle and his Labour colleagues to extend the wage that they 
92 House of Commons debates, 18/07/1917. Ilansard, 5`h Series, xciv, 414-9,672-3. 
93 Howard Frank to Salisbury, 18/04/1917. Salisbury Papers S (4) 79/121-2. 
94 House of Commons debates, 23/07/1917. Mansard, 5`h Series, xciv, 928-31. The only Unionists to 
divide against the government were Rowland Hunt (shortly to be a member of the National Party) and 
Ernest Jardine. 
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made a point of listing (presumably for the scurrilous purposes of Unionist 
campaigners) all the Labour Members who had voted against the 25s minimum - 
without mentioning of course that they had voted for a 30s minimum. 
95 On a 
more general level, concern over wages was probably centred on an appreciation 
that the workers were doing well out of the war and that wage increases would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to reverse after the war. 
96 
One final debate worth recording for its illustrative qualities was over excess 
profits taxes. Several key motivations lay behind what was a highly controversial 
and anti-capitalist policy. As Peto argued, `Labour may very rightly ask that their 
patriotic work should not be used to inflate the profits of directors and 
shareholders of the various great industrial and armament firms. '97 Equally 
prominent, as in the sphere of industrial arbitration, was the recognition of the 
need to temper excessive war profits so as to assuage industrial unrest. 
98 
Notwithstanding these ethical and pragmatic rationales, Chamberlain was against 
extending the scheme, reminding Long that `it was the counterpart of great 
concessions on the part of Labour and was really adopted as an instrument of 
policy rather than of taxation'. Indeed, he believed the `cry of profiteering [to be] 
much exaggerated'. 99 Peto and the UBC demanded that generous consideration 
be given to capital depreciation in any calculation of tax due, just as they had 
fought for implementation of the tax. 100 Majority Unionist opinion viewed 
excess-profits tax as an expedient to ensure full production and a measure 
exceptional to a wartime manufacturing climate within which firms, such as 
95 G&M, November 1918, pp. 217-9. 
96 Charles Marston drew the attention of the NUEC to the `dissatisfaction felt by employers' at the raising 
of wages by a further 12.5% by the Ministry of Munitions. NUEC, 16/01/1918. 
97 Peto to Robert Cecil, 16103/1915. Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51161, ff. 210-11. 
9' Milner to Herbert Samuel, 06/11/1916 (copy); Milner to Colvin, 05/06/1917 (copy). Milner Papers, 
353/102-7,354/124-5. 
99 Chamberlain to Long, 27/11/1916 (copy). AC/12/142. 
100 Memorandum on Excess Profits Tax by Peto. UBC, EC, 10/08/1915. Hewins Papers, 26. 
285 
munitions, could benefit unfairly. Accordingly, there was no projection that the 
duty would be continued beyond the period when trade and industry had been 
normalised post-war. It was another case of the promotion of efficiency, with any 
other claims, like the right of labour to an increased share of profits, suppressed. 
Together these debates demonstrate the realms in which attitudes had changed 
during the war. Despite a continued reluctance to see the state intervening in 
matters of personal choice (such as drink) or of the redistribution of wealth, the 
war encouraged a readiness in the overwhelming majority of the party to 
mobilise in favour of the prosecution of the war, including state control. In so 
doing, it shifted the minimum level of state intervention up a gear, by 
establishing a consensus within the party that moderate action in this area was 
acceptable, at least on occasion. More particularly in this regard, war 
consolidated opinion around the conclusions of the pre-war USRC. The 
sentiment persisted however - partly encouraged by the resilience of a parliament 
seven years old, whose brief was the war - that when state intervention was 
proposed or accepted it was for purposes of economic and military efficiency 
rather than social reasons. This can be witnessed in the Corn Production Bill, 
which sought to increase yields and enlarge arable farming, and which adopted 
the minimum wage only as a necessary corollary to state assistance to the 
consumer. It can also be seen in excess profits legislation, which was enacted to 
achieve the specific goal of wartime industrial production. Where these measures 
caused controversy was when they were perceived as `social', and here Unionists 
sought to ensure that only the minimum was conceded. These debates proved that 
the party was not walking blindly into state control, its eyes blinkered by the 
demands of war, but gave careful consideration as to what was absolutely 
essential to the war and what was not. 
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Looking to the Future 
I do implore my Tory friends [not] to shy off reforms on the grounds that they are 
socialistic: why, the whole of the war is socialistic; every controlled establishment 
making munitions is socialistic; every railway is socialistic .... 
10, 
So did Joynson-Hicks (a most uncompromising Home Secretary a decade later) 
call for state assistance for the rural housing problem, when considering methods 
of reconstruction in 1917. Notwithstanding such brave revolutionary talk, the 
Unionist Party has been accused of thwarting, among others, housing plans, the 
Transport Bill and the Acquisition of Land Bill after the war. This apparent 
regression of the Unionist Party from progressive converts to propertied 
backwoodsmen has demanded explanation. Historians of all shades are ready to 
acknowledge the impact of several institutional and macroeconomic 
determinants. The initial post-war boom was succeeded by a dispiriting economic 
slump and rampant inflation, and then once again by economic buoyancy, all of 
which shaped approaches to labour and helped foster the anti-waste movements. 
On an institutional level reconstruction was fragile as, for instance, the Ministry 
of Labour suffered at the hands of the Treasury whose traditionalist personnel 
and systems disliked the fresh administrative expenditure involved. Equally 
disruptive were the jealousies between the old departments and the new: the 
Board of Trade distrusted the Ministry of Transport; the Ministry of Health could 
barely breathe under the suffocating influence of the Local Government Board. 102 
The proliferation of new departments, also, undermined central planning, as the 
broader economic implications of their programmes were frequently 
lo' William Joynson-Hicks, `The Land Question' in William Harbutt Dawson (ed. ), After-War Problems 
(Allen & Unwin, London, 1917), p. 189. 
102 Abrams, `Social Reform', pp. 50-1; Peter K. Cline, `Eric Geddes and the "Experiment" with 
Businessmen in Government, 1915-22' in Idem., Anti-Labour history, p. 93. 
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disregarded. 103 Last, but not least, was the huge number of other substantive 
issues under consideration at Cabinet level after the conclusion of the war, 
including the Versailles conference, the League of Nations, violent inflation and 
demobilisation. 104 
Notwithstanding such dynamics, the traditional argument explaining the Unionist 
retreat from reconstruction, first posited by the economist Maynard Keynes, was 
that a general election fought on perverted lines had ensured the return to 
Parliament of `a lot of hard-faced men who look as if they had done very well out 
of the war'. 105 These cynical men, who on being passed the national plate during 
the war had filled rather than emptied their pockets, were now only too eager to 
keep their ill-gotten gains. This line of reasoning (a phrase that originated from 
Baldwin) was bolstered by interpretations of the likes of Hugh Cecil who 
suggested that the real power in Baldwin's Cabinet lay with the `middle-class 
monsters'; Winterton, who observed during a debate on the transport bill a 
`rather reactionary opposition among some of the fat, prosperous-looking 
Coalition supporters'; and Marriott who recorded that in 1918 the Unionist 
`victory proved to be too complete; the new House rather smelt of money'. 
106 
Needless to say, many of these were later accounts, tainted somewhat by the 
raised hand of the apologist or the pointed finger of the accuser. More recent 
historians have credited these arguments, most notably Bentley Gilbert, who, 
leaning heavily upon the argument if not the evidence of Keynes, perceives the 
103 Rodney Lowe, The Erosion of State: Intervention, 1917-24', Economic History Review, xxxi (1978), 
pp. 270-286. 
104 Johnson, Land Fit for Heroes, p. 464. 
105 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Macmillan, London, 1924), 
pp. 124-33. 
106 W . D. Rubinbstein, Capitalism, 
Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990 (Routledge, London, 1993), 
pp. 74-7; Earl Winterton, Orders of the Day (Cassell & Co., London, 1953), p. 90; John Marriott, 
Memories of Four Score Years (Blackie & Sons, London, 1946), p. 163. 
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non-socialist social reformist Lloyd George as being captured by the heartless 
and reactionary Tories in the post-war coalition. 
107 
Such arguments are supported by the fruition in 1918 of a policy adopted under 
Law's pre-war leadership to promote business interests within the party. 
108 But, 
inherently, this argument maintains one of two things: that during the war the 
Unionist conversion to state intervention was thorough and genuine and the 
retreat from it was due to the grip of business, property, and voting influences 
becoming tight upon the party. The alternative is that the party had not really 
considered the implications of its wartime actions and merely reverted to its anti- 
collectivist type after the war. However, as has been seen above, proper 
consideration was given to the many facets of wartime state intervention and, 
where the interests of the party were threatened unnecessarily, these interests 
were defended. On the other hand, was the transformation from ingenuous 
reformer to arch reactionary really that overwhelming? 
The first point that must be made is that even if it was a retreat, it was hardly a 
full-scale one: the party accepted the Acquisition of Land Bill (admittedly not 
without fighting its more radical clauses) and an extension of the Corn 
Production Act (the 1920 Agriculture Act). Even C. L. Mowat, never profligate in 
conferring compliments upon interwar governments, considered the Housing and 
Town Planning Act (1919) and the Unemployment Insurance Act (1920) as 
substantial welfare measures. 109 Nevertheless, the retreat to economy after 1920, 
107 Bentley Gilbert, British Social Policy, 1914-1939 (Batsford, London, 1970), pp. 13-25,306. It was an 
argument accepted also by Samuel J. Hurwitz, State Intervention in Great Britain. A Study of Economic 
Control and Social Response, 1914-1919 (Frank Cass & Co., London, 1968), pp. 293-5. One objection at 
the very least to this argument concerning the new members, was that the New Members Coalition 
Group, which accounted for more than half of the 168 new Unionist members, was urging fusion upon 
Law and sponsoring Lloyd George's ambitious social plans. David Close, `Conservatives and Coalition 
after the First World War', Journal of Modern History (1973), p. 244-5. 
108 Ramdsen, Balfour and Baldwin, pp. 98-9. 
109 C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (Methuen & Co., London, 1955), p. 23. 
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most famously through the `Geddes Axe', which slashed expenditure almost 
across the board, represented a departure from that programme. However, it will 
be shown here that attitudes to reconstruction during and after the war displayed 
a consistency not frequently appreciated. 
The most significant point to be realised is the interpretation that Unionists put 
on reconstruction, for therein lies the answer to how far the war affected attitudes 
to state intervention and social reform. It is evident that the divergent enthusiasm 
displayed during the war for government intervention for industrial and national 
efficiency but not for social reform was mirrored in attitudes to reconstruction. In 
spite of the emphases that have come down to the historian, reconstruction was 
for Unionists more a question of economic than social reform. 
110 This is not to 
deny that an undertaking for social reform existed. There is no doubt that in 
manifestos, and more particularly in the programme extolled by the Prime 
Minister whom they were supporting, there lay an obligation of social and 
economic reconstruction. One MP later admitted for instance that, although 
Addison's Housing Bill and a bill for the settlement of ex-servicemen on the land 
were very controversial, `the fact is that we were all committed to a great 
programme of social reform. ' 
111 But how full was their commitment? 
At the 1918 general election it was very rare for Unionists to lead on a policy of 
social reconstruction. Of those studied, only Astor and Robert Cecil gave 
anything approaching prominence to this theme, the former leading with a call 
1 for housing, land, labour and health `to be dealt with on radical lines'. 12 Other 
110 For instance, the accounts of Christopher Addison, which take as their centre the state housing scheme 
and attempt to illustrate the wartime party as committed root and branch to the schemes. Christopher 
Addison, Politics From Within 1911-1918. Including some records of a great national effort, (Herbert 
Jenkins, London, 1924). 
11' Arthur Griffith-Boscawen, Memoirs (John Murray, London, 1925), pp. 219-20. 
112 Astor general election card, December 1918. Astor Papers, 529. Through actual election manifestos, 
extended campaigning speeches and letters to local associations expressing their intentions, twenty-eight 
representative candidates have been studied. 
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socially-minded Unionists, such as Wolmer, laid greater emphasis upon 
indemnities from, and punishment of, Germany. 113 Certainly there was mention - 
in all addresses - of reform and no doubt it was sincerely intentioned, 
nevertheless it was cursory and the emphasis was placed instead on reparations, 
Empire development and tariff reform. So preoccupied with the international 
situation and German criminals was the Devon candidate E. W. Pickering that, 
when forced to respond to a question regarding the level of state intervention in 
housing, he admitted that he had `not given this particular question minute 
attention'. He joked that the solution might lie in commissioning a few bombers 
to destroy the slums, before concluding, `I hardly think, however, this is the time 
to discuss this question. ' 114 In Colchester, even an appeal to women voters by the 
candidate's wife was obsessed with the punishment of the Kaiser and the full 
payment of indemnities, with only a general call for `Good Homes, Good and 
Regular Wages' . 
115 When social reform was addressed, it tended to be war- 
related. In Torquay, the Unionist candidate asserted that `no efforts will be 
spared by me' to ensure that the `millions of our gallant men' will return to jobs 
and homes and that the government would provide `any assistance from the state 
which is necessary to secure them'. 116 Some candidates dealt so thoroughly with 
the conditions of peace and welfare for the returning soldier and the soldier's 
widow that the issue of wider social reform was entirely neglected. '17 Even this 
vision of state pensions for the widowed and disabled was too much for the 
113 Wolmer general election manifesto, 25/11/1918. Wolmer Papers, c1010, ff. 124-5. 
114 Dewsbury District News, 07/12/1918. This paper was produced by the local Unionist association, but 
seemingly was circulated as a normal weekly. 
115 Gertrude Worthington Evans circular to women voters, 02/12/1918. Worthington Evans Papers, c. 892, 
ff. 21-2. 
116 Dartmouth and South Hams Chronicle, 29/11/1918. 
117 Bull General Election Poster, November 1918. Bull Papers, Hammersmith. 
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Spectator, which alluded to the `crude appeal to selfishness disguised under the 
plausible cloak of patriotic generosity' .' 
is 
With the introduction of the electoral element into the equation after four years of 
war administration, Unionists were forced to confront the problematic question 
of whether and, if so how, to advocate social reform. The introduction of women 
into the electorate spurred on a fresh debate and part of this internal discourse is 
worth recording: 
The introduction of such a large feminine element in the political arena must of necessity 
bring domestic legislation to the front to the exclusion of Imperial affairs. Prohibition 
campaigns, home welfare, equal opportunities for women in the labour market, sex 
equality, free meals for all children, permanent communal kitchens, free maternity 
nursing homes for mothers, will all make their appearance in election addresses. Whilst 
there has been a great deal of talk in the Commons about purity of elections, nothing has 
been said or done to check the scandalous growing evil of offering collective. bribes out of 
the public funds to corrupt electors. 119 
In writing this, the Central Office Agent G. W. D. Daw displayed a remarkable 
contradiction between an awareness of what a female electorate might desire and 
a closing warning against collective bribes funded by the state. It mattered less 
that many Unionists appreciated that women would demand welfare reform, than 
that they should consider these but as backhanders. This seems especially 
remarkable in that they had a tendency to consider that the sphere of women's 
action was moral rather than material. 120 No doubt the real fear was that, while 
they might be willing - and able - to grease the palm of the new electorate with 
the odd coin here and there, their political opponents threatened to open wide the 
vaults of the bank. 
118 `The Bottomless Purse', Spectator, 07/12/1918, pp. 648-9. 
119 CAJ, January 1918, p. 7. 
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Neither do false impressions of the bases of wartime collectivism and policies of 
reconstruction assist in understanding Unionist attitudes towards reconstruction. 
According to Kenneth Morgan, after December 1916 laissez-faire `lay in the 
dust'. If proof were needed, Salisbury's heading of a commission that pressed for 
a subsidised public housing scheme provided it. 121 Morgan perceives a marked 
retreat from these Unionist pledges made in the latter half of the war, in relation 
to both social reform and matters like industrial arbitration. One problem with 
Morgan's interpretation of the Lloyd George government as the advent of a 
messianic force is that it tacitly suggests that Unionist MPs and ministers were 
waiting at the starting blocks eager to push off on the collectivist track. However, 
as has been shown in Chapter II, the Lloyd George coalition was never a smooth 
journey for many Unionists. Moreover, Unionist conceptions of reconstruction 
have never been examined in any detail. It will be demonstrated here that their 
priorities were based around wartime themes, such as industrial capacity and 
efficiency, or the Empire, and principally economic rather than social reform. 
Undeniably there were deep-rooted and real desires to see the social betterment 
of the population after the war. The war spurred on the idealist philosophies that 
reduced emphasis on materialism whilst accentuating notions of citizenship and 
ethical duty. 122 One inspiration was the wartime notion of reconstruction inspired 
by the sacrifices made by soldiers, most famously expressed in Lloyd George's 
appeal for `homes for heroes'. This was reflected well in the Anti-Socialist Union 
(ASU), for whom the idea of social regeneration was powerful enough to act as 
an encouragement for it to re-badge itself as the Reconstruction Society in 
1918.123 The prevalence of the sentiment of hope and rejuvenation after the war 
121 Kenneth Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-22 
(Clarendon, Oxford, 1979), pp. 13-21. 122 Jose Harris, `Political Thought and the Welfare State, 1870-1940: An Intellectual Framework for 
British Social Policy', Past and Present, cxxxv (1992), pp. 117-41. 
123 Kenneth Brown `The Anti-Socialist Union, 1909-1949', in Idem., Anti-Labour History, p. 252. 
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was epitomised in the words of its founder, R. D. Blumenfeld, who urged that a 
`new building' (rather than a renovated one) was required on foundations not of 
pre-war assumptions but civilized industrial relations along the lines of Whitley 
Councils. Allied to this was an almost universal desire for the government `to 
secure the future welfare and comfort' of disabled and discharged sailors and 
soldiers. 124 So intense was this feeling that Crawford believed that `the moral 
feeling of obligation towards ex-soldiers is such that we mean to embark on what 
will in all probability prove to be an economic failure. ' 125 Meanwhile, as 
Bentinck argued, housing represented an area in which those at home could seek 
to pay off some of their `debt of gratitude to our gallant soldiers'. 126 For the Daily 
Telegraph, the dreadfulness of war contrasted with the opportunities for peace, in 
which there was `the promise of a new England. 
This sentiment challenged Unionist conceptions of state intervention in a more 
profound manner than wartime collectivism. As in their championing of pensions 
and allowances for the dependents of soldiers and sailors, it inherently 
acknowledged that the serviceman deserved a specific standard of living and that 
he could call upon the state to provide this. As Dicey told Strachey, although 
they both had in the past looked upon old age pensions with `very little favour', 
if the latter were linked to national service - and therefore civic duty - they 
would be acceptable. 128 Consequently, welfare was divorced from social 
efficiency. Its wider implications were that if a person executed his/her duties of 
citizenship, he/she could expect inter alia a basic level of state assistance. For 
several reasons, however, not least the continued emphasis placed upon social 
124 SUA Eastern Division, 21/11/1918, (Acc. 10424/43). 
125 Crawford Diary, 05/03/1918. John Vincent (ed. ), The Crawford Papers: the Journals of David 
Lindsay, Twenty-seventh Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, 1871-1940 (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984), pp. 386-7. 
126 House of Commons Debates, 02/05/1918. Hansard, 5'' Series, cv, 1804-9. 
127 Daily Telegraph, 25/11/1918, Editorial. 
128 Dicey to Strachey, 28/08/1914. Strachey Papers, S/5/7/4. 
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imperialism and social efficiency, it can be demonstrated that the vast majority of 
the party never moved to anything beyond a cursory acceptance of this. 
As always within the party there existed a small hardcore of social reformists, 
including Milner, Neville Chamberlain, Bentinck and Astor. Astor urged the 
adoption of Whitley Councils and a Ministry of Health, berating William Hayes 
Fisher (the Unionist President of the Local Government Board) for refusing to 
advocate one central authority for health as an economic and efficient 
reorganisation. 129 Chamberlain continued his father's municipal reform in 
Birmingham, establishing consultations between workers and employers, paid 
holidays and even the Civic Recreation League (a functional title for what was an 
avant-garde move to establish the City of Birmingham Orchestra). 130 Although 
he could not fully escape his paternalist forefathers, Bentinck advocated a `bold, 
comprehensive [housing] plan [to] bring the people out into the air and 
sunshine'. 131 In the main, there is no doubt that the war increased the appeal of 
state sponsorship of social reform. The Advisory Housing Panel, which included 
the Unionists Salisbury (as chairman), John Hills and Scott, recorded that `it 
would not be justifiable' to assume that private enterprise could provide all the 
houses needed. 132 Salisbury advocated a system whereby the state would 
undertake the entire cost of building and would not, when selling the properties 
on to local authorities after five years, expect to receive full reimbursement of the 
costs. 133 Scott concurred and merely emphasised the necessity for a larger 
number of houses and urged that `where the owner is not willing to sell at once, 
129 Astor to the Editor, The Times, 14/01/1918. 
130 Self, Neville Chamberlain, pp. 77-8,167-8. 
131 Bentinck, Tory Democracy, pp. 119-21. 
132 Housing in England and Wales: Memorandum by Advisory Panel on the Emergency Problem [1918, 
Cd. 9087]. 
133 'Notes on the Principal questions which arise from the consideration of Mr Rowntree's Memoandum' 
by Salisbury, 16/05/1917. Lloyd George Papers, F1781116. 
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drastic, simple and expeditious machinery for compulsory purchase must be 
invented and put in operation. ' 
134 
Manifest in the assumptions of the panel, however, was that `it should be clearly 
understood that no attempt is made to deal with the permanent housing question' 
but only the problems attendant on the war and its immediate aftermath. 
135 In 
truth, the group addressed only one long-term matter, namely rural emigration 
(which Scott argued was spurred on by housing shortages), and this represented a 
long-held Unionist obsession with the depopulation of the countryside, 
possessing both national and political rationales. More generally, whilst state- 
ownership was `not impracticable', it was `undesirable', except as a purely 
temporary expedient. Instead it was to be worked through local authorities, whilst 
the state was to take the burden of uneconomic rents for the period until 
economic rents could be introduced. Therefore, only for the distinct period of 
upheaval was the state to be trusted bureaucratically and burdened financially, 
while, in the longer-term, municipal government was to take the onus. As such, 
their proposals differed radically from that of the Addison Housing Act of 1919, 
which represented a `crucial departure point' as envisaging a long-term extension 
of government action in the housing sphere as a kind of social service in its own 
right. 136 Although different in scale and sphere of activity to the slum-clearance 
policies instigated by Salisbury's father (the Prime Minister), they also possessed 
the similarity of being temporary and one-off solutions to issues of state 
intervention. 137 
134 `Considerations on Mr. Rowntree's and Lord Salisbury's Memoranda' by Leslie Scott, 19/06/1917. 
Lloyd George Papers, F178/117. 
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Several further points must be understood regarding this enthusiasm for state 
collectivism. First, it certainly did not represent a complete ideological shift in 
Salisbury's thoughts. As a rule he held that `the solid ground of Unionist policy 
is cracking in all directions. We have no gospel to preach. ... Shall we accept 
heartily the wide development of the Education Bill upon which all that is most 
Conservative in the working-class has set its heart or shall we emphasise the 
necessity of economy? ' 138 The second feature was that in nearly all cases the 
social aspects of reconstruction were subordinate to the economic and that where 
they were not subordinate, they were overwhelmingly short-term emergency 
measures directed most frequently at the period of demobilisation. Moreover, the 
collision between the economic and social elements, and hence the need to 
choose between them, did not occur until after 1919-20 when inflation and the 
Anti-Waste League made a choice all too necessary. 
Although featuring prominently in manifestos throughout the country, gratitude 
to the serviceman and social reform concealed other more pragmatic 
considerations, namely the satisfaction of the wishes of the ex-servicemen in 
order to forestall mutiny and revolution. 139 As one Yorkshire Unionist had 
warned Boraston, it was not wise to inflame the passions of the returning soldier 
except in favour of the state. 140 The overt radicalism of the Discharged and 
Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors Federation only spurred this on further. 141 
Many demands for social reform were couched in patently pragmatic language. 
Indeed, reform was certainly to some degree a counter-revolution and a means 
(as Mark Swenarton has argued) to control civil disobedience. Mayes Fisher 
implored Lloyd George that there should be no hedging in regard to the 
138 Salisbury to Midleton, 17/08/1918. Midleton Papers, PRO 30/67/25. 
139 Chris Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-War Coalition 1918-1922 (St 
Martin's Press, London, 1990), pp. 14-21; Lawrence Orbach, homes for Heroes: A Study of the Evolution 
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140 See above p. 278. 
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government's pledge of `substantial financial assistance' because serious 
industrial unrest would otherwise result. On the other hand, the necessity of 
maintaining production - so evident during the war - was matched after 
November 1918 by the desire to forestall revolution. By February 1919, Long 
had no doubt that the government was `up against a Bolshevik movement in 
London, Glasgow, and elsewhere'. 142 In March 1919, Austen Chamberlain felt 
housing to be the first priority and that it should be pursued `at whatever cost to 
the State'; a year's experience as Chancellor of the Exchequer (and of inflation) 
led him though to propose that the government should abandon the scheme. 
143 
As in housing, other social reform schemes were partially directed specifically at 
the immediate post-war challenges of demobilisation and normalisation of trade 
and industry. With this in mind, Henry- Terrell MP sought to amend the New 
Ministries (Reconstruction) Bill of August 1917 by limiting its brief to the 
`problem of demobilisation', instead of simply `after-war problems'. 
144 Likewise, 
Lord Sanderson bemoaned the participation in the Reconstruction Committee of 
Beatrice Webb, whose object was `that this intervention of state and municipal 
action should take a permanent form [beyond the period of demobilisation] - not 
excessive in appearance, but superseding and paralysingindividual action'. His 
only consolation was that, once wartime patriotism had ceased to check the flood 
of complaints, bureaucratic officials would not be allowed to continue as they 
wished. 145 Meanwhile, for the extended years of demobilisation, Wolmer was 
prepared to see the government undertake national enterprises such as 
afforestation and the provision of power supplies and transport, but he did not 
141 For Unionist fears see pp. 199-200. 
142 Mark Swenarton, Homes Fit for heroes: The Politics and Architecture of Earl State housing in 
Britain (Heineman, London, 1981), pp. 77-8. 
143 Ibid., pp. 81,130. 
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look beyond this. 146 It is evident therefore that, as in attitudes to electoral reform, 
many MPs were here swayed principally by the need to establish order in the 
immediate post-war environment. 
Despite the rhetoric promising `a land fit for heroes', the favoured route for 
bringing this about was through a robust economy. As early as spring 1915, 
Unionists in Scotland had proposed that a government committee consider the 
likely effect of the war upon trade and industry, and, `in view of the probable 
conditions of the labour market on the termination of the war[, ] to advise what 
steps should be taken in order to prevent as far as possible serious 
unemployment'. One proposal had been for afforestation schemes in Scotland . 
147 
In April 1916, William Bull was remarking that it would be wise to decide how 
best to deal with the returning soldiers so as `to prevent the dislocation that will 
occur'. While shying away from the use of terms such as `public work schemes', 
he did nonetheless propose that the national canal system be resuscitated, new 
waterways dug, and that tunnels be excavated to France and the Isle of Wight. 
His final solution was a `well considered scheme of emigration to Ireland and the 
Dominions'. 148 While the channel tunnel to the continent had long been a pet 
project of Bull, his plans seemed progressive for a Unionist. To propose public 
works did not accept implicitly the Keynesian notion of such schemes as a 
recurrent solution to cyclical depression, but it did display a pessimism regarding 
the capability of the old economic system of providing for the immediate post- 
war upheaval. 
Taken together, Bull's ideas borrowed from several powerful wartime 
impressions: first the idea of national economic efficiency and co-operation. As 
146 Wolmer manifesto, 25/11/1918. Wolmer Papers, 0010, ff. 124-5. 
147 SUA Western Division, 02/03/1915,03/03/1915; SUA Central Council, 16/03/1915, (Acc. 10424128, 
43). 
148 Memorandum by Bull, April 1916. Bull CAC Papers, 4/13. 
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has been shown above, this was felt most forcefully in the development of the 
Ministry of Munitions, but also through departments for shipping and transport. 
The second wartime impression was that of imperial co-operation and 
interdependence. Beyond these, there emerged in Bull's land settlement scheme a 
negativity: the tenets of the national efficiency movement somehow inverted 
with encouragements to the returning soldier - described by Scott as `the cream' 
of their generation - to emigrate from his homeland. While this borrowed much 
from the idea of `Greater Britain' (a concept that placed land settlement near its 
heart as a response to perceived external and internal dangers), it also 
acknowledged the likelihood of - at the very least temporary - unemployment 
and economic disruption, and its debilitating consequences. 149 Some years later 
this became the basis for `Foggartism', the political creed of the fictional MP 
Michael Mont in John Galsworthy's novel The Silver Spoon. Mont, returning 
from the front, proposes mass child emigration to the white dominions and the 
repopulation of the countryside as solutions to unemployment. "0 Caricatured 
though Mont was, he put forward a highly credible strategy for a 1920s Unionist. 
Ideas of `reconstruction' developed much from when Bull had collected these 
thoughts in 1916: it earned its own government department; as a word, it entered 
the political and journalistic dictionaries alongside `Huns' and `slackers'. But it 
is evident that a disparity existed between the priorities of the vast bulk of 
Unionists and the popular image of reconstruction that has been handed down. 
Even by autumn 1916, Lansdowne was remarking to Curzon that 
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Stephen Constantine (ed. ), Emigrants and Empire: Settlement in the Dominions Between the Wars 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1990), pp. 26-32. Calls for Empire settlement were most 
strong during periods of pauperism, unemployment and social agitation (such as mid-1880s, 1903-05, 
1908-09 and 1920s) and were seen as offering a means to calm domestic waters by channelling dangerous 
currents into distant seas. Imperialists such as H. Rider Haggard saw the settlement of ex-servicemen as a 
solution to the problems of demobilisation and demanded state support. 
150 The Silver Spoon was first published 1929. Here, read as part of John Galsworthy, A Modern Comedy 
(Heinemann, London, 1968), pp. 319-25. 
300 
"`Reconstruction" is "round in the mouth" as the wine merchants say, but I 
wonder what it comprehends. ' 
ls1 Certainly, after only a few sips many Unionists 
found it too full-bodied. The two watchwords quickly became efficiency and 
Empire. This was illustrated well in the words of Amery who, assigned to the 
committee to draft the coalition manifesto, informed Worthington Evans: 
I don't think we can insist enough that we are the party of greater prosperity through 
increased production. I am sure this is a sounder line to take than to warn us of the 
heaviness of the future income tax and the need for drastic economy. The one thing we 
must, above all, avoid being committed to in the future is being a party of vested interests 
and strict economy - the anti-Socialist party if you like. If we take that line we unite all 
the Labour forces against us and are done for. The essential thing is that we should stand 
as the party of Imperial and national reconstruction. In so far as expenditure or state 
control, or even measures which in the past have been regarded as Socialist, conduce to 
that end, we must be prepared to take them up. 152 
Amery's motives for including this letter in his memoirs (published some thirty-. 
five years after the war) undoubtedly incorporated a wish to give credence to the 
existence of the Milnerian notion of social imperialism as a powerful element in 
the programme for post-war reconstruction. More importantly, it revealed the 
desire to be - and perhaps more significantly appear to be -a party open towards 
state intervention in the economic and social life of the nation, whilst remaining 
committed to the ready defence of fiscal orthodoxy and the rights of property. 
This dichotomy continued to characterise the internal party discourse. In actual 
fact, although Amery was unready to admit it, his solution of increased 
151 Lansdowne to Curzon, 02/09/1916. Lansdowne maintained this somewhat cynical approach into the 
post-war era, quoting Isaac D'Israeli's maxim "the sting of taxation is extravagance". Interview with 
Francis Hirst, n. d. [1919]. Lansdowne Papers, Misc. Hirst was Honorary Secretary for the League for 
Public Money, editor of the Economist and an anti-war Liberal. 
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1953), pp. 173-4. 
301 
production as a precursor to social reform was little different from the 
interpretations held by late nineteenth century Conservatives. 153 
Amery's line was inherently one of national efficiency: increased production was 
the purpose, and only collectivist measures that `[conduced] to that end' were to 
be pursued. Many concurred with the priorities he established, namely that 
economic stability and prosperity were the prerequisite for social reform. As 
Neville Chamberlain informed voters, increased production was `the master key 
to all the problems [ahead] . 
154 Indeed they borrowed much from the Bismarckian 
ideas espoused by Joseph Chamberlain, who had advocated tariffs as a means by 
which to finance old age pensions. It will be seen that this policy of `increased 
production' was at the heart of many interpretations regarding the post-war 
economy but that, because it was usually denied its tariff mainspring, it remained 
a vacuous programme, too broad to ensure that advocates were kept in favour of 
state intervention. Indeed, in many respects, the party had not found a united or 
well-rounded voice regarding state control of industry, and even at its most 
adventurous its policies did not exceed social imperialism. To become or remain 
the party of `increased production', a reversion to pre-war shibboleths emerged. 
The first was a retreat to stricter interpretations of political economy than had 
been pursued during the war. Closely allied to this was national efficiency. This 
latter standard, once raised, also influenced views on wider issues such as health 
and education, and indeed became resonant in the debate on national 
reconstruction. 
Given the impact of the Boer War in redefining attitudes to social efficiency, the 
First World War acted as a predictable stimulus upon attitudes to education and 
153 H. V. Emy, The Impact of Financial Policy on English Party Politics Before 1914', Historical Journal 
xv (1972), pp. 106-10, passim. 
154 Birmingham Daily Post, 22/11/1918, p. 8. 
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health. 155 As Assheton Pownall acknowledged in his election address to 
Lewisham voters in October 1918, the `recruiting boards have opened our eyes as 
to the amount of physical unfitness throughout our manhood', and that a healthier 
nation must be nurtured. 
156 Similarly, Auckland Geddes - who as the head of the 
National Service Department knew more than most about the problem - 
lambasted the level of unfitness as a `disgrace' and laid the blame on bad 
housing. 157 Most obviously this boosted the movement in favour of a Ministry of 
Health and the provision of new housing. Efficiency formed the raison d'etre of 
other advocates of a new ministry such as Willoughby de Broke who spoke of 
the need for `racial reconstruction'. 158 Such notions of efficiency also shaped 
attitudes to education, because the struggle - as tariff reformers had long argued 
- was one of economics on a national scale, and, accordingly, an educated, strong 
workforce was required. In January 1916, Philip Magnus MP put a question to 
the Prime Minister, recommending `a closer connection between our commercial 
and industrial requirements and the teaching provided in our several education 
institutions'. 159 In similar vein, Mackinder felt that the future lay rather in 
practical training than esoteric knowledge, as the war had taught society that 
education was intimately linked with national life. While he had no wish `to 
Germanize our institutions', nevertheless Britain was too individualistic and 
needed to harmonise its characteristics of initiative and enterprise with co- 
operation and efficiency. 160 
iss Greenleaf notes the advent of development in education in the years 1902,1918 and 1944. Greenleaf, 
Political Tradition, pp. 68-70. For the encouragement that the Boer War gave to the movement for 
technical education, see Searle, National Efficiency, pp. 72-4. 
156 General Election Manifesto of Lt-Col Assheton Pownall to Electors of West Lewisham, 25/11/1918. 
Coates Papers, COA/4. 
157 Auckland Geddes manifesto to the electors of Basingstoke, 27/11/1918. Geddes Papers 4/1/1391. 
iss House of Lords debates, 17/07/1918. Hansard, 5th Series, xxx, 926-38. 
159 House of Commons debates, 26/01/1918. Hansard, 5`h Series, lxxviii, 1265-6. 
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From all sides, including that of business, came powerful demands for the 
provision of technical education and government assistance for scientific 
research. 161 Largely this was the determining factor behind Unionist support for 
the more controversial clauses of the Education Bill of 1917. It was left to the 
maverick individualist (and ex-Liberal candidate) J. D. Rees to maintain that the 
continuation system introduced `something like a revolution into the homes of 
the poor', and that the workingman and the manufacturer ought to be consulted 
before part-time work was abolished. 162 Perhaps this level of support was 
unsurprising in that the most radical clauses of the bill, which dealt with 
continuation schools until the age of eighteen and laid a greater stress on 
technical education, borrowed heavily from pre-war USRC policy. 163 This 
emphasis upon technical education, the state sponsorship of scientific research 
and innovation was one of the less challenging influences of war. Milner could 
have been certain he was alienating nobody in viewing the solution to Britain's 
retarded economy in industrial modernisation, scientific innovation and co- 
operation between big business and organised labour. IM 
Correspondingly, the concept that the state had the right and duty to manage 
essential services and industries received considerable backing within the party, 
most especially, but not only, from social imperialist elements. As early as 1914, 
Ashley noted the importance of `continuity' in government policy beyond the 
war years in order to encourage investment in new wartime industries. 165 Samuel 
Roberts MP claimed that it `[was] impossible for the railways to go back to the 
161 Dudley Docker, The Industrial Problem', National Review, November 1918, ccccxxix, pp. 304-6. 
162 House of Commons debates, 10/08/1917. Hansard, 5`h Series, xcvii, 838-40. 
163 S. G. J. Hoare, The Schools and Social Reform: the report of the Unionist Social Reform Committee on 
Education, with an Introduction by F. E. Smith (John Murray, London, 1914), x-xiv, pp. 17-26. 
164 Lord Milner, The Elements of Reconstruction: A Series of Articles Contributed in July and August 
1916 to The Times, with an Introduction by Lord Milner (Nisbet & Co., London, 1916), pp. 19-21. 
165 WJ Ashley, The War and its Economic Aspects (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1914), pp. 20-1. 
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old system. There must be a continuance of control. '166 The pursuit of national 
prosperity and economic efficiency through state management was mirrored in 
much of the Unionist press: the Liverpool Courier considered that even if the 
railways could not be made to pay, it would be worthwhile to put `them on the 
taxes' for the benefit of British and Empire industries; 167 the Daily Telegraph 
warned voters away from Asquith by alluding to what he might do to the 
resuscitated dye or optical glass industries, which had been left forsaken before 
the war; 168 the Observer congratulated the coalition on taking the `immense step' 
of committing itself to the maintenance of nationalised railways. 169 
For Carson in October 1918, just as for Amery, the chief priority - and difficulty 
- was how to bring about `a greatly increased production', which would in turn 
offer a means of providing higher wages as due reward for sacrifices that the 
working classes had been called upon to make. The solution lay in the bolstering 
of essential industries, with government assistance if necessary, and the 
utilisation of Empire resources for raw materials. In the meantime, a renewal of 
Germany's pre-war penetration of British markets was to be prevented, dumping 
prohibited (with a wider system of tariffs to encourage capital investment in 
industry), and scientific research subsidised. However, he concluded with a 
warning to Law: 
No one is likely to object to such control as I have indicated in my previous observations 
but there is a grave apprehension that the Government has some intention of itself 
usurping either functions of the manufacturer or of the merchant in the carrying on of 
166 Sheffield Ecclesall UA, AGM, 27/03/1919, (LD/2113). 
167 Liverpool Courier, 06/12/1918. Editorial. 
168 Daily Telegraph, 11/12/1918. Editorial. 
169 Observer, 08/12/1918. Editorial. 
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their businesses and I think a clear declaration and explanation of the intentions of the 
Government upon this point are vital. 170 
Law responded in almost apologetic tone: there would be `so great a demand for 
raw materials of all kinds and probably for some time at least such a limitation of 
the shipping available for transport that some measure of government control 
[would] be inevitable'. 171 Not only were his suggestions limited to the immediate 
reconstruction period, but Law's attitude also revealed continued insecurities 
within the party. 
No sooner had the ink dried on the armistice agreement than many Unionists 
were expressing in public their distaste for wartime restrictions. In doing so, 
unsurprisingly, they were referring to limitations placed on trade and industry 
rather than those on naturalised aliens. Commander C. W. Bellairs (Unionist 
candidate for Maidstone) argued that `Government control over business, in a 
small measure, [had been] a necessity of war, but it [was] a necessity of peace 
that it should go' and that businessmen should be able to expect that business 
was now run `on business lines and not on war lines'. 172 As such, conditions of 
peace and war were viewed as largely antithetical. A candidate in Manchester 
Clayton urged `the removal of all restraints on individual liberty at the earliest 
possible moment ... [believing] that the 
industries of the country will recover and 
production increase the more rapidly as restrictions and control are removed, and 
individual initiative and co-operation encouraged'. 173 Conversely, Unionists 
sympathetic to a real social reconstruction of the nation were vulnerable to 
testing enquiries from business interests large and small regarding unnecessary 
170 Memorandum `Economic Policy' by Carson, enclosed in Carson to Lloyd George, 21/10/1918. Lloyd 
George Papers, F/6/3/18. 
171 Memorandum on economic policy by Law, enclosed in Law to Carson, 25/10/1918 (copy). 
BL/84/7/96. 
172 Kent Messenger, 30/11/1918. 
173 Edward Hopkinson to Churchman, 15/11/1918. Derby Papers, 17/2. See also campaign of J. S. Rankin 
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interference. 174 No doubt this was partly the impetus behind such explicit 
declarations in favour of the reduction of red tape. 175 In some degree this may 
have been inevitable, with the Federation of British Industries having been 
founded in 1916 on the back of business discontent with state intervention. 176 
These overt displays of ambiguity illustrated areas in which the war had not 
vitally affected the party, for although it had bolstered the social imperialist 
movement it had not done so sufficiently to overcome traditional interests of 
business and property. Politicians representing these interests, such as Long, had 
never acknowledged the right of the state to interfere with the landowner or the 
manufacturer. The second point was that until the months immediately preceding 
the armistice, Unionists considered electoral considerations but little. This 
uncertainty regarding post-war state control of industry stretched as far as the 
social imperialists themselves. A case in point was the assurance offered by 
Henry Wilson-Fox to members of the Empire Resource Development Committee 
(ERDC): 
I want to emphasize that the committee does not advocate a general State interference 
with and control of industry, which is a far wider question. All the committee is 
concerned with is to press on financial grounds only for State participation in carefully 
selected branches of industry. In 
This carefully worded statement, sensitive to the charges both of `state 
interference' and of unfettered individualism, toed a narrow line. It sought to 
174 Steel-Maitland received specific questions about deregulation from the Agricultural Chamber of 
Commerce, the British Federation of Iron, Steel, Tinplate and Metal Merchants, the Birmingham 
Pharmaceutical Association, and the National Federation of "Off' Licence Holders Association. SM 
GD/193/179/2/13,15,16,23. See also J. S. Symons to Astor, 28/11/1918. Astor Papers, 528. 
175 Manifesto by E. F. Coates to Parliamentary Electors of West Lewisham, 25/11/1918. Coates Papers, 
COA/4. 
176 John Turner, `The Politics of "Organised Business" in the First World War' in Idem. (ed. ), 
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manage industry in an unfussy, non-bureaucratic fashion, in a manner that would 
ensure the success of key industries. Another ERDC publication expressed the 
movement's total objection to confiscation without complete compensation and 
argued that any industry run by government must be done so on business lines - 
the ERDC `would regard management by Civil Service Departments as now 
178 
organised as fatal to success'. 
Therefore as ERDC members were aware, despite the strengthening of the social 
imperialist faction of the party, there was little unanimity on state intervention. 
But neither did the role of government represent a real threat to wartime party 
unity. Interpretations of Henry Page Croft's National Party as being a national 
socialist movement and somehow a precursor of inter-war fascism is rather 
unhelpful in determining the dynamics of the Unionist Party. 
179 A cursory 
analysis of the programmes of the National Party and Lloyd George Government 
establishes that on major policy issues there was little divergence. The common 
cry of fair wages (predictably provided by tariff reform), of employer-trade union 
cooperation, of class conciliation, and of respect for women, could be heard from 
all directions. On social and socio-economic questions Croft's motley crew 
offered no substantive alternatives: the continuation of the Corn Production Act; 
the nationalisation of the canal network (but not the railways upon which 
industry actually depended); and other piecemeal proposals, including an 
extension of the system of allotment holders and a standardisation of weights and 
measures. Its most drastic suggestion was in afforestation, for which they 
planned to grant the state powers of compulsory purchase, but this was a priority 
industry more in war than peace. 180 What was more, after the war, the National 
178 Empire Resource Development Association Publication, July 1918. Bull Papers Hammersmith 
179 Barbara Storm Farr, The Development and Impact of Right-wing Politics in Britain, 1903-32 (Garland, 
London, 1987), pp. 34-50. 
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Party, no less than the Unionist Party, was undermined by the tension between 
statist and anti-waste elements. 
181 The unifying factor for the Unionist Party on 
reconstruction was the national perspective within which it should be shaped. 
This was well illustrated in the debate regarding how best to re-establish a stable 
and productive economy. In fact, both the purpose - simply increased production 
as a prerequisite for better wages - and the means - based around 
national/international foundations - indicates that they had developed little 
during the war. 
Paying off the Debt: through Efficiency and Empire 
In April 1916, the party journal Gleanings and Memoranda recorded that 
McKenna had `no need to apologise for raising the revenue from £198,000,000 
in 1913-14 to £509,000,000 in 1916-17', indeed people would be happy to pay 
taxes and war loans. ' 82 Surprisingly, for a party traditionally opposed to 
substantial income tax, the vast extension of the budget under the Liberal 
Chancellors McKenna and Lloyd George was greeted less with equanimity than 
with enthusiasm. During the war the national debt rose from £650 million to 
£7,800 million and the standard rate of income tax from Is 2d to 6s in the 
pound. 183 In principle the wartime income tax increases may not necessarily have 
challenged Unionist viewpoints. After all, Joseph Chamberlain had advocated the 
raising of income tax during the South African conflict on the basis that it was an 
emergency measure. The scale of the rise in 1914-18 was, however, phenomenal. 
Meanwhile, and crucially for the post-war period, the increase did not question 
attitudes towards redistributive taxation. As Hugh Cecil noted, reasonable 
181 Searle, Corruption in British Politics, pp. 295-7. 
182 G&M, April 1916, p. 293. 
183 James E. Cronin, The Politics of State Expansion: War, State and Society in Twentieth-Century Britain 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1991), pp. 61,76. 
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taxation - such as that on national defence - benefited everyone and not merely 
one class or section of society. Therefore, there was little threat to Cecil's 
interpretation that as the state should not punish an innocent man even if it might 
benefit others, `neither may it inflict upon such a man what is in reality a 
punishment by disguising it under another name. ' The other name of which he 
spoke was of course taxation. 184 
The problem arose rather in respect to the debt. The most controversial solution 
to the war debt, recommended by among others Law, was for the conscription of 
wealth. The reaction to this proposal both during the war and in the immediate 
post-war years illustrated the paucity of ideas and the power of traditionalism 
within the party. Law, with the candidness that won admirers at the NUA 
Conference in November 1917, mentioned (somewhat tactlessly) to a gathering 
of trade union officials the possibility of imposing a tax on capital after the war. 
That a Unionist Chancellor of the Exchequer could propose such a measure was 
testament to the upheaval of the age, the great burden of taxation and the fluidity 
of ideas as how best to respond to the financial millstone of the war (cynics 
might have said it was testament also to the fact that Law had little inherited 
wealth of his own to be conscripted). However, Younger (who did stand to lose 
much by the scheme) described the idea as `suicidal', and Central Office reported 
that there had been `a good deal of trouble' in the party over the matter. 185 The 
cleavage between earners and owners differed little in 1918 from the divisions in 
1965, the latter an occasion on which a wealth tax was rejected with similar 
speed. 186 
'84 Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (Williams and Norgate, London, 1912), p. 166. 185 Sanders Diary, 20/01/1918. John Ramsden (ed. ), Real Old Tory Politics: the Political Diaries of Robert Sanders, Lord Bayford, 1910-35 (Historian's Press, London, 1984), p. 98; Younger to Law, 
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Despite Law's judgement that `any method of dealing with [the financial 
situation was] bound to involve a number of grave disadvantages', 
187 the party 
was united in its outright opposition to the proposal. 
188 The free market 
economist Harold Cox warned his colleagues that the levy was a threat to the 
capitalist system, either by threatening the financial markets that relied on private 
investment or `Socialism by a tricky device'. 
189 In quick time, the conservative 
London Municipal Society prepared a number of pamphlets urging prudence, 
which were promptly distributed to members of both houses of parliament and 
local authorities. 190 The Spectator reflected Unionist feelings well in concluding 
that `frankly, we are unable to unravel his [Law's] exact meaning'. It countered 
the conscription of wealth through emotional arguments (the cost already born by 
the wealthy, the military conscription of the rich as well as the poor), the 
practical (capital would have to be valued), and the abstract (questioning what 
capital was). 191 This was mirrored in the appraisal of Marriott, who considered it 
`not merely inadvisable but impracticable'. 
19` In their reasoning these borrowed 
heavily from the line taken by the party against Lloyd George's land taxes in 
1913-14, when several lines of defence - sentimental and theoretical - had given 
way merely to arguments of a practical nature. George Lloyd and Edward Wood, 
meanwhile, offered one final line of defence: by appropriating from the holders 
of capital, the burden would fall upon the conscientious family who had saved a 
portion of their income and not upon the profligate. What about the small 
shareholder, they asked? 193 In response, they intended to mobilise the small 
181 M. Dauntcn, `How to pay for the war: State, Society and Taxation in Britain, 1917-24, English 
Historical Review, cx (1996), p. 892. 
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311 
taxpayer and minor saver. Both of these groups had swelled in number due to the 
war, the first through income tax, the second through War Savings. The party 
campaigned to win the support of this new breed of investors in literature 
released after the war. A Labour government, it was argued, would rob those 
who had saved in war loans of the interest due them, indeed the state would even 
confiscate the capital investment as well: `If you have only five or ten War 
Savings Certificates, you are a capitalist. ' 194 Most especially, the expansion of 
direct taxation implicated a vast number of middle earners in the actions of the 
state. Several developments were key from 1913 to 1919: first, the exemption 
level was cut from £160 to £130 per annum (also, note, whilst wages were 
increasing); second, the tax rate for those on the lowest band in 1919 (£130 to 
£160 per annum) was almost double that of the highest band in 1913 (over 
£3,000). Accordingly, the number of income tax payers grew from 1,130,000 
(1913) to 3,900,000 (1919). 195 
Constructive responses to the challenge of the financial situation were at best 
vague and often bordered on regressive. Willoughby de Broke and F. S. Oliver 
were petitioned in favour of a Tory movement that sought to link religion, private 
property and responsibility in much the manner that Young England had sought 
to, some eighty years earlier. 196 In some degree, this anticipated the `property- 
owning democracy' first voiced by Noel Skelton in the mid-1920s and promoted 
by Anthony Eden after 1945, and had its genesis in the convergence of the goals 
of hard-line Unionists (such as the Duke of Northumberland) and of the middle- 
194 `Nothing for 15/6: Your Savings Under Socialism', NUA Pamphlet 1890, (June 1919). 
195 What is more, a further 3,900,000 escaped paying income tax only by being relieved by the operation 
of abatements and allowances. Although the number of taxpayers decreased after the war, it still remained 
approximately two and a half times that of the pre-war figure into the mid- 1920s. Figures developed from 
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class socially-minded (such as Neville Chamberlain). 
197 For the coal-owner 
Northumberland, the destruction of both the constitution and central party 
principles determined that the only object for which they could now fight were 
`the dirty dollars we possess [and, as such, ] it becomes simply a fight for our own 
interests & our own wealth. ' 198 With rather more sentimentality, Lloyd and 
Wood professed their confidence in the return of an appreciation by the owners 
of property and wealth of the `duties inseparable from ownership', which had 
declined in the immediate pre-war years. 199 This paternalistic approach was, of 
course, meant to undermine the attraction of the redistribution of wealth and was 
little more than a return to the notion of noblesse oblige in a romanticised 
feudalism. Indeed, Lloyd wanted to retreat to a `merry old England': `you can get 
the Elizabethan system back if you try, and with it Elizabethan good cheer and 
reasoned piety of nationhood. ' 
200 Short of donning finely coloured tunics and 
attending medieval pageants on horseback, this was a most vacuous charade that 
reflected the confusing concoction of numbness and desperate optimism mixed 
by the war. Perhaps heeding the advice of Lloyd and Wood, Sydenham and 
Salisbury were behind a more practical scheme for the great landowners in the 
House of Lords to co-operate to provide for the settlement of soldiers on the land 
after the war. While it is easy to be cynical of proposals rooted so firmly in the 
paternalistic tradition of mid-nineteenth century conservatism as redolent of an 
ideology unyielding to the force of time, it must be acknowledged that the 
generosity of the wealthy towards war veterans, dependents, and the memories of 
197 John Ramsden, "'A Party for Owners or a Party for Earners? " How far did the British Conservative 
Party really change after 1945? ', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, xxxvii (1937), pp. 56-7; 
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19$ Northumberland to Chaplin, 24/10/1917. Chaplin Papers, D/3099/1/B/3/21. 
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the dead came more from the heart then the head. For instance, Baldwin 
famously donated a considerable portion of his industrial fortune to the 
Exchequer (though the failure of his efforts to retain his anonymity resulted in 
the misfortune of being branded modest as well as generous). That said, 
Sydenham was not oblivious to the political impression that might be made, 
namely that it might serve to portray the peers, and - more significantly - 
landowners in general, as responsive and magnanimous in regard to the plight of 
the nation. 201 As such, it might obviate the need for redistributive taxes. In 
similar vein, Blumenfeld (with one eye on Port Sunlight) looked towards the 
establishment of canteens and concert venues by employers. 202 Conservatism 
reigned even within the progressive faction of the party involved with the British 
Workers' National League and ensured that policies developed along fairly 
traditional lines. Unionists refused to budge an inch on the desire of patriotic 
labour for the nationalisation of the railways. 03 
Even when suggestions appeared to be touched with modernity their basis was 
often thin. Shortly before the armistice, Salisbury wrote to the editor of the 
Liverpool Courier, alluding to the necessity of confronting the `profound 
upheaval of ideas' wrought by war. The working classes, he said, must be 
assisted and made `partners in industry' not merely 'hands'. The rhetoric was 
laudable, the means by which to realise it more problematic. A necessity during 
the war, industrial arbitration was held up as a means by which to stabilise the 
economy and society more generally. Lady Acland (the Primrose League 
activist) held out the hope that `the experience of discipline and the mixing up of 
the social classes in our great citizen army' offered the possibility that labour 
201 Sydenham to Salisbury, 09/08/1917. Salisbury Papers, S (4) 80/56. 
202 Reconstruction, (1919). 
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might look more reasonably upon industrial relations. 204 This obviously tied in 
well with the concept of the party as a classless and national party, and allowed it 
to contrast this model of industrial relations as antithetical to that of the Labour 
Ply tos The support for Whitley Councils as the arbiters in industrial disputes 
did serve to detach the party from employer groups, but, born out of the necessity 
of wartime production and flavoured with the optimism wrought by war, it was a 
policy adhered to when the challenges were exceptional. Meanwhile, industrial 
co-partnership - hardly a progressive policy in any case - did not receive any 
particular boost from the war, although its long-term position as a solution 
206 adhered to by a minority was preserved. 
More generally, the most preferred manner of economic interference was on an 
international rather than national level, through imperial preference and Empire 
co-operation. Most famously this was through the appropriation of enemy 
resources. It is too easy to accept Keynes' dismissal of the coalition line on 
German criminals, indemnities and reparations as a cynical ploy to win an 
election, for many Unionists sincerely believed in these responses on both moral 
and economic grounds. In Gateshead, a Unionist speaker argued that if Germany 
had little ready money by which to pay for the damage it had caused, it still had 
its rich coalfields. 207 G. B. Hurst, appealing to be selected as Unionist candidate 
for Manchester Moss Side, emphasised the appropriation of German colonies, 
shipping and reparations, 208 and subsequently became the candidate. Major 
P. G. Smith advised voters in Penistone Yorkshire that the Labour candidate's 
204 Lady Acland, `Democracy and the Primrose League', Primrose League Gazette, xcix, January 1918, 
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scheme for a capital levy was grossly unfair - `it was a far sounder policy to 
make Germany pay for the war, and also for the peace programme. '209 
Some months after peace, Claude Lowther MP proposed `a concrete scheme by 
which Germany could (over a number of years) be compelled to discharge the 
whole cost of the Allies' War Debt'. This included a liberal estimate of 
Germany's financial capacity, an appreciation of the savings she would make 
through being an unarmed and peaceful nation, the confiscation of her mineral 
resources and the gain through territorial acquisitions. 
210 It mattered less that 
Keynes was able to dismiss this scheme in the `airy' fashion that Law requested, 
than that Lowther should have sought recourse to such an idea. Bentinck may 
have been dismayed by the continuance of economic hostilities once the military 
war had ended, but it is evident that, even in June 1920, much of the Unionist 
Party sought to use German reparations as a means to at least restabilise, and 
perhaps even reinvigorate, the economy. A typically violent attack by Maxse 
upon the coalition's `singular and depressing absence of zeal to search the 
capacious pockets of Germany' was greeted with an ovation lasting nearly a 
minute at the NUA Conference, and the resolution was passed with cheers? lt 
However, as means by which to re-establish the pre-war financial and economic 
status quo in Allied countries, such responses were inherently ephemeral. 
Accordingly, they made no provision - either ideologically or practically - for 
steady and continued social reform. 
This policy was to be augmented by national efficiency, imperial co-operation 
and tariff reform. At the Paris Economic Conference (PEC) of 1916 the Allied 
heads of government agreed that there should be post-war co-operation in the 
economic sphere. These were conclusions that were linked by tariff reformers 
209 Yorkshire Post, 25/11/1918, p. 7. 
210 Memorandum by Claude Lowther, enclosed in Lowther to Law, 22/03/1919. BU97/1/9. 
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(most notably the UWC and UBC) to the idea of customs and imperial 
preference. These movements were bolstered also by the shortage of food and 
raw materials in Britain and by the weakness of Britain's key industries. 12 
Alfred Bigland MP was roped in by Ernest Pretyman to assist the Board of Trade 
in securing additional supplies of glycerine from oil seeds, nuts and vegetable oil. 
Accordingly, he suggested that the government sponsor a system to ensure that 
all such resources were kept within the Empire. While he proposed that the 
government establish a fixed price, nonetheless it would be a system based 
largely on co-operation, Empire and efficiency rather than state collectivism 
within Britain. 213 Such guarantees were intended to safeguard scarce resources 
and simultaneously stimulate investment in essential industries. 
It was these exact concepts that were behind the formation of the Empire 
Resource Development Committee (ERDC) in October 1916. On its inception, 
the idea of establishing `an Empire Farm' in Canada was peddled by Milner as 
'the development of the State by the State for the State - the development of our 
national and Imperial property'. Initially launched by Morton Frewen, it attracted 
a powerful group of imperialists, including Milner (until he retired on accepting 
government office in December 1916), Bigland, Earl Grey, Wilson-Fox, 
H. E. Brittain, Bull, Croft, Worthington Evans, Mackinder and Selborne. its 
candidly imperial disposition was illustrated by the election to its chairmanship 
of the controversial figure of Starr Jameson, of South African fame (or rather 
infamy). Renamed the British Empire Parliamentary Development Committee it 
boasted two hundred MPs as members. 214 On 8 November 1916, it made its most 
forceful contribution during the Nigeria debate, which combined general dissent 
211 Bentinck, Tory Democracy, pp. 60-3; NUA Conference, June 1920. 
212 See above, pp. 68-69,72-79,272-285. 
213 Alfred Bigland, The Call of Empire (Cecil Palmer, London, 1926), pp. 45-59. 
214 Ibid., pp. 93-6. 
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with coalition policy with efforts to construct an Empire-based economy. 215 It is 
interesting to note several factors about this movement. The first is that it was 
founded in appreciation of the predicaments envisaged in the post-war world. As 
such it was an effort to formulate an alternative to high income tax and/or the 
capital levy. Its goals were long-term, namely Empire efficiency and co- 
operation, conservation of all resources for imperial (of course, actually 
principally for British) industry and capital investment in Empire resources. 
Thus, store was put on such ventures as the Suez Canal, the Assouan dam and 
West African property. Other organisations such as the British Empire Producers 
Organisation (BEPO) and the British Commonwealth Union (an off-shoot of the 
Federation of British Industries) likewise sought to promote inter-imperial trade, 
such as that set out in the resolutions of the Imperial Conference of 1918. So 
powerful was this emotion that Gwynne wanted Londonderry to chair a joint 
council of the BEPO and manufacturing groups, holding that it `might be the 
foundation for a real revival of national politics and policy on the only true basis 
- the interest of the country '216 
Most especially, the national basis of this policy was tariff reform. The party was 
so firmly behind tariffs that Younger informed Freddie Guest (Lloyd George's 
Chief Whip) that unless his chief came out squarely in favour of the scheme that 
`it would be no good to ask Conservatives to back his candidates'. 217 Moreover, 
almost the entire debate regarding the joint political appeal to be launched by 
Lloyd George and Law was centred on the tariff controversy. 218 Tariffs had been 
215 See above pp. 104-106. 
216 Carson to Gwynne, n. d. Gwynne Papers, Deposit 17. Gwynne to Londonderry, 23/10/1918. 
Londonderry Papers, D/3099/2/4/21. Also see Lawrence to Law, 16/07/1918,02/08/1918. ßU83/5/15. 
83/6/6; Edward Saunders, A Self-supporting Empire (Nisbet & Co., London, 1918), pp. 109-12,116-21. 217 Sanders Diary, 09/08/1918. Ramsden, Tory, pp. 107-8. 
218 For example see the Report of the Party Meeting at the Connaught Rooms, 12/11/1918.131195/3. 
Younger's reservations were in regard to the reconstruction not of the nation, but of the second rhainbe . Younger to Law, n. d. [October 1918]. BU95/5. 
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linked inherently with British economic interests during the war most forcefully 
through the work of Hewins, Carson, the UBC and the UWC. Shortly before the 
general election of 1918, the UWC passed a resolution demanding the adoption 
of a national economic policy to include imperial preference, development of 
Empire resources, allied/imperial co-operation and the elimination of undue 
foreign influence and dumping likely to hinder the reconstruction of our 
industries on a firm basis'. 219 Carson also chaired the appositely named 
Economic Offensive Committee, which sought to prosecute the war on an 
economic basis (through many of the schemes suggested by the UWC and UBC) 
and also, more significantly, establish a post-war economic system based around 
nationalism. Its central purpose was to redress the pre-war situation in which 
Britain had, as Mackinder remarked, `stood naked before the world' by clothing 
her in impervious attire. 220 
Owing to both the strength of traditional party feeling behind tariffs and the close 
connection between the war and tariffs, this was the one economic issue that 
achieved anything like regular attention from the constituencies, the NUA, 
backbench MPs and Unionist ministers. The frequent mobilisation of the UBC 
and the UWC behind the Paris resolutions, and most particularly the pleas 
promoted by Hewins, Carson and Long, posed a significant threat to the 
coalition. In referring in a letter to his party leader to the `more vigorous 
application in public policy of [Conservative Party] principles', Hewins was 
predictably alluding to tariffs. One particular canard he was eager to despatch 
was that `the German people were unwillingly driven into the War through the 
domination of the Kaiser and the Prussian militarist party'. In doing so, he hoped 
that a remorseless economic war could be commenced against the German 
219 Salisbury to Law, 02/11/1918. BL84/3/5. 
220 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction 
(Constable & Co., London, 1919), p. 188. 
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nation. Hewins concluded with the warning that the labour problem, and 
consequently the threat of civil unrest, could only be contained by the fostering 
of British industry, and that this could be effected only through tariff reform. 
221 
Law's refusal to act immediately upon Hewins suggestions inspired the UBC to 
divide against the government in the House of Commons. 222 It resulted, in fact, in 
the most serious Unionist vote (in proportional terms) against the government 
during the entire war: forty-two Unionists supported Hewins' amendment (which 
sought to exclude the province of industry and commerce from the remit of the 
new Ministry of Reconstruction, on the understanding that this underlined the 
acceptance of the decisions of the Paris Conference); only twenty-six Unionists 
voted for the government, including more than ten who were on the payroll of the 
government 223 
Although the failure of the government to enact or articulate an economic policy 
undoubtedly played some part in the creation of the National Party in August 
1917, the threat to party unity that the issue of tariffs represented can be 
overemphasised by examining such overt divisions. While tariffs remained a 
disruptive policy, they served overwhelmingly as a unifying force and the 
question arose only of the priority they should be granted (most importantly in 
relation to the maintenance of the coalition). The strength of this nationalist 
economic policy meant that to some extent the issue of tariffs became, through 
the war, cross party. Indeed, the initiative in government was taken by the 
Liberal free-trader McKenna, a conversion on which Lloyd George commented 
to Long - with characteristic disinterest towards an old core doctrine - `so the 
old fiscal system goes, destroyed by its own advocates. '224 Indeed, Willoughby 
22 Hewins to Law, 19/07/1917. Hewins Papers, 65/110-14. 
222 Hewins Diary, 04/08/1917. W. A. S. Hewins, Apologia of an Imperialist: Forty Years of Empire Policy 
(Constable & Co., London, 1929), II, pp. 159-9. 
223 House of Commons debates, 02/08/1917. Hansard, 5th Series, xciv, 2367-77. 
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de Broke found that `the only amusing thing in this country [was] to watch the 
Manchester School trying to save its face in the presence of the complete 
bankruptcy of Cobdenism and Pacifism. '225 Partially because of the limitations 
placed on imports and exports, the war provided an inherent precedent for tariff 
reform and, as Richard Herzog has noted, the war `de-structured' the issue 
Many previously unconvinced through the prohibition of vital goods in DoRA226 
of its merits came to appreciate its benefits, including even Lord Balfour of 
Burleigh who, having departed the party over tariffs in 1903, chaired the 
powerful eponymous committee on economic policy in 1916. The similarly 
minded Cromer experienced what turned out to be a deathbed conversion. The 
sensibilities of these men had always lain close to that of the party, but their free 
trade principles had been enough to divorce them from Unionist circles before 
the war. Cromer, in light of the insufficiency of direct taxation to pay off the 
huge burden of debt, considered Imperial Preference `now inevitable'. The 
sentiment of Empire brotherhood, he felt, should supersede any economic 
objections to protection. 227 Hugh Cecil, too, advocated an Imperial tariff barrier 
as a means of revenue to reduce war debts (although, note, it was still not to exist 
`for any industrial or commercial purpose'). 228 Eager to demonstrate the new 
wartime appeal of tariff reform to free traders, Gleanings and Memoranda listed 
some notable conversions, including the Spectator, Harold Cox, Chiozza Money, 
224 Hewins to Mrs Hewins, 16/09/1915. Hewins Papers, 58/116-9. A minority of Liberals abandoned this 
principle, even so far as to form part of a delegation to the Prime Minister in favour of the adoptiai of the 
Paris Economic resolutions. Despite this, the Liberal Party remained largely a free-trade party. See for 
instance, J. M. Robertson, The New Tari[fism (Allen & Unwin, London, 1918). 'Paddy' Goulding to Law, 
16/0211917. BLJ81/3/10. The partial consensus was certainly spurred on by the coalition government, in 
forming friendly relations between Liberals and out-and-out tariff reformers such as Chamberlain. Oliver 
to Milner, 10/03/1918 (Copy). Chelwood Papers, MS Add. 51090, ff. 30-9. More generally see Chapters 11 
and III. 
225 Willoughby de Broke to Lloyd, 28/02/1916. Lloyd Papers, 9/2. 
226 Richard Herzog, `The Conservative Party and Protectionist Politics, 1918-32', Sheffield University, 
Ph. D. (1984), pp. 27-8. 
227 The Earl of Cromer, 'Imperial Federation' in Harbutt Dawson (ed. ), After-War Problems, pp. 23-6. 
228 Memorandum, `Suggestions for Fiscal Policy After the War', by Hugh Cecil, 03/04/1918. AC/1516/8. 
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George Reid and Lords Sydenham, Joicey and Cromer. Months later, the leaders 
of the British Workers' National League and John Hodge were added. 
229 
These developments had profound structural influences upon the party. As Ewen 
Green has said of the pre-war libertarian wing of the Unionist Party, such as 
Dicey, Strachey and Lord Wemyss: they may not have loved the Unionist Party, 
but they hated the Liberals. 230 The conversion of many towards tariff reform, and 
therefore to an acceptance that unadulterated individualism had become 
impracticable (or, at the very least, improbable), brought them more firmly 
within the embrace of the wider party. In doing so, the war served to reinforce 
the bond between Liberal Unionists and Conservatives, and between the 
libertarian and collectivist wings of the party. This was wrought by necessity, as 
it was provoked by the coalescing of ideologies. For the waning of the Irish issue 
demanded that other bonding agents were applied. Similarly placed were the 
zealous manufacturing tariff reformers (such as the Empire Industries 
Association) who, though frustrated by the refusal of Conservative governments 
to adopt major protectionist policies, remained loyal to the party through fear of 
the alternative (now Labour). 231 For post-war as well as pre-war social 
imperialists, tariff reform was to be used as an alternative to redistributive 
internal taxation. In the main, the party viewed tariff reform as the solution to its 
most grievous dilemmas: the power of Germany (and other external threats), the 
maintenance of a national industrial spirit, and the means by which to yield 
greater production and thus higher wages. 
In conclusion, it is important to appreciate that the party fully contemplated 
wartime and post-war collectivism, because, it is only through acknowledging 
229 G&M, March 1916, pp. 254-9; April 1916, p. 334. 
230 Ewen Green, The Strange Death of Tory England', Twentieth Century British History, ii (1991), 
pp. 77-9. 
231 Andrew Marrison, British Business and Protection, 1903-32 (Clarendon, Oxford, 1996), p. 385-6. 
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this that the party's robustness can be understood. Unionists therefore remained 
(or rather became) overwhelmingly united on the issue of state intervention. 
Where divisions emerged, such as over the failure of the party leadership to insist 
on the adoption of the protectionist resolutions of the Paris Economic 
Conference, the reasons were political not ideological. Meanwhile, it is 
questionable whether the war radically altered attitudes towards state 
collectivism, although it certainly served to raise the datum line of expectation. 232 
More specifically, it opened the minds of Unionists to state supervision of 
essential industries and undoubtedly influenced attitudes to the founding of the 
Central Electricity Board and the British Broadcasting Corporation (both in 
1926) and British Overseas Airways Corporation (in 1939), all strategic 
industries. Warfare did, however, also illustrate the party's limits, namely a 
continued suspicion of bureaucracy, the primacy of the protection of property 
interests and distaste for the direct redistribution of wealth. Moreover, there were 
a great deal more votes to be had in being anti-tax when there were so many 
(income) taxpayers. The war averted the necessity for the usual discourse 
between political expediency and political conscience, and therefore electoral 
considerations were not at the fore until autumn 1918. This undoubtedly played a 
part in the speed of deregulation in the post-war climate. In spite of the exclusion 
of this dynamic from the debate about the role of the state, Unionist actions did 
leave impressions on the inter-war period. Most powerfully, the war represented 
the first instance in which the Unionist Party sought to manage the population in 
any widespread sense through the auspices of the state. Therefore, although the 
1920s housing policy of Neville Chamberlain undoubtedly owed much to the 
pre-war and post-war desire to create a property-owning democracy, state 
intervention during the war provided a precedent for this type of social 
regulation. 
232 Cronin, Politics of State Expansion, p. 85. 
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John Stubbs has argued that `the war raised the role of the state in society and the 
economy in such a way that Conservatives could no longer afford to ignore it'. 233 
Undoubtedly this is true, but it is evident that the party had discovered few fresh 
long-term amswers. If the party's response exemplified anything it was the 
continuity between the pre-war and wartime solutions: conscription, tariff 
reform, the intensity of the social efficiency and social imperialist movements. 
But, of course, these latter movements were riding the crest of a wartime wave - 
they had been raised by it and as it fell so would they. Meanwhile, the inherent 
nationalism of many of the party's solutions was relevant more to the period of 
warfare and immediate recovery than to periods of peace. Ironically, the most 
profound impact of the war was on a challenge to which they rose most 
apprehensively, namely its legacy in the form of high taxation and a colossal war 
debt. This established a system of taxation that was (although it may not have 
appeared so at the time) inescapable. For all the economies forced by the 
`Geddes axe' of 1922, substantial income tax was there to stay in both financial 
and political terms. Moreover, as has been illustrated above, the party continued 
to campaign - perhaps even more successfully - along the lines of reducing 
taxation. This, when combined with the consideration they had given wartime 
collectivism and the conservative nature of their response in several regards, 
compensated for their lack of fresh ideas. 
In part, this ideological development says much of Conservatism: that its 
responses, although seemingly determined largely by electoral considerations, 
also possessed social goals. As such, the interwar emphasis on a property owning 
democracy, constructed hopefully through the private sector, was more than 
merely an effort to `accommodate and partially defuse the pressures for 
Z33 Stubbs, `Impact', p. 35. 
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reform' . 
234 Like tariff reform, it offered a means by which to defeat the Labour 
Party, a means for social solidarity, and a method by which to promote economic 
and social efficiency. 
234 Clement MacIntyre, `Policy Reform and the Politics of Housing in the British Conservative Party 
1924-1929', Australian Journal of Politics and History, xcv (1999), p. 420. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In a study focussed on a turbulent war, there has been little mention of battles 
lost or won but this is not to deny that military action engaged the minds of those 
politically minded or involved. As the returning soldiers sought to convert their 
military records into service to a peaceful nation, the war served to shape the 
careers and priorities of such men as Edward Wood, Harold Macmillan, Oswald 
Mosley and Anthony Eden. Much broader impressions of the war can be felt for, 
unsurprisingly, if anything determined Unionist actions and attitudes between 
1914 and 1918, it was the prosecution of the war. It was the primacy accorded 
this, rather than party political ideas such as Ireland or tariff reform, that 
compelled Bonar Law to upset the patriotic truce in spring 1915 and usher in the 
first coalition, and again it was this that permitted the wider party to approve of 
the coup enacted by their pre-war nemesis Lloyd George in December 1916. Its 
faithful bedfellow was patriotism and it is that theme that binds this thesis. 
Overwhelmingly, it was patriotism that ensured the unity of the party. As 
Chapter I demonstrated, despite apparent indifference amongst the party 
leadership in July and August 1914, the reticence displayed was actually 
fashioned by interpretations of their political role and by the speed of events that 
overtook them. However, this diffidence contrasted sharply with the alacrity with 
which George Lloyd, Henry Wilson and company approached the European 
situation. Therefore, although the final action taken (the letter to Asquith) 
presented the party acting as one, as so often throughout the war, those upon the 
party fringes felt themselves moving with greater speed towards radical 
solutions. It was not a one-off, but rather the first occasion upon which the 
radical right staked its claim to a greater role in the prosecution of the war. 
Neither before the war nor since would the radical right and social imperialist 
wings of the party possess such relevance or power. R. J. Scally's assertion that 
this movement evolved organically from 1910 onwards may be overstated, but 
the social imperialist faction possessed immense influence and was not content 
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until it was permitted to pace the corridors of power. Meanwhile, the reticent 
reaction of Law, Lansdowne and Balfour was maintained into 1915 and beyond, 
beyond even the point when Milner was finally welcomed into the War Cabinet. 
The latter's participation in government certainly served to shore-up the diverse 
wings of the party: he represented action, forwardness and integrity, and - 
perhaps most significantly throughout - he was not associated with previous 
hedging or with overt party interests. 
On the other hand, it was not Law's particular sensitivity to backbench criticism 
and openness to compromise that safeguarded his position. For (as Chapters I and 
II demonstrate) apart from May 1915, he actually displayed a marked obduracy 
in favour of his own personal view on party fundamentals. Throughout 1915 and 
until May 1916, he was unready to imperil the Asquith government to enforce 
conscription, despite the vast weight of Unionist opinion behind it. Throughout 
the Lloyd George coalition he escaped whilst offering only the most bare 
assurances concerning tariff reform, although faced with unrelenting pressure 
from parliamentary and grassroots Unionists for a clear definition of the 
government's economic policy. Accordingly, Hewins' Unionist Business 
Committee and Carson's Unionist War Committee possessed (and deployed) less 
influence that many at the time, and subsequently, believed. Rather Law's 
position was ensured by the paucity of acceptable alternatives and the dominance 
of patriotism. Both the contenders in the leadership contest of 1911 could be 
discounted: Chamberlain remained too stiff, Long too attentive to minor intrigue, 
and both were on the whole too implicated in the government applecart to seek to 
upset it. Meanwhile, of those Unionist contenders sufficiently self-confident to 
deride the necessity of national consensus, all possessed shortcomings. Even 
though neither Carson nor Milner nor Salisbury were ready to go it alone, none 
possessed the total confidence of the party in any event: Carson was too much an 
Irishman, Milner too little a party man, Salisbury too much lesser a man than his 
father. That the most overt challenge came from Page Croft - whose deficiencies 
were discernible even to his sympathisers, and who was able to dissipate with 
327 
ease the considerable dissatisfaction that he sought to exploit - revealed the 
deficiency. Therefore, even if Law had not been blessed with considerable 
political talents, he would likely have remained leader 
by default. He was also 
blessed with good fortune - for instance the timing of the Lansdowne letter that 
was published the day before Law addressed the NUA for the first (and last) time 
during the war. More important still, Law was safeguarded by a party patriotism 
that allowed Ireland to force its way back into the political mainstream only 
infrequently and that negated the divisive matter of limited patronage wrought by 
coalition government. Although wartime coalition did frustrate personal 
ambitions, the latter were subordinated to the war effort. This did, of course, have 
implications for the post-war as well as the wartime Unionist Party, marking a 
watershed and unleashing the dissent of Steel-Maitland and Selborne. 
Simply through preserving - indeed enhancing - the unity of the party, patriotism 
executed a considerable service to the party (a service it did not provide to either 
the Liberal or Labour parties). But advantages were evident elsewhere as well. 
Most significant was its utilisation as a means by which to undermine the other 
parties. Due to Labour's advancement during the war - through trade union 
membership and the narrowing of the differentials between skilled and unskilled 
workers - the timing of the emergence of this powerful anti-socialist tool was 
propitious, indeed critical. As Chapter III has shown, it was fortunate too in that 
the link between anti-socialism and pacifism drawn by the Unionist Party was 
supported not only by the powerful wartime press but also through the auspices 
of Unionist ministers and the state more generally. It was more however than 
luck: the party acclimatised itself to the peculiar patriotism of the years 1914-18, 
as for instance in the adoption (in line with press and general opinion) of 
Belgium - rather than the `honour' of Britain - as the basis for war. Indeed, this 
faculty of flexibility and readiness to adapt in order to construct a viable appeal 
to a mass electorate and a forceful response to socialism (first manifested as early 
as August 1914) contrasted sharply with the inability of the Liberal Party to 
transform itself. This connection between anti-socialism and patriotism was at 
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the forefront of the appeals constructed during the 1920s. Moreover, and most 
crucially, by establishing more firmly the link between an appeal to self-interest 
and a sentimental appeal to patriotism and imperialism, wartime propaganda 
shaped the interwar response to Labour as a dual appeal to anti-socialism and the 
economic interests of the voters. With the vast increase in the number of income- 
tax payers produced by the war, this link was further intensified. 
' 
In other respects too, this particular response was crucial, as it offset other 
unimpressive approaches to the challenge of Labour. Despite the initial 
enthusiasm within the party leadership towards the connection with patriotic 
Labour, there was little zest for real cooperation. The few seats offered the 
British Workers' National League at the `coupon' election ensured that in 
electoral terms it was stillborn. However, this under-representation was less the 
outcome of the manifold confusions of November 1918, as of the articulation of 
widespread Unionist reservations. By the end of the war, the response of 
grassroots Unionists towards formal cooperation had become at best lukewarm, 
partly because many thought that the BWNL would be a somewhat unruly and 
loud-mouthed child, more considerably because the wider support had rarely 
extended beyond the rhetorical. It is not evident that the failure to maintain a 
union with the BWNL had any lasting detrimental affect upon the party. For, it 
would hardly have moderated the Unionists' anti-socialist stance, because there 
was never any real ideological convergence except on what were already 
Unionist principles. Neither did the failure of the alliance deny the party a pool of 
talent any more than the coalition with Lloyd George was to provide one (except 
of course for the brilliant premier himself). Nevertheless, it may have 
transformed in some degree the manner in which Unionists attempted to work 
with labour. The approach to working-class organisations still seemed redolent of 
1 See Chapter V 
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self-doubt: there was a continued inclination for entering these political 
movements clandestinely, through the back door, rather than proudly bearing the 
Unionist colours from the front. Accordingly, these movements were neither 
easily impregnated nor the crude caricatures of them (as dominated by scheming 
syndicalists and revolutionaries) redrawn. This did much to determine the future 
approach of the party: it represented as much the abandonment of the 
Chamberlainite obsession with winning the working classes over to a complete 
Unionist manifesto, as the arrival of a sophisticated anti-socialist rhetoric. In 
doing so, it clarified the Unionist response to the Labour Party as one based on 
propaganda, anti-socialism and - though they would have been loathe to admit it 
- sectionalism. 
Moreover, despite the significance of the coupon, patriotism as a factor in the 
overwhelming success of the Unionist Party in 1918 must not be discounted. The 
most considerable electoral threat during the war emanated not from the left but 
the right. 2 This had considerable implications for post-war Conservatism. For the 
party's ideological development, in a political climate in which patriotism would 
never again be such a compelling force, it offered transient solutions to electoral 
and ideological challenges. Accordingly it shaped the commitment to the Lloyd 
George coalition, because, whilst stopping well short of an intransigent return to 
the conditions of 1914, Unionist interpretations of reconstruction (social, 
economic and political) were centred specifically on the issue of demobilisation 
and immediate stabilisation. 3 Mirrored in attitudes to electoral reform (most 
especially PR), Unionist MPs demonstrated a desire to maintain the broad status 
quo. As such they showed an implicit confidence in the democratic pretensions 
of their party and a Disraelian willingness to "Trust the People". This displayed 
2 See Chapter III `Pacifism and Bolshevism' and Chapter IV `Electoral Reform and the Coupon Election'. 
3 See Chapter V. 
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real self-assurance, considerable independence and a remarkable lack of 
hedging 
(hedging had, after all, been the central tactic of the pro-PR peers). 
Consequently, although - as John Turner has argued - the Lloyd George 
coalition after mid-1917 served the dual purpose of prosecuting the war and 
acting as a bulwark against socialism, this was not a long-term commitment. As 
far as the coalition was concerned therefore, the Unionists wanted to have their 
drink and quaff it: see off the immediate threat of revolution and social 
disintegration, and imbibe the sentiments of national appeal and success as in the 
coalition cocktail, before spitting out the Lloyd George olive. This did not bode 
well for the long-term participation of the Unionist Party in a coalition 
government, and its precedence for the National Governments of the 1930s 
existed only in so far as many at the head of the party appreciated the advantages 
of coalition government in times of crisis. As Chapter 11 testifies, this is not to 
deny that real implications sprang from their involvement in the coalition. First, 
it served to undermine the notion of party and determined the persistence of a 
real desire to perpetuate a national, non-controversial and non-party political 
system. Bolstered also by the concern over the future of the Unionist cause and 
party, this sentiment was challenged most forcibly in the post-war period when 
the party further defined its response to socialism. Second, Unionists benefited 
by establishing themselves - in the eyes of the nation and, perhaps equally 
importantly, in their own eyes - as the party of patriotism, and hence the national 
party. Therefore, a new veneer was applied in place of the negativism and 
sectionalism that characterised their pre-war politics. 
Indirectly, as Chapter IV has demonstrated, patriotism also decided that the 
Unionists were set off down the route to electoral reform in which there were 
remarkable gains for the party. The conclusions here tend to bolster the 
arguments of John Ramsden, namely that the bedrock of inter-war electoral 
success was the maintenance of plural voting, the redistribution of seats and the 
removal of the Irish representatives from Westminster. However, it has been 
shown that redistribution could hardly have been undertaken at "a more suitable 
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time for the Unionist Party, when wartime sentiment was almost tailor-made to 
suit the party's agricultural figure. The sentimental and practical espousal the 
party received at a national and local level meant that agriculture, and 
subsequently Unionism, received disproportionate representation. Indeed, the 
interests and classes to which the party has been shown as wishing to appeal -a 
middle-class, non-industrial, agricultural, suburban category - was the actual 
outcome. Further rewards were evident: the maintenance of a strong agricultural 
wing within the party (certainly evident in the 1920s but also beyond); a 
proliferation of middle-class seats, peculiarly suited to Unionist pretensions. 
indeed, the nature of redistribution can only have served to reinforce the party's 
affinity with middle-class, suburban and agriculture elements. For, by 
consolidating Unionist strength within such spheres, these interests gained 
greater influence within the party. 
Perhaps equally prominent was the transformation in Unionist perspectives 
towards mass enfranchisement and class, whose genesis lay during rather than 
after the war. Paramount in this regard was submission to an almost fully 
democratic system. This was demonstrated, especially, by an eagerness to search 
for safeguards within the established democratic system (redistribution and plural 
voting) rather than outside it (second chamber reform and, to a lesser degree, 
PR). This had implications, of course, for the cause of House of Lords "reform", 
which was damaged irreparably, constituting as it did a retreat from this 
commitment to democracy. This was only compounded by the fact that Unionists 
in any case did not want "reform" but rather restoration of the second chamber's 
powers. Second, it reflected the party's willingness to get its hands dirty with 
democracy: forging appeals to specific groups and on a national level, and 
confronting the issue of class. This resolve was manifested in the pragmatism of 
the Unionist response. It was this pragmatism -a celebrated characteristic of 
Conservatism - that ensured that the initially hesitant acceptance of women onto 
the electoral roll was substituted by a no-nonsense appreciation of the role they 
must play. While David Jarvis has certainly illustrated the teething problems 
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evident in the party's response to gender after 1918, it is imperative to 
acknowledge that the general basis of successful inclusion was the pragmatism of 
1917 and 1918, and that the outcome was far better than could have been 
expected (and, indeed, than Unionists themselves expected). 
Was the period 1914-18, therefore, an unmitigated success for the party, ensuring 
its rejuvenation? Several qualifications must be made. First, the atrophy in 
organisation induced by war (most especially after the suspension of electoral 
registration) was only partly assuaged by the recruitment campaigns and the 
demands of constituency redistribution. Thus much of the good work executed in 
the years immediately preceding the war was wasted. In comparison to a swelling 
trade union and Labour organisation this boded ill, though Unionists were 
markedly more successful at retaining the foundations of organisation than was 
the Liberal Party. The surrender of Ireland, meanwhile, left a hole at the heart of 
Unionism. By November 1918, reference to Ireland in election manifestos was 
minor, and limited - in all cases - to Ulster and its non-coercion. Ireland was not, 
however, surrendered submissively: the desperate reactions of summer 1916 and 
Edward Carson's ongoing distaste for the government's handling of the matter 
served to illustrate that the variety of opinion evident before the war was still 
alive. Moreover, the importance to the party of the disappearance from the 
political agenda of Ireland can perhaps be overestimated. It was a combination of 
the united response to the war, to the onset of class politics and of the perceived 
socialist menace that compensated for - indeed demanded - the deprivation of 
the Irish issue. Different priorities, most especially the war, fear of socialism and 
Bolshevism, and confidence in the wider Empire, persuaded the party to take a 
step back and consider their policies from the widest possible perspective. 
Furthermore, as Chapters II and III illustrated, Ireland was transmogrified into a 
matter of Empire, of the right of self-determination, which, combined with the 
efforts to inspire a real imperial unity, could ensure that the Empire did not 
disband. Therefore, in Unionist minds at least, the Irish Union had been 
surrendered to grander causes - the war, the prevention of revolution, the 
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continuation of an imperial brotherhood - despite, of course, the fact that had it 
had been lost in August 1914. Indeed, the Unionist Party was fortunate to have 
had a central plank -a plank that in any case would have been removed at some 
stage - removed from them when they could and did focus upon new challenges. 
It is almost inconceivable that the party's evolution from being an anti-home rule 
organisation into essentially an anti-socialist party could have transpired so 
organically without the diversion of the war. 
Nonetheless, one significant outcome of the Unionist policy towards Ireland - for 
the immediate post-war period - was the breach in attitudes that opened up 
between the grassroots and parliamentary party. Evident also in the debate over 
electoral reform, the local associations often moved with leaden feet along the 
path trodden by their parliamentary representatives. This was partly the 
consequence of the fact that, deprived of influence because of the primacy of the 
war effort, and a deficiency of useful military information, the party grassroots 
were shrivelled during the war. Often their views were subordinated to the 
wishes of the leadership and their MPs 4 This in part explains the success of 
Selborne, Steel-Maitland and company in their rebellious activities in the post- 
war coalition: there was a well of dissent on which they could draw. Long after 
the parliamentary party, even more the leadership, had dispensed with but 
cursory mention of Ireland, and indeed second chamber reform, the NUA and 
constituency committees were according it something approaching primacy. The 
disenfranchisement of the party rank and file served to bolster the increased 
authority of the party backbenchers, famously preserved in the 1922 Committee. 
Despite the link between the war and backbench power drawn by John Stubbs 
and John Turner, the strengthened role of the backbench MP can be 
overemphasised. For, it was not solely in relation to the party leadership that he 
° See Chapter II. 
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rose in significance but also in relation to the party rank and file, who were 
largely - though not entirely - disenfranchised by the war. When they discovered 
a voice, most powerfully during the war over electoral reform but after 1918 
most ominously on traditional Unionist issues and on economic waste (the onset 
of middle-class pressure groups), they were capable of dictating the actions of 
their representatives. 
More generally the war did not revolutionise the party. If anything, the politics of 
the war display its organic development. It certainly made relevant many pre-war 
shibboleths, such as patriotism, imperialism, tariff reform, the primacy of 
agriculture and social efficiency, and cemented their place within the Unionist 
canon. In some cases it established them to a greater degree than was helpful - 
tariff reform was pursued as a radical solution into the 1920s and may have 
served to alienate working-class voters. The ideological convergence went 
further than this however, for, as Chapter V proves, an increasing consensus was 
established on the level and nature of the state's role in society and industry. 
Significantly, the party did not close its eyes or ears to wartime developments but 
deliberated upon them. More especially, despite the sincere petitions for 
reconstruction, the realisation of the majority of Unionists that the war was 
transient permitted them to formulate responses pertinent to the war. The 
necessity of increased production of food, munitions, shipping and the demands 
put upon the railways and the harbours encouraged the Unionists to acknowledge 
the possibility of state management of such industries. This was later evinced in 
the interwar legislation for the airways, the BBC and electricity. The 
appreciation, however, that the war had redefined the notion of citizenship and 
duty in relation to welfare was secondary to the traditional link between social 
and economic progress. Therefore, although the war did encourage the party to 
consider the social management of the nation and strengthen pro-welfare 
sentiments, the core of Conservatism remained economic, social and national 
efficiency as a precursor to social reform. Importantly they did not sidestep these 
issues or consider them irrelevant to the post-war climate, but adopted them in 
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part and sought to ensure that they were tempered. Indeed, this clarification of 
the party's position did much to presage the adoption of a deflationary economic 
policy in the 1920s, and the electoral appeals that were based upon 
it. 
It is evident, therefore, that the Unionist Party (unlike the Liberal Party) came to 
an appreciation of the European conflict as a `total war' and was ready, 
subsequently, to surrender certain principles in its name. The obsession with 
`prosecution of the war', conscription, the willingness to co-opt business and 
labour, and the eagerness towards radical solutions, all display this. But, 
ironically, it was by recognising that the `total war' was only a temporary 
challenge that the party was able to retain its cohesion and coherence. It was an 
appreciation of this that determined their attitudes to wartime and post-war state 
intervention, and their (well-placed) confidence that the social upheaval would be 
specific to the period of demobilisation and reconstruction, and, accordingly the 
trust they placed in the democratic system. This ensured they were far more 
adaptable to the challenges of war than their Liberal counterparts, who were 
reluctant to adapt to its `total' nature, a concept that some did not even recognise. 
Indirectly, it was this appreciation that allowed the Unionist Party to re-train its 
heavy guns upon the socialist threat, which they rightly conceived to be their 
long-term rival for power. 
This thesis does not suggest that the war saved the party, nor that it destroyed one 
party and allowed another to prosper. Rather, it concludes that the war's timing 
was crucial for the party: it served to offer in the war an (admittedly transitory) 
alternative objective to the cause of the Irish Union and establish a new basis 
within which Ireland and the Empire could be perceived. Indirectly, the war also 
offered a means by which to forge a response to the threat of Labour at a juncture 
critical in the latter's evolution, based on patriotic and anti-socialist rhetoric, an 
approach that was sponsored by the wartime state and supported by the vast 
majority of the press. More generally, this response and the ideological 
developments in the period in regard to state intervention, taxation and the 
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economy, acted so as to facilitate the nature of Conservative appeals in the 1920s 
and contributed to their success. Accordingly the party did much to shape its 
electoral future and was more than merely a jovial onlooker at the drawn-out 
deathbed of the Liberal Party. Despite the decline of the role of patriotism after 
1918, it had served to preserve and even enhance party unity. And party unity 
had rarely possessed such rewards: permitting the party to exploit the benefits of 
wartime government and allowing it a role in the state when the state was able to 
shape economic, social and political life; ensuring comparative unity as the party 
approached the post-war era of political realignment; at least survival from the 
war - which was more than could be said for the Liberal Party or the 
`Progressive Alliance'. Having fought so long and hard to make the world safe 
for democracy, by the end of the war the party was also closer, certainly in its 
own mind, to its second objective of making democracy safe for the world. 
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